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At least 1,099 records · Page 61

The Maintainable Fusion Pilot Plant

The US fusion community has coalesced around the goal of building an FPP as described by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM). In addition to demonstrating the viability of the technologies necessary to operate such a plant, including demonstration of net energy and electricity production, NASEM found that a “fusion pilot plant will need to demonstrate the ability to efficiently perform remote maintenance and replacement in support of the design of a power plant, taking into account details of the consequences of the fusion environment, such as material activation and tritium retention in components.” Current designs of fusion demonstration reactors do usually foresee a regular exchange of their first wall modules, including the tritium breeding blankets. In the European Power Plant Conceptual Studies, it is assumed that a fusion reactor will need to change its divertor every 2 years and its first wall blanket module every 5 to 6 years to reach acceptable availability. Underlying this capability are remote-handling technologies to keep the outage for the exchange of these components short. There are many uncertainties in the remote-handling schemes, and most schemes are at a preconceptual level at best. In addition, the exchange of these components would either produce an enormous rad-waste stream or would require an enormous refurbishment activity with huge cost-prohibitive hot-cells. Past Fusion Nuclear Science Facility (FNSF) preconceptual studies have led to hot cell dimensions of an unbelievable size, likely costing tens of billions of dollars. Already at The Way (previously International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, ITER), hot-cells have become cost-prohibitive, demanding redesigns of the ITER first wall to reduce the toxic rad-waste/inventory. In this in-situ PFC repair project, a concept for a long-life, maintainable first wall module concept is developed and tested. This first wall concept relies on innovative remote handling to repair the first wall modules in-situ, avoiding costly refurbishments outside of the tokamak vessel. This approach was highlighted in the Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee (FESAC) report on Transformative Enabling Capabilities for Efficient Advance Toward Fusion Energy. In general, the damage of the first wall armor is due to particle and radiation exposures. Load conditions vary from one fusion reactor design to another. In tokamaks, first wall Plasma Facing Components (PFCs) are exposed to far-Scrape-Off-Layer plasma fluxes, electromagnetic radiation, energetic CX neutrals, and potentially runaway electron beams. Protecting the first wall to the worst-case load conditions would require the design of a very thick first wall armor. Transient heat and particle fluxes due to disruptions or edge localized modes can lead to excessive heat loads resulting potentially in melting PFCs down to the cooling channel. Catastrophic events like these need to be avoided by appropriate disruption mitigation systems. However, failure of these systems will still put a first wall at an unacceptable risk. Hence, a first wall design needs to accommodate the occasional transient heat loads by introducing sacrificial limiters, which will absorb these transients.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

ULTIMATE Phase I project: Development of Niobium-based alloys for Turbine Applications

