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Progress of teaching and learning of nuclear engineering courses at College of Engineering, Universiti Tenaga Nasional (UNITEN)

Developing human capital in nuclear with required nuclear background and professional qualifications is necessary to support the implementation of nuclear power projects in the near future. Sufficient educational and training skills are required to ensure that the human resources needed by the nuclear power industry meets its high standard. The Government of Malaysia has made the decision to include nuclear as one of the electricity generation option for the country, post 2020 in order to cater for the increasing energy demands of the country as well as to reduce CO{sub 2} emission. The commitment by the government has been made clearer with the inclusion of the development of first NPP by 2021 in the Economic Transformation Program (ETP) which was launched by the government in October 2010. The In tandem with the government initiative to promote nuclear energy, Center for Nuclear Energy, College of Engineering, Universiti Tenaga Nasional (UNITEN) is taking the responsibility in developing human capital in the area of nuclear power and technology. In the beginning, the College of Engineering has offered the Introduction to Nuclear Technology course as a technical elective course for all undergraduate engineering students. Gradually, other nuclear technical elective courses are offered such as Nuclear Policy, Security and Safeguards, Introduction to Nuclear Engineering, Radiation Detection and Nuclear Instrumentation, Introduction to Reactor Physics, Radiation Safety and Waste Management, and Nuclear Thermal-hydraulics. In addition, another course Advancement in Nuclear Energy is offered as one of the postgraduate elective courses. To enhance the capability of teaching staffs in nuclear areas at UNITEN, several junior lecturers are sent to pursue their postgraduate studies in the Republic of Korea, United States and the United Kingdom, while the others are participating in short courses and workshops in nuclear that are conducted locally and abroad. This paper describes the progress of teaching and learning in nuclear engineering and technology at UNITEN that include curriculum development, students’ enrolment and performance, and teaching staff’s human resource development.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) Development Risk Communication

There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTR for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse (approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration. However, "NUCLEAR" is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. Communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTR. Why is there a fear of nuclear? A bomb that can level a city is a scary weapon. The first and only times the Nuclear Bomb was used in a war was on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 2. The "Little Boy" atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and the "Fat Man" on Nagasaki 3 days later on August 9th. Within the first 4 months of bombings, 90- 166 thousand people died in Hiroshima and 60-80 thousand died in Nagasaki. It is important to note for comparison that over 500 thousand people died and 5 million made homeless due to strategic bombing (approximately 150 thousand tons) of Japanese cities and war assets with conventional non-nuclear weapons between 1942- 1945. A major bombing campaign of "firebombing" of Tokyo called "Operation Meetinghouse" on March 9 and 10 consisting of 334 B-29's dropped approximately1,700 tons of bombs around 16 square mile area and over 100 thousand people have been estimated to have died. The declaration of death is very clear for conventional weapons and then the declaration of death due to radiation becomes vague and unclear. This may have been due to people mis-understanding the dangers and effects of radiation when assessing the damage and harm to people initially, but it is also become insidious when expressing opposition to nuclear energy. A nuclear radiation accident can be scary due to the power involved and the fear of radiation release. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines a nuclear and radiation accident a "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility." There have been 3 commercial nuclear reactor accidents (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima) that stand out to the public and much of the information about the result and impact to workers, environment, and public can be misleading. Often information is presented without clear correlation with radiation and other pertinent information is left out presenting a very scary situation to affect the emotions of the reader. A very boring but "critically acclaimed" movie was made in 1979 called "The China Syndrome" starring Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon. The film was released on March 16, 1979, 12 days before the 3-Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania. The basis from the movie was from a few nuclear plant incidents and in particular, the Brown's Ferry Alabama Power Plant fire. In one scene from the movie, a physicist Dr. Elliott Lowell played by Donald Hotton states that a China Syndrome event would make "an area the size of Pennsylvania" permanently uninhabitable. Real serious nuclear incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are often sited to make people fear the consequences of using nuclear power. However, the consequences are at best poorly communicated and at worst fictitiously inflated to instigate social unrest against nuclear power. There is an article being circulated on Facebook with a title "28 Signs that the (US) West Coast is being absolutely fried with nuclear radiation from Fukushima" which focus on mis-information and fear mongering. Nuclear power and NTR are powerful resources that can open many doors for future prosperity and capability. With great power comes great responsibility. Radiation and its effects need to be better understood, quantified, and communicated. A human mission to mars has its own risks of deep space radiation and is considered a considerable risk at 400 milli-Sieverts per year in deep space and 245 milli-Sieverts per year on the surface of Mars as measured by the Mars Curiosity mission. Although these quantities of ionizing radiation are within the astronaut career limit, it exceeds the yearly average amounts of ionizing radiation. Astronaut crews have experienced these levels of radiation before, but for durations shorter than a year, and a mission to Mars could possibly be 3 years in length. There is also evidence that people can comfortably handle higher levels of ionizing radiation where the radiation occurs naturally like Ramsar, Iran when people can experience 270 milli-Sieverts per year. A risk posture that the development, test, and flight of an NTR will meet opposition from groups who oppose nuclear energy must be likely and the impact can be sever to the effort. Active risk mitigation must be taken for an NTR full-scale development project. The NTR design must take into account safety for transport and off nominal conditions. Nuclear fuel element must consider containment of fission products and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that may meet less opposition should be considered for safety and security reasons. Even though testing was conducted on Rover/NERVA safely and successfully in the 60's with exhaust sent heavenward in to open air, modern testing of NTR must consider full containment and no release of ionizing radiation to the public and must meet the current requirement of no more than 0.1 milli-Sieverts per year to the public. 0.1 milli-Sieverts is equivalent to eating one banana or a 20 hour plane flight. Good communication with the public and regulatory agencies will be essential to show that all effort is applied toward protection to the public and astronauts. The inspiring endeavor to put humans on Mars to study the planet, search for life, and learn more about this Solar System will be full of risks but it will be worth it. NTR will be worth the development effort if it allows humans to explore our Solar System.

