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Challenges and Opportunities For Ensuring Entry System Technology Readiness For Ice Giants Probe Missions

The Ice Giants represent a distinct class of planets within our solar system, and appear to be similar to most exoplanets that have been detected thus far. Exploring Ice Giants in our Solar System would allow us to better understand their formation and evolution processes, and thus help establish scientific links to exoplanets. In situ exploration using probes similar to Galileo, along with an orbiter or a relay spacecraft, will require entry followed by deployment of the descent probe containing science instruments into Uranus or Neptune atmosphere. The challenge is not in the deployment of the probe, but in the atmospheric entry prior to deployment. The entry system has to have a capable, robust and efficient ablative thermal protection system (TPS) designed to protect the descent probe from the thermal and mechanical entry loads. Although entries into Ice Giants may not be as demanding as the Galileo entry at Jupiter, the entry environments will be more severe than environments for Mars, Sample Return missions, and Venus, and will therefore require robust TPS. While Galileo Probe’s success, nearly 25 years ago, should give us confidence, the recession data from the Galileo entry informs us that the entry environment was under predicted and the design thickness was barely adequate. The lesson learned from Galileo probe for future Ice Giant missions will require us to be cautious and demand a more robust design. The TPS technology used on Galileo entry system no longer exists due to atrophy of manufacturing processes. Instead of attempting to revive Galileo-legacy TPS technology, NASA invested in a new and innovative TPS called HEEET (Heat-shield for Extreme Entry Environment Technology). HEEET has been matured, and is now ready to support future missions not only to the Ice Giants but also for Venus, high-speed sample return, and Saturn probe missions. This lead talk, intended for the technology section of the workshop, will cover entry, descent, and deployment (EDD), with an emphasis on entry. A brief history of the TPS challenges for extreme entry missions will be given along with a quick overview of the concept of operations for EDD. The development and maturation of HEEET system capability will be described. Data gathered in ground-test facilities in the US will be highlighted to show that the technology is mature and ready for Ice Giant missions. All thermal protection systems carry some risk as a result of ground test limitations and Ice Giant missions present some unique challenges. These challenges are not only technical, but also due to limitations in the currently established manufacturing and integration. In addition, the concerns that arise due to potential for atrophy for future Ice Giant mission a decade or more from now will be analyzed. Plausible avenues for mitigation will be presented. There are two companion planned presentations by Dr. Prabhu and Dr. Hwang will dive deeper in the challenges and opportunities. This intended talk will set the stage for their presentations.

Venkatapathy, Ethiraj↗

Development of an Assessment Methodology That Enables the Nuclear Industry to Evaluate Adoption of Advanced Automation

Nuclear power has a crucial role in providing safe, reliable, and economical carbon-free electricity for today and the future. For continued operation, many of the existing United States nuclear power plants will begin the subsequent license renewal process for extending their operating license periods. As plants extend their expected operating lifetimes, there is a significant opportunity to modernize. These plants have a much stronger business case with these extended mission periods to modernize and significantly enhance their economic viability in current and future energy markets by implementing digital technologies that support innovation, efficiency gains, and business-model transformation. Ensuring continued safety and reliability is crucial. Transformative digital technologies—including automation—that fundamentally change the concept of operation for the nuclear power plant operating model requires a critical focus on the human and technology integration element. Further, the nuclear industry has historically been reluctant to modernize due to having a risk adverse culture and lack of clarity for a transformative new state vision (Joe & Remer, 2019; Thomas et al., 2020). Common barriers include (1) the perceived value and return on investment (ROI) of digital technology, (2) the perceived risk associated with licensing, regulatory, and cybersecurity, and (3) insufficient guidance for performing digital modifications to power generation systems. This work presents a methodology to address these barriers and support the industry in adopting advanced automation and digital technology through developing a transformative vision and implementation strategy that will address the human and technology integration element. This research leverages previous LWRS Program and industry results. It draws specifically on previous LWRS Program research in the areas of advanced alarm systems, computer-based procedures, model informed decision support, and advanced human-system interface displays (e.g., overviews and task-based). The modernization methodology can be used to guide transformative thinking when integrating a set of vendor-specific capabilities to support a new concept of operations and a utility’s end-state vision. The results of this research are organized into six major sections: - Section 1 introduces the need for supporting large-scale digital modifications that will renew the technology base for extended operating life beyond 60 years - Section 2 describes the challenges that the nuclear industry is enduring with modernizing. - Section 3 summarizes the primary standards and guidance. - Section 4 presents earlier work from the LWRS Program regarding the development of a transformative conceptual design for an advanced control room of a hybrid plants. - Section 5 presents a methodology that is designed at addressing the challenges in the industry today in achieving a transformative new state vision and concept of operations. - Conclusions and next steps of this research are provided in Section 6.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

SLS-SPEC-159 Cross-Program Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE) Revision D