Current Ni-based alloys used in turbine blade applications are operating at 1100°C which is approximately 90% of the solidus of Ni-based alloys. Further increases in temperature can be achieved only through the use of alloys with higher solidus temperatures such as refractory alloys which include Mo, Nb, W, Ta alloys. Niobium has a unique combination of physical properties that include a high melting point (2468°C), lowest density (8.57 g/cc), and the lowest modulus amongst refractory alloys, a good thermal conductivity that increases from 45 W/mK at room temperature to 62 W/mK at 1093°C, good ductility with fabricability using traditional techniques, high strength, good creep resistance, and general chemical inactivity. Hence niobium alloys offer many advantages for use at the desired temperature of 1300°C. One of the major deterrents to the use of niobium and its alloys at high temperatures is achieving good oxidation resistance. In addition, achieving balanced properties of room temperature strength, ductility, fracture toughness, high temperature strength, and creep resistance required for 1300°C operation at a density of 9 g/cm 3 is extremely challenging since the addition of W which is a potent strengthener increases the density of the alloy. This project seeks to enable the development of a tri-layered turbine blade that can operate continuously at 1300°C with the core of the turbine blade providing good creep resistance, the second layer providing improved oxidation resistance over the core layer, and the third layer being an environmental barrier providing oxidation resistance. The objective of this Phase 1 project was to use computational modeling and advanced characterization tools to develop two classes of Nb alloys which could be used as the core layer and the transition layer. The first class of alloys developed in this project was a Nb-alloy designed to serve as the turbine blade core with excellent room temperature strength, ductility, and high temperature strength and creep resistance required for 1300°C operation. These alloys were designed to contain sufficient solute solution strengthening elements (W, Mo) but constrained by the density of alloy, along with the addition of elements such as Zr, Hf, Ta, C, and N to achieve a combination of primary and secondary carbide precipitation. A total of 38 “creep-resistant” alloys were designed and cast during the duration of the project. Processing techniques were developed to keep the oxygen contents as low as possible with typical oxygen contents less than 250 ppm. One alloy with a density of < 9.5 g/cc was successful in meeting the Phase 2 intermediate project mechanical property milestone requirements of room temperature ductility greater than 1.0%, 1200°C creep strain of less than 3% at 150 MPa and 100 hours in vacuum, and with solidus temperature greater than 1500ᵒC. The second class of alloys was designed to be a Nb-rich alloy with improved oxidation resistance when compared to the core layer and was designed specifically to be compatible with the core layer and the outer environmental barrier coating. This Nb- alloy will be specifically designed to be microstructurally stable at these temperatures when in contact with the core alloy and provide protection against catastrophic failure of the barrier coating. Two alloys were cast and processed but further development was discontinued to focus on the development of the creep resistant alloy.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

A North Carolina Retrospective: Major Outage Event Trends & Hurricane Helene using TASTI-GRID

The impacts of Hurricane Helene in September of 2024 showed magnifying effects on the number of major power outages reported both during and after the catastrophic weather event. The affected areas on the western edge of North Carolina, particularly Buncombe County (Asheville), endured a disproportionate number of outage impacts than surrounding counties atop the Piedmont Plateau. In 2024, each of the counties with the highest frequency of major outage events received at least one category of FEMA Disaster Declaration following Hurricane Helene. While the storm’s impacts certainly skewed 2024’s yearly major outage frequencies, we use TASTI-GRID to identify existence resilience challenges in the years prior to 2024 that may have given way to understanding how geography, topography, population density and other factors have compounding effects on existing resilience challenges in Buncombe and Mecklenburg counties, specifically.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Strategies for Flood Resilience and Grid Investment Among Iowa's Electric Distribution Utilities

Flooding poses a growing threat to Iowa's electric distribution system, yet utilities face significant data and modeling challenges in planning effective resilience investments. This report provides a foundational assessment of how distribution utilities in Iowa, investor-owned, municipal, and cooperative, approach resilience planning, with a focus on flood risk. It combines hazard characterization, review of state and utility practices, and application of NLR's Energy Resilience Analysis for Distribution Systems (ERAD) and Capacity Expansion Decision Support for Distribution Networks (CADET) tools. Using FEMA floodplains, Iowa Flood Center depth grids, and utility infrastructure data, the analysis quantifies asset exposure, simulates outage risks, and evaluates resilience strategies such as pole hardening, undergrounding, and substation protection. Results indicate that while feeder-level upgrades provide incremental benefits, the most significant reductions in outage risk are achieved through targeted substation interventions. The report highlights key data gaps, such as limited elevation data and fragility functions, and underscores the need for probability-weighted investment frameworks to address both frequent and catastrophic flood events. These insights aim to support utilities, state agencies, and federal partners in prioritizing resilience investments that safeguard Iowa's electric grid against future flooding.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Deflagration to Detonation Transition Update: XTIV (eXplosive Thermal Ignition to Violence)

The report describes a pipeline to connect a pre-thermal ignition code called XCHEM to a post-thermal ignition code called XDDT. The coupled code enables end-to-end simulation from first exposure to an abnormal thermal environment such as a fire, through thermal ignition, to the final reactive event—a benign pressure burst or a catastrophic detonation. Several demonstration calculations are given for slab and cylindrical geometries. Suggested future work is also discussed.

