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Criticality Safety Aspects of Higher Fissile Gram Equivalent at the AMWTF - 19296

Operating since 2003, the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Facility (AMWTF) has used high-tech characterization equipment, robotics, and automated treatment processes to accomplish its mission. The facility was designed to treat contact handled waste up to 325 Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE). As the lower fissile mass drums and boxes were treated and shipped for disposal, other high fissile mass containers needed to be treated and shipped. The facility's mission evolved to include treating containers with up to 3,000 FGE. The nuclear criticality safety group has worked diligently with operations to increase AMWTF's fissile mass limits. As operations change across the Department of Energy facility, the nuclear criticality safety groups must work with operations to meet the mission. How Fluor Idaho LLC is accomplishing this task with respect to criticality safety is the subject of this paper. The signature piece of equipment at AMWTF is the Supercompactor, a giant hydraulic ram capable of exerting 4 million pounds of force that can reduce a 55-gal drum to a 5-inch puck. By compacting waste, the Department of Energy can put more waste into the limited storage space of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Compaction also reduces the number of trips required to transport waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. There are two box-lines with hydraulic manipulators, nondestructive assay systems for drums and boxes, along with real-time-radiography. The plant's operations are highly automated. As time passed, AMWTF was tasked to treat drums that were not treatable with current operations. Based on analysis and experience of the nuclear criticality safety personnel, we have changed the fissile limits while maintaining a critically safe environment for the facility. Credit was taken for form, geometry, and lack of moderation in the material being treated. As the need arose to process higher FGE containers, more controls were identified for the treatment process. Criticality safety evaluations were expanded to 1,000 FGE for operational flexibility. Those evaluations included the box-line, the hot maintenance cell, and conveyors. Later, criticality safety evaluations were written to allow tanks to be processed in a box-line, as well as the use of a port in the box-line. Criticality safety evaluations for the box-line, hot maintenance cell, and conveyor were expanded to 3,000 FGE. The criticality safety officer is onsite and actively involved in operations. By expanding the nuclear criticality safety operating parameters, the AMWTF will meet the 2008 Record of Decision in which the Department of Energy directed 8,700 cubic meters of waste to be treated at the facility. (author)

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Panel Session 51: Idaho Transuranic Waste Challenges, Solutions and Implications for the Future (3/5)

This panel focused on the retrieval, characterization, treatment, certification, and shipping of transuranic (TRU) waste at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site, Idaho, USA. The INL began receiving TRU waste from offsite generators (primarily the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado, USA) beginning in 1954. Until 1970, the INL Site disposed of barrels, boxes, and other debris in a shallow, unlined landfill. Beginning in 1970, the INL Site began storing TRU waste on an asphalt pad, which was then covered with several feet of soil. This practice continued until the late 1980's at which time a large air support building was erected over the waste. In the mid-to-late 1990's, the air support building was removed and a massive building was constructed over the entire dirt mound. Contractors retrieved the waste from the early 2000's through February 2017 to support an Idaho Settlement Agreement milestone that required the retrieval of 65,000 cubic meters of TRU waste and removal from Idaho. This panel focused on the Idaho Transuranic Waste Challenges, Solutions and Implications for the Future. The Idaho Transuranic Waste Program includes buried and stored waste retrieval and processing of contact- and remote-handled transuranic waste. Over the duration of the program, the Idaho site has conducted targeted retrieval of buried waste from the 1950's and 1960's; designed, permitted, built, operated, and completed the mission of a facility to process 65,000 cubic meters of waste; and shipped more than 57,000 cubic meters of waste to WIPP. Presentation proposed: Transuranic Waste Challenges and Solutions (Hoss Brown, Fluor Idaho, LLC (USA), John McCoy, Fluor Idaho, LLC (USA), James Malmo, US DOE (USA), Doug Pruitt, Department of Energy Idaho Field Office (USA), Kenneth Princen, US DOE (USA))

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Offsite Source Recovery Program; High Activity Beta Gamma Removal, Transport and Disposition - 19663

The Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Radiological Security's (ORS) Off-Site Source Recovery Program (OSRP) has been tasked with the removal and disposition of radioactive sealed sources in the interest of national security and public health and safety. It is the mission of the program to recover radioactive sources to prevent them from falling into the hands of individuals who would use this material for malicious intent. OSRP is a collaborative effort involving Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). At the inception of the program, Pu-239 was the only isotope acceptable for recovery. As a wider security scope developed, OSRP expanded its mission to include the recovery of other sources that posed a potential risk to national security, health, and safety. Starting in 2004, OSRP began recovering cesium and cobalt devices, largely from medical, research, and industrial facilities. These disused higher-activity devices present a burden to licensees in terms of security, and demand for OSRP's assistance in removing them has been high. Today, OSRP removes around 40 high-activity devices per year in support of domestic demand as well as ORS's Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project (CIRP). This represents an average of over 50,000 Ci of Cs-137 and Co-60 removed from the private sector each year for permanent disposition. A major component of this effort is the use of the proper shipping container to transport the devices. As a way to increase transportation capabilities ORS has developed two new Type B containers. The most recently completed of these containers, the 435-B, is currently certified to transport Gammators and Gammacell-1000, -3000, and -40 irradiators in an overpack configuration. This provides greater capacity and flexibility to safely and effectively transport these devices, for which acceptable shipping configurations had been previously limited. (authors)

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Optimization of Energy Absorbing Materials for Radioactive Packaging

Most applications of honeycomb materials are for lightweight structural members. This area of honeycomb material behavior has been extensively researched. In packaging design, honeycomb materials are used for impact energy absorption. Data concerning the deformation of stainless steel honeycomb structures is not widely available. It is being proposed to use honeycomb stainless steel as an impact energy absorber in a new radioactive material shipping package. Honeycomb materials can be useful for energy absorption applications because the geometry causes the structure to have a constant compressive force during buckling. This Finite Element Analysis is used to predict the compressive buckling strength of various honeycomb structures in order to design an energy absorber for a specific package weight and geometry. The model simulates a drop test where a 50 pound plate lands flat on a honeycomb stainless steel structure from a height of 30 feet. Some actual drop tests have already been performed on real specimens. Most of the resulting deformations of these tests include the bottom of the honeycomb structure buckling while the rest of the structure was either slightly deformed or straight. The deformation of the simulated honeycomb specimen matched the deformation from the actual drop tests. This is one verification that the model is working properly. It is evident that after about 2.5% strain the strength is a relatively linear value, and eventually flattens out to about 875 psi. The crush strength measured from the actual drop tests for the same density honeycomb was just over 800 psi. This is further verification that the model is working correctly. The results gathered from the FEA model successfully mirror the results from a real drop test. The deformation looks realistic, and the compressive strength found is consistent with the empirically measured value. Future work for this model includes modeling different density honeycomb structures which have not been tested before. This will allow for optimization of honeycomb stainless steel use for impact absorption in radioactive material shipping packages.

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Packaging and Transportation Regulatory Inconsistencies and Challenges - 20485

This paper presents regulatory inconsistencies within and between various regulatory agencies. These inconsistencies relate to the packaging and transportation of radioactive materials typically encountered during decommissioning including mixed wastes that are required to be compliant with more than one regulatory agency during shipment. At least one possible solution is presented for consideration. The following four examples are presented: - Packaging discrepancies for radioactive material meeting the DOT definition of Radioactive LSA-I that also contain lead may be compliant when shipped unpackaged per Department of Transportation (DOT) rules in 173.427 paragraph C. However, since they contain lead, they are required to be shipped in a package per the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Hazardous Waste Manifest (HWM) instructions. - The difference between the units of measure used in 49 CFR Part 172.101 Appendix A and 40 CFR, Part 355, Appendices A and B. - The requirement for outer packaging for radioactive gauges meeting all other requirements of 49 CFR 173.424 and 173.425. - E-Manifesting EPA system difficult for waste materials containing both radioactive class 7 and PCBs. (authors)

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Panel Session 145: Challenges and Opportunities in Establishing a System for Transportation of SNF/UNF