Kim, Tony↗

Optimising National WM Strategies through early consideration of Nuclear Safeguards - 18607

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards stand alongside safety and security as one of the three pillars for prudent management of all nuclear material, including nuclear waste. Although safety considerations, including public and environmental radiation protection, are the traditional drivers of waste management strategies, there is a requirement for nuclear safeguards in shaping and quantifying long-term solutions for special classes of radioactive waste. This is especially important when considering the disposal of nuclear material in a repository that could be released from regulatory oversight for radiation protection after a period of institutional control, as some safeguards oversight would still be required. Failure to consider nuclear safeguards at the early stages of planning may alternatively lead to excessive volumes for disposal or the need to recondition already treated wastes. At the very least, safeguards measures should be considered before countries seek to dispose of legacy nuclear materials, decommissioning wastes and other materials containing uranium, thorium or plutonium in an operating repository. Nuclear safeguards are the set of tools and techniques used by the IAEA to verify that countries comply with their international obligations not to divert nuclear materials to nuclear explosive devices. Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nuclear safeguards apply to all uranium, thorium and plutonium held in non-weapons NPT states, with limited exceptions. In nuclear-weapon states, much of their material is likewise subject to IAEA safeguards through conditions in agreements with respective suppliers of the uranium. Under IAEA safeguards, such nuclear material must remain accounted for and accessible for periodic verification-analogous to the safety concepts of reversibility and retrievability. Nevertheless, safeguards requirements can be terminated - provided that the State and the [IAEA] agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable - through dilution or immobilisation in solid form (such as cement, glass or ceramic). This means candidate material can be disposed of as non- nuclear material, with no further safeguards requirements, provided this criterion is met. Unlike radiological wastes where repository design strongly influences pathways for radionuclide migration and overall safety performance, repository design is not a factor in considering the termination of safeguards on nuclear material. This paper looks at similarities and differences in the safety, security and safeguards regulatory requirements for the management of radioactive waste and nuclear material in Australia. In particular, it outlines recent experience gained from participation in Australia's waste acceptance criteria working group for a national low-level waste repository and intermediate-level waste store, as well as from Australia's overall waste management strategy. These items of work have coincided with the IAEA update of its internal policy on termination of safeguards on nuclear material. Australia's experience shows how inclusion of safeguards criteria in the planning process is leading to optimisations in choice of facility concepts, project sequencing and equitable distribution of economic risk. By considering the three pillars-safety, security and safeguards-early on in the planning process, Australia's waste management strategy will provide a benchmark for other states in establishing and updating their own waste acceptance criteria for the disposal of nuclear material. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Systems Thinking Approach to Nuclear Pedagogy and Workforce Development

Nuclear technology's controversial status has been shaped by its early use in military applications, fear driven by high-profile accidents, and unresolved waste management challenges. There have, on the other hand, been periodic claims that a “nuclear renaissance” is imminent, driven by different dynamics at different times, most recently related to growing energy demands and increasing concern over carbon emissions. In this article, we respond to urgent calls for more nuclear engineers, resulting from the latest rallying cry around nuclear energy, by reframing the problem using a systems thinking approach that illuminates new pathways for nuclear workforce development via interdisciplinary pedagogies. By building nuclear education into a wide variety of disciplines, we argue, the nuclear workforce could become more resilient to ebbs and flows in energy markets and public opinion. Widening nuclear education beyond nuclear engineers could also reduce the isolation and compartmentalization that has limited the possibilities of nuclear technology. We show how growing and diversifying the overall nuclear workforce could create a wide variety of career opportunities outside STEM and enable greater specialization within STEM, since nuclear engineers and other specialists could be freed up to focus on technological and infrastructural innovations. We argue that interventions into nuclear education should establish new connections and applications of the nuclear sciences in diverse areas of expertise to develop a broad range of professionals who can contribute to a more stable nuclear workforce, bringing what we call “critical and creative nuclear energy literacies” to long-standing and systemic challenges around nuclear energy.

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Examination of the role of nuclear deterrence in the 21st century: a systems analysis approach