Hobbs, Michael Lane [Sandia National Laboratories ↗

Machine Protection Studies of Fast Instability-Driven Beam Losses in the EIC Electron Storage Ring

Fast transverse beam instabilities represent one of the most challenging protection scenarios for the Electron-Ion Collider (EIC) electron storage ring (ESR). Coherent betatron oscillations driven by collective effects can grow rapidly and lead to substantial beam losses within only a few tens of turns, posing a threat to collimators, superconducting (SC) magnets, cryogenic systems, and detector components. A dedicated simulation framework based on distributed transverse excitations was developed to evaluate instability-driven beam losses in the ESR. A conservative instability rise time on the order of 10 turns was used to define a bounding protection scenario. Simulations show that the original two-collimator configuration is insufficient to localize losses under all operating conditions, whereas an optimized four-collimator configuration reduces loss leakage into protected regions by more than two orders of magnitude. Nevertheless, the most severe instability scenarios produce catastrophic beam impacts, with nearly half of the stored beam being intercepted by the collimators within a single turn, exceeding the preliminary estimated survivability limits of the baseline collimator design. The results demonstrate that collimation alone is insufficient to guarantee safe ESR operation and must be complemented by a fast machine-protection system. Dedicated turn-by-turn beam-position monitors and fast beam-loss monitors provide sufficient advance warning to detect instability growth and initiate a beam abort before equipment-damaging loss levels are reached. These findings establish quantitative requirements for the ESR machine-protection architecture and support the implementation of a multilayer protection strategy for both accelerator and detector systems.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

The Resilient Economy: Integrating Competitiveness and Security

Globalization, technological complexity, interdependence, terrorism, climate and energy volatility, and pandemic potential are increasing the level of risk that societies and organizations now face. Risks also are increasingly interrelated; disruptions in one area can cascade in multiple directions. The ability to manage emerging risks, anticipate the interactions between different types of risk, and bounce back from disruption will be a competitive differentiator for companies and countries alike in the 21st century. What Policymakers Should Know The national objective is not just homeland protection, but economic resilience: the ability to mitigate and recover quickly from disruption. Businesses must root the case for investment in resilience strategies to manage a spectrum of risks, not just catastrophic ones. Making a business case for investment in defenses against low-probability events (even those with high impact) is difficult. However, making a business case for investments that assure business continuity and shareholder value is not a heavy lift. There are an infinite number of disruption scenarios, but only a finite number of outcomes. Leading organizations do not manage specific scenarios, rather they create the agility and flexibility to cope with turbulent situations. The investments and contingency plans these leading companies make to manage a spectrum of risk create a capability to respond to high-impact disasters as well. Government regulations tend to stovepipe different types of risk, which impedes companies abilities to manage risk in an integrated way. Policies to strengthen risk management capabilities would serve both security and competitiveness goals. What CEOs and Boards Should Know Operational risks are growing rapidly and outpacing many companies abilities to manage them. Corporate leadership has historically viewed operational risk management as a back office control function. But managing operational risks increasingly affects real-time financial performance. The 835 companies that announced a supply chain disruption between 1989 and 2000 experienced 33 percent to 40 percent lower stock returns than their industry peers. Twenty-five percent of companies that experienced an IT outage of two to six days went bankrupt immediately. Ninety-three percent of companies that lost their data center for 10 days or more filed for bankruptcy within a year.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

