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At least 1,117 records · Page 62

Uranus Orbiter and Probe: Mission Challenges and Concept Updates Since the Origins, Worlds, and Life Decadal Survey

Origins, Worlds, and Life: Planetary Science and Astrobiology in the Next Decade identified a Uranus Orbiter and Probe as the highest-priority strategic mission for the decade 2023–2032, as it enables broad cross-disciplinary science in the largely unexplored Uranian system. The mission architecture evaluated by the Decadal Survey was a singular proof of concept demonstrating that a moderately instrumented mission could deliver Decadal-priority science with a reduced cost and risk posture by leveraging existing technologies to the maximum extent possible. With revised assumptions since the Decadal, we have explored a large trade space including launch vehicles, propulsion options, cruise trajectories, available power sources, viable concept of operations, and science data return for later launch dates without a Jupiter gravity assist. The most repeatable trajectory solutions employ either a commercially derived solar electric propulsion (SEP) transfer stage or the availability of a more capable launch vehicle under development, such as the SpaceX Starship. Orbit insertion has been moved farther from Uranus to acknowledge the remaining uncertainty in Uranian ring structure. A streamlined, SEP-adaptable, orbiter design was developed using two Next Gen Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators, and the probe design was matured, reducing the entry gravitational acceleration, and assuming the largest Decadal-recommended payload to provide margin for future instrument selections. With this updated design, we also constructed a detailed concept of operations for three representative science cases, returning 13–15 Gbit of science data and spacecraft telemetry per ∼34 day orbit.

Amy A Simon↗

Insider Threat - Material Control and Accountability Mitigation

The technical objectives of nuclear safeguards are (1) the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful uses to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown and (2) the deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards and security program must address both outsider threats and insider threats. Outsider threats are primarily addressed by the physical protection system. Insider threats can be any level of personnel at the site including passive or active insiders that could attempt protracted or abrupt diversion. This could occur by an individual acting alone or by collusion between an individual with material control and accountability (MC&A) responsibilities and another individual who has responsibility or control within both the physical protection and the MC&A systems. The insider threat is one that must be understood and incorporated into the safeguards posture. There have been more than 18 documented cases of theft or loss of plutonium or highly enriched uranium. The insider has access, authority, and knowledge, as well as a set of attributes, that make him/her difficult to detect. An integrated safeguards program is designed as a defense-in-depth system that seeks to prevent the unauthorized removal of nuclear material, to provide early detection of any unauthorized attempt to remove nuclear material, and to rapidly respond to any attempted removal of nuclear material. The program is also designed to support protection against sabotage, espionage, unauthorized access, compromise, and other hostile acts that may cause unacceptable adverse impacts on national security, program continuity, the health and safety of employees, the public, or the environment. Nuclear MC&A play an essential role in the capabilities of an integrated safeguards system to deter and detect theft or diversion of nuclear material. An integrated safeguards system with compensating mitigation can decrease the risk of an insider performing a malicious act without detection.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Addressing the Need for Independence in the CSE Model

Abstract Information system security risk, defined as the product of the monetary losses associated with security incidents and the probability that they occur, is a suitable decision criterion when considering different information system architectures. Risk assessment is the widely accepted process used to understand, quantify, and document the effects of undesirable events on organizational objectives so that risk management, continuity of operations planning, and contingency planning can be performed. One technique, the Cyberspace Security Econometrics System (CSES), is a methodology for estimating security costs to stakeholders as a function of possible risk postures. In earlier works, we presented a computational infrastructure that allows an analyst to estimate the security of a system in terms of the loss that each stakeholder stands to sustain, as a result of security breakdowns. Additional work has applied CSES to specific business cases. The current state-of-the-art of CSES addresses independent events. In typical usage, analysts create matrices that capture their expert opinion, and then use those matrices to quantify costs to stakeholders. This expansion generalizes CSES to the common real-world case where events may be dependent.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Using system-of-systems simulation modeling and analysis to measure energy KPP impacts for brigade combat team missions.