This document is derived from the former National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Constellation Program (CxP) document CxP 70023, titled "The Design Specification for Natural Environments (DSNE), Revision C." The original document has been modified to represent updated Design Reference Missions (DRMs) for the NASA Exploration Systems Development (ESD) Programs. The DSNE completes environment-related specifications for architecture, system-level, and lower-tier documents by specifying the ranges of environmental conditions that must be accounted for by NASA ESD Programs. To assure clarity and consistency, and to prevent requirements documents from becoming cluttered with extensive amounts of technical material, natural environment specifications have been compiled into this document. The intent is to keep a unified specification for natural environments that each Program calls out for appropriate application. This document defines the natural environments parameter limits (maximum and minimum values, energy spectra, or precise model inputs, assumptions, model options, etc.), for all ESD Programs. These environments are developed by the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Natural Environments Branch (MSFC organization code: EV44). Many of the parameter limits are based on experience with previous programs, such as the Space Shuttle Program. The parameter limits contain no margin and are meant to be evaluated individually to ensure they are reasonable (i.e., do not apply unrealistic extreme-on-extreme conditions). The natural environments specifications in this document should be accounted for by robust design of the flight vehicle and support systems. However, it is understood that in some cases the Programs will find it more effective to account for portions of the environment ranges by operational mitigation or acceptance of risk in accordance with an appropriate program risk management plan and/or hazard analysis process. The DSNE is not intended as a definition of operational models or operational constraints, nor is it adequate, alone, for ground facilities which may have additional requirements (for example, building codes and local environmental constraints). "Natural environments," as the term is used here, refers to the environments that are not the result of intended human activity or intervention. It consists of a variety of external environmental factors (most of natural origin and a few of human origin) which impose restrictions or otherwise impact the development or operation of flight vehicles and destination surface systems. These natural environments include the following types of environments: Terrestrial environments at launch, abort, and normal landing sites (winds, temperatures, pressures, surface roughness, sea conditions, etc.); Space environments (ionizing radiation, orbital debris, meteoroids, thermosphere density, plasma, solar, Earth, and lunar-emitted thermal radiation, etc.); Destination environments (Lunar surface and orbital, Mars atmosphere and surface, near Earth asteroids, etc.). Many of the environmental specifications in this document are based on models, data, and environment descriptions contained in the CxP 70044, Constellation Program Natural Environment Definition for Design (NEDD). The NEDD provides additional detailed environment data and model descriptions to support analytical studies for ESD Programs. For background information on specific environments and their effects on spacecraft design and operations, the environment models, and the data used to generate the specifications contained in the DSNE, the reader is referred to the NEDD paragraphs listed in each section of the DSNE. Also, most of the environmental specifications in this document are tied specifically to the ESD DRMs in ESD-10012, Revision B, Exploration Systems Development Concept of Operations (ConOps). Coordination between these environment specifications and the DRMs must be maintained. This document should be compatible with the current ESD DRMs, but updates to the mission definitions and variations in interpretation may require adjustments to the environment specifications.

Roberts, Barry C.↗

Challenges and Opportunities for Ensuring Entry System Technology Readiness for Ice Giants Probe Missions

The Ice Giants represent a distinct class of planets within our solar system, and appear to be similar to most exoplanets that have been detected thus far. Exploring Ice Giants in our Solar System would allow us to better understand their formation and evolution processes, and thus help establish scientific links to exoplanets. In situ exploration using probes similar to Galileo, along with an orbiter or a relay spacecraft, will require entry followed by deployment of the descent probe containing science instruments into Uranus or Neptune atmosphere. The challenge is not in the deployment of the probe, but in the atmospheric entry prior to deployment. The entry system has to have a capable, robust and efficient ablative thermal protection system (TPS) designed to protect the descent probe from the thermal and mechanical entry loads. Although entries into Ice Giants may not be as demanding as the Galileo entry at Jupiter, the entry environments will be more severe than environments for Mars, Sample Return missions, and Venus, and will therefore require robust TPS. While Galileo Probe’s success, nearly 25 years ago, should give us confidence, the recession data from the Galileo entry informs us that the entry environment was under-predicted and the design thickness was barely adequate. The lesson learned from the Galileo probe for future Ice Giant missions will require us to be cautious and demand a more robust design. The TPS technology used on the Galileo entry system no longer exists due to atrophy of manufacturing processes. Instead of attempting to revive Galileo-legacy TPS technology, NASA invested in a new and innovative TPS called HEEET (Heat-shield for Extreme Entry Environment Technology). HEEET has been matured, and is now ready to support future missions not only to the Ice Giants but also for Venus, high-speed sample return, and Saturn probe missions. This lead talk, intended for the technology section of the workshop, will cover entry, descent, and deployment (EDD), with an emphasis on entry. A brief history of the TPS challenges for extreme entry missions will be given, along with a quick overview of the concept of operations for EDD. The development and maturation of HEEET system capability will be described. Data gathered in ground-test facilities in the US will be highlighted to show that the technology is mature and ready for Ice Giant missions. All thermal protection systems carry some risk as a result of ground test limitations and Ice Giant missions present some unique challenges. These challenges are not only technical, but also due to limitations in the currently established manufacturing and integration. In addition, the concerns that arise due to the potential for atrophy for future Ice Giant missions a decade or more from now will be analyzed. Plausible avenues for mitigation will be presented. There are two planned companion presentations by Dr. Prabhu and Dr. Hwang that will dive deeper into the challenges and opportunities. This intended talk will set the stage for their presentations.

