The Transition of the Nuclear Weapons Complex Towards Nuclear-Zero - Impacts on Stockpile Surveillance.
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India's nuclear energy strategy has traditionally strived for energy self-sufficiency, driven largely by necessity following trade restrictions imposed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) following India's 'peaceful nuclear explosion' of 1974. On September 6, 2008, the NSG agreed to create an exception opening nuclear trade with India, which may create opportunities for India to modify its baseline strategy. The purpose of this document is to describe India's 'baseline plan,' which was developed under constrained trade conditions, as a basis for understanding changes in India's path as a result of the opening of nuclear commerce. Note that this treatise is based upon publicly available information. No attempt is made to judge whether India can meet specified goals either in scope or schedule. In fact, the reader is warned a priori that India's delivery of stated goals has often fallen short or taken a significantly longer period to accomplish. It has been evident since the early days of nuclear power that India's natural resources would determine the direction of its civil nuclear power program. It's modest uranium but vast thorium reserves dictated that the country's primary objective would be thorium utilization. Estimates of India's natural deposits vary appreciably, but its uranium reserves are known to be extremely limited, totaling approximately 80,000 tons, on the order of 1% of the world's deposits; and nominally one-third of this ore is of very low uranium concentration. However, India's roughly 300,000 tons of thorium reserves account for approximately 30% of the world's total. Confronted with this reality, the future of India's nuclear power industry is strongly dependent on the development of a thorium-based nuclear fuel cycle as the only way to insure a stable, sustainable, and autonomous program. The path to India's nuclear energy self-sufficiency was first outlined in a seminal paper by Drs. H. J. Bhabha and N. B. Prasad presented at the Second United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in 1958. The paper described a three stage plan for a sustainable nuclear energy program consistent with India's limited uranium but abundant thorium natural resources. In the first stage, natural uranium would be used to fuel graphite or heavy water moderated reactors. Plutonium extracted from the spent fuel of these thermal reactors would drive fast reactors in the second stage that would contain thorium blankets for breeding uranium-233 (U-233). In the final stage, this U-233 would fuel thorium burning reactors that would breed and fission U-233 in situ. This three stage blueprint still reigns as the core of India's civil nuclear power program. India's progress in the development of nuclear power, however, has been impacted by its isolation from the international nuclear community for its development of nuclear weapons and consequent refusal to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Initially, India was engaged in numerous cooperative research programs with foreign countries; for example, under the 'Atoms for Peace' program, India acquired the Cirus reactor, a 40 MWt research reactor from Canada moderated with heavy water from the United States. India was also actively engaged in negotiations for the NPT. But, on May 18, 1974, India conducted a 'peaceful nuclear explosion' at Pokharan using plutonium produced by the Cirus reactor, abruptly ending the era of international collaboration. India then refused to sign the NPT, which it viewed as discriminatory since it would be required to join as a non-nuclear weapons state. As a result of India's actions, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created in 1975 to establish guidelines 'to apply to nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes to help ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities. These nuclear export controls have forced India to be largely self-sufficient in all nuclear-related technologies.
Nuclear forensics is important to our national security. Actions, including provision of appropriate funding, are needed now to sustain and improve the nation's nuclear forensics capabilities. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), working with cooperating agencies and national laboratories, should plan and implement a sustainable, effective nuclear forensics program. Nuclear forensics is the examination and evaluation of discovered or seized nuclear materials and devices or, in cases of nuclear explosions or radiological dispersals, of detonation signals and post-detonation debris. Nuclear forensic evidence helps law enforcement and intelligence agencies work toward preventing, mitigating, and attributing a nuclear or radiological incident. This report, requested by DHS, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the Department of Defense, makes recommendations on how to sustain and improve U.S. nuclear forensics capabilities. The United States has developed a nuclear forensics capability that has been demonstrated in real-world incidents of interdicted materials and in exercises of actions required after a nuclear detonation. The committee, however, has concerns about the program and finds that without strong leadership, careful planning, and additional funds, these capabilities will decline. Major areas of concern include: Organization. The responsibility for nuclear forensics is shared by several agencies without central authority and with no consensus on strategic requirements to guide the program. This organizational complexity hampers the program and could prove to be a major hindrance operationally. Sustainability. The nation's current nuclear forensics capabilities are available primarily because the system of laboratories, equipment, and personnel upon which they depend was developed and funded by the nuclear weapons program. However, the weapons program's funds are declining. Workforce and