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NASA NTRS2011

Achieving Maximum Integration Utilizing Requirements Flow Down

A robust and experienced systems engineering team is essential for a successful program. It is often a challenge to build a core systems engineering team early enough in a program to maximize integration and assure a common path for all supporting teams in a project. Ares I was no exception. During the planning of IVGVT, the team had many challenges including lack of: early identification of stakeholders, team training in NASA s system engineering practices, solid requirements flow down and a top down documentation strategy. The IVGVT team started test planning early in the program before the systems engineering framework had been matured due to an aggressive schedule. Therefore the IVGVT team increased their involvement in the Constellation systems engineering effort. Program level requirements were established that flowed down to IVGVT aligning all stakeholders to a common set of goals. The IVGVT team utilized the APPEL REQ Development Management course providing the team a NASA focused model to follow. The IVGVT team engaged directly with the model verification and validation process to assure that a solid set of requirements drove the need for the test event. The IVGVT team looked at the initial planning state, analyzed the current state and then produced recommendations for the ideal future state of a wide range of systems engineering functions and processes. Based on this analysis, the IVGVT team was able to produce a set of lessons learned and to provide suggestions for future programs or tests to use in their initial planning phase.

Archiable, Wes↗

NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned for Planning and Estimating Operations Support Requirements

Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead projects to focus on hardware development schedules and costs, de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations, and any LCC growth can directly impact the programs ability to fund new missions. The D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center recently studied cost overruns for 7 D&NF missions related to phase C/D development of operational capabilities and phase E mission operations. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential operations risks and controlling the associated impacts to operations development and execution costs. The study found that the drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This presentation summarizes the study and the results, providing a set of lessons NASA can use to improve early estimation and validation of operations costs.

Newhouse, Marilyn↗

NASA NTRS2011

Testing Requirements for Refractory Materials

Launch Pads 39A and 39B currently use refractory material (Fondu Fyre) in the flame trenches. This material was initially approved for the Saturn program. This material had a lifetime of 10 years according to the manufacturer, and it has been used for over 40 years. As a consequence, the Fondu Fyre at Launch Complex 39 requires repair subsequent to almost every launch. A review of the literature indicates that the gunned Fondu Fyre refractory product (WA-1G) was never tested prior to use. With the recent severe damage to the flame trenches, a new refractory material is sought to replace Fondu Fyre. In order to replace Fondu Fyre, a methodology to test and evaluate refractory products was developed. This paper outlines this methodology and discusses current testing requirements, as well as the laboratory testing that might be required. Furthermore, this report points out the necessity for subscale testing, the locations where this testing can be performed, and the parameters that will be necessary to qualify a product. The goal is to identify a more durable refractory material that has physical, chemical, and thermal properties suitable to withstand the harsh environment of the launch pads at KSC.

Calle, Luz Marina↗

NASA NTRS2011

Verification and Validation of Requirements on the CEV Parachute Assembly System Using Design of Experiments

The Crew Exploration Vehicle Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) project conducts computer simulations to verify that flight performance requirements on parachute loads and terminal rate of descent are met. Design of Experiments (DoE) provides a systematic method for variation of simulation input parameters. When implemented and interpreted correctly, a DoE study of parachute simulation tools indicates values and combinations of parameters that may cause requirement limits to be violated. This paper describes one implementation of DoE that is currently being developed by CPAS, explains how DoE results can be interpreted, and presents the results of several preliminary studies. The potential uses of DoE to validate parachute simulation models and verify requirements are also explored.

Schulte, Peter Z.↗

NASA NTRS2009

Actuator Requirements and Roadmaps

The actuators requirements identified previously are reviewed, and the requirements of the three main application areas of flow manipulation, flow switching and mechanical manipulation are addressed. The requirements associated with the principal gas path components are considered and presented in a summary table derived from Chapter 2. The issues and considerations which must be made in the choice of any actuator for a specific application are reviewed followed by an assessment of available actuators and their application to the identified applications. The chapter is completed with a table of the applications, actuator specification, time to maturity and expected challenges

John Webster↗

NASA NTRS2011

Verification and Validation Plan for Flight Performance Requirements on the CEV Parachute Assembly System

The Crew Exploration Vehicle Parachute Assembly System (CPAS) is engaged in a multi-year design and test campaign aimed at qualifying a parachute recovery system for human use on the Orion Spacecraft. Orion has parachute flight performance requirements that will ultimately be verified through the use of Monte Carlo multi-degree of freedom flight simulations. These simulations will be anchored by real world flight test data and iteratively improved to provide a closer approximation to the real physics observed in the inherently chaotic inflation and steady state flight of the CPAS parachutes. This paper will examine the processes necessary to verify the flight performance requirements of the human rated spacecraft. The focus will be on the requirements verification and model validation planned on CPAS.