The Department of Defense's (DoD) Energy Posture identified dependence of the US Military on fossil fuel energy as a key issue facing the military. Inefficient energy consumption leads to increased costs, effects operational performance and warfighter protection through large and vulnerable logistics support infrastructures. Military's use of energy is a critical national security problem. DoD's proposed metrics Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel and Energy Efficiency Key Performance Parameter (FBCF and Energy KPP) are a positive step to force energy use accountability onto Military programs. The ability to measure impacts of sustainment are required to fully measure Energy KPP. Sandia's work with Army demonstrates the capability to measure performance which includes energy constraint.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

DOE/DHS Industrial Control System Cyber Security Programs: A Model for Use in Nuclear Facility Safeguards and Security

Many critical infrastructure sectors have been investigating cyber security issues for several years especially with the help of two primary government programs. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National SCADA Test Bed and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program have both implemented activities aimed at securing the industrial control systems that operate the North American electric grid along with several other critical infrastructure sectors (ICS). These programs have spent the last seven years working with industry including asset owners, educational institutions, standards and regulating bodies, and control system vendors. The programs common mission is to provide outreach, identification of cyber vulnerabilities to ICS and mitigation strategies to enhance security postures. The success of these programs indicates that a similar approach can be successfully translated into other sectors including nuclear operations, safeguards, and security. The industry regulating bodies have included cyber security requirements and, in some cases, have incorporated sets of standards with penalties for non-compliance such as the North American Electric Reliability Corporation Critical Infrastructure Protection standards. These DOE and DHS programs that address security improvements by both suppliers and end users provide an excellent model for nuclear facility personnel concerned with safeguards and security cyber vulnerabilities and countermeasures. It is not a stretch to imagine complete surreptitious collapse of protection against the removal of nuclear material or even initiation of a criticality event as witnessed at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl in a nuclear ICS inadequately protected against the cyber threat.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Essay: In Memory of Robert Siemann

Bob Siemann came to SLAC from Cornell in 1991. With the support from Burton Richter, then Director of SLAC, he took on a leadership role to formulate an academic program in accelerator physics at SLAC and the development of its accelerator faculty. Throughout his career he championed accelerator physics as an independent academic discipline, a vision that he fought so hard for and never retreated from. He convinced Stanford University and SLAC to create a line of tenured accelerator physics faculty and over the years he also regularly taught classes at Stanford and the U.S. Particle Accelerator School. After the shutdown of the SSC Laboratory, I returned to SLAC in 1993 to join the accelerator faculty he was forming. He had always visualized a need to have a professional academic journal for the accelerator field, and played a pivotal role in creating the journal Physical Review Special Topics - Accelerators and Beams, now the community standard for accelerator physics after nine years of his editorship. Today, Bob's legacy of accelerator physics as an independent academic discipline continues at SLAC as well as in the community, from which we all benefit. Bob was a great experimentalist. He specialized in experimental techniques and instrumentation, but what he wanted to learn is physics. If he had to learn theory - heaven forbid - to reach that goal, he would not hesitate one second to do so. In fact, he had written several theoretical papers as results of these efforts. Now this is what I call a true experimentalist! Ultimately, however, I think it was experimental instruments that he loved most. His eyes widened when he talked about his instruments. Prompted by a question, he would proceed to a nearby blackboard, with a satisfying grin, and draw his experimental device in a careful thinking manner, then describe his experiment and educate the questioner with some insightful physics. These moments were most enjoyable, to him and the questioner alike. When I think of Bob today, it is these moments that first come to mind, and it is these moments I will miss the most. I should like to mention another curious thing about Bob, namely he had a special talent of finding persuasive arguments that went his way. It was difficult to argue with Bob because it was so difficult to win. Generally quiet otherwise, he was too good and too methodical a debater. I had never seen him losing a debate on a policy issue or in a committee setting. However, when it comes to physics, his soft spot, he occasionally let go some weakness. When so doing, he would lose the debate, but his grin revealed that the loss was more than compensated by the physics he gained together with his debater. It is hard to believe that the office around the corner is now empty. The dear colleague we have come to know, to talk to, and to seek advice from, together with the feet-on-the-desk posture and the familiar grin, are no longer there. I wonder, who will now occupy that office next? And who will continue to carry on Bob Siemann's legacy? Many of us are waiting.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Monitoring and verification R&D