Until very recently, an evaluation of US policy regarding deterrence and the role of its nuclear weapons arsenal as a deterrent has been largely absent in the public debate. With President's Obama embrace of a goal of a future world without nuclear weapons, issues of nuclear policy and deterrence have just recently risen to the forefront of policy discussions. The traditional role of US nuclear weapons-to deter the use of nuclear weapons by other states-endures, but is no longer unique nor even predominant. In an increasingly multi-polar world, the US now faces growing risks of nuclear weapons proliferation; the spread of weapons of mass destruction generally to non-state, substate and transnational actors; cyber, space, economic, environmental and resource threats along with the application of numerous other forms of 'soft power' in ways that are inimical to national security and to global stability. What concept of deterrence should the US seek to maintain in the 21st Century? That question remains fluid and central to the current debate. Recently there has been a renewed focusing of attention on the role of US nuclear weapons and a national discussion about what the underlying policy should be. In this environment, both the United States and Russia have committed to drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals, while still maintaining forces sufficient to ensure unacceptable consequence in response to acts of aggression. Further, the declared nuclear powers have maintained that a limited nuclear arsenal continues to provide insurance against uncertain developments in a changing world. In this environment of US and Russian stockpile reductions, all declared nuclear states have reiterated the central role which nuclear weapons continue to provide for their supreme national security interests. Given this new environment and the challenges of the next several decades, how might the United States structure its policy and forces with regard to nuclear weapons? Many competing objectives have been stated across the spectrum of political, social, and military thought. These objectives include goals of ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, recommitment to further downsizing of the nuclear arsenal, embracing a long-term goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, limitations on both the production complex and upgrades to nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and controls and constraints to limit proliferation of nuclear materials and weapons, particularly to rogue states and terrorist groups.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 33, No. 4, October-December 1992]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 499 Technical Note: Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Examination Question Bank System, C. L Jensen and N. L. Skinner; 506 Report on the Specialists’ Meeting on Passive and Active Safety Features of Liquid-Metal Fast Breeder Reactors Organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency at Oarai Engineering Centre of Power Reactor and Nuclear Development Corporation, Japan, November 5-7,1991, S. R. Paranjpe; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 514 A Review of Hydrogen Production During Melt/Water Interaction in LWRs, D. F. Fletcher, B. D. Turland, and S. P. A. Lawrence; 535 A Review of the U 3 0 8 -Al Reaction as a Potential Heat Source in Research and Test Reactor Accidents, J. L. Snelgrove; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 543 Multilevel Interfaces for Power Plant Control Rooms II: A Preliminary Design Space, K. J. Vicente; DESIGN FEATURES: 549 Twenty-Second DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning and Treatment Conference, R. R. Bellamy, D. W. Moeller, and M. W. First; 562 Book Review: Safety Assessment of Unit 5 (WWER-440/W-213) of the Greifswald Nuclear Power Station, M. H. Fontana; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 576 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 586 Analysis of Corrective Actions Applied to Nuclear Power Plant Operations, A. E. Cross; 593 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 596 Operating U.S. Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 609 Non-Commercial Power Operating Experience; 614 World Nuclear Performance, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 623 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 635 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 639 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1992; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 513 Fourth International Conference on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and Waste Management RECOD '94; 585 International Topical Meeting on Advanced Reactors Safety; 622 International Workshop on Implementation of ALARA at Nuclear Power Plants; 648 Short Course on Nuclear Criticality Safety; 648 8th Topical Meeting on Problems in Reactor Physics MEPhi-VOLGA-93; 643 The Authors; 646 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol. 33

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Web-Based Computational Model Builder For Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (Final Report)

According to the World Nuclear Association, the U.S. is the largest producer of nuclear power worldwide. In fact, the U.S. provides over 30 percent of the world's nuclear generation of electricity. Although few new reactors have been built in the past 30 years, the association anticipates that four to six reactors may be built by 2020. The first of the reactors will be built in response to 16 license applications, which have been completed since 2007, to build 24 additional nuclear reactors. Currently, both government and industry are working to accelerate approval for the construction and design of new nuclear energy plants. The U.S. nuclear industry has already achieved significant developments in the implementation of nuclear power plants due to advancements in refueling, maintenance, and safety systems at current power plants. Meanwhile, changes in government policy, which have occurred since the late 1990s, have provided for noteworthy expansion in nuclear capacity. For example, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 evoked investment in electricity infrastructure such as nuclear power. To design future systems and continue operational improvements at existing U.S. plants, advanced modeling and simulation of nuclear reactors are crucial. We developed a Cloud/Web-based tool, HPCCloud, that enables nuclear energy firms, or other manufacturing and engineering companies, to innovate using advanced modeling and simulation. Through the Web-Based Computational Model Builder for Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation grant, we develop HPCCloud to simplify and democratize advanced modeling and simulation in the nuclear energy industry on a range of nuclear engineering applications. It leverages millions of investment dollars from the Department of Energy's Consortium for Advanced Simulation of Light Water Reactors (CASL) and the Office of Nuclear Energy's research and development in Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS). Our approach simplifies the workflow, alleviates the need for in-house computational science and engineering experts, and lowers the capital investments required for advanced modeling and simulation. The Cloud/Web-based simulation environment guides end-users and developers through the advanced modeling and simulation lifecycle. In addition to providing significantly improved, intuitive software, the environment offers reproducible workflows where one can save, share, and even publish the full path of data from input to final analyzed results. HPCCloud addresses identified challenges to the nuclear energy industry's use of advanced modeling and simulation. With this unique Cloud/Web-based environment, we enable an ecosystem of synergistic activities, fueling new research and development for nuclear energy. HPCCloud lays the groundwork for commercialization, through customization, technology integration, and advanced research and development services.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Systems Analysis of an Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle Based on a Modified UREX+3c Process

