Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “ANN”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 1,117 records · Page 62

Assessment of Residual Stresses in 3013 Inner and Outer Containers and Teardrop Samples

This report is an assessment performed by LANL that examines packaging for plutonium-bearing materials and the resilience of its design. This report discusses residual stresses in the 3013 outer, the SRS/Hanford and RFETS/LLNL inner containers, and teardrop samples used in studies to assess the potential for SCC in 3013 containers. Residual tensile stresses in the heat affected zones of the closure welds are of particular concern.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Preparation and Characterization of a Master Blend of Plutonium Oxide for the 3013 Large Scale Shelf-Life Surveillance Project

A mixture of chlorine-containing, impure plutonium oxides has been produced and has been given the name Master Blend. This large quantity of well-characterized chlorinecontaining material is available for use in the Integrated Surveillance and Monitoring Program for shelf-life experiments. It is intended to be representative of materials packaged to meet DOE-STD-3013.1 The Master Blend contains a mixture of items produced in Los Alamos National Laboratory’s (LANL) electro-refining pyrochemical process in the late 1990s. Twenty items were crushed and sieved, calcined to 800ºC for four hours, and blended multiple times. This process resulted in four batches of Master Blend. Calorimetry and density data on material from the four batches indicate homogeneity.

3013 electro-refining storagage radioactive↗

Corrosion Testing of 304L SS 3013 Inner Container and Teardrop Samples

The Department of Energy (DOE) 3013 Standard specifies a minimum of two containers to be used for the storage of plutonium-bearing materials containing at least 30 wt.% plutonium and uranium. Three nested containers are typically used, the outer, inner, and convenience containers, shown in Figure 1. Both the outer and inner containers are sealed with a weld while the innermost convenience container must not be sealed. Lifetime of the containers is expected to be fifty years. The containers are fabricated of austenitic stainless steels (SS) due to their high corrosion resistance. Potential failure mechanisms of the storage containers have been examined by Kolman and Lillard et al.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Residual Stresses and Other Properties of Teardrops

The Department of Energy’s 3013 Standard for packaging plutonium-bearing materials for storage up to fifty years specifies a minimum of two individually welded, nested containers herein referred to as the 3013 outer and the 3013 inner.1 Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is a potential failure mechanism for 3013 inner containers.2,3 The bagless transfer container (BTC), a 3013 inner container used by Hanford and Savanna River Site (SRS) made from 304L stainless steel (SS), poses the greatest concern for SCC.4,5 The Surveillance and Monitoring Program (SMP) use stressed metal samples known as teardrops as screening tools in SCC studies to evaluate factors that could result in cracks in the 3013 containers.6,7 This report provides background information on the teardrops used in the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) SMP studies including method of construction, composition and variability. In addition, the report discusses measurements of residual stresses in teardrops and compares the results with residual stresses in BTCs reported previously.4 Factors affecting residual stresses, including teardrop dimensions and surface finish, are also discussed.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

MIS High-Purity Plutonium Oxide Metal Oxidation Product TS707001 (SSR123): Final Report

A high-purity plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample TS707001 represents process plutonium oxides from several metal oxidation operations as well as impure and scrap plutonium from Hanford that are currently stored in 3013 containers. After calcination to 950°C, the material contained 86.98% plutonium with no major impurities. This study followed over time, the gas pressure of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions were measured periodically over a six year period. The maximum observed gas pressure was 138 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 80 kPa was primarily due to generation of nitrogen and carbon dioxide gas in the first six months. Hydrogen and oxygen were minor components of the headspace gas. At the completion of the study, the internal components of the sealed container showed signs of corrosion, including pitting.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Equation of State and Damage in Polyethylene