ILC TARGET WHEEL RIM FRAGMENT/GUARD PLATE IMPACT ANALYSIS

A positron source component is needed for the International Linear Collider Project. The leading design concept for this source is a rotating titanium alloy wheel whose spokes rotate through an intense localized magnetic field. The system is composed of an electric motor, flexible motor/drive-shaft coupling, stainless steel drive-shaft, two Plumber's Block tapered roller bearings, a titanium alloy target wheel, and electromagnet. Surrounding the target wheel and magnet is a steel frame with steel guarding plates intended to contain shrapnel in case of catastrophic wheel failure. Figure 1 is a layout of this system (guard plates not shown for clarity). This report documents the FEA analyses that were performed at LLNL to help determine, on a preliminary basis, the required guard plate thickness for three potential plate steels.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Report on Department of Homeland Security Sponsored Research Project at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory on Preparation for an Improvised Nuclear Device Event

Following the events of September 11th, a litany of imaginable horribles was trotted out before an anxious and concerned public. To date, government agencies and academics are still grappling with how to best respond to such catastrophes, and as Senator Lieberman's quote says above, now is the time to plan and prepare for such events. One of the nation's worst fears is that terrorists might detonate an improvised nuclear device (IND) in an American city. With 9/11 serving as the catalyst, the government and many NGOs have invested money into research and development of response capabilities throughout the country. Yet, there is still much to learn about how to best respond to an IND event. My summer 2008 internship at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory afforded me the opportunity to look in depth at the preparedness process and the research that has been conducted on this issue. While at the laboratory I was tasked to collect, combine, and process research on how cities and the federal government can best prepare for the horrific prospect of an IND event. Specific projects that I was involved with were meeting reports, research reviews, and a full project report. Working directly with Brooke Buddemeier and his support team at the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center, I was able to witness first hand, preparation for meetings with response planners to inform them of the challenges that an IND event would pose to the affected communities. In addition, I supported the Homeland Security Institute team (HSI), which was looking at IND preparation and preparing a Congressional report. I participated in meetings at which local responders expressed their concerns and contributed valuable information to the response plan. I specialized in the psycho-social aspects of an IND event and served as a technical advisor to some of the research groups. Alongside attending and supporting these meetings, I worked on an independent research project which collected information from across disciplines to outline where the state of knowledge on IND response is. In addition, the report looked at meetings that were held over the summer in various cities. The meetings were attended by both federal responders and local responders. The meetings explored issues regarding IND preparation and how to mitigate the effects of an IND detonation. Looking at the research and current preparation activity the report found that the state of knowledge in responding and communicating is a mixed bag. Some aspects of an IND attack are well understood, some are not, but much is left to synthesize. The effects of an IND would be devastating, yet much can be done to mitigate those effects through education, preparation, and research. A major gap in current knowledge is how to effectively communicate with the public before an attack. Little research on the effectiveness of public education has been done, but it is likely that educating the public about the effects of an IND and how to best protect oneself could save many lives.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Life Cost Based FMEA Manual: A Step by Step Guide to Carrying Out a Cost-based Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