The research described in this report was performed under a grant from the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to describe and compare the merits of two advanced alternative nuclear fuel cycles -- named by this study as the “UREX+3c fuel cycle” and the “Alternative Fuel Cycle” (AFC). Both fuel cycles were assumed to support 100 1,000 MWe light water reactor (LWR) nuclear power plants operating over the period 2020 through 2100, and the fast reactors (FRs) necessary to burn the plutonium and minor actinides generated by the LWRs. Reprocessing in both fuel cycles is assumed to be based on the UREX+3c process reported in earlier work by the DOE. Conceptually, the UREX+3c process provides nearly complete separation of the various components of spent nuclear fuel in order to enable recycle of reusable nuclear materials, and the storage, conversion, transmutation and/or disposal of other recovered components. Output of the process contains substantially all of the plutonium, which is recovered as a 5:1 uranium/plutonium mixture, in order to discourage plutonium diversion. Mixed oxide (MOX) fuel for recycle in LWRs is made using this 5:1 U/Pu mixture plus appropriate makeup uranium. A second process output contains all of the recovered uranium except the uranium in the 5:1 U/Pu mixture. The several other process outputs are various waste streams, including a stream of minor actinides that are stored until they are consumed in future FRs. For this study, the UREX+3c fuel cycle is assumed to recycle only the 5:1 U/Pu mixture to be used in LWR MOX fuel and to use depleted uranium (tails) for the makeup uranium. This fuel cycle is assumed not to use the recovered uranium output stream but to discard it instead. On the other hand, the AFC is assumed to recycle both the 5:1 U/Pu mixture and all of the recovered uranium. In this case, the recovered uranium is reenriched with the level of enrichment being determined by the amount of recovered plutonium and the combined amount of the resulting MOX. The study considered two sub-cases within each of the two fuel cycles in which the uranium and plutonium from the first generation of MOX spent fuel (i) would not be recycled to produce a second generation of MOX for use in LWRs or (ii) would be recycled to produce a second generation of MOX fuel for use in LWRs. The study also investigated the effects of recycling MOX spent fuel multiple times in LWRs. The study assumed that both fuel cycles would store and then reprocess spent MOX fuel that is not recycled to produce a next generation of LWR MOX fuel and would use the recovered products to produce FR fuel. The study further assumed that FRs would begin to be brought on-line in 2043, eleven years after recycle begins in LWRs, when products from 5-year cooled spent MOX fuel would be available. Fuel for the FRs would be made using the uranium, plutonium, and minor actinides recovered from MOX. For the cases where LWR fuel was assumed to be recycled one time, the 1st generation of MOX spent fuel was used to provide nuclear materials for production of FR fuel. For the cases where the LWR fuel was assumed to be recycled two times, the 2nd generation of MOX spent fuel was used to provide nuclear materials for production of FR fuel. The number of FRs in operation was assumed to increase in successive years until the rate that actinides were recovered from permanently discharged spent MOX fuel equaled the rate the actinides were consumed by the operating fleet of FRs. To compare the two fuel cycles, the study analyzed recycle of nuclear fuel in LWRs and FRs and determined the radiological characteristics of irradiated nuclear fuel, nuclear waste products, and recycle nuclear fuels. It also developed a model to simulate the flows of nuclear materials that could occur in the two advanced nuclear fuel cycles over 81 years beginning in 2020 and ending in 2100. Simulations projected the flows of uranium, plutonium, and minor actinides as these nuclear fuel materials were produced and consumed in a fleet of 100 1,000 MWe LWRs and in FRs. The model also included recycle and reuse of extant inventories of spent LWR fuel. The results of the simulations allowed comparisons of the two fuel cycles from the standpoints of cost, non-proliferation, radiological health, wastes generated, and sustainability. Results of the research also provide insights regarding (i) multiple recycling of uranium and plutonium from spent MOX fuel in LWRs, (ii) costs and benefits of reenriching and reusing uranium from spent LWR fuel; (iii) effects of using uranium, plutonium, and minor actinides from LWR spent fuels to produce fuel for FRs; (iv) net rates of consumption (burning) in FRs of actinide elements produced in LWRs, and (v) ependencies of and interactions among the different systems of an advanced nuclear fuel cycle -- and the flows of nuclear materials between these systems.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Progress in Constraining Nuclear Symmetry Energy Using Neutron Star Observables Since GW170817