Morris, Aaron L.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Human Research Program Requirements Document. Human Research Program Revision E

This document defines, documents, and allocates the Human Research Program (HRP) requirements to the HRP Program Elements. It also establishes the flow of requirements from the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) and the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) down to the various HRP Program Elements to ensure that human research and technology countermeasure investments support the delivery of countermeasures and technologies that satisfy HEOMD's and OCHMO's exploration mission requirements.

Vargas, Paul↗

NASA NTRS2011

Innovative Approach Enabled the Retirement of TDRS-1 Compliant with NASA Orbital Debris Requirements

The first Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS-1) was deactivated on June 27th 2010 following more than 26 years of operation. The end-of-mission (EOM) operations were developed to address the stringent requirements of NPR 8715.6: NASA Procedural Requirements for Limiting Orbital Debris, which consists of three key items: 1) removal from the geosynchronous arc; 2) depletion of the remaining propellant; and 3) passivation of all sources of energy storage or generation [1]. The EOM approach minimized risks while accomplishing these goals. Raising TDRS-1 over 350 km above geosynchronous was accomplished via proven station change operations. Depleting propellant was the most challenging task, requiring over 20 hours of thruster on-time accumulated within schedule, orbit, and spacecraft subsystem constraints. The attitude configuration and operational procedures, including the unique final passivation method, were thoroughly analyzed and simulated prior to the start of operations. The complete EOM campaign lasted 21 days. The TDRS-1 EOM campaign demonstrated that pre-NPR 8715.6 satellite designs can be made to comply and that lessons learned could be applied to other satellite designs. The significant TDRS-1 effort demonstrates a commitment by NASA to responsible orbital debris management in compliance with international standards.

Zaleski, Ronald↗

NASA NTRS2011

L-Band System Engineering - Concepts of Use, Systems Performance Requirements, and Architecture

This document is being provided as part of ITT s NASA Glenn Research Center Aerospace Communication Systems Technical Support (ACSTS) contract NNC05CA85C, Task 7: New ATM Requirements-Future Communications, C-band and L-band Communications Standard Development. Task 7 was motivated by the five year technology assessment performed for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under the joint FAA-EUROCONTROL cooperative research Action Plan (AP-17), also known as the Future Communications Study (FCS). It was based on direction provided by the FAA project-level agreement (PLA FY09_G1M.02-02v1) for "New ATM Requirements-Future Communications." Task 7 was separated into two distinct subtasks, each aligned with specific work elements and deliverable items. Subtask 7-1 addressed C-band airport surface data communications standards development, systems engineering, test bed development, and tests/demonstrations to establish operational capability for what is now referred to as the Aeronautical Mobile Airport Communications System (AeroMACS). Subtask 7-2, which is the subject of this report, focused on preliminary systems engineering and support of joint FAA/EUROCONTROL development and evaluation of a future L-band (960 to 1164 MHz) air/ground (A/G) communication system known as the L-band digital aeronautical communications system (L-DACS), which was defined during the FCS. The proposed L-DACS will be capable of providing ATM services in continental airspace in the 2020+ timeframe. Subtask 7-2 was performed in two phases. Phase I featured development of Concepts of Use, high level functional analyses, performance of initial L-band system safety and security risk assessments, and development of high level requirements and architectures. It also included the aforementioned support of joint L-DACS development and evaluation, including inputs to L-DACS design specifications. Phase II provided a refinement of the systems engineering activities performed during Phase I, along with continued joint FAA/EUROCONTROL L-DACS development and evaluation support.

Henriksen, Stephen↗

NASA NTRS2011

Formal Verification Toolkit for Requirements and Early Design Stages

Efficient flight software development from natural language requirements needs an effective way to test designs earlier in the software design cycle. A method to automatically derive logical safety constraints and the design state space from natural language requirements is described. The constraints can then be checked using a logical consistency checker and also be used in a symbolic model checker to verify the early design of the system. This method was used to verify a hybrid control design for the suit ports on NASA Johnson Space Center's Space Exploration Vehicle against safety requirements.

Badger, Julia M.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Requirements to Design to Code: Towards a Fully Formal Approach to Automatic Code Generation

A general-purpose method to mechanically transform system requirements into a provably equivalent model has yet to appear. Such a method represents a necessary step toward high-dependability system engineering for numerous possible application domains, including distributed software systems, sensor networks, robot operation, complex scripts for spacecraft integration and testing, and autonomous systems. Currently available tools and methods that start with a formal model of a: system and mechanically produce a provably equivalent implementation are valuable but not sufficient. The "gap" that current tools and methods leave unfilled is that their formal models cannot be proven to be equivalent to the system requirements as originated by the customer. For the ciasses of systems whose behavior can be described as a finite (but significant) set of scenarios, we offer a method for mechanically transforming requirements (expressed in restricted natural language, or in other appropriate graphical notations) into a provably equivalent formal model that can be used as the basis for code generation and other transformations.

