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NASA NTRS2009

Cooper-Harper Experience Report for Spacecraft Handling Qualities Applications

A synopsis of experience from the fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft communities in handling qualities development and the use of the Cooper-Harper pilot rating scale is presented as background for spacecraft handling qualities research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E). In addition, handling qualities experiences and lessons-learned from previous United States (US) spacecraft developments are reviewed. This report is intended to provide a central location for references, best practices, and lessons-learned to guide current and future spacecraft handling qualities RDT&E.

Bailey, Randall E.↗

NASA NTRS2012

U.S. Spacesuit Legacy: Maintaining it for the Future

The history of US Spacesuit development and use is rich with information on lessons learned, and constitutes a valuable legacy to those designing spacesuits for the future, as well as educators, students and the general public. The genesis of lessons learned is best understood by studying the evolution of past spacesuit programs how the challenges and pressures of the times influenced the direction of the various spacesuit programs. This paper will show how the legacy of various programs evolved in response to these forces. Important aspects of how this rich U.S. spacesuit legacy is being preserved today will be described, including the archiving of spacesuit hardware, important documents, videos, oral history, and the rapidly expanding US Spacesuit Knowledge Capture program.

Chullen, Cinda↗

NASA NTRS2013

U.S. Spacesuit Legacy: Maintaining it for the Future

The history of U.S. spacesuit development and its use are rich with information on lessons learned, and constitutes a valuable legacy to those designing spacesuits for the future, as well as to educators, students, and the general public. The genesis of lessons learned is best understood by studying the evolution of past spacesuit programs - how the challenges and pressures of the times influenced the direction of the various spacesuit programs. This paper shows how the legacy of various spacesuit-related programs evolved in response to these forces. Important aspects of how this U.S. spacesuit legacy is being preserved today is described, including the archiving of spacesuit hardware, important documents, videos, oral history, and the rapidly expanding U.S. Spacesuit Knowledge Capture program.

Chullen, Cinda↗

NASA NTRS2015

CYGNSS: Lessons We are Learning from a Class D Mission

CYGNSS: Lessons Learned from NASA Class D Mission and how they selected their parts for the program to include balance between cost, risk, schedule and technology available as well as balancing cost restraints with mission risk profile.

Class D Missions↗

NASA NTRS1994

Re-Engineering the Multimission Command System at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory

This paper will discuss the design and implementation of the command software, especially trade-offs and lessons learned from practical operational use in JPL's Advanced Multimission Operations System.The command system provides an advanced multimission environment for secure, concurrent commanding of multiple spacecraft. The lessons learned have resulted in a re-engineering of the command system, especially in its user interface and new automation capabilities. This paper will also discuss new development work including a multimission command database toolkit, a universal command translator for sequencing and real-time commands, and incorporation of telecommand capabilities for new missions.

re-engineering↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Importance of Workplace Book Clubs to Start Idea Discussions and Changing Workplace Culture

Many of the ideas presented at this workshop will focus on larger initiatives for addressing IDEA; here we present a more focused effort to start discussions about IDEA, including changing workplace culture – a book club. A book club can be implemented at any size institute, department, or university with minimal resources. While this is not meant to replace any larger initiatives that are desperately needed, this is a way to start discussions within an organization to both change culture, build relationships and camaraderie among the participants, and increase management’s awareness of different direct approaches to addressing diversity and inclusion. It also has the advantage of being detached from the lived day-to-day experience at the organization and therefore provides a more neutral ground to think about and become aware of topics that might raise a plethora of uncomfortable feelings in those discussing them. There are different approaches to implementing a book club depending on the specific goals or needs of an organization – these can include who participates (such as management versus departments or sections versus colleagues outside your organization), the types of books or journal articles chosen, the schedule, and whether it is optional vs. required, among others. Here we discuss some of the approaches we have implemented at our institutions in setting up diversity-focused book clubs, including some lessons learned. We will specifically use a manager’s book club and an employee driven book club (called UnBinding Bias) as two detailed examples. Finally, we end with lessons learned from our experiences.