The dynamic response of polymers differs significantly from those of metals, upon which many of the National Laboratories' deformation, damage, and failure models are based. Their moduli, yield strength, and damage characteristics are highly strain rate-, temperature-, and phase-dependent, requiring models that encompass a wide range of phenomena including some not in equilibrium. Recently, Los Alamos developed the Glassy Amorphous Polymer (GAP) 1 model [1] to address limitations in existing models of polymer deformation. GAP captures both volumetric (equation of state) and deviatoric (shear) response, including a non-equilibrium component to the former (a feature determined to be crucial in capturing the low-pressure, viscoelastic response to impact loading). GAP has already been applied to polymers such as PMMA, PTFE, epoxy, and Kel-F 800, but with an emphasis on impact response as opposed to damage or failure. The current effort was launched to address this gap in predictive capability. For reasons that will be made clear, semi-crystalline polyethylene (PE) was chosen to serve as a model system for parameterization and validation. PE (-C 2 H 4- )n is one of the most widely used polymers in industrial and engineering contexts, chiey due to the versatility of its mechanical response. This response can be tuned through network and chain structure, degree of crystallinity, and molecular weight. PE is found in several forms including low density (LDPE), high density (HDPE), and ultra-high molecular weight (UHMWPE). The focus here was on HDPE and UHMWPE, of pedigree described in the following section. Materials were well-characterized prior to study and are representative of semi-crystalline polymers of interest to DOE and DoD. Semi-crystalline PE undergoes a glass transition at low temperature (-35°C) and melts across a range of moderate temperatures (~80-180°C), depending on its structure. It is typically inert chemically, has low strength and high ductility, and the high strength and anisotropy of UHMWPE ber, in particular, have driven its use in engineering, impact, and armor applications. Surprisingly little is known, however, about the influence of PE's crystalline structure and associated phase transitions (including melt) on its response to dynamic compression. A broad suite of experiments was used to calibrate the GAP model for HDPE and UHMWPE. Section IV examines the effects of tensile strain on the structure and integrity of PE crystalline domains. These data were used to inform the preliminary damage model described in Section XII, whose roots lie in statistical physics and network theory. The viscoelastic and plastic components of GAP rely heavily on the stress-strain data of Section VI, which also include dynamic extrusion and Taylor anvil experiments used to validate the damage model. The thermal data of Section X provide crucial inputs to the equilibrium EOS in GAP, as well as the much broader range SESAME EOS whose construction is outlined in Section XI. Section VII details plate impact experiments characterizing the low-pressure shock locus and failure (spall) using in situ electromagnetic gauges. A previously reported \cusp" in the principal Hugoniot near 0.5 kbar was confirmed, and a multi-wave structure was observed over a limited input stress range above the cusp. This cusp is believed due to solid-solid phase transitions associated with the crystalline domains of the polymer.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Residual Stresses in SAVY 4000 and Hagan Container Bodies

Chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (SCC) has been investigated as a potential failure mechanism for the SAVY 4000 and the Hagan containers used to store plutonium-bearing materials at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This report discusses the regions of the container bodies most susceptible to SCC and the magnitude of the residual stresses in those regions. Boiling MgCl2 testing indicated that for both containers the region near the top weld was most susceptible to SCC. The Hagan showed through wall cracking after 22-24 hours of exposure both parallel (axial stresses) and perpendicular (hoop stresses) to the weld. The SAVY 4000 container showed significant cracking above and below the weld after 47 hours of exposure but there was no visual evidence of a through wall crack and the cracks did not leak water. Two through wall holes formed in the bottom of the SAVY 4000 container after 44-46 hours of exposure. For both containers, average “through wall” residual stresses were determined from hole drilling data 4 mm below the weld. In the Hagan body, average tensile hoop stresses were 194 MPa and average compressive axial stresses were -120 MPa. In the SAVY 4000 body, average compressive hoop stresses were 11 MPa and average tensile axial stresses were 25 MPa. Results suggest that because the Hagan container exhibited through wall cracking in a shorter time in boiling MgCl2 and had the higher average tensile stress, 194 MPa hoop stress, it is more susceptible to SCC than the SAVY 4000 container.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Surveillance and Monitoring Program Full-Scale Experiments to Evaluate the Potential for Corrosion in 3013 Containers

A set of six long-term, full-scale experiments were initiated to determine the type and extent of corrosion that occurs in 3013 containers packaged with chloride-bearing plutonium oxide materials. The materials were exposed to a high relative humidity environment representative of actual packaging conditions for the materials in storage. The materials were sealed in instrumented, inner 3013 containers with corrosion specimens designed to test the corrosiveness of the environment inside the containers under various conditions. This report focuses on initial loading conditions that are used to establish a baseline to show how the conditions change throughout the storage lifetime of the containers.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