Issues associated with establishing a SNF Transportation System in the U.S. are complex. In part, this is because in the US when discussing SNF, there are two distinct categories. The two categories represent significant differences in ownership, transportation-regulator, and even the physical characteristics of the SNF. Specifically, the physical differences in the SNF include size of the rods, associated quantities to be shipped, cladding material, and radionuclide content/enrichment. The first is commercial SNF (i.e., that associated with nuclear power plants), owned by utilities, until a permanent repository is built with DOE obligated by law to then assume the responsibility for shipping and ownership of the SNF. Since no-permanent repository currently exists, most commercial SNF is stored near the reactor in which it was installed, hence requiring no shipments. Although current shipments of commercial SNF are very limited, the few that do occur are generally performed to support a utilities SNF consolidation effort utility and for post irradiation examination/testing. However, with approximately 83,000 metric tons currently being stored at more than 70 sites around the U.S., when a permanent repository becomes available, the required number of shipments will be extensive. The second category is DOE and research reactor fuel. These fuel rods are generally much smaller in length than commercial fuel rods, with the quantity of rods transported in a shipment significantly less than the number of rods in a typical commercial fuel assembly. Currently, most of the SNF shipments within the U.S come from this category. DOE is currently managing about 2500 metric tons of heavy metal of SNF. This panel focused on updates and status of transportation of SNF/UNF. Panelists provided updates and information on continuing impacts, risk assessment, equipment (rail cars, handling, securement), possible rail routing, and proposed inspection equipment/routing prior to shipments. Panelists with presentations: Preparing for Nuclear Waste Transportation (Daniel Ogg); Challenges and Opportunities in Establishing a System for Transportation of SNF/UNF (Kathy Langan); UNF Transportation: Challenges and Opportunities (Michael Valenzano)

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MH-1A Sturgis Decommissioning and Dismantlement - 20281

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) with its prime contractor, Aptim Federal Services, LLC (APTIM), recycled 5,260 metric tons (11.6 million pounds) of material from Sturgis Barge (Sturgis) during the Decommissioning and Dismantlement of the MH-1A nuclear power reactor. The overall objective of the project was to reduce residual radioactivity associated with MH-1A to levels that permitted release of Sturgis for dismantlement and termination of the Army Reactor Office permit. By effectively applying waste hierarchy's three Rs - reduce, reuse and recycle - the Sturgis project not only minimized the amount of waste that required disposal at landfills, but also reduced the potential for long-term environmental liability emanating from these landfills. The project team completed the physical decommissioning efforts in June 2018 in Galveston, TX. In September 2018, radiological surveys were completed to demonstrate the vessel could be released for shipbreaking. Sturgis was towed from Galveston, TX to Brownsville, TX in late September 2018. Shipbreaking, dismantlement and recycling efforts began in early October 2018 and were completed on 15 March 2019. As part of the decommissioning effort in Galveston, the team shipped 69 shipments (860 metric tons) of low-level radioactive waste and radioactive components to the Waste Control Specialist (WCS) facility in Andrews TX for disposal. Certain radioactive components had to be transferred to the Department of Energy prior to placing the materials into the Federal Waste Facility located within WCS. However, most of the radioactive waste was characterized, profiled, approved and managed under the WCS permitted radioactive waste exemption process authorized and implemented by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) and the Radioactive Materials Division. This allows LLRW and LLMW to be shipped as regulated waste and then upon receipt at WCS through satisfying the relevant waste acceptance criteria the waste is exempted and placed into the WCS RCRA permitted cell. An additional 35 shipments (544 metric ton) of contaminated hazardous waste water were transported to U.S. Ecology in Robstown, TX for treatment/disposal. An additional 36 shipments (500 metric tons) of non-hazardous wastewater was sent to Republic Waste Services' facility in Fresno, TX. The disposal of these materials required close coordination with State of Texas regulators. During decommissioning, the project team recycled approximately 270 metric tons (600,000 pounds) of lead and steel. As part of the dismantlement in Brownsville, TX the team recycled approximately 5,000 metric tons (11 million pounds) of ferrous and non-ferrous material, limiting our disposal requirements to about 180 metric tons (400,000 pounds) of material (<4% from entire shipbreaking activity). Although the primary hazard being mitigated by this project was radiological, recycling was always a priority for the project. The team strived to achieve sustainability goals as we implemented this one of a kind project. Scrap metal recycling has a large positive impact on the environment and can also favorably impact project disposal costs. Steel is among the most recycled material in the world. Nearly 40% of the world's steel production is made from scrap. Recycling steel also requires 75% less energy than producing it from raw materials. By using recycled steel rather than virgin materials, 2.33 kg of carbon emissions are eliminated per kg of steel [1]. The project recycled more than 4,500 metric tons (10 million pounds) of steel, which eliminated about 10,400 metric tons (23 million pounds) of CO{sub 2}. By implementing a recycling initiative for the Sturgis project, the team was able to realize cost avoidance for disposal of scrap, cost savings from the metals recycled, plus the project provided benefits to the environment through our recycling efforts. Once the dismantlement was complete, the team prepared a detailed decommissioning closure report, which allowed for the termination of the Army Reactor Decommissioning Permit. While it not only reduced any potential long-term environmental liability, this project to decommission and dismantle a floating nuclear power plant is truly unprecedented - it is a prime example of the USACE mission which is: 'Engineering solutions for the Nation's toughest challenges'. This unique, one of a kind, historical power plant was never designed to be taken apart, and the available information about its construction was lacking in many details. The hazards that required mitigation dictated a painstaking and deliberate process in order to avoid any release to the environment and the community, and to protect the health and safety of the workers involved while keeping the waste hierarchy's three R's - reduce, reuse and recycle at the forefront. (authors)

