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At least 1,117 records · Page 62

Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Detailed Technical Framework Specification

A key area of the Small Modular Reactor (SMR) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) strategy is the development of methodologies and tools that will be used to predict the safety, security, safeguards, performance, and deployment viability of SMR systems starting in the design process through the operation phase. The goal of the SMR PRA activity will be to develop quantitative methods and tools and the associated analysis framework for assessing a variety of risks. These risks will be focused on SMR designs and operational strategies as they relate to the technical basis behind safety and security characterization.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Designing and Operating Through Compromise: Architectural Analysis of CKMS for the Advanced Metering Infrastructure

Compromises attributable to the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) highlight the necessity for constant vigilance. The APT provides a new perspective on security metrics (e.g., statistics based cyber security) and quantitative risk assessments. We consider design principals and models/tools that provide high assurance for energy delivery systems (EDS) operations regardless of the state of compromise. Cryptographic keys must be securely exchanged, then held and protected on either end of a communications link. This is challenging for a utility with numerous substations that must secure the intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) that may comprise complex control system of systems. For example, distribution and management of keys among the millions of intelligent meters within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is being implemented as part of the National Smart Grid initiative. Without a means for a secure cryptographic key management system (CKMS) no cryptographic solution can be widely deployed to protect the EDS infrastructure from cyber-attack. We consider 1) how security modeling is applied to key management and cyber security concerns on a continuous basis from design through operation, 2) how trusted models and key management architectures greatly impact failure scenarios, and 3) how hardware-enabled trust is a critical element to detecting, surviving, and recovering from attack.

Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS)↗

2022 Annual Site Environmental Report for Sandia National Laboratories, Livermore, California

Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at Sandia National Laboratories, California. Activities at this multiprogram engineering and science laboratory support the nuclear weapons stockpile program, energy and environmental research, homeland security, micro- and nanotechnologies, and basic science and engineering research. The U.S. Department of Energy and its management and operating contractor are committed to safeguarding the environment, assessing sustainability practices, and ensuring the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data presented in this annual site environmental report. This report provides a summary of environmental monitoring information and compliance activities that occurred at Sandia National Laboratories, California during calendar year 2022 unless noted otherwise. General site and environmental program information is also included. This report was prepared in accordance with DOE O 231.1B, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense (Final)

In the world of ever-advancing technology, Autonomous Systems (AS) find extensive application, bolstering functionalities of critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants. These systems, however, are increasingly becoming a target for nefarious activities, namely through inference attacks, trojan attacks, and adversarial reprogramming. This paper delves into a comprehensive exploration of machine learning (ML)-driven autonomous control systems within advanced nuclear reactor designs, revealing the vulnerabilities and proposing strategies for defense against potential cyber-attacks. Advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)- based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber-physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems. As global reliance on generation III reactors begins to be critically assessed, the evolution towards advanced reactor systems utilizing digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) becomes not merely preferable, but essential. The integration of semi and fully autonomous control systems (ACS), powered by digital I&C and machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies, emerges as a potent strategy to mitigate operations and maintenance costs, thereby enhancing the economic feasibility of novel reactor designs. However, with a staggering 500% and 380% increase in cyber-attacks reported against the energy sector by the United States Department of Energy (DoE) and the European Union respectively, a surge in cyber vulnerabilities specifically targeting the nuclear industry has been 2 markedly observed. Notable incidents, such as the W32.Ramnit spyware infiltration at the Gundremmingen nuclear power plant in Germany and the Dtrack spyware intrusion at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in India, while not directly compromising core industrial control systems (ICS), underscore a compelling necessity to fortify cybersecurity protocols in safeguarding reactor systems against increasingly adept digital adversaries. In light of this, our investigation extends beyond conventional cybersecurity parameters, diving into the intricate web of potential vulnerabilities woven into ML-based DTs and ACS in advanced reactor systems. A crafted cyber-physical testbed and preliminary ACS were devised to act as a mirror, reflecting potential configurations of advanced reactor control designs. Moreover, this study is intertwined with a scrutinization of ML models, developed either through conventional, manually tuned methodologies or via automated means through AutoML, probing into their cyber-risk profiles within operational technology (OT) environments. Expanding on this, two distinct ACS blueprints were forged – one navigating through the corridors of traditional ML and the other traversing the path of AutoML – in an effort to holistically encapsulate the considerations pivotal to ML-based DT control system design. Employing the SANS Institute Industrial Control System (ICS) Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) framework, a structured analysis was conducted, launching three targeted attacks against the training dataset, real-time dataset, and ML models, therein dissecting the potential cyber-attack implications against both ML frameworks within an ACS milieu. It is essential to note that three distinct categories of attacks were conducted against both ACS configurations, each encompassing three distinct ML-based DTs, cumulating in a total of 18 varied attacks. This exploration extends into the realms of Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense, unraveling vulnerabilities, and opportunities for fortified defenses against such intrusions, particularly where ML-driven technologies, and by extension, ACS, are deployed. Final recommendations, articulated through a lens of security, safeguard, and implementation considerations, are presented for both traditional and AutoML models, anchoring upon the existing knowledge landscape and ML-based DT modeling for ACS, and are offered as a beacon to guide the nuclear industry through the intricate cybersecurity challenges that lie ahead.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NREL Project CloudZero