MIS High-Purity Plutonium Oxide Hydride Product 5501579 (SSR124): Final Report

A high-purity plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample 5501579 represents process plutonium oxides from hydride oxide from Rocky Flats that are currently stored in 3013 containers. After calcination to 950°C, the material contained 87.42% plutonium with no major impurities. This study followed over time, the gas pressure of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions were measured periodically over a six year period. The maximum observed gas pressure was 124 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 70 kPa was primarily due to generation of nitrogen and carbon dioxide gas. Hydrogen and oxygen were minor components of the headspace gas. At the completion of the study, the internal components of the sealed container showed signs of corrosion.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

MIS High-Purity Plutonium Oxide Metal Oxidation Product BLO-39-11-14-004 (SSR132 and 132A): Final Report

A high-purity, reactor-grade plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. BLO-39-11-14-004 is a high specific power oxide that represents Hanford process plutonium oxides from oxalate process product, oxalate precipitation of impure plutonium and pure mixed uranium/plutonium nitrate solutions, PFP NDA and impure and scrap plutonium oxides 80-85% from PFP and the 300 area. It also represents plutonium oxides from oxalate precipitation at LANL and Savannah River. After calcination to 950 °C, the material contained 80% plutonium and 7% americium with no major impurities. This study followed over time the gas pressure of a sample with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. A leak occurred in the original reactor (SSR132) which was terminated after 3 years. The sample was reloaded (SSR132A) and an additional set of data was collected. Results from both loadings are discussed. Gas compositions were measured periodically over three (SSR132) and four and a half (SSR132A) year periods. The maximum observed gas pressures were 93 kPa and 94 kPa, respectively. The increase over the initial pressure was primarily due to generation of nitrogen gas. For SSR132, the maximum observed gas pressure for hydrogen was 1.2 kPa and oxygen was 9.3 kPa (includes oxygen from leak). For SSR132A, the maximum observed gas pressure for hydrogen was 5.5 kPa and oxygen was 0.9 kPa. At the completion of the study, the internal components of the sealed container showed limited signs of corrosion.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

2017 Annual Site Environmental Report

Los Alamos National Laboratory’s (the Laboratory’s) annual site environmental reports are prepared annually by the Laboratory’s environmental organizations, as required by U.S. Department of Energy Order 231.1B, Administrative Change 1, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting, and Order 458.1, Administrative Change 3, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment. The following chapters in this report discuss our success in complying with environmental laws, regulations, and orders (Chapter 2, Compliance Summary); how we manage the Laboratory’s environmental performance (Chapter 3, Environmental Programs); how we monitor for air emissions of radioactive materials and climate conditions (Chapter 4, Air Quality); how we monitor for effects of Laboratory operations on groundwater quality (Chapter 5, Groundwater Monitoring); how we monitor the movement of chemicals and radionuclides by storm water runoff and the levels of chemicals and radionuclides in deposited sediment (Chapter 6, Watershed Quality); how we monitor for the presence, levels, and effects of chemicals and radionuclides in plants, animals, soil, and vegetation (Chapter 7, Ecosystem Health); and finally, what radionuclide dose or risk from chemical exposure members of the public may experience as a result of Laboratory operations (Chapter 8, Public Dose and Risk Assessment).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

MIS High-Purity Uranium/Plutonium Oxide Metal Oxidation Product SCP711-56 (SSR135): Final Report

A high-purity uranium/plutonium mixed oxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample SCP711-56 represents process plutonium oxides from mixed oxides at the Hanford Site, byproduct plutonium/uranium mixed oxides at the Rocky Flats Plant, Hanford Site mixed oxides at Savannah River, mixed oxides from alloy oxidation at Savannah River, scrap mixed oxides at Savannah River and plutonium/uranium oxide at Los Alamos National Laboratory that are currently stored in 3013 containers. After calcination to 950°C the material contains 17% fuel grade plutonium and 68% uranium with approximately 1.5% impurities and the remainder principally oxygen. This study followed over time the gas pressure of a sample with nominally 0.1 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. Gas compositions were measured periodically over approximately 4 years. The maximum observed gas pressure was 115 kPa. The increase over the initial pressure of 83 kPa was primarily due to generation of carbon dioxide and nitrogen gases. A small amount of hydrogen was generated and oxygen was consumed. At the completion of the study, the internal components of the sealed container showed signs of corrosion, including pitting.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

MIS High Purity Plutonium Oxide Metal Oxidation Product MT1490 (SSR125): Final Report