The density dependence of nuclear symmetry energy is among the most uncertain parts of the Equation of State (EOS) of dense neutron-rich nuclear matter. It is currently poorly known especially at suprasaturation densities partially because of our poor knowledge about isovector nuclear interactions at short distances. Because of its broad impacts on many interesting issues, pinning down the density dependence of nuclear symmetry energy has been a longstanding and shared goal of both astrophysics and nuclear physics. New observational data of neutron stars including their masses, radii, and tidal deformations since GW170817 have helped improve our knowledge about nuclear symmetry energy, especially at high densities. Based on various model analyses of these new data by many people in the nuclear astrophysics community, while our brief review might be incomplete and biased unintentionally, we learned in particular the following: (1) The slope parameter L of nuclear symmetry energy at saturation density ρ0 of nuclear matter from 24 new analyses of neutron star observables was about L≈57.7±19 MeV at a 68% confidence level, consistent with its fiducial value from surveys of over 50 earlier analyses of both terrestrial and astrophysical data within error bars. (2) The curvature Ksym of nuclear symmetry energy at ρ0 from 16 new analyses of neutron star observables was about Ksym≈−107±88 MeV at a 68% confidence level, in very good agreement with the systematics of earlier analyses. (3) The magnitude of nuclear symmetry energy at 2ρ0, i.e., Esym(2ρ0)≈51±13 MeV at a 68% confidence level, was extracted from nine new analyses of neutron star observables, consistent with the results from earlier analyses of heavy-ion reactions and the latest predictions of the state-of-the-art nuclear many-body theories. (4) While the available data from canonical neutron stars did not provide tight constraints on nuclear symmetry energy at densities above about 2ρ0, the lower radius boundary R2.01=12.2 km from NICER’s very recent observation of PSR J0740+6620 of mass 2.08±0.07M⊙ and radius R=12.2–16.3 km at a 68% confidence level set a tight lower limit for nuclear symmetry energy at densities above 2ρ0. (5) Bayesian inferences of nuclear symmetry energy using models encapsulating a first-order hadron–quark phase transition from observables of canonical neutron stars indicated that the phase transition shifted appreciably both L and Ksym to higher values, but with larger uncertainties compared to analyses assuming no such phase transition. (6) The high-density behavior of nuclear symmetry energy significantly affected the minimum frequency necessary to rotationally support GW190814’s secondary component of mass (2.50–2.67) M⊙ as the fastest and most massive pulsar discovered so far. Overall, thanks to the hard work of many people in the astrophysics and nuclear physics community, new data of neutron star observations since the discovery of GW170817 have significantly enriched our knowledge about the symmetry energy of dense neutron-rich nuclear matter.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 36, No. 1, January-June 1995]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHORNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 The Chornobyl Accident Revisited, Part II: The State of the Nuclear Fuel Located Within the Chornobyl Sarcophagus, A A. Borovoi and A. R. Sich; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 33 Nuclear Power Safety in Central and Eastern Europe, R. Wilson; 46 Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors in the Former Eastern European Countries, S. Chakraborty; 53 Technical Note: On the Definition of Common-Cause Failures, H. Paula; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 58 Modeling and Analysis of Core-Debris Recriticality During Hypothetical Severe Accidents in the Advanced Neutron Source Reactor, S.-H. Kim, V. Georgevich, D. B. Simpson, C. O. Slater, and R. P. Taleyarkhan; 68 Ignitability of Hydrogen/Oxygen/Diluent Mixtures in the Presence of Hot Surfaces, R. K. Kumar and G. W. Koroll; 94 Coupled RELAP5 and CONTAIN Accident Analysis Using PVM, K. A. Smith, A. J. Baratta, and G. E. Robinson; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 109 Application of Fuzzy Logic in Nuclear Reactor Control Part I: An Assessment of State-of-the-Art, A. S. Heger, N. K. Alang-Rashid, and M. Jamshidi; DESIGN FEATURES: 122 Twenty-Third DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning and Treatment Conference, R. R. Bellamy, J. J. Hayes, and M. W. First; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 135 Atmospheric Dispersion and the Radiological Consequences of Normal Airborne Effluents from a Nuclear Power Plant, D. Fang, C. Z. Sun, and L. Yang; 142 Calculation of Distribution Coefficients for Radionuclides in Soils and Sediments, I. Puigdomenech and U. Bergstrom: OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 155 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 158 Operating Experience Feedback Report—Reliability of Safety-Related Steam Turbine-Driven Standby Pumps Used in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants, J. R. Boardman; 166 Turbine Building Hazards, H. L Ornstein; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 169 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 175 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31,1994; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 32 Harvard School of Public Health In-Place Filter Testing Workshop; 134 International Conference on Advances in the Operational Safety of Nuclear Power Plants; 193 30th Tennessee Industries Week; 193 DOE Technical Standards Program 1995 Workshop; 194 Multiphase Flow Experiments and Instrumentation; 180 The Authors; 185 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volumes 34 and 35.

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Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 2, March-April 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 127 Quality Assurance in the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants by Sidney A. Bernsen, 141 1974 ANS Topical Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety by M. H. Fontana; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 150 GBR-4 Protection Systems: Failures and Their Consequences by Peter Burgsmüller, J. J. Dekais, Albert Krähe, Raffaello Pignatelli, and Gottfried Vieider, 162 Standby Emergency Power Systems. Part 2—The Later Plants by E. W. Hagen; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 180 Radiotoxic Hazard Measure for Buried Solid Radioactive Waste by J. Hamstra, 190 The Thirteenth AEC Air-Cleaning Conference by D. W. Moeller, D. W. Underhill, and M. W. First, 203 Book Review: Nuclear Criticality Safety; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 204 Environmental Radiation Effects of Nuclear Facilities in New York State by M. S. Terpilak and B. L. Jorgensen, 222 Book Review: Thermal Ecology; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 223 Set-Point Drift in Nuclear Power-Plant Safety-Related Instrumentation Adapted by the Nuclear Safety Staff, 224 Diesel-Generator Operating Experience at Nuclear Power Plants, 227 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Jan. 1, 1975, 232 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in November and December 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto, 235 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 243 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 251 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 266 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B Cottrell, 268 Proposed Rule Changes as of Jan. 1, 1975; MISCELLANY: 149 Course in Italy on High-Energy Radiation Dosimetry and Protection (Announcement), 250 Course at Northwestern on Safety of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Announcement), 266 Symposium of the Combined Effects on the Environment of Radioactive, Chemical, and Thermal Releases from the Nuclear Industry (Announcement), 271 Short Course on Engineering for Extreme Winds and Tornadoes (Announcement), 272 Three 1-Week Courses at MIT on Nuclear Power-Reactor Safety (Announcement), 272 Harvard University Short Courses (Announcement).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Deep Geologic Nuclear Waste Disposal - No New Taxes - 12469