J Filiberto↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Collection, Usage, and Preliminary Examination of the Apollo Sample Suite: Lessons for Artemis

Apollo Sample Collection and Usage: From 1969 to 1972 there were six Apollo missions to the surface of the Moon during which the astronauts collected 382 kg of rock and regolith (~2200 samples). The samples collected fall into these general categories: rocks (~66% by mass), rake samples (~4%), bulk regolith (~24%), and specialty regolith (deep drill cores, drive tubes, sealed bulk regolith) samples (~6%). In each category there are a variety of different subtypes available for study, e.g., among the bulk regolith samples there are also skim, trench, and (partially) shaded regolith samples each sampling unique types or depths of regolith. This variety of subsamples has enabled a multitude of different studies over the past 55 years (>3400 individual requests). We are still averaging ~50 unique requests and have allocated >500 individual Apollo samples annually for the past 10 years (2020 excepted). Looking at the 4,675 non-ANGSA (Apollo Next Generation Sample Analysis) samples allocated over the past 10 years, the proportions of allocated samples do not precisely align with the abundance (by mass) of those samples withing the collection: Rock (69.4 %); Rake (10.8 %); Bulk Regolith (15.5 %); Drive Tube (3.3 %); Core/Specialty (1.0 %). Apollo Preliminary Examination (PE): The PE process differs significantly for the various sample types enumerated above; we focus on regolith and rock samples here. During the Apollo mission era, the PE process evolved over the course of the missions; below is what was done for the Apollo 17 mission. For regolith samples, the PE process was: (1) documented bags containing regolith are opened, photographed, and described; (2) large rocks are removed and treated separately; (3) 25% to 33% of the bulk soil is scooped out, weighed, and stored in reserve; (4) the remaining sample is sieved to produce the size fractions <1, 1- 2, 2-4, and 4-10 mm, all of which are weighed. For rock samples, the process is: (1) removing rocks from the container(s) it came back from the Moon in; (2) rematching any materials that spalled off the rock to their original location; (3) numbering, weighing, and basic photographic documentation; (4) dusting with a gentle N2 gas jet; (5) Orthogonal photography; (6) detailed description of the textures and features of the rock; (7) rock modelling and measurement; (8) stereophotography; (9) determination of the orientation of the rock on the lunar surface. Drive tubes and deep drill cores were not characterized during PE beyond an initial weight and a sketch of the interior tube materials derived from 2D medical X-ray images. Catalogs: The ongoing utility of the Apollo samples is enabled by the robust cataloguing process for the samples [3-5], which allows the scientific community to accurately request samples uniquely suited to their proposed studies. A common misconception, however, is the amount of detail that goes into the initial catalog (e.g., [6]) for a collection from the preliminary examination (PE) period, versus what goes into the catalogs that come later in the life cycle of the samples from that mission (e.g., [7]). The only required data for a PE catalog is a weight, a basic photograph, and a description of the nature of the sample. Artemis PE: Over the past few years, the ongoing ANGSA project studied previously unopened Apollo 17 double drive tube samples 73001/2 [1], and a PE of the drive tubes was done. The PE took the existing core dissection process (developed during PE of Apollo cores in the 1970s, 1980s), and modernized it [7]. The main lesson from the ANGSA PE relative to future missions was that the physical work done during PE of lunar samples has not changed much over the past 5 decades. The use of “modern” technology during PE (e.g., XCT; multispectral analyses) resulted in an enhanced initial understanding of the 73001 and 73002 drive tubes, but greatly increased the time required. The lessons learned from recent astromaterial PEs (e.g., ANGSA and OREx) are important to consider when planning for Artemis, but the unique nature of the Artemis Campaign means many lessons learned from these mission will not be applicable. Given the time constraints (6 months) and likely number of samples that will be returned by Artemis (>200), the Artemis PE catalog will necessarily look much more like [4] than [6].