Venkatapathy, Ethiraj↗

Creating a Simulation Platform for Research and Development of Advanced Control Methods

Advanced nuclear reactors are essential to meet the changing energy requirements throughout both the United States and the rest of world. In addition to other features, they are designed to enable deployment in remote locations and operate in a fully (or near-fully) autonomous manner, which will require a new control paradigm. To realize autonomously operating reactors, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies Advanced Sensors and Instrumentation (NEET ASI) program conducts research and development into the enabling technologies and methods needed, including digital twins, machine learning, and risk modeling, in addition to various types of control methods. These technologies and methods are the key foundations needed to achieve fully autonomous systems. To develop and evaluate the technologies and methods necessary for achieving autonomous operations, it is critical to identify a software tool capable of integrating all the required elements. In surveying the available solutions, no software platforms were identified that could accomplish what was needed without introducing drawbacks. This challenge was the motivation for the current effort: to develop a software platform that can seamlessly integrate autonomouscontrol-enabling technologies and methods, allowing for accelerated research and development and transfer of ideas. The resulting platform, known as the Control and Optimization Modular Modeling Application for Nuclear Deployment (COMMAND), is Python-based, and leverages open-source tools to provide flexibility and facilitate building upon prior research. It is designed to enable advanced reactor developers to deploy and test advanced control technologies and methods coupled with their own models, solutions, and hardware. Given the substantial undertaking of developing such a platform, the current effort focused on laying down scalable, flexible software foundations and infrastructure, then demonstrating the platform via a use case. These foundations included developing generic modules, which contain the base variable and system blocks (the information and functional building blocks, respectively, that can be used to design a simulation) and the data handling and storage blocks needed to exchange information between the various blocks; as well as enablingtechnology-specific modules. This platform was evaluated via a use case, which was to simulate and control a process for the Microreactor Automated Control System (MACS) test bed. While MACS is not currently directly coupled to any specific microreactor physics, it was initially developed in concert with the Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) microreactor, and so the MARVEL physics are used here. As part of this use case, several enabling-technology-specific blocks within COMMAND were integrated, including a proportional integral derivative (PID) control block, a Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program (RELAP5-3D) block, and an anomaly detection block. The COMMAND software platform was successfully demonstrated to achieve the scalability and flexibility objectives of this effort and will be leveraged by the program’s research efforts to advance state of the art control methodologies towards autonomous operations of advanced reactors. As new use cases are created and implemented, it is anticipated that COMMAND will continue to grow and evolve to meet new requirements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Planning Amidst Uncertainty: Identifying Core CCS Infrastructure Robust to Storage Uncertainty

Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) is a critical technology for reducing anthropogenic CO2 emissions, but its large-scale deployment is complicated by uncertainties in geological storage performance. These uncertainties pose significant financial and operational risks, as underperforming storage sites can lead to costly infrastructure modifications, inefficient pipeline routing, and economic shortfalls. To address this challenge, we propose a novel optimization workflow that is based on mixed-integer linear programming and explicitly integrates probabilistic modeling of storage uncertainty into CCS infrastructure design. This workflow generates multiple infrastructure scenarios by sampling storage capacity distributions, optimally solving each scenario using a mixed-integer linear programming model, and aggregating results into a heatmap to identify core infrastructure components that have a low likelihood of underperforming. A risk index parameter is introduced to balance trade-offs between cost, CO2 processing capacity, and risk of underperformance, allowing stakeholders to quantify and mitigate uncertainty in CCS planning. Applying this workflow to a CCS dataset from the US Department of Energy’s Carbon Utilization and Storage Partnership project reveals key insights into infrastructure resilience. Reducing the risk index from 15% to 0% is observed to lead to an 83.7% reduction in CO2 processing capacity and a 77.1% decrease in project profit, quantifying the trade-off between risk tolerance and project performance. Furthermore, our results highlight critical breakpoints, where small adjustments in the risk index produce disproportionate shifts in infrastructure performance, providing actionable guidance for decision-makers. Unlike prior approaches that aimed to cheaply repair underperforming infrastructure, our workflow constructs robust CCS networks from the ground up, ensuring cost-effective infrastructure under storage uncertainty. These findings demonstrate the practical relevance of incorporating uncertainty-aware optimization into CCS planning, equipping decision-makers with a tool to make informed project planning decisions.