To some, the perceived inability of the United States to dispose of high-level nuclear waste justifies a moratorium on expansion of nuclear power in this country. Instead, it is more an example of how science yields to social pressure, even on a subject as technical as nuclear waste. Most of the problems, however, stem from confusion on the part of the public and their elected officials, not from a lack of scientific knowledge. We know where to put nuclear waste, how to put it there, how much it will cost, and how well it will work. And it's all about the geology. The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future has drafted a number of recommendations addressing nuclear energy and waste issues (BRC 2011) and three recommendations, in particular, have set the stage for a new strategy to dispose of high-level nuclear waste and to manage spent nuclear fuel in the United States: 1) interim storage for spent nuclear fuel, 2) resumption of the site selection process for a second repository, and 3) a quasi-government entity to execute the program and take control of the Nuclear Waste Fund in order to do so. The first two recommendations allow removal and storage of spent fuel from reactor sites to be used in the future, and allows permanent disposal of actual waste, while the third controls cost and administration. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NPWA 1982) provides the second repository different waste criteria, retrievability, and schedule, so massive salt returns as the candidate formation of choice. The cost (in 2007 dollars) of disposing of 83,000 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) high-level waste (HLW) is about $ 83 billion (b) in volcanic tuff, $ 29 b in massive salt, and $ 77 b in crystalline rock. Only in salt is the annual revenue stream from the Nuclear Waste Fund more than sufficient to accomplish this program without additional taxes or rate hikes. The cost is determined primarily by the suitability of the geologic formation, i.e., how well it performs on its own for millions of years with little engineering assistance from humans. It is critical that the states most affected by this issue (WA, SC, ID, TN, NM and perhaps others) develop an independent multi-state agreement in order for a successful program to move forward. Federal approval would follow. Unknown to most, the United States has a successful operating deep permanent geologic nuclear repository for high and low activity waste, called the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico. Its success results from several factors, including an optimal geologic and physio-graphic setting, a strong scientific basis, early regional community support, frequent interactions among stakeholders at all stages of the process, long-term commitment from the upper management of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) over several administrations, strong New Mexico State involvement and oversight, and constant environmental monitoring from before nuclear waste was first emplaced in the WIPP underground (in 1999) to the present. WIPP is located in the massive bedded salts of the Salado Formation, whose geological, physical, chemical, redox, thermal, and creep-closure properties make it an ideal formation for long-term disposal, long-term in this case being greater than 200 million years. These properties also mean minimal engineering requirements as the rock does most of the work of isolating the waste. WIPP has been operating for twelve years, and as of this writing, has disposed of over 80,000 m{sup 3} of nuclear weapons waste, called transuranic or TRU waste (>100 nCurie/g but <23 Curie/1000 cm{sup 3}) including some high activity waste from reprocessing of spent fuel from old weapons reactors. All nuclear waste of any type from any source can be disposed in this formation better, safer and cheaper than in any other geologic formation. At the same time, it is critical that we complete the Yucca Mountain license application review so as not to undermine the credibility of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the scientific community. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Monte-Carlo Simulations of the Nuclear Energy Deposition Inside the CARMEN-1P Differential Calorimeter Irradiated into OSIRIS Reactor

The nuclear heating measurements in Material Testing Reactors (MTRs) are crucial for the study of nuclear materials and fuels under irradiation. The reference measurements of this nuclear heating are especially performed by a differential calorimeter including a graphite sample material. These measurements are then used for other experimental conditions in order to predict the nuclear heating and thermal conditions induced in the irradiation devices. Nuclear heating is a great deal of interest at the moment as the measurement of such heating is an important issue for MTRs reactors. This need is especially generated by the new Jules Horowitz Reactor (JHR), under construction at CEA/Cadarache 'French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission'. This new reactor, that will be operational in late 2019, is a new facility for the nuclear research on materials and fuels. Indeed the expected nuclear heating rate is about 20 W/g for nominal capacity of 100 MW. The present Monte Carlo calculation works belong to the IN-CORE (Instrumentation for Nuclear radiation and Calorimetry On line in Reactor): a joint research program between the CEA and Aix- Marseille University in 2009. One scientific aim of this program is to design and develop a multi-sensors device, called CARMEN, dedicated to the measurements of main physical parameters simultaneously encountered inside JHR's experimental channels (core and reflector) such as neutron fluxes, photon fluxes, temperature, and nuclear heating. A first prototype was already developed. This prototype includes two mock-ups dedicated respectively to neutronic measurements (CARMEN-1N) and to photonic measurements (CARMEN-1P) with in particular a specific differential calorimeter. Two irradiation campaigns were performed successfully in the periphery of OSIRIS reactor (a MTR located at Saclay, France) in 2012 for nuclear heating levels up to 2 W/g. First Monte Carlo calculations reduced to the graphite sample of the calorimeter were carried out. A preliminary analysis shows that the numerical results overestimate the measurements by about 20 %. A new approach has been developed in order to estimate the nuclear heating by two methods (energy deposition or KERMA) by considering the whole complete geometry of the sensor. This new approach will contribute to the interpretation of the irradiation campaign and will be useful to improve the out-of-pile calibration procedure of the sensor and its thermal response during irradiations. The aim of this paper is to present simulations made by using MCNP5 Monte-Carlo transport code (using ENDF/B-VI nuclear data library) for the nuclear heating inside the different parts of the calorimeter (head, rod and base). Calculations into two steps will be realized. We will use as an input source in the model new spectra (neutrons, prompt-photons and delayed-photons) calculated with the Monte Carlo code TRIPOLI-4{sup R} inside different experimental channels (water) located into the OSIRIS periphery and used during the CARMEN-1P irradiation campaign. We will consider Neutrons- Photons-Electrons and Photons-Electrons modes. We will begin by a brief description of the differential-calorimeter device geometry. Then the MCNP5 model used for the calculations of nuclear heating inside the calorimeter elements will be introduced. The energy deposition due to the prompt-gamma, delayed-gamma and neutrons, the neutron-activation of the device will be considered. The different components of the nuclear heating inside the different parts of the calorimeter will be detailed. Moreover, a comparison between KERMA and nuclear energy deposition estimations will be given. Finally, a comparison between this total nuclear heating Calculation and Experiment in graphite sample will be determined. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Global Trends of ASME "N-Stamp" Certifications for Nuclear Component Vendors