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Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project Overcomes Challenges to Complete Treatment of Debris Waste - 20616

The Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP), operated by Fluor Idaho for the Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office, completed the last of its debris waste treatment in the fall of 2019. Concluding that work-scope was certainly not without its challenges. Fluor Idaho and its employees had to adapt to treating extremely challenging waste types, such as high-fissile gram materials and potentially pyrophoric and reactive wastes coming down the stretch. It also had to complete the sizing of large waste boxes from Mound Laboratories in inner-contamination enclosures designed to capture the extremely fine, 'flighty' plutonium-238 in its high-efficiency particulate air filters. Very few waste treatment facilities in the DOE Complex have completed their missions. In fact, most large-scale waste treatment facilities are still under construction with many months or years remaining before 'hot operations' begin. AMWTP is unique because it functioned as a 'one-stop shop.' Transuranic and low-level waste characterization, treatment, certification, and shipping all occurred there. AMWTP concluded the most challenging part of its mission and will continue to ship material out of the state of Idaho for the next decade. This paper will provide a background of the AMWTP mission, and the adaptations to its operating permit, equipment, or treatment processes to address challenging waste types. AMWTP will leave behind a legacy of being one of the most successful waste treatment facilities in the history of the DOE Complex. The facility was well-conceived, well-constructed, and well-executed; it was done right from start to finish. During the course of its waste treatment mission, the facility was required to adapt to changing conditions by treating extremely challenging waste types. (authors)

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Dose Rate Investigation for Cobalt Isotope Rods Retrieval Campaign

GE-Hitachi (GEH) partnered with Exelon for a first of a kind program to generate cobalt-60 (Co-60) sources at Clinton Power Station (CPS). The cobalt targets are placed within the fuel bundle, double encapsulated in metal rods, and irradiated in the Boiling Water Reactor for activation. After the bundle is discharged, the Co-60 sources are harvested for medical and industrial applications. In order to ensure safe shipment of the Co-60 sources, shielding evaluations are required. As required by 10 CFR 71, a licensing basis evaluation was performed and submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and approved as a Letter Authorization. This 10 CFR 71 evaluation utilizes bounding design inputs to demonstrate compliance with the regulatory limits. The retrieval campaign of the Co-60 rods involves disassembly of the bundle/rods, loading into a material basket, and then loading the material basket into GEHitachi's Model 2000 cask that is part of the Type B Transportation Package. As part of conservative decision making, CPS wanted confidence that measurements taken at various locations around the material basket loaded with Co-60 rods are consistent or bounded by the dose rate calculations performed by GEH. This would ensure that after all loading operations are completed, and the Model 2000 package is in the shipping configuration (i.e., cask drained and secured within the Model 2000 overpack), the dose rates would meet 10 CFR 71 shipping requirements. In addition, dose rate predictions were used to develop an ALARA plan at CPS to ensure radiological safety of the workers. To support CPS, a second, more realistic shielding evaluation was performed to verify the as planned loading. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Review of Fissile Material Exemptions and General Licenses in 10 CFR Part 71 - 14578

