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The Texas Solution to the Nation's Disposal Needs for Irradiated Hardware - 13337

The closure of the disposal facility in Barnwell, South Carolina, to out-of-compact states in 2008 left commercial nuclear power plants without a disposal option for Class B and C irradiated hardware. In 2012, Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) opened a highly engineered facility specifically designed and built for the disposal of Class B and C waste. The WCS facility is the first Interstate Compact low-level radioactive waste disposal facility to be licensed and operated under the Low-level Waste Policy Act of 1980, as amended in 1985. Due to design requirements of a modern Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) facility, traditional methods for disposal were not achievable at the WCS site. Earlier methods primarily utilized the As Low as Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) concept of distance to accomplish worker safety. The WCS method required the use of all three ALARA concepts of time, distance, and shielding to ensure the safe disposal of this highly hazardous waste stream. (authors)

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Life Extension of Nuclear Plant Facilities through Monitoring and Detailed Analysis - 16175

The UK has accumulated a substantial legacy of radioactive waste from various civil nuclear and defence programmes. Presently, however most of the UK radioactive waste is generated from nine power stations which generate approximately one sixth of the of the country's electricity. Irradiated fuel is removed from these reactors and safe management of the radioactive solid and liquid effluents is required. The safe management of these effluents is essential. Sellafield, in West Cumbria UK, contains two reprocessing plants, one designed to process nuclear fuel from Magnox reactors (CO{sub 2} cooled with Uranium bar fuel) and the other to process nuclear fuel from Advanced Gas cooled Reactors and Pressurized Water Reactors. The reprocessing stage enables extraction of fissile material for recycling. This leaves a volume of dilute but high-level waste. The high-level radioactive liquid waste is concentrated to reduce its volume and then incorporated into borosilicate glass, using a process called vitrification. The glass is then poured into stainless steel containers and placed in long term storage. This required concentration of HLW liquor is achieved using a suite of aging evaporators. All evaporators are of similar design constructed from corrosion resistant stainless steel having dimensions height ∼11 m, internal diameter 3.05 m and capable of holding 13.7 m{sup 3} of liquor. The basic principle of operation is to heat the dilute liquor under partial vacuum, at constant volume, until the target concentration is achieved. Heating of the liquor is achieved using steam heated coils within the evaporator, and steam in the jacket which surrounds the lower half of the evaporator vessel. The evaporator is then brought to atmospheric pressure and the concentrated liquor is ejected whilst hot. The evaporator is then cooled with water cooled coils and a water filled jacket. New dilute liquor is then added for a new batch. The process is then repeated. As the evaporators reach the end of their original design life accurate prediction of the current condition of nuclear plant facilities is essential to safely justify continued plant operation by ensuring structural integrity. This poses a significant challenge as many aging UK nuclear facilities were not inherently built with inspection in mind. The potential life limiting components of the HA evaporators at Sellafield are the surfaces that contact the product liquor at elevated temperatures i.e. the steam heated surfaces of the coils within the evaporator vessel and the vessel base and wall surrounded by the steam jacket. Each heating component is critical to the operational life of the evaporator - the removal from service of a coil heating component significantly reduces the operational flexibility and remnant life of this plant. Over the last decade a variety of cutting-edge expertise and methodologies have been utilised to accurately measure and then predict the current condition of the plant and also to predict its remnant life. This paper provides an overview of the development of several techniques deployed, namely non-destructive testing/inspection, in-house software development and finite element modelling. These methods have been validated by lab-scale or full-scale experiments along with historical plant data. These techniques have been evolved and refined for over a decade, providing vital insights into the physical behaviour of this complex reprocessing system. This enables not only accurate assessment of the current condition of the plant equipment but also allows scientifically underpinned predictions to be made of how it will behave into the future. This is critical for Sellafield as this knowledge feeds into their safety case to the Office of Nuclear Regulation to justify continued operation. It is concluded that this integrated approach provides a robust analysis tool which has driven change and optimisation of plant procedures ensuring continued safe operation whilst extending the life of the facility. (authors)

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Performance Confirmation Strategies for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant - A Historical Perspective from an Operating Disposal Facility - 12248