Infrastructure. Personnel skilled in nuclear forensics are too few and are spread too thinly. Some key facilities are in need of replacement because they are old, outdated, and not built to modern environmental, health, and safety standards. Procedures and Tools. Most nuclear forensics techniques were developed to carry out Cold War missions and to satisfy a different, less restrictive set of environmental, health, and safety standards. Some of the equipment also does not reflect today's technical capabilities. The Executive Office of the President established the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center under the direction of the Secretary of Homeland Security, to coordinate nuclear forensics in the United States. DHS's responsibility can only be carried out with the cooperation and support of the other agencies involved. The committee recommends that DHS and the other cooperating agencies should: 1. Streamline the organizational structure, aligning authority and responsibility; and develop and issue appropriate requirements documents. 2. Issue a coordinated and integrated implementation plan for fulfilling the requirements and sustaining and improving the program's capabilities. This plan would form the basis for the agencies' multi-year program budget requests. 3. Implement a plan to build and maintain an appropriately sized and composed nuclear forensics workforce, ensuring sufficient staffing at the national laboratories and support for university research, training programs, and collaborative relationships among the national laboratories and other organizations. 4. Adapt nuclear forensics to the challenges of real emergency situations, including, for example, conducting more realistic exercises that are unannounced and that challenge regulations and procedures followed in the normal work environment, and implementing lessons learned. The national laboratories should: 5. Optimize procedures and equipment through R&D to meet program requirements. Modeling and simulation should play an increased role in research, development, and planning. The nuclear forensics community should: 6. Develop standards and procedures for nuclear forensics that are rooted in the same underlying principles that have been recommended to guide modern forensic science. DHS and the other cooperating agencies should: 7. Devise and implement a plan that enables access to relevant information in databases including classified and proprietary databases for nuclear forensics missions. The Executive Office of the President and the Department of State, working with the community of nuclear forensics experts, should: 8. Determine the classes of data and methods that are to be shared internationally and explore mechanisms to accomplish that sharing.
Nuclear energy is an important part of our current global energy system, and contributes to supplying the significant demand for electricity for many nations around the world. There are 433 commercial nuclear power reactors operating in 30 countries with an installed capacity of 367 GWe as of October 2011 (IAEA PRIS, 2011). Nuclear electricity generation totaled 2630 TWh in 2010 representing 14% the world’s electricity generation. The top five countries of total installed nuclear capacity are the US, France, Japan, Russia and South Korea at 102, 63, 45, 24, and 21 GWe, respectively (WNA, 2012a). The nuclear capacity of these five countries represents more than half, 68%, of the total global nuclear capacity. The role of nuclear power in the global energy system today has been motivated by several factors including the growing demand for electric power, the regional availability of fossil resources and energy security concerns, and the relative competitiveness of nuclear power as a source of base-load electricity. There is additional motivation for the use of nuclear power because it does not produce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or local air pollutants during its operation and contributes to low levels of emissions throughout the lifecycle of the nuclear energy system (Beerten, J. et. al., 2009). Energy from nuclear fission primarily in the form of electric power and potentially as a source of industrial heat could play a greater role for meeting the long-term growing demand for energy worldwide while addressing the concern for climate change from rising GHG emissions. However, the nature of nuclear fission as a tremendously compact and dense form of energy production with associated high concentrations of radioactive materials has particular and unique challenges as well as benefits. These challenges include not only the safety and cost of nuclear reactors, but proliferation concerns, safeguard and storage of nuclear materials associated with nuclear fuel cycles. In March of 2011, an unprecedented earthquake of 9 magnitude and ensuing tsunami off the east coast of Japan caused a severe nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2011). The severity of the nuclear accident in Japan has brought about a reinvestigation of nuclear energy policy and deployment activities for many nations around the world, most notably in Japan and Germany (BBC, 2011; Reuter, 2011). The response to the accident has been mixed and its full impact may not be realized for many years to come. The nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan has not directly affected the significant on-going nuclear deployment activities in many countries. China, Russia, India, and South Korea, as well as others, are continuing with their deployment plans. As of October 2011, China had the most reactors under construction at 27, while Russia, India, and South Korea had 11, 6, and 5 reactors under construction, respectively (IAEA PRIS, 2011). Ten other nations have one or two reactors currently under construction. Many more reactors are planned for future deployment in China, Russia, and India, as well as in the US. Based on the World Nuclear Association’s data, the realization of China’s deployment plan implies that China will surpass the US in total nuclear capacity some time in the future.