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) report outlined the Administration's approach to promoting the agenda put forward by President Obama in Prague on April 5, 2009. The NPR calls for a national monitoring and verification R&D program to meet future challenges arising from the Administration's nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament agenda. Verification of a follow-on to New START could have to address warheads and possibly components along with delivery capabilities. Deeper cuts and disarmament would need to address all of these elements along with nuclear weapon testing, nuclear material and weapon production facilities, virtual capabilities from old weapon and existing energy programs and undeclared capabilities. We only know how to address some elements of these challenges today, and the requirements may be more rigorous in the context of deeper cuts as well as disarmament. Moreover, there is a critical need for multiple options to sensitive problems and to address other challenges. There will be other verification challenges in a world of deeper cuts and disarmament, some of which we are already facing. At some point, if the reductions process is progressing, uncertainties about past nuclear materials and weapons production will have to be addressed. IAEA safeguards will need to continue to evolve to meet current and future challenges, and to take advantage of new technologies and approaches. Transparency/verification of nuclear and dual-use exports will also have to be addressed, and there will be a need to make nonproliferation measures more watertight and transparent. In this context, and recognizing we will face all of these challenges even if disarmament is not achieved, this paper will explore possible agreements and arrangements; verification challenges; gaps in monitoring and verification technologies and approaches; and the R&D required to address these gaps and other monitoring and verification challenges.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Replacing the Rare Earth Intellectual Capital

The rare earth crisis slowly evolved during a 10 to 15 year period beginning in the mid-1980s, when the Chinese began to export mixed rare earth concentrates. In the early 1990s, they started to move up the supply chain and began to export the individual rare earth oxides and metals. By the late 1990s the Chinese exported higher value products, such as magnets, phosphors, polishing compounds, catalysts; and in the 21st century they supplied finished products including electric motors, computers, batteries, liquid-crystal displays (LCDs), TVs and monitors, mobile phones, iPods and compact fluorescent lamp (CFL) light bulbs. As they moved to higher value products, the Chinese slowly drove the various industrial producers and commercial enterprises in the US, Europe and Japan out of business by manipulating the rare earth commodity prices. Because of this, the technically trained rare earth engineers and scientists who worked in areas from mining to separations, to processing to production, to manufacturing of semifinished and final products, were laid-off and moved to other fields or they retired. However, in the past year the Chinese have changed their philosophy of the 1970s and 1980s of forming a rare earth cartel to control the rare earth markets to one in which they will no longer supply the rest of the world (ROW) with their precious rare earths, but instead will use them internally to meet the growing demand as the Chinese standard of living increases. To this end, they have implemented and occasionally increased export restrictions and added an export tariff on many of the high demand rare earth elements. Now the ROW is quickly trying to start up rare earth mines, e.g. Molycorp Minerals in the US and Lynas Corp. in Australia, to cover this shortfall in the worldwide market, but it will take about five years for the supply to meet the demand, even as other mines in the ROW become productive. Unfortunately, today there is a serious lack of technically trained personnel to bring the entire rare earth industry, from mining to original equipment manufacturers (OEM), up to full speed in the next few years. Accompanying this decline in technical expertise, innovation and new products utilizing rare earth elements has slowed dramatically, and it may take a decade or more to recapture America's leading role in technological advancements of rare earth containing products. Before the disruption of the US rare earth industry, about 25,000 people were employed in all aspects of the industry from mining to OEM. Today, only about 1,500 people are employed in these fields. The ratio of non-technically trained persons to those with college degrees in the sciences or engineering varies from about 8 to 1 to about 4 to 1, depending on the particular area of the industry. Assuming an average of 6 to 1, the number of college degree scientists and engineers has decreased from about 4,000 to 250 employed today. In the magnetic industry the approximate numbers are: 6,000 total with 750 technically trained people in the 1980s to 500 totally employed today of which 75 have degrees. The paucity of scientists and engineers with experience and/or training in the various aspects of production and commercialization of the rare earths is a serious limitation to the ability of the US to satisfy its own needs for materials and technologies (1) to maintain our military strength and posture, (2) to assume leadership in critical energy technologies, and (3) to bring new consumer products to the marketplace. The lack of experts is of even greater national importance than the halting in the 1990s and the recent restart of the mining/benification/separation effort in the US; and thus governmental intervention and support for at least five to 10 years will be required to ameliorate this situation. To respond quickly, training programs should be established in conjunction with a national research center at an educational institution with a long tradition in multiple areas of rare earth and other critical elements research and technology. This center should form close affiliations with other universities, governmental laboratories and non-profit research organizations having complementary strengths. In addition, single investigators or small teams of rare earthers at other universities should be supported by the usual grants from NSF, DOD and DOE. These investigators may or may not be affiliated with the center.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Generic Repository Concepts and Thermal Analysis for Advanced Fuel Cycles