Hinchey, Michael G.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Testing Requirements for Refractory Materials

Launch Pads 39A and 39B currently use refractory material (Fondu Fyre) in the flame trenches. This material was initially approved for the Saturn program. This material had a lifetime of 10years according to the manufacturer, and it has been used for over 40 years. As a consequence, the Fondu Fyre at Launch Complex 39 requires repair subsequent to almost every launch. A review of the literature indicates that the gunned Fondu Fyre refractory product (WA-1 G) was never tested prior to use. With the recent severe damage to the flame trenches, a new refractory material is sought to replace Fondu Fyre. In order to replace Fondu Fyre, a methodology to test and evaluate refractory products was developed. This paper outlines this methodology and discusses current testing requirements, as well as the laboratory testing that might be required. Furthermore, this report points out the necessity for subscale testing, the locations where this testing can be performed, and the parameters that will be necessary to qualify a product. The goal is to identify a more durable refractory material that has physical, chemical, and thermal properties suitable to withstand the harsh environment of the launch pads at KSC.

Calle, Luz Marina↗

NASA NTRS2012

Simulation Modeling Requirements for Loss-of-Control Accident Prevention of Turboprop Transport Aircraft

In-flight loss of control remains the leading contributor to aviation accident fatalities, with stall upsets being the leading causal factor. The February 12, 2009. Colgan Air, Inc., Continental Express flight 3407 accident outside Buffalo, New York, brought this issue to the forefront of public consciousness and resulted in recommendations from the National Transportation Safety Board to conduct training that incorporates stalls that are fully developed and develop simulator standards to support such training. In 2010, Congress responded to this accident with Public Law 11-216 (Section 208), which mandates full stall training for Part 121 flight operations. Efforts are currently in progress to develop recommendations on implementation of stall training for airline pilots. The International Committee on Aviation Training in Extended Envelopes (ICATEE) is currently defining simulator fidelity standards that will be necessary for effective stall training. These recommendations will apply to all civil transport aircraft including straight-wing turboprop aircraft. Government-funded research over the previous decade provides a strong foundation for stall/post-stall simulation for swept-wing, conventional tail jets to respond to this mandate, but turboprops present additional and unique modeling challenges. First among these challenges is the effect of power, which can provide enhanced flow attachment behind the propellers. Furthermore, turboprops tend to operate for longer periods in an environment more susceptible to ice. As a result, there have been a significant number of turboprop accidents as a result of the early (lower angle of attack) stalls in icing. The vulnerability of turboprop configurations to icing has led to studies on ice accumulation and the resulting effects on flight behavior. Piloted simulations of these effects have highlighted the important training needs for recognition and mitigation of icing effects, including the reduction of stall margins. This paper addresses simulation modeling requirements that are unique to turboprop transport aircraft and highlights the growing need for aerodynamic models suitable for stall training for these configurations. A review of prominent accidents that involved aerodynamic stall is used to illustrate various modeling features unique to turboprop configurations and the impact of stall behavior on susceptibility to loss of control that has led to new training requirements. This is followed by an overview of stability and control behavior of straight-wing turboprops, the related aerodynamic characteristics, and a summary of recent experimental studies on icing effects. In addition, differences in flight dynamics behavior between swept-wing jets and straight-wing turboprop configurations are discussed to compare and contrast modeling requirements. Specific recommendations for aerodynamic models along with further research needs and data measurements are also provided. 1

Crider, Dennis↗

NASA NTRS2012

The HAL 9000 Space Operating System Real-Time Planning Engine Design and Operations Requirements

In support of future deep space manned missions, an autonomous/automated vehicle, providing crew autonomy and an autonomous response planning system, will be required due to the light time delays in communication. Vehicle capabilities as a whole must provide for tactical response to vehicle system failures and space environmental effects induced failures, for risk mitigation of permanent loss of communication with Earth, and for assured crew return capabilities. The complexity of human rated space systems and the limited crew sizes and crew skills mix drive the need for a robust autonomous capability on-board the vehicle. The HAL 9000 Space Operating System[2] designed for such missions and space craft includes the first distributed real-time planning / re-planning system. This paper will detail the software architecture of the multiple planning engine system, and the interface design for plan changes, approval and implementation that is performed autonomously. Operations scenarios will be defined for analysis of the planning engines operations and its requirements for nominal / off nominal activities. An assessment of the distributed realtime re-planning system, in the defined operations environment, will be provided as well as findings as it pertains to the vehicle, crew, and mission control requirements needed for implementation.