Failure occurs when one or more of the intended functions of a product are no longer fulfilled to the customer's satisfaction. The most critical product failures are those that escape design reviews and in-house quality inspection and are found by the customer. The product may work for a while until its performance degrades to an unacceptable level or it may have not worked even before customer took possession of the product. The end results of failures which may lead to unsafe conditions or major losses of the main function are rated high in severity. Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a tool widely used in the automotive, aerospace, and electronics industries to identify, prioritize, and eliminate known potential failures, problems, and errors from systems under design, before the product is released (Stamatis, 1997). Several industrial FMEA standards such as those published by the Society of Automotive Engineers, US Department of Defense, and the Automotive Industry Action Group employ the Risk Priority Number (RPN) to measure risk and severity of failures. The Risk Priority Number (RPN) is a product of 3 indices: Occurrence (O), Severity (S), and Detection (D). In a traditional FMEA process design engineers typically analyze the 'root cause' and 'end-effects' of potential failures in a sub-system or component and assign penalty points through the O, S, D values to each failure. The analysis is organized around categories called failure modes, which link the causes and effects of failures. A few actions are taken upon completing the FMEA worksheet. The RPN column generally will identify the high-risk areas. The idea of performing FMEA is to eliminate or reduce known and potential failures before they reach the customers. Thus, a plan of action must be in place for the next task. Not all failures can be resolved during the product development cycle, thus prioritization of actions must be made within the design group. One definition of detection difficulty (D) is how well the organization controls the development process. Another definition relates to the detectability of a particular failure in the product when it is in the hands of the customer. The former asks 'What is the chance of catching the problem before we give it to the customer'? The latter asks 'What is the chance of the customer catching the problem before the problem results in a catastrophic failure?' (Palady, 1995) These differing definitions confuse the FMEA users when one tries to determine detection difficulty. Are we trying to measure how easy it is to detect where a failure has occurred or when it has occurred? Or are we trying to measure how easy or difficult it is to prevent failures? Ordinal scale variables are used to rank-order industries such as, hotels, restaurants, and movies (Note that a 4 star hotel is not necessarily twice as good as a 2 star hotel). Ordinal values preserve rank in a group of items, but the distance between the values cannot be measured since a distance function does not exist. Thus, the product or sum of ordinal variables loses its rank since each parameter has different scales. The RPN is a product of 3 independent ordinal variables, it can indicate that some failure types are 'worse' than others, but give no quantitative indication of their relative effects. To resolve the ambiguity of measuring detection difficulty and the irrational logic of multiplying 3 ordinal indices, a new methodology was created to overcome these shortcomings, Life Cost-Based FMEA. Life Cost-Based FMEA measures failure/risk in terms of monetary cost. Cost is a universal parameter that can be easily related to severity by engineers and others. Thus, failure cost can be estimated using the following simplest form: Expected Failure Cost = {sup n}{Sigma}{sub i=1}p{sub i}c{sub i}, p: Probability of a particular failure occurring; c: Monetary cost associated with that particular failure; and n: Total number of failure scenarios. FMEA is most effective when there are inputs into it from all concerned disciplines of the product development team. However, FMEA is a long process and can become tedious and won't be effective if too many people participate. An ideal team should have 3 to 4 people from: design, manufacturing, and service departments if possible. Depending on how complex the system is, the entire process can take anywhere from one to four weeks working full time. Thus, it is important to agree to the time commitment before starting the analysis else, anxious managers might stop the procedure before it is completed.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Preliminary Investigation of Rapid Depressurization Phenomena Following a Sudden DLOFC in a VHTR

Air ingress has been identified as a potential threat for Very High Temperature gas-cooled Reactors (VHTR). Reactor components constructed of graphite will, at high temperatures, produce exothermic reactions in the presence of oxygen. The danger lies in the possibility of fuel element damage and core structural failure. Previous investigations of air ingress mechanisms have focused on thermal and molecular diffusion, density-driven stratified flow, and natural convection. Here, we investigate the possibility of a rapid ingress of air due to a Taylor wave expansion after a hypothetical sudden loss of coolant accident (LOCA) scenario in a VHTR. Our analysis starts with a one-dimensional shock tube simulation to simply illustrate the development of a Taylor wave with resulting reentrant flow. Then, a simulation is performed of an idealized two-dimensional axisymmetric representation of the lower plenum of General Atomics GT-MHR subjected to a hypothetical catastrophic break of the hot duct. Analysis shows the potential for significant and rapid air ingress into the reactor vessel in the case of a large break in the cooling system.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Reintroduction of Lower Columbia River Chum Salmon into Duncan Creek, 2007 Annual Report.