Olson, Daniel↗

The state of the art for neutron irradiation experiments from the perspective of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR)

Irradiation experiment campaigns are critical to advancing nuclear energy technologies by providing data on material performance under relevant radiation conditions. Successful irradiation experiments require integrated design efforts that balance technical goals with facility constraints. Here, this paper presents an expert-informed overview of irradiation experiment design at the High Flux Isotope Reactor. It addresses the nuclear materials research and irradiation experiment communities to guide them toward developing technically sound, facility-compatible campaigns. The High Flux Isotope Reactor is a multipurpose reactor supporting isotope production, neutron scattering, and materials testing. Its high, steady-state neutron flux is ideal for irradiation experiments, but successful execution demands coordinated thermal, structural, and reactor physics analyses. The paper outlines the complete development workflow from concept definition and design optimization to safety qualification and post-irradiation examination. Standardized capsule platforms are also discussed in terms of flexibility, specimen capacity, and thermal performance. Common failure modes such as unanticipated geometric variations, can impact temperature-dose profiles and compromise data reliability. Therefore, detailed thermal modeling and accurate as-built characterization are essential for meaningful post-irradiation data interpretation. Key recommendations include early engagement all stakeholders, clearly defined design expectations, and alignment of specimen geometries with post-irradiation examination capabilities. This approach reduces design iterations, enhances data quality, and supports more efficient use of irradiation resources. Strategic and well-planned irradiation testing not only improves individual campaign success but also accelerates the deployment of advanced nuclear technologies. By closing critical data gaps and reducing development risks, the nuclear materials community can more effectively contribute to the future of clean, resilient energy systems.

Experiments↗

A Simple Standard for Sharing Ontological Mappings (SSSOM)

Abstract Despite progress in the development of standards for describing and exchanging scientific information, the lack of easy-to-use standards for mapping between different representations of the same or similar objects in different databases poses a major impediment to data integration and interoperability. Mappings often lack the metadata needed to be correctly interpreted and applied. For example, are two terms equivalent or merely related? Are they narrow or broad matches? Or are they associated in some other way? Such relationships between the mapped terms are often not documented, which leads to incorrect assumptions and makes them hard to use in scenarios that require a high degree of precision (such as diagnostics or risk prediction). Furthermore, the lack of descriptions of how mappings were done makes it hard to combine and reconcile mappings, particularly curated and automated ones. We have developed the Simple Standard for Sharing Ontological Mappings (SSSOM) which addresses these problems by: (i) Introducing a machine-readable and extensible vocabulary to describe metadata that makes imprecision, inaccuracy and incompleteness in mappings explicit. (ii) Defining an easy-to-use simple table-based format that can be integrated into existing data science pipelines without the need to parse or query ontologies, and that integrates seamlessly with Linked Data principles. (iii) Implementing open and community-driven collaborative workflows that are designed to evolve the standard continuously to address changing requirements and mapping practices. (iv) Providing reference tools and software libraries for working with the standard. In this paper, we present the SSSOM standard, describe several use cases in detail and survey some of the existing work on standardizing the exchange of mappings, with the goal of making mappings Findable, Accessible, Interoperable and Reusable (FAIR). The SSSOM specification can be found at http://w3id.org/sssom/spec. Database URL: http://w3id.org/sssom/spec

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 32, No. 4, October-December 1991]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 477 Report on the International Symposium on the Use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Operational Safety—PSA '91, S. Chakraborty and M. Khatib-Rahbar; 488 Good Relationships Are Pivotal in Nuclear Data Bases, A. S. Heger and B. V. Koen; 494 Technical Note: The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel's Evaluation of the Ulysses Space Mission, J. A. Sholtis, Jr., D. A. Huff, L. B. Gray, N. P. Klug, and R. O. Winchester; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 502 The Severe Accident Analysis Program for the Savannah River Nuclear Production Reactors, M. L. Hyder; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 511 A Framework for Selecting Suitable Control Technologies for Nuclear Power Plant Systems, R. A. Kisner; DESIGN FEATURES: 521 Containments for Gas-Cooled Power Reactors History and Status, P.W. Williams; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 537 Indoor Radon: A Natural Risk, N. H. Harley and J.H. Harley; On the Importance of the Atmospheric Parameters in the Fission Products Distribution of a Severe Reactor Accident, M. C. Barla and A. R. Bayulken; Book Review: Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation BEIR V, C. R. Richmond; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 555 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 567 Effects of Component Aging on the Westhinghouse Control Rod Drive System, K. Sullivan and W. Gunther; 577 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 580 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 582 Operating U 8 Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 596 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 610 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 614 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1991; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 520 Workshop on PC PRAISE: A Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Personal Computer Code for Nuclear Power Plant Piping Reliability Assessment; 536 Fifth Workshop on Nuclear Power Plant Containment Integrity; 624 New OECD "International Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE)"; 625 Harvard School of Public Health Announces Short Courses; 625 Eighth Power Plant Dynamics, Control and Testing Symposium; 626 Second Training Course on Off-Site Emergency Planning and Response for Nuclear Accidents; 618 The Authors; 622 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol 32.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 32, No. 4, October-December 1991]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 477 Report on the International Symposium on the Use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Operational Safety—PSA '91, S. Chakraborty and M. Khatib-Rahbar; 488 Good Relationships Are Pivotal in Nuclear Data Bases, A. S. Heger and B. V. Koen; 494 Technical Note: The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel's Evaluation of the Ulysses Space Mission, J. A. Sholtis, Jr., D. A. Huff, L. B. Gray, N. P. Klug, and R. O. Winchester; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 502 The Severe Accident Analysis Program for the Savannah River Nuclear Production Reactors, M. L. Hyder; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 511 A Framework for Selecting Suitable Control Technologies for Nuclear Power Plant Systems, R. A. Kisner; DESIGN FEATURES: 521 Containments for Gas-Cooled Power Reactors History and Status, P.W. Williams; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 537 Indoor Radon: A Natural Risk, N. H. Harley and J.H. Harley; On the Importance of the Atmospheric Parameters in the Fission Products Distribution of a Severe Reactor Accident, M. C. Barla and A. R. Bayulken; Book Review: Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation BEIR V, C. R. Richmond; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 555 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 567 Effects of Component Aging on the Westhinghouse Control Rod Drive System, K. Sullivan and W. Gunther; 577 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 580 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 582 Operating U 8 Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 596 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 610 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 614 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1991; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 520 Workshop on PC PRAISE: A Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Personal Computer Code for Nuclear Power Plant Piping Reliability Assessment; 536 Fifth Workshop on Nuclear Power Plant Containment Integrity; 624 New OECD "International Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE)"; 625 Harvard School of Public Health Announces Short Courses; 625 Eighth Power Plant Dynamics, Control and Testing Symposium; 626 Second Training Course on Off-Site Emergency Planning and Response for Nuclear Accidents; 618 The Authors; 622 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol 32.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Imaging and speciation of intracellular metallic implant debris using synchrotron-based X-ray fluorescence micro-spectroscopy: a study of two cases