Stetson, Howard↗

NASA NTRS2012

Postures and Motions Library Development for Verification of Ground Crew Human Systems Integration Requirements

Spacecraft and launch vehicle ground processing activities require a variety of unique human activities. These activities are being documented in a Primitive motion capture library. The Library will be used by the human factors engineering in the future to infuse real to life human activities into the CAD models to verify ground systems human factors requirements. As the Primitive models are being developed for the library the project has selected several current human factors issues to be addressed for the SLS and Orion launch systems. This paper explains how the Motion Capture of unique ground systems activities are being used to verify the human factors analysis requirements for ground system used to process the STS and Orion vehicles, and how the primitive models will be applied to future spacecraft and launch vehicle processing.

Jackson, Mariea Dunn↗

NASA NTRS2012

Aircraft Design Considerations to Meet One Engine Inoperative (OEI) Safety Requirements

Commercial airlines are obligated to operate such that an aircraft can suffer an engine failure at any point in its mission and terminate the flight without an accident. Only minimal aircraft damage is allowable, such as brake replacement due to very heavy application, or an engine inspection and/or possible removal due to use of an emergency rating. Such performance criteria are often referred to as zero exposure, referring to zero accident exposure to an engine failure. The critical mission segment for meeting one engine inoperative (OEI) criteria is takeoff. For a given weight, wind, and ambient condition, fixed wing aircraft require a balanced field length. This is the longer of the distance to take off if an engine fails at a predetermined critical point in the takeoff profile, or the distance to reject the takeoff and brake to a stop. Rotorcraft have requirements for horizontal takeoff procedures that are equivalent to a balanced field length requirements for fixed wing aircraft. Rotorcraft also perform vertical procedures where no runway or heliport distance is available. These were developed primarily for elevated heliports as found on oil rigs or rooftops. They are also used for ground level operations as might be found at heliports at the end of piers or other confined areas.

Scott, Mark W.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Requirements, Resource Planning and Management for Decrewing/Recrewing Scenarios of the International Space Station

Following the failure of 44P on launch in August 2011, and the subsequent grounding of all Russian Soyuz rocket based launches, the ISS ground teams engaged in an effort to determine how long the ISS could remain crewed, what would be required to safely configure the ISS for decrewing, and what would be required to recrew the ISS upon resumption of Soyuz rocket launches if decrewing became necessary. This White Paper was written to capture the processes and lessons learned from real-time time events and to provide a reference and training document for ISS Program teams in the event decrewing of the ISS is needed. Through coordination meetings and assessments, teams identified six decrewing priorities for ground and crew operations. These priorities were integrated along with preflight priorities through the Increment replanning process. Additionally, the teams reviewed, updated, and implemented changes to the governing documentation for the configuration of the ISS for a contingency decrewing event. Steps were taken to identify critical items for disposal prior to decrewing, as well as identifying the required items to be strategically staged or flown with the astronauts and cosmonauts who would eventually recrew the ISS. After the successful launches and dockings of both 45P and 28S, the decrewing team transitioned to finalizing and publishing the documentation for standardizing the decrewing flight rules. With the continued launching of crews and cargo to the ISS, utilization and science is again a high priority, with the Increment pairs 29 and 30, and 31 and 32 reaching the milestone of at least 35 hours per week average utilization.

Bach, David A.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Requirements, Resource Planning, and Management for Decrewing/Recrewing Scenarios of the International Space Station

Following the failure of 44 Progress (44P) on launch in August 2011, and the subsequent grounding of all Russian Soyuz rocket based launches, the International Space Station (ISS) ground teams engaged in an effort to determine how long the ISS could remain crewed, what would be required to safely configure the ISS for decrewing, and what would be required to recrew the ISS upon resumption of Soyuz rocket launches if decrewing became necessary. This White Paper was written to capture the processes and lessons learned from real-time time events and to provide a reference and training document for ISS Program teams in the event decrewing of the ISS is needed. Through coordination meetings and assessments, teams identified six decrewing priorities for ground and crew operations. These priorities were integrated along with preflight priorities through the Increment re-planning process. Additionally, the teams reviewed, updated, and implemented changes to the governing documentation for the configuration of the ISS for a contingency decrewing event. Steps were taken to identify critical items for disposal prior to decrewing, as well as identifying the required items to be strategically staged or flown with the astronauts and cosmonauts who would eventually recrew the ISS. After the successful launches and dockings of both 45P and 28 Soyuz (28S), the decrewing team transitioned to finalizing and publishing the documentation for standardizing the decrewing flight rules. With the continued launching of crews and cargo to the ISS, utilization and science is again a high priority; both Increment pairs 29 and 30, and Increment 31 and 32 reaching the milestone of at least 35 hours per week average utilization.

Bach, David A.↗