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At least 1,117 records · Page 62
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

A multiscale cohesive law for carbon fiber networks

Better predictive models of mechanical failure in low-weight heat shield composites would aid material certification for missions with aggressive atmospheric entry conditions. In this study, we develop such a model for the rapid engineering analysis of the failure limits of phenolic impregnated carbon ablator (PICA) - a leading heat shield material whose structural component is a carbon fiber network. We hypothesize inelastic deformation failure mechanisms and model their behavior using molecular dynamics simulations to calculate the binding energy. We then upscale this binding energy to the macroscale using a renormalization argument. The approach delivers insightful and reasonably accurate macroscale predictions that compare favorably to experiments. In application, the model is validated for a particular variety of PICA by comparison to experiment and would then be used to study design scenarios in different entry conditions.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Systems Health Monitoring: Integrating FMEA into Bayesian Networks

The foreseeable high traffic density suggests that a large number of electric propulsion systems will enter the airspace, and that they will also operate at high frequency, e.g., large number of take offs and landings per unit time. The reliability of such critical systems is therefore key to ensure high safety standards in the low-altitude airspace. Diagnostic systems, which aim at identifying incipient faults, can mitigate unexpected failures or lower-than-expected reliability by performing early fault detection by monitoring the systems. A key element of fault diagnosis is fault detection and isolation (FDI), which complexity increases with the complexity of the system itself, namely the number of subsystems and components, interactions among sub-systems, and the number of sensors available. The proposed approach leverages combination of failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) integrated with Bayesian networks, thus introducing dependability structures into a diagnostic framework to aid FDI. Faults and failure events from the FMEA are mapped within a Bayesian network, where network edges replicate the links embedded within FMEAs. The integrated framework enables the fault isolation process by identifying the probability of occurrence of specific faults or root causes given evidence observed through sensor signals. In this work, sub systems of Urban Air Mobility (UAM) type vehicle like avionics, structures, power-train etc. are taken into account to show the approach at the system level. This work integrates early design phase in the development of UAM type vehicles with diagnostic tools, which are often developed later in the product life-cycle, or retrofitted at a later time on systems. Failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) derived for the system in the design phase is embedded within a Bayesian network (BN).

UAM↗
DOE OSTI2020

Joint Development of SAS4A Code in Application to Oxide-fueled LFR Severe Accident Analysis

The scope of this project was to pursue specific SAS4A liquid-metal cooled reactor (LMR) safety analysis software extensions to simulate postulated accidents with fuel failures for oxide-fueled Lead-cooled Fast Reactors (LFRs). Since most U.S. LMR experience is on sodium-cooled fast reactor options based on past testing and operation experience with EBR-II and FFTF, the DOE’s legacy fast reactor safety analysis capabilities were focused on metal-fueled pool-type concepts with sodium coolant. In recent years, Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) has decided to pursue an LFR design as one of their next generation nuclear technology options because of its favorable safety and economics attributes. Oxide fuel is considered among other fuel options due to previous WEC experience with this fuel form. Development of this new technology requires the availability of adequately accurate computational tools, some of which can be adapted from versions of similar software used for analysis of other LMRs. Although Argonne National Laboratory’s (ANL) SAS4A/SASSYS-1 safety analysis software suite (shortened as SAS4A code hereafter for brevity) has the basic capabilities to model LFR system designs, the SAS4A code modules used in the analysis of accidents with fuel/cladding failures lack appropriate models for the unique phenomena that govern as-irradiated oxide-fuel damage mechanisms in lead coolant. Therefore, the objective of this project was to extend the capabilities of SAS4A with mechanistic oxide-fuel failure models in lead coolant for margin to failure assessments, analysis of failure modes, location and timing of failures under different accident scenarios consistent with the whole-plant dynamic response including the reactivity feedback, and assessment of the potential for fuel damage propagation due to potential fission gas jet and fuel-fragment/molten fuel impingement to neighboring fuel pins in an assembly. This report provides mainly a summary of Argonne’s technical contributions in the joint project, but the reports and publications by the Participant team are included as references at the end of the report.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Range Safety Debris Catalog Analysis in Preparation for the Pad Abort One Flight Test

With each flight test a Range Safety Data Package is assembled to understand the potential consequences of various failure scenarios. Debris catalog analysis considers an overpressure failure of the Abort Motor and the resulting debris field created 1. Characterize debris fragments generated by failure: weight, shape, and area 2. Compute fragment ballistic coefficients 3. Compute fragment ejection velocities.