Debris generated from total hip arthroplasty (THA) components made from metal alloys can cause, in some cases, inflammatory cell (e.g., macrophages) responses that lead to adverse local tissue reactions (ALTR) and implant failure. The lack of information on intracellular chemical alterations of metal debris has hindered the understanding of the pathogenesis of ALTR. The goal of this study was to characterize intracellular debris within macrophages using Synchrotron imaging and spectroscopy. We studied periprosthetic tissues of two retrieved THAs with (1) a metal-on-metal (MoM) articulation and (2) a metal-on-polyethylene (MoP) articulation exhibiting corrosion of the metal femoral head. The MoM-THA exhibited different valence states of chromium- and cobalt-containing debris, suggesting three different moieties: Cr 2 O 3 , CrPO 4 , and an alloy-oxide mixture. The findings further suggest that Cr 2 O 3 formed in the tribological interfaces of the implant, while CrPO 4 is a by-product of the phagocytosis process of cobalt alloy-containing debris. Titanium debris appeared to occur in a mixed crystalline/amorphous oxide state. It remains unclear if this chemical state results from the tribochemical processes at the implant surface or intracellular alterations. The MoP-THA specimen exhibited no intracellular particulate debris associated with macrohpages, indicating that the ALTR may be entirely triggered by metal ionic species in this case. A better understanding of in vivo chemical alteration of implant debris will aid in assessing the risk for ALTR during implant design and material choice. However, various techniques are needed to accurately determine the interaction between metal particles and the inta- and extra-cellular environment.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Characteristics of Extreme Auroral Charging Events

The highest level spacecraft charging observed in low Earth orbit (LEO) occurs when spacecraft are exposed to energetic auroral electrons. Since auroral charging has been identified as a mechanism responsible for on-orbit anomalies and even possible satellite failures it is important to consider extreme auroral charging events as design and test environments for spacecraft to be used in high inclination LEO orbits. This paper will report on studies of extreme auroral charging events using data from the SSJ/4 and SSJ/5 precipitating electron and ion sensors on the Defense Meteorology Satellite Program (DMSP) satellites. Early studies of DMSP charging to negative potentials ≥100 V focused on statistics of the electron environment responsible for charging. Later statistical studies of auroral charging have generally focused on solar cycle dependence of charging behavior and magnitude of the maximum potential and duration of the charging events. We extend these studies to focus on more detailed investigations of extreme charging event characteristics that are required to evaluate potential threats to spacecraft systems. A collection of example auroral charging events is assembled from the DMSP data set using the criteria that "extreme auroral charging" is defined as periods with spacecraft negative potentials ≥400 V. Specific characteristics to be treated include (but are not limited to) maximum and mean potentials, time history of spacecraft potentials through the events, total charging duration and the time potentials exceed voltage thresholds, frame charging/discharging rates, and information on geographic and geomagnetic latitudes at which the events are observed. Finally, we will comment on the implications of these studies for potential auroral charging risks to the International Space Station.