Title 10 of the United States (US) Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 71, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material includes requirements for the transport of fissile material in packages. These regulations provide requirements for packaging that is certified by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to transport fissile material, but the regulations also include provisions that allow for shipment of fissile material in packages that are not required to be certified by the NRC. These provisions include criteria for exemptions from classification as fissile material (10 CFR 71.15) and permit general licenses for limited quantities of fissile material and plutonium-beryllium special form sources (10 CFR 71.22 and 10 CFR 71.23, respectively). These regulations were revised by NRC as part of a broad rulemaking effort in 2004. These regulations are used frequently for a wide-variety of fissile material shipping operations and shippers must interpret the regulations for particular shipping situations. The quantity of fissile material that presents a criticality safety risk depends on the other materials in the system that might absorb neutrons emitted from fission or moderate (slow) those neutrons to lower energies where the probability of them creating an additional fission is highest. Besides the absorption and moderation of neutrons, other parameters that must be considered to ensure criticality safety are: the mass, concentration, or isotopic distribution of the fissile material; and the system geometry and neutron reflection of the package from surrounding materials. These parameters were carefully considered in developing the requirements for the exemptions from the classification of fissile material and the requirements for general licenses for fissile material. This paper will review the technical basis, intent, and anticipated usage of each of the fissile material exemption and general license provisions. Additionally, this paper will discuss the recent regulatory history of the Part 71 fissile material exemptions and general licenses, including the 2015 rulemaking effort. Finally, this paper will outline an upcoming NUREG/CR document regarding the fissile material exemptions and general licenses, and discuss recommendations that are being formulated for potential future revisions to the regulations. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Process Improvement For Pu-238 Production at Idaho National Laboratory

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has supported the production of Pu-238 for future NASA deep space missions since 2017. Over this time, INL has worked to improve the qualification process of Pu-238 production targets as well as improve processes related to the shipping, storage, irradiation, and storage of Pu-238 production targets. Qualification of Pu-238 production targets began with flux measurements and scoping analysis to provide fundamental data to confirm the impacts on the operation of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Fig1. Later, initial production targets were irradiated in ATR’s I-7 position, and then the South Flux Trap (SFT). A modified target design was then implemented which would use the full length of the ATR core and increase Pu-238 production. While working to improve and streamline the qualification of the Pu-238 production targets, INL worked to improve multiple operational aspects of the Pu-238 production process. These changes include updating procedures to streamline operations, supporting modification of shipping containers to contain five rather than one production target, reviewing target receipt procedures and changing work flow to provide flexibility in target receipt, and designing and fabricating support equipment for the storage and internal transfer of production targets

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Process Improvements For Pu-238 Production at Idaho National Laboratory

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has supported the production of Pu-238 for future NASA deep space missions since 2017. Over this time, INL has worked to improve the qualification process of Pu-238 production targets as well as improve processes related to the shipping, storage, irradiation, and storage of Pu-238 production targets. Qualification of Pu-238 production targets began with flux measurements and scoping analysis to provide fundamental data to confirm the impacts on the operation of the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Fig1. Later, initial production targets were irradiated in ATR’s I-7 position, and then the South Flux Trap (SFT). A modified target design was then implemented which would use the full length of the ATR core and increase Pu-238 production. While working to improve and streamline the qualification of the Pu-238 production targets, INL worked to improve multiple operational aspects of the Pu-238 production process. These changes include updating procedures to streamline operations, supporting modification of shipping containers to contain five rather than one production target, reviewing target receipt procedures and changing work flow to provide flexibility in target receipt, and designing and fabricating support equipment for the storage and internal transfer of production targets.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Biofuels as Heavy Fuel Oil Substitutes in the Maritime Sector: Findings and Potential Pathways