Kutty, Prasad↗
NASA NTRS1992

Technology integration box beam failure study

The objective of this paper is to describe current results from an on-going study of the mechanisms that led to the failure of the TIBB. Experimental and analytical results are presented. Experimental results include load, strain, and deflection data for the TIBB (Technology Integration Box Beam). An analytical investigation was conducted to compliment the experimental investigation and to gain additional insight into the TIBB structural response. Analytical results include strain and deflection results from a global analysis of the TIBB. A local analysis of the failure region is being completed. These analytical results are validated through comparisons with the experimental results from the TIBB tests. The experimental and analytical results from the TIBB tests are used to determine a sequence of events that may have resulted in failure of the TIBB. A potential cause of failure is high stresses in a stiffener runout region. Typical analytical results are presented for a stiffener runout specimen that is being defined to simulate the TIBB failure mechanisms. The results of this study are anticipated to provide better understanding of potential failure mechanisms in composite aircraft structures, to lead to future design improvements, and to identify needed analytical tools for design and analysis.

Shuart, Mark J.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the EPD and C/remote manipulator system FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA analysis of the EPD and C/RMS hardware initially generated 345 failure mode worksheets and identified 117 Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment process. These analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline of 132 FMEAs and 66 CIL items.

Robinson, W. W.↗
DOE OSTI2021

In Situ Synchrotron Tensile Investigations on Ultrasonic Additive Manufactured (UAM) Zirconium

The microstructure evolution of ultrasonic additive manufactured (UAM) zirconium under room temperature uniaxial tensile straining is reported. Miniature dog-bone tensile specimens of two orientations were cut from a UAM zirconium bar for in situ synchrotron tensile tests. Wide-angle X-ray scattering (WAXS) scanning at the Advanced Photon Source (APS) at Argonne National Laboratory was used to unveil the changes in microstructure of the entire gauge regions throughout the straining. A series of WAXS data analysis methods were utilized to quantify both elastic and plastic deformation mechanisms within the strained specimens. Stress concentrations were identified during early stage of plastic deformation, which become candidate necking positions and eventually lead to failure. Fracture surface analysis implied that these stress concentration locations may be correlated to the fabrication defects, providing insightful guidance for future improvement of the UAM zirconium process.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
NASA NTRS1989

Space Shuttle Main Engine structural analysis and data reduction/evaluation. Volume 1: Aft Skirt analysis

Using the ANSYS finite element program, a global model of the aft skirt and a detailed nonlinear model of the failure region was made. The analysis confirmed the area of failure in both STA-2B and STA-3 tests as the forging heat affected zone (HAZ) at the aft ring centerline. The highest hoop strain in the HAZ occurs in this area. However, the analysis does not predict failure as defined by ultimate elongation of the material equal to 3.5 percent total strain. The analysis correlates well with the strain gage data from both the Wyle influence test of the original design aft sjirt and the STA-3 test of the redesigned aft skirt. it is suggested that the sensitivity of the failure area material strength and stress/strain state to material properties and therefore to small manufacturing or processing variables is the most likely cause of failure below the expected material ultimate properties.

Berry, David M.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safety Risk Reliability Model Library

SR2ML is a software package which contains a set of safety and reliability models designed to be interfaced with the INL developed RAVEN code. These models can be employed to perform both static and dynamic system risk analysis and determine risk importance of specific elements of the considered system. Two classes of reliability models have been developed; the first class includes all classical reliability models (Fault-Trees, Event-Trees, Markov models and Reliability Block Diagrams) which have been extended to deal not only with Boolean logic values but also time dependent values. The second class includes several components aging models. Models of these two classes are designed to be included in a RAVEN ensemble model to perform time dependent system reliability analysis (dynamic analysis). Similarly, these models can be interfaced with system analysis codes to determine failure time of systems and evaluate accident progression (static analysis).

Wang, Congjian↗
NASA NTRS1992

Postbuckling failure of composite plates with holes

This paper summarizes a study focused on understanding the failure mechanisms present in a plate with a centrally located circular hole loaded inplane into the postbuckling range of deflections. The study was numerical and experimental in nature and had as a goal the a priori prediction of failure using existing failure data from several sources, together with a stress analysis. The maximum stress failure criterion was used to predict failure and both intra- and interlaminar stresses were considered. Four laminates were considered. The phenomenon of modal interaction, or the jumping from one deformed configuration to another, is discussed. With this jumping, the plate configuration may change from one half-wave in the loading direction to two half-waves in the loading direction. The study concludes that the failure in (+/-45/0/90)2s and (+/-45/2(2))2s laminates is due to fiber compression failure and is predictable. The failure load is, for the most part, independent of response configuration. The (+/-45/0/(6))s laminate fails due to interlaminar shear along the simple support, while the response and failure of the (+/-45)4s laminate is governed to a large degree by material nonlinearities and progressive failure.