Minow, Joseph I.↗

An Advanced Open-Source Platform for Air Quality Analysis, Visualization, and Prediction

Ambient air pollution is the largest environmental health risk factor, leading to several million premature deaths globally per year. The challenge of combating poor air quality is exacerbated by growing urban populations, changing emissions, and a warming climate. While there have been many advances monitoring and modeling of atmospheric composition, reflected in the dramatic increase in archived Earth Observations, there is no single measurement or method that alone can provide an accurate depiction of the entire atmosphere. The rapidly growing collections of observational and modeling data require us to be smarter about what data to include, and how such data is used. In recent years, NASA has invested significantly in advancing the concepts for Analytics Collaborative Framework (ACF) [5] and New Observing Strategies (NOS) [4] to tackle our software infrastructure need for harmonized data management and dynamic acquisition of diverse measurements for on-demand, interactive, multivariate analysis, and access [3]. It is not enough to have a big data, standalone analytics solution; it is critical that we start integrating data from remote sensing, modeling, and in-situ networks in a harmonized manner that enables timely and data-driven decision-making for air quality management. This work presents the design and development of an Air Quality Analytics Collaborative Framework (AQ ACF), as part of NASA’s Advanced Information Systems Technology (AIST) effort, to establish a data, machine-learning, and numerically driven platform for air quality analysis, visualization, and prediction.

Liu, Qian↗

User's Manual for RESRAD-BUILD Code Version 4: Vol. 2 - User's Guide for RESRAD-BUILD Code Version 4

The RESRAD-BUILD computer code is designed to assess radiological doses to individuals who live or work in a building contaminated with radioactive material. The code is equipped with a user-friendly interface that has many features to facilitate using the computer code and understanding the results. The design of the interface provides various options, from entering data and performing calculations to displaying calculation results. General and context-specific help are available, providing information on editing and viewing the radionuclide database, the definitions of input parameters and their use in the calculations, and the selection of the calculation results for placement into other applications. Two types of sensitivity analysis are supported by the code, i.e., deterministic and probabilistic, that can be used to study the influence of input parameters on the calculation results. This user’s guide provides instructions to help users on how to install the RESRAD-BUILD code, navigate the interface, and use the various features to set up a dose/risk analysis and to view/print the results in text and graphical outputs.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Multi-Sensor Testing for Automated Rendezvous and Docking Sensor Testing at the Flight Robotics Laboratory

The Exploration Systems Architecture defines missions that require rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking (RPOD) of two spacecraft both in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and in Low Lunar Orbit (LLO). Uncrewed spacecraft must perform automated and/or autonomous rendezvous, proximity operations and docking operations (commonly known as AR&D). The crewed missions may also perform rendezvous and docking operations and may require different levels of automation and/or autonomy, and must provide the crew with relative navigation information for manual piloting. The capabilities of the RPOD sensors are critical to the success of the Exploration Program. NASA has the responsibility to determine whether the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) contractor proposed relative navigation sensor suite will meet the requirements. The relatively low technology readiness level of AR&D relative navigation sensors has been carried as one of the CEV Project's top risks. The AR&D Sensor Technology Project seeks to reduce the risk by the testing and analysis of selected relative navigation sensor technologies through hardware-in-the-loop testing and simulation. These activities will provide the CEV Project information to assess the relative navigation sensors maturity as well as demonstrate test methods and capabilities. The first year of this project focused on a series of"pathfinder" testing tasks to develop the test plans, test facility requirements, trajectories, math model architecture, simulation platform, and processes that will be used to evaluate the Contractor-proposed sensors. Four candidate sensors were used in the first phase of the testing. The second phase of testing used four sensors simultaneously: two Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Advanced Video Guidance Sensors (AVGS), a laser-based video sensor that uses retroreflectors attached to the target vehicle, and two commercial laser range finders. The multi-sensor testing was conducted at MSFC's Flight Robotics Laboratory (FRL) using the FRL's 6-DOF gantry system, called the Dynamic Overhead Target System (DOTS). The target vehicle for "docking" in the laboratory was a mockup that was representative of the proposed CEV docking system, with added retroreflectors for the AVGS. The multi-sensor test configuration used 35 open-loop test trajectories covering three major objectives: (1) sensor characterization trajectories designed to test a wide range of performance parameters; (2) CEV-specific trajectories designed to test performance during CEV-like approach and departure profiles; and (3) sensor characterization tests designed for evaluating sensor performance under more extreme conditions as might be induced during a spacecraft failure or during contingency situations. This paper describes the test development, test facility, test preparations, test execution, and test results of the multi-sensor series of trajectories.