The United States Department of Energy has commissioned four national laboratories to evaluate the feasibility of biofuels in the maritime sector. This effort is briefly described including the overall project goals, structure and aims. The large two-stroke crosshead engines used to power large merchant vessels were of particular interest since they can burn lower combustion quality fuels relative to four-stroke engines. This characteristic allows for consideration of pyrolysis oils and hydrothermal liquefaction (HTL) oils which are feedstock agnostic and, in the raw state, are more economical compared to distillate drop-in fuels. Pyrolysis and HTL oils are collectively known as bio-intermediates since they require additional processing for use in distillate fuel systems. The key limiting feature is that these bio-intermediate fuels will cause asphaltene precipitation when blended with heavy fuel oils (HFOs) such as very low sulfur fuel oil (VLSFO) unless they are upgraded to remove water and oxygenates. Economics are the key driver at this point in time, and preliminary techno-economic analyses (TEAs) indicate that bio-intermediates have potentially lower cost relative to other biofuels such as biodiesel and renewable diesel. Additionally, life cycle analyses (LCAs) of feedstocks and pathways show the life cycle carbon reduction benefit relative to heavy fuel oils. In addition to TEA and LCA results, we also present on the technical feasibility of these fuels. These studies have focused on the properties of biofuel blends with VLSFO that are critical to the fuel systems of maritime vessels fueled with HFOs. These properties include the compatibility with fuel system metals, viscosity, and blend stability. Aging studies with blends of VLSFO with biodiesel, HTL, and pyrolysis oils are also presented. Future efforts being planned to conduct additional biofuel testing, including the use of biofuels as pilot fuels in zero carbon shipping options fueled with ammonia and methanol, ship-based demonstrations, and bioresource competition studies.

Kass, Michael↗

RH-TRU Waste Streams: HFDA Crucibles Create New Complex Waste Stream

This project focuses on the removal of the Hot Fuel Dissolution Apparatus (HFDA) crucibles from the Hot Fuel Examination Facility’s (HFEF) hot cells to create space for upcoming projects. The project team has created a crucible and pyro-salt non-debris waste stream that can be disposed of at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). Chemical Compatibility Examinations (CCEs) must be performed on candidate waste by reviewing the types of chemicals used in the experiments, information found in INL Process Knowledge Summary Reports (PKSRs), and Environmental Protection Agency guides on chemical compatibility. The CCEs identify which chemicals can be safely combined to ensure adverse reactions do not occur in the waste packages. The CCEs are then used to update the PKSR, Basis of Knowledge, and Acceptable Knowledge documents and demonstrate compliance with the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria. Once documents are finalized, they are reviewed and approved by the WIPP Central Characterization Project (CCP) to ensure proper waste stream characterization. After the documents are approved, the crucibles can be packaged and shipped to the Idaho Nuclear Technical and Engineering Center for storage awaiting certification. CCP will certify the waste using the approved documents and a series of confirmatory testing before being shipped and disposed in WIPP’s deep geological repository. Currently, the CCE is in progress and the PKSRs are being updated.

Basis of Knowledge↗

Fresh and Spent Nuclear Fuel Repatriation from the IRT-2000 Research Reactor Facility, Sofia, Bulgaria

The IRT 2000 research reactor, operated by the Bulgarian Institute for Nuclear Research and Nuclear Energy (INRNE), safely shipped all of their Russian-origin nuclear fuel from the Republic of Bulgaria to the Russian Federation beginning in 2003 and completing in 2008. These fresh and spent fuel shipments removed all highly enriched uranium (HEU) from Bulgaria. The fresh fuel was shipped by air in December 2003 using trucks and a commercial cargo aircraft. One combined spent fuel shipment of HEU and low enriched uranium (LEU) was completed in July 2008 using high capacity VPVR/M casks transported by truck, barge, and rail. The HEU shipments were assisted by the Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program (RRRFR) and the LEU spent fuel shipment was funded by Bulgaria. This report describes the work, approvals, organizations, equipment, and agreements required to complete these shipments and concludes with several major lessons learned.