The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) listed Lower Columbia River (LCR) chum salmon as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in March, 1999 (64 FR 14508, March 25, 1999). The listing was in response to the reduction in abundance from historical levels of more than one-half million returning adults to fewer than 10,000 present-day spawners. Harvest, habitat degradation, changes in flow regimes, riverbed movement and heavy siltation have been largely responsible for this decline. The timing of seasonal changes in river flow and water temperatures is perhaps the most critical factor in structuring the freshwater life history of this species. This is especially true of the population located directly below Bonneville Dam, where hydropower operations can block access to spawning sites, dewater redds, strand fry, cause scour or fill of redds and increase sedimentation of spawning gravels. Prior to 1997, only two chum salmon populations were recognized as genetically distinct in the Columbia River, although spawning had been documented in many Lower Columbia River tributaries. The first population was in the Grays River (RKm 34), a tributary of the Columbia River, and the second was a group of spawners utilizing the mainstem Columbia River just below Bonneville Dam (RKm 235) adjacent to Ives Island and in Hardy and Hamilton creeks. Using additional DNA samples, Small et al. (2006) grouped chum salmon spawning in the mainstem Columbia River and the Washington State tributaries into three groups: the Coastal, the Cascade and the Gorge. The Coastal group comprises those spawning in the Grays River, Skamokawa Creek and the broodstock used at the Sea Resources facility on the Chinook River. The Cascade group comprises those spawning in the Cowlitz (both summer and fall stocks), Kalama, Lewis, and East Fork Lewis rivers, with most supporting unique populations. The Gorge group comprises those spawning in the mainstem Columbia River from the I-205 Bridge up to Bonneville Dam and those spawning in Hamilton and Hardy creeks. Response to the federal ESA listing has been primarily through direct-recovery actions: reducing harvest, hatchery supplementation using local broodstock for populations at catastrophic risk, habitat restoration (including construction of spawning channels) and flow agreements to protect spawning and rearing areas. Both state and federal agencies have built controlled spawning areas. In 1998, the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) began a chum salmon supplementation program using native stock on the Grays River. This program was expanded during 1999 - 2001 to include reintroduction into the Chinook River using eggs from the Grays River Supplementation Program. These eggs are incubated at the Grays River Hatchery, reared to release size at the Sea Resources Hatchery on the Chinook River, and the fry are released at the mouth of the Chinook River. Native steelhead, chum, and coho salmon are present in Duncan Creek, and are recognized as subpopulations of the Lower Gorge population, and are focal species in the Lower Columbia Fish Recovery Board (LCFRB) plan. Steelhead, chum and coho salmon that spawn in Duncan Creek are listed as Threatened under the ESA. Duncan Creek is classified by the LCFRB plan as a watershed for intensive monitoring (LCFRB 2004). This project was identified in the 2004 Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) revised Biological Opinion (revised BiOp) to increase survival of chum salmon, 'BPA will continue to fund the program to re-introduce Columbia River chum salmon into Duncan Creek as long as NOAA Fisheries determines it to be an essential and effective contribution to reducing the risk of extinction for this ESU'. (USACE et al. 2004, page 85-86). The Governors Forum on Monitoring and Salmon Recovery and Watershed Health recommends one major population from each ESU have adult and juvenile monitoring. Duncan Creek chum salmon are identified in this plan to be intensively monitored. Planners recommended that a combination of natural and hatchery production would be the most likely way to produce the most rapid sustainable improvement in chum runs. Specifically, it was assumed that improving habitat conditions would promote efficient natural production, and that the most rapid way to rebuild the run would be to combine releases of an appropriate stock into the improved habitat. WDFW's recovery strategy for LCR chum salmon, as outlined in the WDFW Grays River and Washougal Hatchery Genetic Management Plans (HGMP), is as follows. First, determine if remnant populations of chum salmon exist in LCR tributaries. Second, if such populations exist, develop stock-specific recovery plans involving habitat restoration that include the creation of spawning refugias, supplementation where necessary, and a habitat and fish monitoring and evaluation plan.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Evaluation of MerCAP for Power Plant Mercury Control