In the UK, nuclear skills and qualifications have been the subject of several studies in higher levels of Government, including one by UK Cabinet Office. The newly formed UK Nuclear Skills Strategy Group (NSSG) has been tasked with addressing the current skills and people gaps for the UK nuclear industry. The NSSG is working with several key organisations in the UK: The National Skills Academy for Nuclear, (NSAN), which covers skills interventions, training and workforce development and experience, and the newly forming National College for Nuclear (NCfN) which will become a nuclear qualifications awarding body, regulating educational qualifications and curriculum in the nuclear sector. The NSSG has published its own UK Nuclear Skills Strategy in December 2016, aligned to the UK Cabinet Office study. It is the intent that, in the near future, nuclear qualifications and experience will be directly transferable across different organisations and nuclear sites in the UK, enabling the maintenance of high standards of behaviours and improved mobility throughout the sector. The UK needs to maintain and grow a diverse workforce and nuclear Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP) people. The 2015 UK Nuclear Labour Market Intelligence (LMI) report, produced by Cogent for the Nuclear Energy Skills Alliance (NESA), concluded that the total nuclear workforce demand for the UK Nuclear Civil and Defence sector needed to grow by 33,000 people in the next five years, which includes replacement and expansion demand. This involved all disciplines and grades, with for example, higher level skilled workers needing to increase by 2200 FTEs every year. The main discipline pinch points were in, for example, Mechanical; Electrical; Project Management; Safety Case Specialists; Commissioning Engineers. Of the overall workforce, around 10% is over 60 years old and around 38% is over 50 years old. Jacobs in the UK is widely involved in many aspects of skills and competence development, with active involvement in local and national training programmes, and driving new methodologies to accelerate our staff's journey to nuclear competence. As well as looking at the immediate future, there is a risk in the UK that, over the 120-year plus clean-up mission, there won't be enough people with the right skills. Jacobs is developing sustainable solutions to this in our skills and development strategy for the nuclear sector. Jacobs has developed a variety of approaches to help us maintain and grow our diverse workforce and nuclear 'SQEP' people. This includes: - Identifying and developing our employees' technical and personal skills and capabilities, particularly the requirements of our millennials in both technical and social aspects of their working lives. - Identifying and planning for our future skills needs to meet our projected business requirements. - Our programme to transfer skilled employees from other sectors into the nuclear industry. - Our extensive school student placement scheme, aligned to the UK's 'Industrial Cadet' scheme, which has helped to bring school-aged students into Jacobs on workplace experience. - Our collaboration with our customers to develop UK national level Trailblazer Apprentice programmes. - Our involvement at a UK national level in the work of the National Skills Academy for Nuclear (NSAN), the Nuclear Energy Skills Alliance (NESA) High Level Skills Committee and the newly forming UK National College for Nuclear (NCfN). - Our work to ensure diversity is valued in our workplace, for example in our involvement in 'Women in Nuclear'. (authors)
The US Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), has been tasked with the important mission of ensuring that nuclear energy remains a compelling and viable energy source in the U.S. The motivations behind this mission include cost-effectively meeting the expected increases in the power needs of the country, reducing carbon emissions and reducing dependence on foreign energy sources. In the near term, to ensure that nuclear power remains a key element of U.S. energy strategy and portfolio, the DOE-NE will be working with the nuclear industry to support safe and efficient operations of existing nuclear power plants. In the long term, to meet the increasing energy needs of the U.S., the DOE-NE will be investing in research and development (R&D) and working in concert with the nuclear industry to build and deploy new, safer and more efficient nuclear power plants. The safe and efficient operations of existing nuclear power plants and designing, licensing and deploying new reactor designs, however, will require focused R&D programs as well as the extensive use and leveraging of advanced modeling and simulation (M&S). M&S will play a key role in ensuring safe and efficient operations of existing and new nuclear reactors. The DOE-NE has been actively developing and promoting the use of advanced M&S in reactor design and analysis through its R&D programs, e.g., the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) and Consortium for Advanced Simulation of Light Water Reactors (CASL) programs. Also, nuclear reactor vendors are already using CFD and CSM, for design, analysis, and licensing. However, these M&S tools cannot be used with confidence for nuclear reactor applications unless accompanied and supported by verification and validation (V&V) and uncertainty quantification (UQ) processes and procedures which provide quantitative measures of uncertainty for specific applications. The Nuclear Energy Knowledge base for Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NE-KAMS) is being developed at the Idaho National Laboratory in conjunction with Bettis Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Argonne National Laboratory, Utah State University and others with the objective of establishing a comprehensive and web-accessible knowledge base that will provide technical services and resources for V&V and UQ of M&S in nuclear energy sciences and engineering. The knowledge base will serve as an important resource for technical exchange and collaboration that will enable credible and reliable computational models and simulations for application to nuclear reactor design, analysis and licensing. NE-KAMS will serve as a valuable resource for the nuclear industry, academia, the national laboratories, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the public and will help ensure the safe, economical and reliable operation of existing and future nuclear reactors. From its inception, NE-KAMS will directly support nuclear energy research, development and demonstration programs within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), including the CASL, NEAMS, Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS), Small Modular Reactors (SMR), and Next Generation Nuclear Power Plant (NGNP) programs. These programs all involve M&S of nuclear reactor systems, components and processes, and it is envisioned that NE-KAMS will help to coordinate and facilitate collaboration and sharing of resources and expertise for V&V and UQ across these programs.