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory's (NREL's) CloudZero project is evaluating the ability to reliably and securely manage complex energy systems from the cloud, identifying major technical and regulatory barriers to cloud adoption, suggesting new security controls and best practices for cloud applications, and empowering industry to embrace the cloud, where appropriate.

cloud↗

psst: An open-source power system simulation toolbox in Python

This paper is an overview of Power System Simulation Toolbox (psst). psst is an open-source Python application for the simulation and analysis of power system models. psst simulates the wholesale market operation by solving a DC Optimal Power Flow (DCOPF), Security Constrained Unit Commitment (SCUC) and a Security Constrained Economic Dispatch (SCED). psst also includes models for the various entities in a power system such as Generator Companies (GenCos), Load Serving Entities (LSEs) and an Independent System Operator (ISO). psst features an open modular object oriented architecture that will make it useful for researchers to customize, expand, experiment beyond solving traditional problems. psst also includes a web based Graphical User Interface (GUI) that allows for user friendly interaction and for implementation on remote High Performance Computing (HPCs) clusters for parallelized operations. This paper also provides an illustrative application of psst and benchmarks with standard IEEE test cases to show the advanced features and the performance of toolbox.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Quantum key distribution for 10 Gb/s dense wavelength division multiplexing networks

We demonstrate quantum key distribution (QKD) with bidirectional 10 Gb/s classical data channels in a single fiber using dense wavelength division multiplexing. Record secure key rates of 2.38 Mbps and fiber distances up to 70 km are achieved. Data channels are simultaneously monitored for error-free operation. The robustness of QKD is further demonstrated with a secure key rate of 445 kbps over 25 km, obtained in the presence of data lasers launching conventional 0 dBm power. We discuss the fundamental limit for the QKD performance in the multiplexing environment.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Energy Management Information Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices

Energy management information systems (EMIS) are a broad and rapidly evolving family of tools that monitor, analyze, and control building energy use and system performance. Critical systems are often integrated with or operate on the same networks as EMIS scope systems, necessitating stable, continuous, and secure communication. When connecting EMIS to building automation and utility control systems, there are also many physical assets that could cause harm to the building and its occupants if a malicious act or human error were introduced. It is imperative to ensure all EMIS scope systems are connected securely to the EMIS and do not open vulnerable pathways to other facility networks and operations. The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) promotes best practices for impactful utilization of EMIS at federal facilities. This best practice document is part of a series of fact sheets created to help accelerate the market adoption and use of EMIS in the federal sector. It provides an overview of required EMIS cybersecurity standards for compliance and authority to operate along with additional recommendations.