The current posture of the used nuclear fuel management program in the U.S. following termination of the Yucca Mountain Project, is to pursue research and development (R&D) of generic (i.e., non-site specific) technologies for storage, transportation and disposal. Disposal R&D is directed toward understanding and demonstrating the performance of reference geologic disposal concepts selected to represent the current state-of-the-art in geologic disposal. One of the principal constraints on waste packaging and emplacement in a geologic repository is management of the waste-generated heat. This paper describes the selection of reference disposal concepts, and thermal management strategies for waste from advanced fuel cycles. A geologic disposal concept for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or high-level waste (HLW) consists of three components: waste inventory, geologic setting, and concept of operations. A set of reference geologic disposal concepts has been developed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Used Fuel Disposition Campaign, for crystalline rock, clay/shale, bedded salt, and deep borehole (crystalline basement) geologic settings. We performed thermal analysis of these concepts using waste inventory cases representing a range of advanced fuel cycles. Concepts of operation consisting of emplacement mode, repository layout, and engineered barrier descriptions, were selected based on international progress and previous experience in the U.S. repository program. All of the disposal concepts selected for this study use enclosed emplacement modes, whereby waste packages are in direct contact with encapsulating engineered or natural materials. The encapsulating materials (typically clay-based or rock salt) have low intrinsic permeability and plastic rheology that closes voids so that low permeability is maintained. Uniformly low permeability also contributes to chemically reducing conditions common in soft clay, shale, and salt formations. Enclosed modes are associated with temperature constraints that limit changes to the encapsulating materials, and they generally have less capacity to dissipate heat from the waste package and its immediate surroundings than open modes such as that proposed for a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Open emplacement modes can be ventilated for many years prior to permanent closure of the repository, limiting peak temperatures both before and after closure, and combining storage and disposal functions in the same facility. Open emplacement modes may be practically limited to unsaturated host formations, unless emplacement tunnels are effectively sealed everywhere prior to repository closure. Thermal analysis of disposal concepts and waste inventory cases has identified important relationships between waste package size and capacity, and the duration of surface decay storage needed to meet temperature constraints. For example, the choice of salt as the host medium expedites the schedule for geologic disposal by approximately 50 yr (other factors held constant) thereby reducing future reliance on surface decay storage. Rock salt has greater thermal conductivity and stability at higher temperatures than other media considered. Alternatively, the choice of salt permits the use of significantly larger waste packages for SNF. The following sections describe the selection of reference waste inventories, geologic settings, and concepts of operation, and summarize the results from the thermal analysis.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Report of a workshop on nuclear forces and nonproliferation Woodrow Wilson international center for scholars, Washington, DC October 28, 2010

A workshop sponsored by the Los Alamos National Laboratory in cooperation with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was held at the Wilson Center in Washington, DC, on October 28, 2010. The workshop addressed evolving nuclear forces and their impacts on nonproliferation in the context of the new strategic environment, the Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review and the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The discussions reflected the importance of the NPR for defining the role of US nuclear forces in dealing with 21st century threats and providing guidance for National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Department of Defense (DoD) programs and, for many but not all participants, highlighted its role in the successful outcome of the NPT RevCon. There was widespread support for the NPR and its role in developing the foundations for a sustainable nuclear-weapon program that addresses nuclear weapons, infrastructure and expertise in the broader nonproliferation, disarmament and international security contexts. However, some participants raised concerns about its implementation and its long-term effectiveness and sustainability.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Cyber Security Testing and Training Programs for Industrial Control Systems