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Global Radiological Source Sorting, Tracking, and Monitoring (Gradsstram) Using Emergin RFID and Web 2.0 Technologies to Provide Total Asset and Information Visualization, Paper at 2009 INMM

Background Thousands of shipments of radioisotopes developed in the United States (U.S.) are transported domestically and internationally for medical and industrial applications, including to partner laboratories in European Union (EU) countries. Over the past five years, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)1 have worked with state first responder personnel, key private sector supply chain stakeholders, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tracking and monitoring of medical, research and industrial radioisotopes in commerce. ORNL was the pioneer of the international radioisotope shipping and production business. Most radioisotopes made and used today were either made or discovered at ORNL. While most of the radioisotopes used in the commercial sector are now produced and sold by the private market, ORNL still leads the world in the production of exotic, high-value and/or sensitive industrial, medical and research isotopes. The ORNL-EPA-DOE Radiological Source Tracking and Monitoring (RadSTraM) project tested, evaluated, and integrated RFID technologies in laboratory settings and at multiple private-sector shipping and distribution facilities (Perkin Elmer and DHL) to track and monitor common radioisotopes used in everyday commerce. The RFID tracking capability was also tested in association with other deployed technologies including radiation detection, chemical/explosives detection, advanced imaging, lasers, and infrared scanning. At the 2007 EU-U.S. Summit, the leaders of the US Department of Commerce (DOC) and EU European Commission (EC) committed to pursue jointly directed Lighthouse Priority Projects. These projects are intended to foster cooperation and reduce regulatory burdens with respect to transatlantic commerce. The Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) Lighthouse Project on Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) has been directed to develop a joint framework for cooperation on identification and development of best practices for Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technologies The RFID Lighthouse Priority Project commits both sides to endeavor to align U.S. and EU regulatory and policy approaches on RFID technologies, including pilot projects in the public sector.

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Sealed source peer review plan

Sealed sources are known quantities of radioactive materials that have been encapsulated in quantities that produce known radiation fields. Sealed sources have multiple uses ranging from instrument calibration sources to sources that produce radiation fields for experimental applications. The Off-Site Source Recovery (OSR) Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), created in 1999, under the direction of the Waste Management Division of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Albuquerque has been assigned the responsibility to recover and manage excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources from the public and private sector. LANL intends to ship drums containing qualified sealed sources to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. Prior to shipping, these drums must be characterized with respect to radiological content and other parameters. The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) requires that ten radionulcides be quantified and reported for every container of waste to be disposed in the WIPP. The methods traditionally approved by the EPA include non-destructive assay (NDA) in accordance with Appendix A of the Contact-Handled Transuranic Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (DOE, 2002) (CH WAC). However, because of the nature and pedigree of historical records for sealed sources and the technical infeasibility of performing NDA on these sources, LANL proposes to characterize the content of these waste drums using qualified existing radiological data in lieu of direct measurement. This plan describes the process and documentation requirements for the use of the peer review process to qualify existing data for sealed radiological sources in lieu of perfonning radioassay. The peer review process will be performed in accordance with criteria provided in 40 CFR {section} 194.22 which specifies the use of the NUREG 1297 guidelines. The plan defines the management approach, resources, schedule, and technical requirements for the subject peer review.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE-EM-45 PACKAGING OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COURSE

Savannah River National Laboratory - Savannah River Packaging Technology (SRNL-SRPT) delivered the inaugural offering of the Packaging Operations and Maintenance Course for DOE-EM-45's Packaging Certification Program (PCP) at the University of South Carolina Aiken on September 1 and 2, 2009. Twenty-nine students registered, attended, and completed this training. The DOE-EM-45 Packaging Certification Program (PCP) sponsored the presentation of a new training course, Packaging Maintenance and Operations, on September 1-2, 2009 at the University of South Carolina Aiken (USC-Aiken) campus in Aiken, SC. The premier offering of the course was developed and presented by the Savannah River National Laboratory, and attended by twenty-nine students across the DOE, NNSA and private industry. This training informed package users of the requirements associated with handling shipping containers at a facility (user) level and provided a basic overview of the requirements typically outlined in Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Chapters 1, 7, and 8. The course taught packaging personnel about the regulatory nature of SARPs to help reduce associated and often costly packaging errors. Some of the topics covered were package contents, loading, unloading, storage, torque requirements, maintaining records, how to handle abnormal conditions, lessons learned, leakage testing (including demonstration), and replacement parts. The target audience for this course was facility operations personnel, facility maintenance personnel, and field quality assurance personnel who are directly involved in the handling of shipping containers. The training also aimed at writers of SARP Chapters 1, 7, and 8, package designers, and anyone else involved in radioactive material packaging and transportation safety. Student feedback and critiques of the training were very positive. SRNL will offer the course again at USC Aiken in September 2010.

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