Performance confirmation is an important element of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) program. Performance confirmation was first used during the early WIPP site characterization phase to focus experimental activities that address the development of probabilistic repository performance models and to address stakeholder assurance needs. The program is currently used to analyze the conditions of the repository and its surroundings to ensure that the basis for the repository's long-term radioactive waste containment predictions is valid. This basis is related to the parameters, assumptions, conceptual and numerical models that are used to predict or validate the potential radioactive waste containment performance of the system. The concept of performance confirmation for the WIPP is one that has evolved since the first repository work was initiated decades ago and plays an important role in assuring adequate repository performance both now and in the long-term. The WIPP mission has progressed from a pilot project to an operational disposal facility and will progress to eventual site closure when disposal operations are completed. Performance confirmation is an important part of each of these progressions. The concept of disposing radioactive waste in a geologic repository today involves a complete understanding of many technical, political, regulatory, societal and economic elements. Many of these elements overlap and solving all relevant issues necessary to site, operate and decommission a disposal facility should be done with knowledge of each element's requirements and impacts. Performance confirmation is one tool that can help to coordinate many of these elements into a program that actively investigates what is thought to be adequately understood about the system and what information is lacking. A performance confirmation program is used to determine ways to challenge and verify those areas that are thought to be understood and to find ways to understand those areas that are not well understood. Performance confirmation programs have been used twice at WIPP, first during site characterization and PA development and later in a Compliance Monitoring program. At first, only certain technical aspects of the system were deemed important because it was a scientifically-based, government project. Early site characterization work was design to gather information about the geology and hydrology of the area and the mechanical properties of the natural barrier. The information would be used in a PA to determine the long-term containment performance of the disposal system. A performance confirmation element was used to identify the sensitive elements of the system that were certain, well understood or justified and those that were not. It identified experimental and analytical programs that could be used to reduce uncertainty, confirm sensitive assumptions and provide useful data. This performance confirmation program provided data to justify the adequacy of the information used in PA to demonstrate compliance with EPA's containment requirements. Performance confirmation will continue to be used in the post-closure period for at least 30 years and likely up to the end of the 100-year institutional controls period. As the technical basis for the repository matures throughout the operational period, the currently planned post-closure monitoring program will need to be reassessed prior to implementation. However, the intent of the program will be the same as it was for the previous programs, to ensure the ultimate goal of the repository. This goal is to safely isolate waste from the accessible environment and ensure public and environmental safety. (authors)

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Guidance on Good Practice for Waste Management in Decommissioning - 19080

The World Nuclear Association (WNA) is an international organization that represents the global nuclear industry. Its mission is to promote a wider understanding of nuclear energy among key international influencers by producing authoritative information, developing common industry positions, and contributing to the energy debate. The Waste Management and Decommissioning Working Group of WNA monitors developments and shapes industry positions in radioactive waste management in nuclear decommissioning. The Working Group promotes accepted international principles and methods, including the sustainable management of natural resources, appropriate re-use and recycling of material, as well as safe and cost-efficient disposal of radioactive waste. In 2015, the WNA decided to identify international good practices in decommissioning and waste management and to appoint a group of international experts to produce a report bringing together this knowledge. The report is aimed at policy- and decision-makers, as well as nuclear professionals looking for guidance or facing decommissioning challenges related to waste management. The scope of the report covers commercial nuclear plants and nuclear research facilities, including legacy plants being decommissioned after normal operation. Although light water and graphite reactor types are mainly considered, the methods described can be applied to other nuclear facilities. The report is due to be published in February 2019. This paper summarizes its findings and recommendations. (authors)

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The Status of LILW Complex Disposal Facility Construction in Korea - 17123

In this paper, the experiences and directions of the construction of the LILW disposal facility in Korea are discussed. The LILW disposal facility is being constructed in Gyeongju-si, Korea. The disposal facility is officially called 'Wolsong Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Center (WLDC)'. It can dispose of 800,000 drums (hereafter, 'drums' means '200 liter drum equivalents' unless specified otherwise) of radioactive waste in a site of 2,060,000 m{sup 2}. The first stage of the LILW facility construction was completed in June 2014, and approved for use by Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) in December 2014. The first stage of the LILW facility is a type of underground silo with disposal capacity of 35,200 m{sup 3} (100,000 drums). The first stage of the LILW facility consists of a construction tunnel, an operation tunnel, an access shaft and six silos, etc. Silo for final disposal is located 80∼130 m below sea level, 25 m in diameter and 50 m in height. The capacity of each silo is approximately 16,700 drums. The second stage of the LILW facility is under construction to be completed by December 2019. Site construction is currently underway. The second stage of the LILW facility is a type of near-surface disposal with disposal capacity of 32,875 m{sup 3} (125,000 drums). This stage of the LILW disposal facility consists of an underground gallery, three movable cranes and twenty vaults, etc. Vault for final disposal is located 70 m above sea level, 20 m in width, 20 m length and 10 m in height. The capacity of each vault is approximately 6,250 drums. These stages of the LILW disposal facilities are together called LILW complex disposal facility. It's the world's first LILW disposal facility with two different types of disposal facilities in one site. For efficient operation, these disposal facilities share a reception and storage building, waste water treatment system, measurement and monitoring system, etc. After construction of the first two stages is completed, LILW disposal facilities will be incrementally expanded, and as the whole LILW disposal facilities are completed, all LILW in Korea will be managed safely in WLDC. (authors)