This report is submitted to the U.S. Department of Energy National Energy Technology Laboratory (DOE-NETL) as part of Cooperative Agreement DE-FC26-03NT41993, 'Evaluation of EPRI's MerCAP{trademark} Technology for Power Plant Mercury Control'. This project has investigated the mercury removal performance of EPRI's Mercury Capture by Amalgamation Process (MerCAP{trademark}) technology. Test programs were conducted to evaluate gold-based MerCAP{trademark} at Great River Energy's Stanton Station Unit 10 (Site 1), which fired both North Dakota lignite (NDL) and Power River Basin (PRB) coal during the testing period, and at Georgia Power's Plant Yates Unit 1 (Site 2) [Georgia Power is a subsidiary of The Southern Company] which fires a low sulfur Eastern bituminous coal. Additional tests were carried out at Alabama Power's Plant Miller, which fires Powder River Basin Coal, to evaluate a carbon-based MerCAP{trademark} process for removing mercury from flue gas downstream of an electrostatic precipitator [Alabama Power is a subsidiary of The Southern Company]. A full-scale gold-based sorbent array was installed in the clean-air plenum of a single baghouse compartment at GRE's Stanton Station Unit 10, thereby treating 1/10th of the unit's exhaust gas flow. The substrates that were installed were electroplated gold screens oriented parallel to the flue gas flow. The sorbent array was initially installed in late August of 2004, operating continuously until its removal in July 2006, after nearly 23 months. The initial 4 months of operation were conducted while the host unit was burning North Dakota lignite (NDL). In November 2004, the host unit switched fuel to burn Powder River Basin (PRB) subbituminous coal and continued to burn the PRB fuel for the final 19 months of this program. Tests were conducted at Site 1 to evaluate the impacts of flue gas flow rate, sorbent plate spacing, sorbent pre-cleaning and regeneration, and spray dryer operation on MerCAP{trademark} performance. At Site 2, a pilot-scale array was installed in a horizontal reactor chamber designed to treat approximately 2800 acfm of flue gas obtained from downstream of the plant's flue gas desulfurization (FGD) system. The initial MerCAP{trademark} array was installed at Plant Yates in January 2004, operating continuously for several weeks before a catastrophic system failure resulting from a failed flue gas fan. A second MerCAP{trademark} array was installed in July 2006 and operated for one month before being shut down for a reasons pertaining to system performance and host site scheduling. A longer-term continuous-operation test was then conducted during the summer and fall of 2007. Tests were conducted to evaluate the impacts of flue gas flow rate, sorbent space velocity, and sorbent rinsing frequency on mercury removal performance. Detailed characterization of treated sorbent plates was carried out in an attempt to understand the nature of reactions leading to excessive corrosion of the substrate surfaces.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Producing Conditional Mutants for Studying Plant Microtubule Function

The cytoskeleton, and in particular its microtubule component, participates in several processes that directly affect growth and development in higher plants. Normal cytoskeletal function requires the precise and orderly arrangement of microtubules into several cell cycle and developmentally specific arrays. One of these, the cortical array, is notable for its role in directing the deposition of cellulose (the most prominent polymer in the biosphere). An understanding of how these arrays form, and the molecular interactions that contribute to their function, is incomplete. To gain a better understanding of how microtubules work, we have been working to characterize mutants in critical cytoskeletal genes. This characterization is being carried out at the subcellular level using vital microtubule gene constructs. In the last year of funding colleagues have discovered that gamma-tubulin complexes form along the lengths of cortical microtubules where they act to spawn new microtubules at a characteristic 40 deg angle. This finding complements nicely the finding from our lab (which was funded by the DOE) showing that microtubule encounters are angle dependent; high angles encounters results in catastrophic collisions while low angle encounters result in favorable zippering. The finding of a 40 deg spawn of new microtubules from extant microtubule, together with aforementioned rules of encounters, insures favorable co-alignment in the array. I was invited to write a New and Views essay on this topic and a PDF is attached (News and Views policy does not permit funding acknowledgments and so I was not allowed to acknowledge support from the DOE).