Lee, H. H.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Use of AI for Interpreting Technical Specifications for Power Uprates in Nuclear Power Plants

Powerpoint presentation. Background information provided on power plant uprates. Discussion of the current and proposed approaches to power plant uprates. Explanation of what data is used to draft a LAR. Methods such as retrieval augmented generation (RAG) and fine-tuning are discussed. Use case analysis is performed. Different failure types are examined. Conclusions are drawn from the analysis. Future work is proposed.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Joint Cyber/Safety Risk in Nuclear Power Systems

This report presents an analysis of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) for a generic Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)-4 NPP. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) developed Hazards and Consequences Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS) process is applied to the ECCS and its subsystems to identify unsafe control actions (UCAs) which act as possible cyber events of concern. The analysis is performed for two design basis events: Small-break Loss of Coolant Accident (SLOCA) and general transients (TRANS), such as unintended reactor trip. In previous work, HAZCADS UCAs were combined with other cyber-attack analysis to develop a risk-informed approach; however, this was for a single system. This report explores advanced systems engineering modeling approaches to model the interactions between digital assets across multiple systems which may be targeted by cyber adversaries. The complex and interdependent design of digital systems has the potential to introduce emergent cyber properties that are generally not covered by hazard analyses nor formal nuclear Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). The R&D and supporting analysis presented here explores approaches to predict and manage how interdependent system properties effect risk. To show the potential impact of a successful cyber-attack to formal PRA event tree probabilities, HAZCADS analysis was also used. HAZCADS was also used to model the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automatic actuation. This analysis extended to an integrated system analysis for common-cause failure (CCF). In this aspect, the HAZCADS analysis continued by analyzing plant design details for system connectivity in support of critical plant functions. A dependency matrix was developed to depict the integrated functionality of the interconnected systems. Areas of potential CCF are indicated. Future work could include adversary attack development to show how CCF could be caused, resulting in PRA events. Across the multiple systems that comprise the ECCS, the analysis shows that the change in such probabilities was very different between systems. This indicates that some systems have a larger potential risk impact from successful cyber-attack or digital failure, which indicates a need for these systems to have a higher priority for design and defensive measures. Furthermore, we were able to establish that a risk analysis using any arbitrary threat model establishes an ordering of components with regard to cyber-risk. This ordering can be used to influence the overall system design with an eye to lowering risk, or as a way to understand real-time risk to operational systems based on a current threat landscape. Expert knowledge of both the analysis process and the system being analyzed is required to perform a HAZCADS analysis. The need for a tiered risk analysis is demonstrated by the results of this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Test and Analysis Correlation of Standard and Hybrid Standard/Thin-ply Composite Notched Test Specimens

Hybrid composite laminates, a combination of standard-and thin-ply layers, are structurally efficient and can offer opportunities for weight savings over composite laminates composed of only standard-thickness plies. Three hybrid laminates and three standard laminates were tested and analyzed to provide a baseline comparison for not only weight savings and strength benefits of the hybrid stacking sequences, but also to provide fidelity for progressive failure modeling techniques using the two different laminate designs. The standard and hybrid composite specimens were designed to have the same thickness and in-plane stiffness properties, as closely as possible, and were loaded with axial tension and axial compression. Small notched specimens were tested under compression and tension loading, and larger intermediate specimens were tested under tension loading, only. The finite element modeling represented the as-designed panel dimensions as well as the real-life testing conditions through various boundary conditions. The progressive failure modeling and analysis technique described, exhibited very good correlation with the hybrid test specimens, and therefore is appropriate for use in future investigations into more appealing stacking sequences. The progressive failure modeling can also be used to determine the proper usage of thin-ply materials in order to determine the most ideal strength benefits over their standard-ply counterparts.