J Gross↗

NASA NTRS2008

Preparing Cassini Uplink Operations for Extended Mission

The Cassini-Huygens Mission to Saturn and Titan, a joint venture between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the European Space Agency, and the Italian Space Agency, is conducting a four-year, prime mission exploring the Saturnian system, including its atmosphere, rings, magnetosphere, moons and icy satellites. Launched in 1997, Cassini began its prime mission in 2004. Cassini is now preparing for a new era, a two-year extended mission to revisit many of the highlights and new discoveries made during the prime mission. Because of the light time delay from Earth to Saturn, and the time needed to coordinate the complicated science and engineering activities that take place on the spacecraft, commanding on Cassini is done in approximately 40-day intervals known as sequences. The Cassini Uplink Operations team is responsible for the final development and validation of the pointing profile and instrument and spacecraft commands that are contained in a sequence. During this final analysis prior to uplink to the spacecraft, thorough and exact evaluation is necessary to ensure there are no mistakes during commanding. In order to perform this evaluation, complete and refined processes and procedures are fundamental. The Uplink Operations team is also responsible for anomaly response during sequence execution, a process in which critical decisions often are made in real-time. Recent anomalies on other spacecraft missions have highlighted two major risks in the operations process: (1) personnel turnover and the retirement of critical knowledge and (2) aging, outdated operations procedures. If other missions are a good barometer, the Cassini extended mission will be presented with a high personnel turnover of the Cassini flight team, which could lead to a loss of expertise that has been essential to the success of the prime mission. In order to prepare the Cassini Uplink Operations Team for this possibility and to continue to develop and operate safe science and engineering sequences, a review and major update of the current documentation and operations procedures was needed. This paper will address the changes made to extended mission sequence generation processes primarily due to new restrictions in spacecraft operating capability and lessons learned from prime mission. In addition, it will address the state of the prime mission operations procedures, the philosophy changes and updates that were made to those procedures in response to process improvement, and the validation of those new procedures through the training of current and new personnel. And lastly, it will address the lessons learned throughout prime mission and how the Uplink Operations team chose to incorporate those lessons into the working documentation and team knowledge. This incorporation was necessary to facilitate the success of the extended mission with potentially all new personnel at some point prior to the end of the mission.

Maxwell, Jennifer L.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Shuttle orbit flight control design lessons - Direction for Space Station

The Space Shuttle orbit flight control system, which operates during all exo-atmospheric flight phases, has successfully met operational requirements. Many design integration and operational issues that required resolution during development and testing provide an experience base that will benefit the development of future space systems, particularly the Space Station. To this end, the applicable Shuttle and Space Station hardware/software is reviewed with some perspective provided on how current design groundrules were derived and how issues that affected the Shuttle orbit control system design are a pathway for the Space Station. Some of the most significant lessons learned from the Shuttle are summarized, with a discussion of the effect of performance and design of hardware, including the data processing system on software structures and usage procedures. Crew interface issues and important results from man-in-the-loop tests are summarized. Problems resulting from trying to meet difficult orbital operational objectives, including some sophisticated payload operations are characterized. Several proposed Shuttle flight control design improvements, developed in response to some of the lessons learned so far, are identified. Potential application of the Shuttle design lessons and new control technologies to the Space Station are discussed.

Cox, Kenneth J.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Lunar and Mars Exploration: The Autonomy Factor

Long duration space flight crews have relied heavily on almost constant communication with ground control mission support. Ground control teams provide vehicle status and system monitoring, while offering near real time support for specific tasks, emergencies, and ensuring crew health and well being. With extended exploration goals to lunar and Mars outposts, real time communication with ground control teams and the ground s ability to conduct mission monitoring will be very limited compared to the resources provided to current International Space Station (ISS) crews. An operational shift toward more autonomy and a heavier reliance on the crew to monitor their vehicle and operations will be required for these future missions. NASA s future exploration endeavors and the subsequent increased autonomy will require a shift in crew skill composition, i.e. engineer, doctor, mission specialist etc. and lead to new training challenges and mission scenarios. Specifically, operational and design changes will be necessary in many areas including: Habitat Infrastructure and Support Systems, Crew Composition, Training, Procedures and Mission Planning. This paper will specifically address how to apply ISS lessons learned to further use ISS as a test bed to address decreased amounts of ground support to achieve full autonomous operations for lunar and Mars missions. Understanding these lessons learned and applying them to current operations will help to address the future impacts of increased crew autonomy for the lunar and Mars outposts and pave the way for success in increasingly longer mission durations.

Rando, Cynthia M.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Seal Technology for Hypersonic Vehicle and Propulsion: An Overview

Hypersonic vehicles and propulsion systems pose an extraordinary challenge for structures and materials. Airframes and engines require lightweight, high-temperature materials and structural configurations that can withstand the extreme environment of hypersonic flight. Some of the challenges posed include very high temperatures, heating of the whole vehicle, steady-state and transient localized heating from shock waves, high aerodynamic loads, high fluctuating pressure loads, potential for severe flutter, vibration, and acoustic loads and erosion. Correspondingly high temperature seals are required to meet these aggressive requirements. This presentation reviews relevant seal technology for both heritage (e.g. Space Shuttle, X-15, and X-38) vehicles and presents several seal case studies aimed at providing lessons learned for future hypersonic vehicle seal development. This presentation also reviews seal technology developed for the National Aerospace Plane propulsion systems and presents several seal case studies aimed at providing lessons learned for future hypersonic propulsion seal development.