Historically, nuclear component manufacturing vendors, from small businesses through large conglomerates, have felt compelled to obtain an American Society for Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Nuclear Certification, known colloquially as an "N-stamp", to assure supply chain quality standards that will be acceptable to regulators and safety concerns. Since the N-stamp quality standard is a U.S.-origin code, combined with the apparent decline in the U.S. nuclear industry alongside the growth of the Asian nuclear industry, there is the question of whether the rest of the world, including new entrants to the nuclear industry, also regard N-stamp as a needed certification. This study addresses this question through analysis of the entire N-stamp database of holders, and former holders, of N-stamp certificates of all types and for all regions worldwide from 1989-2020 (the dates available in the database). From this 30 years of data, we find that actually U.S.-based vendors still consistently obtain the largest number of N-stamps worldwide over all time periods, but also find that the countries participating in the N-stamp certification process has broadly expanded beyond just North America, Japan, S. Korea and Western Europe (the primary N-stamp recipients before the mid-2000's). We produced global heats maps and bar charts to illustrate our findings, as well as further investigation into why the data shows changes over time and region. We note that nuclear entities involved with Soviet-type reactors do not participate in the N-stamp process, but instead pursue the Russian version PNAE, which is substantially similar to the ASME code. We conclude that at least from the N-stamp database, the United States nuclear component manufacturing industry is alive and well, although there have been some consolidations, and that the ASME N-stamp appears to still be a valued certificate worldwide, including in China which now ranks second only to the United States in obtaining N-stamp certificates in recent years. We further note that the vendors of new reactor types, in particular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors (HTGRs) and Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), are actively engaged with ASME (and other U.S.-based nuclear standards bodies such as the American Nuclear Society and Nuclear Energy Institute) to coordinate updates to the ASME N-Stamp criteria to ensure applicability of the code for these new designs. Implications of these findings include the following: The global use of the U.S.-origin N-stamp certification supports the view that, despite the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry, the United States remains an esteemed global leader in the area of nuclear safety. As the U.S. Government works to revitalize the U.S. nuclear industry, especially in the area of exports, it may be beneficial to leverage the global standing of the N-stamp certification. The findings indicate that the N-stamp database would be a useful tool for the U.S. Government to use to track the growth of the civil nuclear industry in foreign countries, under certain circumstances. The Excel-format N-stamp database produced as part of this study may be a useful tool for this purpose. N-stamp data may be a useful tool for foreign governments to use to identify nuclear manufacturers within their own country, especially to identify "targets" for outreach on nuclear export control compliance. The U.S. Government could carry this message to foreign partners during bilateral engagements or as part of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) discussions on industry outreach.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Verification of Upcoming MCNP Features For Estimating Nuclear Data Sensitivities in Fixed Source Simulations [Abstract]

Predictive simulation codes, like the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code, are used throughout the nuclear community. These simulations are based on nuclear data. Maximizing the accuracy and precision of nuclear data maximizes the accuracy and precision of the overall simulation. This is imperative to applications that rely on simulations. For example, improving nuclear data for special nuclear material improves simulation accuracy in stockpile stewardship applications, which results in larger safety margins and decreased operational costs. The improvement and validation of nuclear data is completed through integral benchmark experiments. Past benchmarks have primarily been limited to focus on the effective multiplication factor ($\kappa$ eff ); broadening the purview of benchmarks beyond $\kappa$ eff -dependent nuclear data addresses nuclear data deficiencies. Different response types depend on different areas of nuclear data. This dependence is quantified as nuclear data sensitivity: the change in response due to perturbation of a contributing parameter. The larger the nuclear data sensitivity of a response, the more the experiment is influenced by the uncertainties of the nuclear data. The optimization of nuclear data sensitivities in future benchmarks would result in more detailed validation of lesser studied areas of nuclear data. Currently, direct sensitivity capabilities are not easily found for all experiment types and parameters. An MCNP tool to directly estimate the cross section sensitivities of tallied values is under development. Additionally, updates have been made to the perturbation feature of MCNP, which can be used in a less direct approach to estimating sensitivities. This work verifies these features to estimate nuclear data sensitivities in fixed source simulations of a 4.5-kg sphere of alpha- phase weapons-grade plutonium surrounded by differing amounts of copper and polyethylene. Integrated estimates made using MCNP’s tools were found to statistically agree with integrated estimates made from manual perturbation of nuclear data proving the validity of the MCNP tools.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Enterprise SRS: Leveraging Ongoing Operations to Advance Nuclear Fuel Cycle Programs - 12579