Alana Zahn↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power distribution and control/remote manipulator system subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C)/Remote Manipulator System (RMS) hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained in the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the results of the independent analysis of the EPD and C/RMS (both port and starboard) hardware. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem hardware provides the electrical power and power control circuitry required to safely deploy, operate, control, and stow or guillotine and jettison two (one port and one starboard) RMSs. The EPD and C/RMS subsystem is subdivided into the four following functional divisions: Remote Manipulator Arm; Manipulator Deploy Control; Manipulator Latch Control; Manipulator Arm Shoulder Jettison; and Retention Arm Jettison. The IOA analysis process utilized available EPD and C/RMS hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based on the severity of the effect for each failure mode.

Robinson, W. W.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the electrical power generation/fuel cell powerplant subsystem FMEA/CIL

Results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Electrical Power Generation/Fuel Cell Powerplant (EPG/FCP) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed Post 51-L NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison was provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter EPG/FCP hardware.

Brown, K. L.↗
NASA NTRS1988

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the atmospheric revitalization pressure control subsystem FMEA/CIL

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the NASA FMEA/CIL proposed Post 51-L updates based upon the CCB/PRCB presentations and an informal criticality summary listing. A discussion of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. These discrepancies were flagged as issues, and recommendations were made based on the FMEA data available at the time. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter ARPCS hardware.

Saiidi, M. J.↗
NASA NTRS1986

Hubble Space Telescope meteoroid-debris protection analysis

A system level failure could occur if the Hubble Space Telescope's (ST) capability to operate as a facility on-orbit is critically reduced or when a significant reduction in the quality of science data is registered. Failure could occur if a meteoroid/debris impact damages a component of a major support subsystem or if a meteoroid/debris penetration causes straylight contamination in the light shield, forward shell, aft shroud, or through the aperture door. The ST was analyzed to find the probability of no critical penetration. This probability value was found to be 92.25% for a two-year service life. A straylight leakage repair technique was recommended for the aft shroud, the region found most likely to be critically penetrated. Fozar tape and multilayer insulation blankets are suggested as posible repair materials.

Horn, J.↗
DOE OSTI2021

Bio-project “derisking” through development of systematic methodologies and frameworks for risk assessment

One of the primary hindrances to producing a viable, sustainable domestic biomass industry for renewable biofuels, bio-products and bio-power is the lack of understanding and quantification of the risks associated with both the biomass supply chain and preprocessing and conversion technologies. Currently a consistent method for assessing, comparing, and quantifying risks in biomass supply chains does not exist, creating a major investment barrier to bioenergy projects in the U.S. The lack of a standardized approach has resulted in bioenergy stakeholders independently using inconsistent approaches and evaluation criteria, leading to unreliable and incomparable assessments of risks and financing barriers to bio-project development. Along with the challenges of inconsistent risk assessment for supply chain risk, technology specific risks based on variability in biomass properties are not fully understood and can pose significant unforeseen challenges for bioenergy projects. In many cases these properties have not yet been identified and the impacts on the proposed technology and products unquantified. This is particularly challenging for emerging preprocessing and conversion technologies. Without a firm understanding of the preprocessing/conversion technology-specific critical properties, the risk of a proposed bio-project cannot be fully evaluated. To address inconsistent risk evaluation in the biomass supply chain supporting project financing, a Biomass Supply Chain Risk Standards (BSCRS) framework was developed. The BSCRS framework includes a comprehensive list of known and perceived risks (Risk Indicators) to the supply chain developed through 100’s of interviews with bioenergy industry experts spanning from feedstock growers and suppliers to representatives from the financial sector. These risks have been organized into a manageable hierarchy of Risk Categories and Risk Factors that can be practically assessed. This BSCRS framework also provides mitigation strategies for multiple Risk Indicators from best available industry practices and research findings. Additionally, a risk quantification methodology for each Risk Factor, Risk Category, and the bio-project as a whole was developed to enable capital markets to assess feedstock risk more efficiently and more accurately. Multiple case studies representing existing bio-projects have been used to evaluate and verify the BSCRS framework and scoring methodology. To address technological risk along with the supply chain risk captured in the developed BSCRS framework, this work also focuses on development of a systematic criticality assessment tool using well-accepted, quantitative risk analysis methods to evaluate bioenergy feedstock critical properties impacting system unit operations. The proposed Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) approach uses a team of subject area experts (SAEs) for each targeted unit operation within a system. Collectively, the team will develop and use a quantitative scoring system to assess the material attributes, process parameters, and quality attributes for key unit operations that have already been identified. The FMEA process generates Risk Priority Numbers (RPNs) for the various failures and predominant causes for each material/process unit/product combination resulting in a semi-quantitative, standardized methodology for assessing technological risk and biomass properties contributing to that risk.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