Steinetz, Bruce M.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Learning from Past Missions for Today’s Case Studies

As interest in small spacecraft and its community continue to grow, the extensive selection of subsystem parts and service providers can present as many opportunities as unique challenges for mission design and implementation. These challenges often include inadequate trade studies, missing lessons learned, and unknown solutions to common pitfalls. Trade studies frequently fall short if products and services ultimately do not meet customer expectations, especially if the actual performance of a particular service or technology is not shared with others seeking similar products or services. It is difficult to quantify the viability and robustness of desired products and services, truly understand what solutions exist, and account for unique failures from previous SmallSat missions when experiences are not shared and captured. This noted, one reason for the lack of information as input for trade studies is that it is problematic to capture and disseminate the relevant lessons learned, experienced anomalies, and programmatic issues in both the laboratory and on-orbit setting, as these types of information can be extremely sensitive and are specific to each unique mission. Often, they are not made publicly available. The adoption and use of existing tools and databases, as well as contributions toward and sharing of information available in literature can help distribute useful information for future SmallSat missions to help avoid these common pitfalls. This paper will provide the required framework for current and future SmallSat mission implementation by providing best practices and identifying helpful resources to assist with subsystem parts and services as part of trade study selections.

Bruce Yost↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Informing Disaster Response: An Introduction to the NASA Disaster Response Coordination System

Satellite observations provide information about the Earth that can be critical to building situational awareness and filling in data gaps during disaster response. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Earth Science Division’s Disasters Program aims to advance Earth science data and information to support management decisions that prevent or mitigate the impacts of disasters. In support of this goal, NASA’s Disaster Response Coordination System (DRCS) manages a One-NASA approach to coordinate and mobilize the Agency’s assets and expertise to provide geospatial information during disasters. The purpose of the DRCS is to advance the utility of Earth observation information for supporting disaster response decision support, build skilled and effective response communities through improved coordination, engagement, and learning, and reduce impact to lives and livelihoods by empowering communities to respond to disasters more effectively. The DRCS employs a user-centered, activation framework that begins with direct requests from responders and ends with after-action assessments that feed lessons learned and process improvements. This poster will introduce the DRCS model and approach to expanding the use of Earth observations and geospatial information to support disaster response, share use cases for recent event activations, and highlight initial lessons learned.

Disaster Response↗

NASA NTRS1981

1981 LTA technology assessment - Past and present

A four-part presentation is made of (1) lessons learned from the design and operation of the 'classic' airships of the 1920s and 30s, with respect to such issues as construction, propulsion, control, instrumentation, ground handling, habitability, aerodynamics, and structure and construction; (2) lessons learned from the development of such specialized lighter-than-air (LTA) concepts as metal-clad airships, semi-buoyant lifting bodies, experimental, sport and commercial free balloons, high-altitude platforms, and tethered aerostats; (3) the current status of LTA technology in various countries, with emphasis on significant developments in configuration, dynamics, control, structures, materials, and propulsion; and (4) a projection of future trends. It is concluded that socio-economic factors will strongly influence and encourage LTA development in the 1990s.

Ashford, R. L.↗

NASA NTRS1994

Leveraging object-oriented development at Ames

This paper presents lessons learned by the Software Engineering Process Group (SEPG) from results of supporting two projects at NASA Ames using an Object Oriented Rapid Prototyping (OORP) approach supported by a full featured visual development environment. Supplemental lessons learned from a large project in progress and a requirements definition are also incorporated. The paper demonstrates how productivity gains can be made by leveraging the developer with a rich development environment, correct and early requirements definition using rapid prototyping, and earlier and better effort estimation and software sizing through object-oriented methods and metrics. Although the individual elements of OO methods, RP approach and OO metrics had been used on other separate projects, the reported projects were the first integrated usage supported by a rich development environment. Overall the approach used was twice as productive (measured by hours per OO Unit) as a C++ development.