Brewster, L.↗

Multi-Sensor Testing for Automated Rendezvous and Docking Sensor Testing at the Flight Robotics Lab

The Exploration Systems Architecture defines missions that require rendezvous, proximity operations, and docking (RPOD) of two spacecraft both in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and in Low Lunar Orbit (LLO). Uncrewed spacecraft must perform automated and/or autonomous rendezvous, proximity operations and docking operations (commonly known as AR&D). The crewed missions may also perform rendezvous and docking operations and may require different levels of automation and/or autonomy, and must provide the crew with relative navigation information for manual piloting. The capabilities of the RPOD sensors are critical to the success ofthe Exploration Program. NASA has the responsibility to determine whether the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) contractor-proposed relative navigation sensor suite will meet the requirements. The relatively low technology readiness level of AR&D relative navigation sensors has been carried as one of the CEV Project's top risks. The AR&D Sensor Technology Project seeks to reduce the risk by the testing and analysis of selected relative navigation sensor technologies through hardware-in-the-Ioop testing and simulation. These activities will provide the CEV Project information to assess the relative navigation sensors maturity as well as demonstrate test methods and capabilities. The first year of this project focused on a series of "pathfinder" testing tasks to develop the test plans, test facility requirements, trajectories, math model architecture, simulation platform, and processes that will be used to evaluate the Contractor-proposed sensors. Four candidate sensors were used in the first phase of the testing. The second phase of testing used four sensors simultaneously: two Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Advanced Video Guidance Sensors (AVGS), a laser-based video sensor that uses retroreflectors attached to the target vehicle, and two commercial laser range finders. The multi-sensor testing was conducted at MSFC's Flight Robotics Laboratory (FRL) using the FRL's 6-DOF gantry system, called the Dynamic Overhead Target System (DOTS). The target vehicle for "docking" in the laboratory was a mockup that was representative of the proposed CEV docking system, with added retroreflectors for the AVGS.' The multi-sensor test configuration used 35 open-loop test trajectories covering three major objectives: (l) sensor characterization trajectories designed to test a wide range of performance parameters; (2) CEV-specific trajectories designed to test performance during CEV-like approach and departure profiles; and (3) sensor characterization tests designed for evaluating sensor performance under more extreme conditions as might be induced during a spacecraft failure or during contingency situations. This paper describes the test development, test facility, test preparations, test execution, and test results of the multisensor series oftrajectories

Brewster, Linda L.↗

Sensor Development for Liquid Water Detection in Dry Storage Casks: FY 2023 Status

Modeling efforts were undertaken in fiscal year (FY) 2023 to evaluate the feasibility and capability for sensing of liquid water inside canister-based dry cask storage systems (DCSSs). The focus was on the development of full-scale finite element models (FEMs) of ultrasound propagation through DCSS canister components. For these initial investigations, simulation of the baseplate component was targeted, envisioning water collection at the bottom of a vertically oriented canister. The effects of internal canister components (i.e., fuel basket, fuel assemblies) on ultrasound propagation in the baseplate component were evaluated in these efforts. The environment inside a DCSS confinement is intended to be inert and free of water to prevent potential corrosion of used fuel cladding or other internal hardware. Spent fuel assemblies are dried, after storage in water pools, to make sure water has been removed from assembly cavities. However, there is some uncertainty about the amount of residual water potentially left behind in a DCSS after drying processes, because water can become trapped in cavities or other small crevices in the surfaces formed by the fuel cladding, fuel assemblies, and other internal hardware components. Considering the complex space- and time-dependent temperature profiles in DCSSs, water may be in a liquid or gas phase depending on its location in the cask and how long the cask has been in storage. Evacuating most water and oxidizing agents contained within a canister is recommended by NUREG-1536 (NRC 2010), which covers DCSSs. As summarized by Salazar et al. (2020), existing guidance typically relies on achievable vacuum pumping pressures sustained over a hold period as a signal of dryness and water removal. However, time series data about water removal from full-scale commercial drying procedures are lacking (Hanson and Alsaed 2019). A review of drying specifications from several vendors led to the conclusion that if the specifications are followed correctly, the residual moisture in DCSSs should present an insignificant risk of cladding degradation (Knoll and Gilbert 1987). A more recent analysis concluded that much larger quantities of residual water could remain in DCSSs, but the amount would still not be expected to lead to significant corrosion of fuel cladding or other internal components (Jung et al. 2013). Industry drying procedures are mostly prescriptive in nature, and operational issues arising during the process could result in incomplete drying. A summary of operational issues and potential negative effects of residual water is provided by Salazar et al. (2019). Experimental efforts are ongoing to validate the extent of water removal in a DCSS based on drying procedures used at nuclear power plants through well-designed investigations of drying process efficacy and water retention (Durbin et al. 2021; Pulido et al. 2022a, Pulido et al. 2022b). This has been approached by simulating limited portions of a DCSS internal volume and fuel assemblies. So far, these efforts have focused on the effects of potential water trapping in the dashpot region of control rod guide tubes but are expected to be expanded to include the effects of other internal hardware features and failed fuel rod cladding. A method for detection and measurement of liquid water (Meyer et al. 2022; Meyer et al. 2021), in tandem with the drying information gained through experimental investigations, provides comprehensive bases for understanding the internal conditions of DCSSs and provides technical information to support licensing decisions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) Development Risk Communication