Today the applications of nuclear physics span a very broad range of topics and fields. This review discusses a number of aspects of these applications, including selected topics and concepts in nuclear reactor physics, nuclear fusion, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear-geophysics, and nuclear medicine. The review begins with a historic summary of the early years in applied nuclear physics, with an emphasis on the huge developments that took place around the time of World War II, and that underlie the physics involved in designs of nuclear explosions, controlled nuclear energy, and nuclear fusion. The review then moves to focus on modern applications of these concepts, including the basic concepts and diagnostics developed for the forensics of nuclear explosions, the nuclear diagnostics at the National Ignition Facility, nuclear reactor safeguards, and the detection of nuclear material production and trafficking. The review also summarizes recent developments in nuclear geophysics and nuclear medicine. The nuclear geophysics areas discussed include geo-chronology, nuclear logging for industry, the Oklo reactor, and geo-neutrinos. The section on nuclear medicine summarizes the critical advances in nuclear imaging, including PET and SPECT imaging, targeted radionuclide therapy, and the nuclear physics of medical isotope production. Lastly, each subfield discussed requires a review article unto itself, which is not the intention of the current review; rather, the current review is intended for readers who wish to get a broad understanding of applied nuclear physics.
In my home country of Venezuela, nuclear energy is not a topic that attracts much attention. The government briefly oversaw some nuclear energy programs during the 1950s, but currently there are no active nuclear power facilities in the country. In fact, the Venezuelan government signed and ratified the treaty of the prohibition of nuclear weapons in 2021, which states that Venezuela has never owned, possessed or controlled nuclear weapons or programs of any kind. When I moved to the United States, however, nuclear energy became an extremely relevant topic. In the 1940s, the U.S. government established and oversaw the Manhattan Project to build atomic bombs for use in World War II. After the war, the government encouraged scientists to use this information on nuclear reactions to develop nuclear energy for peaceful civilian purposes instead.1 During these early days of nuclear research, there were no formal regulatory standards for nuclear waste management. Policies usually were self-regulated and often created based on existing policies of disposal for non-nuclear waste.2 As a result, there were instances of nuclear waste leaching into the environment and affecting local communities. So, much research has been conducted since then to characterize and store nuclear waste safely and securely.3 I first became interested in nuclear energy during my undergraduate studies when I worked on a project involving ligand synthesis to help extract actinides from nuclear waste. I then studied electrochemistry in molten salt systems for nuclear energy applications during my Ph.D. As I approached graduation, I started looking into national laboratories that have programs involving nuclear energy and waste management. At Idaho National Laboratory (INL), the focus is more on applied processes and how nuclear energy can be innovated to realize next-generation reactor design and technologies. This focus led me to apply for a Seaborg distinguished postdoctoral position at INL, for which I was chosen based on my proposal of a way to improve nuclear waste recycling. To understand my proposal, we must familiarize ourselves with the makeup of nuclear waste. After uranium dioxide is used as nuclear fuel in a reactor, the fuel matrix is then characterized by various fission products, including rare earth elements, alkali and alkaline earths, and actinides. Some of these fission products can potentially be recovered through pyroprocessing, 4 which involves the electrochemical dissolution of the used nuclear fuel in a molten chloride salt mixture at high temperatures. Though some of the fission products can be easily recovered—for example, uranium is reduced onto an inert cathode by applied potentials—numerous other fission products such as rare earth elements are difficult to recover due to their multivalent oxidation states and side reactions.5 To improve the recovery efficiency of rare earth elements specifically, I proposed investigating the fundamental interactions between rare earth elements in the molten chloride salt and their metallic form (Figure 1). The kinetic pathways and the chemical reactions of these elements, which will be elucidated through spectro-electrochemistry at high temperatures, will give insights on how the recovery efficiency can be improved. Although my research focuses on fundamental science, it will benefit the applied process by generating new scientific knowledge and closing the gap for efficient recycling of the waste: one step at a time.