cybersecurity↗

Energy Management Information Systems Cybersecurity Best Practices

Energy management information systems (EMIS) are a broad and rapidly evolving family of tools that monitor, analyze, and control building energy use and system performance. Critical systems are often integrated with or operate on the same networks as EMIS scope systems, necessitating stable, continuous, and secure communication. When connecting EMIS to building automation and utility control systems, there are also many physical assets that could cause harm to the building and its occupants if a malicious act or human error were introduced. It is imperative to ensure all EMIS scope systems are connected securely to the EMIS and do not open vulnerable pathways to other facility networks and operations. The Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) promotes best practices for impactful utilization of EMIS at federal facilities. This best practice document is part of a series of fact sheets created to help accelerate the market adoption and use of EMIS in the federal sector. It provides an overview of required EMIS cybersecurity standards for compliance and authority to operate along with additional recommendations.

Cybersecurity↗

Emerging Trends and Systemic Issues Influencing Today’s U.S. Electric Grid

With increasing shifts from vertically integrated to horizontally structured operations and from centralized to distributed electric power delivery, today’s electric power grid (the “grid”) operators and designers face the challenge of creating an architecture that accommodates a host of diverse requirements. The grid’s modes of operation must address concerns of reliability and stability, new deployments of renewable energy sources, threats from cyber-attacks and natural disasters, and increasingly distributed system operations. Grid modernization calls for a reliable, affordable, sustainable, agile, secure, and resilient grid. However, the modernization of the U.S. power grid is hampered by mounting complexity and diverging objectives from owners and operators and is consequently risky and fraught with potential missteps. Flawed architecture, design, and implementation will lead to stranded investments and lost opportunities. A principled approach to minimize risk and develop a robust grid of the future is to begin with a sound architecture for the grid to inform the design process. Architecture development starts with the context of influencing factors that provide constraints as well as driving goals. This report provides the context of emerging trends and cross-cutting systemic issues in the U.S. electric power grid and serves as a vital input for grid architecture development.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Antiagglomerants Affect Gas Hydrate Growth

In gas clathrate hydrates, inclusion gas molecules stabilize crystalline water structures. In addition to being fundamentally interesting, gas hydrates attract significant practical attention because of their possible application in various high-tech technologies. However, gas hydrates pose health, safety, and environmental risks when they form within oil and gas pipelines, as well as within hydrocarbon-producing and treatment facilities. Among available strategies to control and sometimes prevent hydrate plug formation is the use of surface-active low-molecular-weight compounds, known as antiagglomerants (AAs). AAs prevent the agglomeration of small hydrate particles into large plugs. It is not clear whether AAs promote or frustrate hydrate growth. We present two molecular mechanisms by which AAs promote and frustrate, respectively, hydrate growth. Our results could lead to innovative methodologies for managing hydrates in high-tech applications, as well as for securing the safety of oil and gas operations.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Mission Critical Networking

Mission-Critical Networking (MCN) refers to networking for application domains where life or livelihood may be at risk. Typical application domains for MCN include critical infrastructure protection and operation, emergency and crisis intervention, healthcare services, and military operations. Such networking is essential for safety, security and economic vitality in our complex world characterized by uncertainty, heterogeneity, emergent behaviors, and the need for reliable and timely response. MCN comprise networking technology, infrastructures and services that may alleviate the risk and directly enable and enhance connectivity for mission-critical information exchange among diverse, widely dispersed, mobile users.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Alleviating Contingency Violations through Visual Analytics and Suggested Actions

Contingency analysis (CA) is essential in maintaining a stable and secure power grid. It is required by operating standards that contingency violations need to be alleviated within 30 minutes. In today’s practice, operators normally make decisions based on the information they have with limited support. This paper presents a new feature of user suggested actions integrated in the graphical contingency analysis (GCA) tool, developed by the authors to help the operator’s decision making process. This paper provides a few examples on showing how the decision support element of the GCA tool is further enhanced by this new feature to alleviate contingency violations for better grid reliability.