Service providers rely on industrial control systems (ICS) to manage the flow of water at dams, open breakers on power grids, control ventilation and cooling in nuclear power plants, and more. In today's interconnected environment, this can present a serious cyber security challenge. To combat this growing challenge, government, private industry, and academia are working together to reduce cyber risks. The Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is a key contributor to the Department of Energy National SCADA Test Bed (NSTB) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Control Systems Security Program (CSSP), both of which focus on improving the overall security posture of ICS in the national critical infrastructure. In support of the NSTB, INL hosts a dedicated SCADA testing facility which consists of multiple control systems supplied by leading national and international manufacturers. Within the test bed, INL researchers systematically examine control system components and work to identify vulnerabilities. In support of the CSSP, INL develops and conducts training courses which are designed to increase awareness and defensive capabilities for IT/Control System professionals. These trainings vary from web-based cyber security trainings for control systems engineers to more advanced hands-on training that culminates with a Red Team/ Blue Team exercise that is conducted within an actual control systems environment. INL also provides staffing and operational support to the DHS Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) Security Operations Center which responds to and analyzes control systems cyber incidents across the 18 US critical infrastructure sectors.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

The Use Of Computational Human Performance Modeling As Task Analysis Tool

During a review of the Advanced Test Reactor safety basis at the Idaho National Laboratory, human factors engineers identified ergonomic and human reliability risks involving the inadvertent exposure of a fuel element to the air during manual fuel movement and inspection in the canal. There were clear indications that these risks increased the probability of human error and possible severe physical outcomes to the operator. In response to this concern, a detailed study was conducted to determine the probability of the inadvertent exposure of a fuel element. Due to practical and safety constraints, the task network analysis technique was employed to study the work procedures at the canal. Discrete-event simulation software was used to model the entire procedure as well as the salient physical attributes of the task environment, such as distances walked, the effect of dropped tools, the effect of hazardous body postures, and physical exertion due to strenuous tool handling. The model also allowed analysis of the effect of cognitive processes such as visual perception demands, auditory information and verbal communication. The model made it possible to obtain reliable predictions of operator performance and workload estimates. It was also found that operator workload as well as the probability of human error in the fuel inspection and transfer task were influenced by the concurrent nature of certain phases of the task and the associated demand on cognitive and physical resources. More importantly, it was possible to determine with reasonable accuracy the stages as well as physical locations in the fuel handling task where operators would be most at risk of losing their balance and falling into the canal. The model also provided sufficient information for a human reliability analysis that indicated that the postulated fuel exposure accident was less than credible.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

SRS K-AREA MATERIAL STORAGE - EXPANDING CAPABILITIES

In support of the Department of Energy’s continued plans to de-inventory and reduce the footprint of Cold War era weapons’ material production sites, the K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility, located in the K-Area Complex (KAC) at the Savannah River Site reservation, has expanded since its startup authorization in 2000 to accommodate DOE’s material consolidation mission. During the facility’s growth and expansion, KAMS will have expanded its authorization capability of material types and storage containers to allow up to 8200 total shipping containers once the current expansion effort completes in 2014. Recognizing the need to safely and cost effectively manage other surplus material across the DOE Complex, KAC is constantly evaluating the storage of different material types within K area. When modifying storage areas in KAC, the Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) must undergo extensive calculations and reviews; however, without an extensive and proven security posture the possibility for expansion would not be possible. The KAC maintains the strictest adherence to safety and security requirements for all the SNM it handles. Disciplined Conduct of Operations and Conduct of Projects are demonstrated throughout this historical overview highlighting various improvements in capability, capacity, demonstrated cost effectiveness and utilization of the KAC as the DOE Center of Excellence for safe and secure storage of surplus SNM.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