The availability of trained and qualified nuclear and radiation security experts worldwide has decreased as those with hands-on experience have retired while the demand for these experts and skills have increased. The U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has responded to the continued loss of technical and policy expertise amongst personnel and students in the security field by initiating the establishment of a Nuclear Security Education Initiative, in partnership with Pennsylvania State University (PSU), Texas A and M (TAMU), and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). This collaborative, multi-year initiative forms the basis of specific education programs designed to educate the next generation of personnel who plan on careers in the nonproliferation and security fields with both domestic and international focus. The three universities worked collaboratively to develop five core courses consistent with the GTRI mission, policies, and practices. These courses are the following: Global Nuclear Security Policies, Detectors and Source Technologies, Applications of Detectors/Sensors/Sources for Radiation Detection and Measurements Nuclear Security Laboratory, Threat Analysis and Assessment, and Design and Analysis of Security Systems for Nuclear and Radiological Facilities. The Pennsylvania State University (PSU) Nuclear Engineering Program is a leader in undergraduate and graduate-level nuclear engineering education in the USA. The PSU offers undergraduate and graduate programs in nuclear engineering. The PSU undergraduate program in nuclear engineering is the largest nuclear engineering programs in the USA. The PSU Radiation Science and Engineering Center (RSEC) facilities are being used for most of the nuclear security education program activities. Laboratory space and equipment was made available for this purpose. The RSEC facilities include the Penn State Breazeale Reactor (PSBR), gamma irradiation facilities (in-pool irradiator, dry irradiator, and hot cells), neutron beam laboratory, radiochemistry laboratories, and various radiation detection and measurement laboratories. A new nuclear security education laboratory was created with DOE NNSA- GTRI funds at RSEC. The nuclear security graduate level curriculum enables the PSU to educate and train future nuclear security experts, both within the United States as well as worldwide. The nuclear security education program at Penn State will grant a Master's degree in nuclear security starting fall 2015. The PSU developed two courses: Nuclear Security- Detector And Source Technologies and Nuclear Security- Applications of Detectors/Sensors/Sources for Radiation Detection and Measurements (Laboratory). Course descriptions and course topics of these courses are described briefly: - Nuclear Security - Detector and Source Technologies; - Nuclear Security - Applications of Detectors/Sensors/Sources for Radiation Detection and Measurements Laboratory.