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Project Plan 7930 Cell G PaR Remote Handling System Replacement

For over 40 years the US Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessors have made Californium-252 ({sup 252}Cf) available for a wide range of industries including medical, nuclear fuels, mining, military and national security. The Radiochemical Engineering Development Center (REDC) located within the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) processes irradiated production targets from the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR). Operations in Building 7930, Cell G provide over 70% of the world's demand for {sup 252}Cf. Building 7930 was constructed and equipped in the mid-1960s. Current operations for {sup 252}Cf processing in Building 7930, Cell G require use of through-the-wall manipulators and the PaR Remote Handling System. Maintenance and repairs for the manipulators is readily accomplished by removal of the manipulator and relocation to a repair shop where hands-on work can be performed in glove boxes. Contamination inside cell G does not currently allow manned entry and no provisions were created for a maintenance area inside the cell. There has been no maintenance of the PaR system or upgrades, leaving operations vulnerable should the system have a catastrophic failure. The Cell G PaR system is currently being operated in a run to failure mode. As the manipulator is now 40+ years old there is significant risk in this method of operation. In 2006 an assessment was completed that resulted in recommendations for replacing the manipulator operator control and power centers which are used to control and power the PaR manipulator in Cell G. In mid-2008 the chain for the bridge drive failed and subsequent examinations indicated several damaged links (see Figure 1). To continue operations the PaR manipulator arm is being used to push and pull the bridge as a workaround. A retrieval tool was fabricated, tested and staged inside Cell G that will allow positioning of the bridge and manipulator arm for removal from the cell should the PaR system completely fail. A fully functioning and reliable Par manipulator arm is necessary for uninterrupted {sup 252}Cf operations; a fully-functioning bridge is needed for the system to function as intended.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

High energy arcing fault fires in switchgear equipment : a literature review.

In power generating plants, switchgear provide a means to isolate and de-energize specific electrical components and buses in order to clear downstream faults, perform routine maintenance, and replace necessary electrical equipment. These protective devices may be categorized by the insulating medium, such as air or oil, and are typically specified by voltage classes, i.e. low, medium, and high voltage. Given their high energy content, catastrophic failure of switchgear by means of a high energy arcing fault (HEAF) may occur. An incident such as this may lead to an explosion and fire within the switchgear, directly impact adjacent components, and possibly render dependent electrical equipment inoperable. Historically, HEAF events have been poorly documented and discussed in little detail. Recent incidents involving switchgear components at nuclear power plants, however, were scrupulously investigated. The phenomena itself is only understood on a very elementary level from preliminary experiments and theories; though many have argued that these early experiments were inaccurate due to primitive instrumentation or poorly justified methodologies and thus require re-evaluation. Within the past two decades, however, there has been a resurgence of research that analyzes previous work and modern technology. Developing a greater understanding of the HEAF phenomena, in particular the affects on switchgear equipment and other associated switching components, would allow power generating industries to minimize and possibly prevent future occurrences, thereby reducing costs associated with repair and downtime. This report presents the findings of a literature review focused on arc fault studies for electrical switching equipment. The specific objective of this review was to assess the availability of the types of information needed to support development of improved treatment methods in fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for nuclear power plant applications.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

LDRD final report on "fundamentals of synthetic conversion of CO2 to simple hydrocarbon fuels" (LDRD 113486).

Energy production is inextricably linked to national security and poses the danger of altering the environment in potentially catastrophic ways. There is no greater problem than sustainable energy production. Our purpose was to attack this problem by examining processes, technology, and science needed for recycling CO{sub 2} back into transportation fuels. This approach can be thought of as 'bio-inspired' as nature employs the same basic inputs, CO{sub 2}/energy/water, to produce biomass. We addressed two key deficiencies apparent in current efforts. First, a detailed process analysis comparing the potential for chemical and conventional engineering methods to provide a route for the conversion of CO{sub 2} and water to fuel has been completed. No apparent 'showstoppers' are apparent in the synthetic route. Opportunities to improve current processes have also been identified and examined. Second, we have also specifically addressed the fundamental science of the direct production of methanol from CO{sub 2} using H{sub 2} as a reductant.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