HPC s Pivot to Data

Computer centers such as NERSC and OLCF have traditionally focused on delivering computational capability that enables breakthrough innovation in a wide range of science domains. Accessing that computational power has required services and tools to move the data from input and output to computation and storage. A ''pivot to data'' is occurring in HPC. Data transfer tools and services that were previously peripheral are becoming integral to scientific workflows. Emerging requirements from high-bandwidth detectors, high-throughput screening techniques, highly concur- rent simulations, increased focus on uncertainty quantification, and an emerging open-data policy posture toward published research are among the data-drivers shaping the networks, file systems, databases, and overall compute and data environment. In this paper we explain the pivot to data in HPC through user requirements and the changing resources provided by HPC with particular focus on data movement. For WAN data transfers we present the results of a study of network performance between centers.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Nuclear policy impacts at the national laboratories: maintaining the deterrence

In this presentation, the author will discuss recent nuclear policy impacts, including the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, and the impacts they have on maintaining the nuclear deterrent. Specifically, he will highlight some of the remaining questions and challenges that remain to the nation and to the national laboratories. (auth)

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Cyber / Physical Security Vulnerability Assessment Integration

Abstract Both physical protection and cyber security domains offer solutions for the discovery of vulnerabilities through the use of various assessment processes and software tools. Each vulnerability assessment (VA) methodology provides the ability to identify and categorize vulnerabilities, and quantifies the risks within their own areas of expertise. Neither approach fully represents the true potential security risk to a site and/or a facility, nor comprehensively assesses the overall security posture. The technical approach to solving this problem was to identify methodologies and processes that blend the physical and cyber security assessments, and develop tools to accurately quantify the unaccounted for risk. SMEs from both the physical and the cyber security domains developed the blending methodologies, and cross trained each other on the various aspects of the physical and cyber security assessment processes. A local critical infrastructure entity volunteered to host a proof of concept physical/cyber security assessment, and the lessons learned have been leveraged by this effort. The four potential modes of attack an adversary can use in approaching a target are; Physical Only Attack, Cyber Only Attack, Physical Enabled Cyber Attack, and the Cyber Enabled Physical Attack. The Physical Only and the Cyber Only pathway analysis are two of the most widely analyzed attack modes. The pathway from an off-site location to the desired target location is dissected to ensure adversarial activity can be detected and neutralized by the protection strategy, prior to completion of a predefined task. This methodology typically explores a one way attack from the public space (or common area) inward towards the target. The Physical Enabled Cyber Attack and the Cyber Enabled Physical Attack are much more intricate. Both scenarios involve beginning in one domain to affect change in the other, then backing outward to take advantage of the reduced system effectiveness, before penetrating further into the defenses. The proper identification and assessment of the overlapping areas (and interaction between these areas) in the VA process is necessary to accurately assess the true risk.

Vulnerability Analysis, Risk Analysis, Cyber Secur↗

Cyber Hygiene for Control System Security

There are many resources from government and private industry available to assist organizations in reducing their attack surface and enhancing their security posture. Furthermore, standards are being written and improved upon to make the practice of securing a network more manageable. And while the specifics of network security are complex, most system vulnerabilities can be mitigated using fairly simple cyber hygiene techniques like those offered above.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cybersecurity Intrusion Detection and Monitoring for Field Area Network: Final Report

This report summarizes the key technical accomplishments, industry impact and performance of the I2-CEDS grant entitled “Cybersecurity Intrusion Detection and Monitoring for Field Area Network”. Led by Applied Communication Sciences (ACS/Vencore Labs) in conjunction with its utility partner Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), the project accelerated research on a first-of-its-kind cybersecurity monitoring solution for Advanced Meter Infrastructure and Distribution Automation field networks. It advanced the technology to a validated, full-scale solution that detects anomalies, intrusion events and improves utility situational awareness and visibility. The solution was successfully transitioned and commercialized for production use as SecureSmart™ Continuous Monitoring. Discoveries made with SecureSmart™ Continuous Monitoring led to tangible and demonstrable improvements in the security posture of the US national electric infrastructure.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