The international leadership in nuclear technology development and deployment long held by the United States has eroded due to the lack of clear national strategies for advanced reactor fuel cycle concepts and for nuclear materials management, as well as to the recent policy decision that halts work on the nuclear fuel repository at Yucca Mountain. Although no national consensus on strategy has yet been reached, a number of recent high-profile reviews and workshops have clearly highlighted a national need for robust research, development and deployment (RD and D) programs in key areas of nuclear technology, especially nuclear separations science and engineering. Collectively, these reviews and workshops provide a picture of the nuclear separations mission needs for three major program offices: Department of Energy Office of-Environmental Management), DOE Office of Nuclear Energy), and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). While the individual program needs differ significantly in detail and timing, they share common needs in two critical areas of RD and D: - The need for access to and use of multi-purpose engineering-scale demonstration test facilities that can support testing with radioactive material, and - The need for collaborative research enterprises that encompass government research organizations (i.e., national laboratories), commercial industry and the academic community. Such collaborative enterprises effectively integrate theory and modeling with the actual experimental work at all scales, as well as strengthen the technical foundation for research in critical areas. The arguments for engineering-scale collaborative research facilities are compelling. Processing history has shown that test programs and demonstrations conducted with actual nuclear materials are essential to program success. It is widely recognized, however, that such facilities are expensive to build and maintain; creating an imposing, if not prohibitive, financial burden on an individual sponsoring office. Given that reality, success for the current and future nuclear separations missions is dependent on a concerted effort to develop new, creative, approaches that leverage existing facilities in a manner that supports both near- and long-term needs of national programs. As a result of this situation, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) organized the 'Nuclear Separations User Facility Strategy Session' in Washington, D.C. on July 29, 2011. This workshop brought together key stakeholders from DOE and the private sector to develop a strategy for using engineering-scale nuclear materials processing facilities to advance our nation's nuclear separations research needs. In particular, the meeting focused on recommending how these engineering-scale demonstration facilities, like the Savannah River Site H-Canyon, can be connected with smaller 'bench-scale' research activities to form a seamless approach that integrates across the continuum of RD and D of advanced separations technologies. Coming out of this workshop, a new vision has been developed for a collaborative research facility model that centers on H-Canyon. Unique to this approach is the fact that H-Canyon will continue to accomplish DOE's critical nuclear material processing missions, while simultaneously serving as an RD and D resource for the scientific and technical portions of the nuclear separations community. This paper describes the planned operations for H-Canyon in FY2012 and beyond and discusses how these operations fit within the context of a collaborative research facility model and support the ongoing fuel cycle research and development programs of the DOE. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

National technical nuclear forensics: U.S. approach to capability sustainment

In the event of a nuclear detonation in the United States (U.S.), the interdiction of a nuclear device, or the seizure of nuclear materials, there will be tremendous pressure to attribute the source of the material, establish responsibility, and ensure the prevention of another incident. Along with intelligence and law enforcement investigations, nuclear forensics is one of the three pillars supporting attribution. The field of nuclear forensics includes the collection, analysis, and evaluation of radiological or nuclear materials, devices, and debris after an event or interdiction. The nuclear forensics scientific workforce is situated primarily in national and defense laboratories, but in recent decades has experienced a decline in numbers. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has implemented an expertise development program in order to off-set these declines and sustain a workforce of educated and trained scientists skilled in areas needed for nuclear forensics. Since its inception in 2008, the National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Program (NNFEDP) addresses this challenge holistically, through support to undergraduate and graduate students, university faculty and programs, as well as post-doctoral researchers at national laboratories in fields which are directly relevant to nuclear forensics. In that time, the program has placed 44 Ph.D.'s directly into national laboratories and U.S. federal agencies, maintaining the technical expertise required to execute the Nation's nuclear forensics mission. In 2017, the NNFEDP will institute the new Nuclear Forensics Research Award that will foster collaborations between university students and faculty with national laboratory researchers to further support and reinforce the advancement of nuclear forensic science through joint efforts. This opportunity will increase participation in this exciting and critically important national security mission space and contribute to the sustained development of the nuclear forensics workforce. (authors)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

ADVANCED CERAMIC MATERIALS FOR NEXT-GENERATION NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS

Rising global energy demands coupled with increased environmental concerns point to one solution; they must reduce their dependence on fossil fuels that emit greenhouse gases. As the global community faces the challenge of maintaining sovereign nation security, reducing greenhouse gases, and addressing climate change nuclear power will play a significant and likely growing role. In the US, nuclear energy already provides approximately one-fifth of the electricity used to power factories, offices, homes, and schools with 104 operating nuclear power plants, located at 65 sites in 31 states. Additionally, 19 utilities have applied to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for construction and operating licenses for 26 new reactors at 17 sites. This planned growth of nuclear power is occurring worldwide and has been termed the 'nuclear renaissance.' As major industrial nations craft their energy future, there are several important factors that must be considered about nuclear energy: (1) it has been proven over the last 40 years to be safe, reliable and affordable (good for Economic Security); (2) its technology and fuel can be domestically produced or obtained from allied nations (good for Energy Security); and (3) it is nearly free of greenhouse gas emissions (good for Environmental Security). Already an important part of worldwide energy security via electricity generation, nuclear energy can also potentially play an important role in industrial processes and supporting the nation's transportation sector. Coal-to-liquid processes, the generation of hydrogen and supporting the growing potential for a greatly increased electric transportation system (i.e. cars and trains) mean that nuclear energy could see dramatic growth in the near future as we seek to meet our growing demand for energy in cleaner, more secure ways. In order to address some of the prominent issues associated with nuclear power generation (i.e., high capital costs, waste management, and proliferation), the worldwide community is working to develop and deploy new nuclear energy systems and advanced fuel cycles. These new nuclear systems address the key challenges and include: (1) extracting the full energy value of the nuclear fuel; (2) creating waste solutions with improved long term safety; (3) minimizing the potential for the misuse of the technology and materials for weapons; (4) continually improving the safety of nuclear energy systems; and (5) keeping the cost of energy affordable.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