Contingency Analysis, Operator Actions, Situationa↗

Noise analysis for near field 3-D FM-CW radar imaging systems

Near field radar imaging systems are used for several applications including concealed weapon detection in airports and other high-security venues. Despite the near-field operation, phase noise and thermal noise can limit the performance in several ways including reduction in system sensitivity and reduction of image dynamic range. In this paper, the effects of thermal noise, phase noise, and processing gain are analyzed in the context of a near field 3-D FM-CW imaging radar as might be used for concealed weapon detection. In addition to traditional frequency domain analysis, a time-domain simulation is employed to graphically demonstrate the effect of these noise sources on a fast-chirping FM-CW system.

microwave imaging↗

AMPS: An Augmented Matrix Formulation for Principal Submatrix Updates with Application to Power Grids

We present an augmented matrix approach to update the solution to a linear system of equations when the coefficient matrix is modified by a few elements within a principal submatrix. This problem arises in the dynamic security analysis of a power grid, where operators need to perform $N-x$ contingency analysis, i.e., determine the state of the system when up to $x$ links from $N$ fail. Our algorithms augment the coefficient matrix to account for the changes in it, and then compute the solution to the augmented system without refactoring the modified matrix. We provide two algorithms, a direct method, and a hybrid direct-iterative method for solving the augmented system. We also exploit the sparsity of the matrices and vectors to accelerate the overall computation. Our algorithms are compared on three power grids with PARDISO, a parallel direct solver, and CHOLMOD, a direct solver with the ability to modify the Cholesky factors of the coefficient matrix. We show that our augmented algorithms outperform PARDISO (by two orders of magnitude), and CHOLMOD (by a factor of up to 5). Further, our algorithms scale better than CHOLMOD as the number of elements updated increases. The solutions are computed with high accuracy. Our algorithms are capable of computing $N-x$ contingency analysis on a $778K$ bus grid, updating a solution with $x=20$ elements in $1.6 \times 10^{-2}$ seconds on an Intel Xeon processor.

Yeung, Yu-Hong↗

Communication Pathways in the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Online Monitoring Project

Implementation of online monitoring and prognostics in existing U.S. nuclear power plants will involve coordinating the efforts of national laboratories, utilities, universities, and private companies. Large amounts of operational data, including failure data, are necessary for the development and calibration of diagnostic and prognostic algorithms. The ability to use data from all available resources will provide the most expeditious avenue to implementation of online monitoring in existing NPPs; however, operational plant data are often considered proprietary. Secure methods for transferring and storing data are discussed, along with a potential technology for implementation of online monitoring.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Level-2 Milestone 3508: Certify and Accredit Livermore Computing to NAPS 14.2C

This report documents Livermore Computing (LC) activities in support of certifying and accrediting LC’s Secure Computing Facility’s (SCF) NAPS 14.2c compliant Information System Security Plan (ISSP), ASC L2 milestone 3508: Certify and Accredit Livermore Computing to NAPS 14.2c, due September 30, 2010. The full text of the milestone is included in Attachment 1. The description of the milestone is: LC’s cyber security plan accreditation expires March 31, 2010. A new plan must be written to be compliant with the NNSA’s NAPS 14.2c cyber security policy. This new policy requires a complete overhaul of LLNL’s classified security plans. LC will be a major contributor in the effort to create a Site Security Component Library, which will be used as a basis for LC’s NAPS compliant plan. All new security test and evaluation plans will be developed to demonstrate NAPS compliance. Ultimately, the LC Information System Security Plan (ISSP) will be developed and delivered. This milestone is complete when the ISSP and the security test and evaluation plans have been submitted and LC has received interim approval to test. The milestone was completed on August 20, 2010 when a letter from the NNSA Livermore Site Office (LSO) was received by Mr. John E. Lewis, Director of LLNL’s Security Organization, granting LC SCF “Approval to Operate”. The letter is included in Attachment 2. The accreditation as stated in the letter is effective until August 18, 2013.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

HAN Attack Surface and the Open Smart Energy Gateway Project

This paper attempts to provide, on a non-proprietary basis, insight into the major design elements of both smart meters and the larger AMI systems within which they operate and, within this context, enumerate known security issues.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