Wenneson, Greg↗

NASA NTRS2005

Mars Exploration Rover Entry, Descent, and Landing: A Thermal Perspective

Perhaps the most challenging mission phase for the Mars Exploration Rovers was the Entry, Descent, and Landing (EDL). During this phase, the entry vehicle attached to its cruise stage was transformed into a stowed tetrahedral Lander that was surrounded by inflated airbags through a series of complex events. There was only one opportunity to successfully execute an automated command sequence without any possible ground intervention. The success of EDL was reliant upon the system thermal design: 1) to thermally condition EDL hardware from cruise storage temperatures to operating temperature ranges; 2) to maintain the Rover electronics within operating temperature ranges without the benefit of the cruise single phase cooling loop, which had been evacuated in preparation for EDL; and 3) to maintain the cruise stage propulsion components for the critical turn to entry attitude. Since the EDL architecture was inherited from Mars Pathfinder (MPF), the initial EDL thermal design would be inherited from MPF. However, hardware and implementation differences from MPF ultimately changed the MPF inheritance approach for the EDL thermal design. With the lack of full inheritance, the verification and validation of the EDL thermal design took on increased significance. This paper will summarize the verification and validation approach for the EDL thermal design along with applicable system level thermal testing results as well as appropriate thermal analyses. In addition, the lessons learned during the system-level testing will be discussed. Finally, the in-flight EDL experiences of both MER-A and -B missions (Spirit and Opportunity, respectively) will be presented, demonstrated how lessons learned from Spirit were applied to Opportunity.

thermal↗

NASA NTRS2004

Space-Based Telemetry And Range Safety Flight Demonstration #1

The basic ability of STARS to maintain a satellite communications link with TDRSS satellites during dynamic aircraft flights was successfully demonstrated during FD 1. The Range Safety and Range User systems' link margins were measured. The ability to acquire/reacquire and maintain lock between a high-dynamic vehicle and a satellite-based system was demonstrated. The Range Safety system simultaneously received and processed command links from space and ground transmitters and provided near real-time Range Safety telemetry to DFRC, which then sent it in near real time to KSC, GSFC, and WFF for monitoring. The GPS receiver maintained track except during extremely dynamic maneuvers. The Range User system sent data at three different data rates. There were excellent cooperation and support from the different Centers, contractors, and Ranges. A large amount of data was recorded and extensive post-flight analysis was performed. The Range User TDRSS link margin met or exceeded the predicted performance at three different data rates. The Range Safety launch-head link margins generally agreed with the predicted performance. The UPS positions and velocities agreed with those from tracking radar to within about 20 m and a few rn/s. The link margins for the Range Safety TDRSS telemetry link were less than expected. The link margin for one TDRSS command link LPT channel was occasionally much less than the other. Additional post-flight testing has yet to identify the root causes of these results. There were many lessons learned from this first set of test flights. The most important one is that more time and testing are needed for each step to deal with the inevitable problems. It is vital that these lessons be among the primary areas of study that will carry over from FD#1 to FD#2, which is currently scheduled for early FY05 at DFRC and will use a specially designed Ku-band phased array antenna for the Range User system. The next series of flight demonstrations scheduled for late 2004 at DFRC will incorporate many lessons learned from FD#1. A specially designed Ku-band phased array antenna will be used with the Range User system. A test flight on a hypersonic vehicle is planned by the end of 2006.

Demspm. Erol↗

NASA NTRS2006

Achieving Operability via the Mission System Paradigm

In the past, flight and ground systems have been developed largely-independently, with the flight system taking the lead, and dominating the development process. Operability issues have been addressed poorly in planning, requirements, design, I&T, and system-contracting activities. In many cases, as documented in lessons-learned, this has resulted in significant avoidable increases in cost and risk. With complex missions and systems, operability is being recognized as an important end-to-end design issue. Never-the-less, lessons-learned and operability concepts remain, in many cases, poorly understood and sporadically applied. A key to effective application of operability concepts is adopting a 'mission system' paradigm. In this paradigm, flight and ground systems are treated, from an engineering and management perspective, as inter-related elements of a larger mission system. The mission system consists of flight hardware, flight software, telecom services, ground data system, testbeds, flight teams, science teams, flight operations processes, procedures, and facilities. The system is designed in functional layers, which span flight and ground. It is designed in response to project-level requirements, mission design and an operations concept, and is developed incrementally, with early and frequent integration of flight and ground components.

ground systems↗