On August 5, 1963, after more than eight years of negotiations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs marked the end of World War II and the beginning of the nuclear age. As tensions between East and West settled into a Cold War, scientists in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union conducted tests and developed more powerful nuclear weapons. In 1959, radioactive deposits were found in wheat and milk in the northern United States. As scientists and the public gradually became aware of the dangers of radioactive fallout, they began to raise their voices against nuclear testing. Leaders and diplomats of several countries sought to address the issue. In May 1955, the United Nations Disarmament Commission brought together the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on ending nuclear weapons testing. Conflict soon arose over inspections to verify underground testing. The Soviet Union feared that on-site inspections could lead to spying that might expose the Soviets' vastly exaggerated claims of the number of deliverable nuclear weapons. As negotiators struggled over differences, the Soviet Union and the United States suspended nuclear tests—a moratorium that lasted from November 1958 to September 1961. John F. Kennedy had supported ban on nuclear weapons testing since 1956. He believed a ban would prevent other countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, and took a strong stand on the issue in the 1960 presidential campaign. Once elected, President Kennedy pledged not to resume testing in the air and promised to pursue all diplomatic efforts for a test ban treaty before resuming underground testing. He envisioned the test ban as a first step to nuclear disarmament. President Kennedy met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, just five weeks after the humiliating defeat of the US-sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Khrushchev took a hard line at the summit. He announced his intention to cut off Western access to Berlin and threatened war if the United States or its allies tried to stop him. Many US diplomats felt that Kennedy had not stood up to the Soviet premier at the summit and left Khrushchev with the impression that he was a weak leader. President Kennedy's political and military advisers feared that the Soviet Union had continued secret underground testing and made gains in nuclear technology. They pressured Kennedy to resume testing. And, according to a Gallup poll in July 1961, the public approved of testing by a margin of two-to-one. In August 1961, the Soviet Union announced its intention to resume atmospheric testing, and over the next three months it conducted 31 nuclear tests. It exploded the largest nuclear bomb in history—58 megatons—4,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. In his commencement address at American University on June 10, 1963, Kennedy announced a new round of high-level arms negotiations with the Russians. He boldly called for an end to the Cold War. "If we cannot end our differences," he said, "at least we can help make the world a safe place for diversity." The Soviet government broadcast a translation of the entire speech, and allowed it to be reprinted in the controlled Soviet press. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, by US Secretary Dean Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home—one day short of the 18th anniversary of the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Over the next two months, President Kennedy convinced a fearful public and a divided Senate to support the treaty. The Senate approved the treaty on September 23, 1963, by an 80-19 margin. Kennedy signed the ratified treaty on October 7, 1963. The treaty: prohibited nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear explosions under water, in the atmosphere, or in outer space allowed underground nuclear tests as long as no radioactive debris falls outside the boundaries of the nation conducting the test pledged signatories to work towards complete disarmament, an end to the armaments race, and an end to the contamination of the environment by radioactive substances. Thirty-three years later, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Signed by 71 nations, including those possessing nuclear weapons, the treaty prohibited all nuclear test explosions including those conducted underground. Though it was signed by President Bill Clinton, the Senate rejected the treaty by a vote of 51 to 48.
There are 24 units of nuclear power reactors in operation and 4 units of nuclear power reactors under construction in Korea as of November 2015. However, there is no permanently shutdown nuclear power reactor and decommissioned or under decommissioning nuclear power reactor. There are only 2 research reactors being decommissioned since 1997. It is realized that improvement of the regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear facilities has been emphasized constantly from the point of view of IAEA's safety standards. IAEA published the safety requirement on decommissioning of facilities on July 2014; its title is the Safe Decommissioning of Facilities, General Safety Requirement Part 6. According to follow up action on the result of IAEA's Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) mission to Korea in 2011, regulatory framework for decommissioning of nuclear facilities in Korea was revised through comparing to IAEA safety standards. It was identified that items should be revised to improve the regulatory framework for decommissioning. Those are as follows: absence of legal definition of decommissioning, incomplete procedure for safety regulation after permanent shutdown, un-detailed acceptance criteria for decommissioning plan, incomplete requirements for early preparing and periodic update of decommissioning plan, un-detailed requirements on standard format and contents for decommissioning plan, and incomplete radiological criteria on site and building reuse after completion of decommissioning. Nuclear Safety Act related to decommissioning of nuclear facilities was revised and promulgated on 21 July 2015. As the lower statute of Nuclear Safety Act, Enforcement Decree of the Nuclear Safety Act and Enforcement Regulation of the Nuclear Safety Act were also revised and promulgated on 21 July 2015. In this paper, related to decommissioning of nuclear facilities such as nuclear power reactor, research or training reactor, and nuclear fuel cycle facility, it was introduced the main changes of the amended and promulgated Nuclear Safety Act on July 2015. It was also mentioned about the current issue in accordance with its implementation. Main contents of revised Nuclear Safety Act are that decommissioning plan should be submitted for nuclear installations to be constructed and operated, and this plan should be updated periodically. In addition, 3 years of grace period was set to submit preliminary decommissioning plan for the facility which has already been approved prior to July 2018. Preliminary decommissioning plan should be updated every 10 years, and regulatory body should review this document. According to the revised Nuclear Safety Act, in the case of a nuclear power reactor after the approval of the change on operating license for permanent shutdown, should submit final decommissioning plan within 5 years, and be approved by the regulatory body. On July 2015, Kori Unit 1 was determined not to apply its 2nd continued operation, and will expire in 2017. Kori Unit 1 will be the first case for the submission of final decommissioning plan. (authors)