There are clear advantages of development of a Nuclear Thermal Rocket (NTR) for a crewed mission to Mars. NTR for in-space propulsion enables more ambitious space missions by providing high thrust at high specific impulse (approximately 900 sec) that is 2 times the best theoretical performance possible for chemical rockets. Missions can be optimized for maximum payload capability to take more payload with reduced total mass to orbit; saving cost on reduction of the number of launch vehicles needed. Or missions can be optimized to minimize trip time significantly to reduce the deep space radiation exposure to the crew. NTR propulsion technology is a game changer for space exploration. However, "NUCLEAR" is a word that is feared and vilified by some groups and the hostility towards development of any nuclear systems can meet great opposition by the public as well as from national leaders and people in authority. Communication of nuclear safety will be critical to the success of the development of the NTR. Why is there a fear of nuclear? A bomb that can level a city is a scary weapon. The first and only times the Nuclear Bomb was used in a war was on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War 2. The "Little Boy" atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945 and the "Fat Man" on Nagasaki 3 days later on August 9th. Within the first 4 months of bombings, 90- 166 thousand people died in Hiroshima and 60-80 thousand died in Nagasaki. It is important to note for comparison that over 500 thousand people died and 5 million made homeless due to strategic bombing (approximately 150 thousand tons) of Japanese cities and war assets with conventional non-nuclear weapons between 1942- 1945. A major bombing campaign of "firebombing" of Tokyo called "Operation Meetinghouse" on March 9 and 10 consisting of 334 B-29's dropped approximately1,700 tons of bombs around 16 square mile area and over 100 thousand people have been estimated to have died. The declaration of death is very clear for conventional weapons and then the declaration of death due to radiation becomes vague and unclear. This may have been due to people mis-understanding the dangers and effects of radiation when assessing the damage and harm to people initially, but it is also become insidious when expressing opposition to nuclear energy. A nuclear radiation accident can be scary due to the power involved and the fear of radiation release. The International Atomic Energy Agency defines a nuclear and radiation accident a "an event that has led to significant consequences to people, the environment or the facility." There have been 3 commercial nuclear reactor accidents (Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Fukushima) that stand out to the public and much of the information about the result and impact to workers, environment, and public can be misleading. Often information is presented without clear correlation with radiation and other pertinent information is left out presenting a very scary situation to affect the emotions of the reader. A very boring but "critically acclaimed" movie was made in 1979 called "The China Syndrome" starring Jane Fonda and Jack Lemmon. The film was released on March 16, 1979, 12 days before the 3-Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania. The basis from the movie was from a few nuclear plant incidents and in particular, the Brown's Ferry Alabama Power Plant fire. In one scene from the movie, a physicist Dr. Elliott Lowell played by Donald Hotton states that a China Syndrome event would make "an area the size of Pennsylvania" permanently uninhabitable. Real serious nuclear incidents like Chernobyl and Fukushima are often sited to make people fear the consequences of using nuclear power. However, the consequences are at best poorly communicated and at worst fictitiously inflated to instigate social unrest against nuclear power. There is an article being circulated on Facebook with a title "28 Signs that the (US) West Coast is being absolutely fried with nuclear radiation from Fukushima" which focus on mis-information and fear mongering. Nuclear power and NTR are powerful resources that can open many doors for future prosperity and capability. With great power comes great responsibility. Radiation and its effects need to be better understood, quantified, and communicated. A human mission to mars has its own risks of deep space radiation and is considered a considerable risk at 400 milli-Sieverts per year in deep space and 245 milli-Sieverts per year on the surface of Mars as measured by the Mars Curiosity mission. Although these quantities of ionizing radiation are within the astronaut career limit, it exceeds the yearly average amounts of ionizing radiation. Astronaut crews have experienced these levels of radiation before, but for durations shorter than a year, and a mission to Mars could possibly be 3 years in length. There is also evidence that people can comfortably handle higher levels of ionizing radiation where the radiation occurs naturally like Ramsar, Iran when people can experience 270 milli-Sieverts per year. A risk posture that the development, test, and flight of an NTR will meet opposition from groups who oppose nuclear energy must be likely and the impact can be sever to the effort. Active risk mitigation must be taken for an NTR full-scale development project. The NTR design must take into account safety for transport and off nominal conditions. Nuclear fuel element must consider containment of fission products and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) that may meet less opposition should be considered for safety and security reasons. Even though testing was conducted on Rover/NERVA safely and successfully in the 60's with exhaust sent heavenward in to open air, modern testing of NTR must consider full containment and no release of ionizing radiation to the public and must meet the current requirement of no more than 0.1 milli-Sieverts per year to the public. 0.1 milli-Sieverts is equivalent to eating one banana or a 20 hour plane flight. Good communication with the public and regulatory agencies will be essential to show that all effort is applied toward protection to the public and astronauts. The inspiring endeavor to put humans on Mars to study the planet, search for life, and learn more about this Solar System will be full of risks but it will be worth it. NTR will be worth the development effort if it allows humans to explore our Solar System.

Kim, Tony↗