A high purity plutonium dioxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample MT1490 represents process plutonium oxides from several metal oxidation operations that are currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time, the gas pressure of a sample with nominally 0.5 weight percent water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500 th of the volume of a 3013 container. The sample was a mixture of as-received material, material calcined at 800°C and material calcined at 950°C. This material contained 87% plutonium with no major impurities. Gas compositions were measured periodically over a nine year period. The maximum observed gas pressure of 118 kPa was reached during the ninth year. The increase over the initial pressure of 95 kPa was primarily due to generation of nitrogen and hydrogen gas. Oxygen was a minor component of the headspace gas. At the completion of the study, the inner bucket showed signs of corrosion, including pitting, in the container material contact region.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

2014 Annual Site Environmental Report for Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico

Sandia National Laboratories is a multiprogram laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation (Sandia), a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. This Annual Site Environmental Report summarizes data and the compliance status of Sandia’s sustainability, environmental protection, and monitoring programs at Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico, during calendar year 2014. Major environmental programs include air quality, water quality, groundwater protection, terrestrial surveillance, waste management, pollution prevention, environmental restoration, oil and chemical spill prevention, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs are required by DOE O 231.1B, Change 1, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting .

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

2014 Annual Site Environmental Report for Sandia National Laboratories, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, and Kauai Test Facility, Hawaii

Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) is a multiprogram laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation (Sandia), a wholly owned subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. The DOE/NNSA Sandia Field Office administers the contract and oversees contractor operations at the SNL, Tonopah Test Range (SNL/TTR) in Nevada and the SNL, Kauai Test Facility (SNL/KTF) in Hawaii. Sandia manages and conducts operations at SNL/TTR in support of the DOE/NNSA’s Weapons Ordnance Program and has operated the site since 1957. Navarro Research and Engineering subcontracts with Sandia to administer most of the environmental programs at SNL/TTR. The DOE/NNSA/Nevada Field Office retains responsibility for cleanup and management of SNL/TTR Environmental Restoration sites. Sandia operates SNL/KTF as a rocket preparation launching and tracking facility. This Annual Site Environmental Report summarizes data and the compliance status of Sandia’s sustainability, environmental protection, and monitoring programs at SNL/TTR and SNL/KTF during calendar year 2014. Major environmental programs include air quality, water quality, groundwater protection, terrestrial surveillance, waste management, pollution prevention, environmental restoration cleanup activities, and implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act. Sandia is responsible only for those environmental program activities related to its operations. Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs are required by DOE O 231.1B, Change 1, Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting .

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

2019 Theoretical Division Lightning Talk Series

All members of the Theoretical (T) Division Community, students, staff members, group leaders, division management and other interested individuals are invited to come and support the following student(s) during their Lightning Talk presentation. The Lightning Talk Series is a forum for T Division students to present information about their current projects.

2019 Theoretical Division Lightning Talk Series↗

MIS High-Purity Plutonium/Uranium Oxide Hydride Product 5501407 (SSR129): Final Report

A high-purity uranium/plutonium mixed oxide material from the Material Identification and Surveillance (MIS) Program inventory has been studied with regard to gas generation and corrosion in a storage environment. Sample 5501579 represents process plutonium oxides from high purity mixed oxides and mixed oxides from alloy oxidation at Hanford, hydride oxide from Rocky Flats, and mixed oxides from alloy oxidation and scrap mixed oxides at Savannah River that are currently stored in 3013 containers. This study followed over time the gas pressure of two samples of this material with nominally 0.5 wt% water in a sealed container with an internal volume scaled to 1/500th of the volume of a 3013 container. The first experiment studied a mixture of 60% as-received material (AR) and 40% material that had been calcined at 950 °C. The mixture contained 66% weapons grade plutonium and 11% uranium, with approximately 7.3% impurities and the remainder principally oxygen. A second experiment studied material calcined at 950 °C which contained approximately 4.3% impurities and similar uranium and plutonium content. Gas compositions were measured periodically over approximately 3.5 years in the first container and 20 months for the second container, which was terminated early due to an inadvertent container pumpdown. The maximum observed gas pressures were 152 kPa and 161 kPa, respectively. The increase over the initial pressures of 82 kPa and 88 kPa, respectively, was primarily due to generation of carbon dioxide and nitrogen gases. In the container with the AR/calcined mixture, a small amount of hydrogen and oxygen was generated and was consumed. In the container with calcined material only, hydrogen partial pressure of 18.9 kPa was measured. A small amount of oxygen was generated and was consumed. At the completion of the study, the internal components of both sealed containers showed signs of corrosion

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