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Evaluation and Impacts of Mercury in the SRS Liquid Waste System - 16121

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Liquid Waste System (LWS) stores radioactive waste in 43 underground tanks. The radionuclides in the waste are removed through a series of separation processes and the low-level fraction is immobilized in a grout waste form while the high level fraction is disposed in a glass waste form. Mercury originated from decades of canyon processing (used as a catalyst for dissolving the aluminum cladding of reactor fuel) and is present throughout the LWS (∼60 metric tons). Mercury has long been a consideration in the LWS, from both hazard and processing perspectives. Mercury is removed from the LWS in many ways including: 1) the Tank Farm evaporator condensates; 2) at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) where it is steam-stripped and removed during the feed preparation processes; 3) it is removed at the Effluent Treatment Plant (ETP); and it is immobilized in the low-level, grout waste form. An integrated, system-wide evaluation and assessment of mercury behavior in the LWS is being performed. The recently completed Phase I evaluation focused on mercury inventory and speciation in the LWS; mercury holdup and chemical processing behavior; mercury impact Identification, including worker safety and equipment degradation; and mercury removal and disposal options. The mercury removal system at the DWPF has been unable to remove mercury successfully due to equipment and chemistry challenges since the 2008 timeframe. Phase I evaluations indicate that approximately 43 percent of the mercury in waste sent to the DWPF is now returning to the Tank Farm in the recycle stream and is concentrating to higher than expected levels (∼500 mg/l) around the 2H evaporator system. The chemical behavior of mercury is further complicated by the formation of higher than expected quantities of organomercury species, specifically methyl mercury, now present in the DWPF recycle evaporator system (2H Tank farm evaporator), which is used to volume-reduce the recycle stream. Phase II activities are building on the Phase I mercury activities, including additional sampling and characterization activities, a re-assessment of overall system knowledge, ranking and prioritizing critical gaps/information in mercury behavior across the flowsheet, assessing impacts of mercury removal and disposal options, and documenting an action plan for overall mercury management in the LWS. Phase II activities include two System Engineering Evaluations to 1) 'Reestablish Mercury removal Capability within DWPF', and 2) 'Determine the Best Alternative Mercury Removal Location with the LWS'. This paper provides the results of the Phase I and II mercury evaluations for the SRS LWS. (authors)

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Addressing an aging facility: improving reliability of the defense waste processing facility at the Savannah River Site - 15539

The High Level Waste program at the Savannah River Site significantly reduces environmental risks associated with the storage of radioactive waste from legacy efforts to separate fissionable nuclear material from irradiated targets and fuels. The Defense Waste Processing Facility treats and immobilizes High Level Waste into a durable borosilicate glass for safe, permanent storage. Construction of the facility began in 1983 and radioactive operations commenced in 1996. In an effort to support the disposition of radioactive waste and accelerate tank closure for the balance of the Savannah River Site mission, the Defense Waste Processing Facility recently underwent an extensive reliability review in 2013 to understand future needs as well as to address aging infrastructure. As a product of this review, a Performance Improvement Plan was developed to systematically address three major focus areas including, a) asset preservation, b) facility housekeeping, and 3) process improvements. Since issuance of the plan, significant progress has been made in each of these areas to improve the reliability and predictability of the Defense Waste Processing Facility. Providing consistent, constructive, and concise communications is vital in the face of a changing budgetary environment. The Savannah River Site case study provides an example of the U.S. Department of Energy - Savannah River (DOE-SR) and SRR partnering to inform stakeholders about cleanup progress at the site. DOE-SR and SRR periodically and consistently provide both annual written progress reports under the Federal Facility Agreement and quarterly written progress reports under the landfill permit to the government regulators. Through the Liquid Waste System Plans, DOE-SR and SRR constructively and concisely summarize both the significant progress made and explain how a changed budget can impact the goals moving forward. Furthermore, DOE-SR and SRR informs the community and general public about the Site's progress and future during Citizens Advisory Board meetings. In addition, through the new proposed model for complex-wide communications, stakeholders can better understand how budget constraints will affect them. The set-aside program would also encourage stakeholder participation and involvement in helping each state and site obtain extra funding through performance evaluations. Waste management organizations can benefit in a number of ways from an effective partnership approach to communicate with stakeholders about available funding. Keeping an open and honest dialogue with regulatory agencies can help preserve confidence, thus mitigating or completely avoiding costly and distracting fines and penalties. Informing the public not only promotes trust, but also spurs the public to exercise its right to demand more information and voice any concerns to elected or DOE officials. With this approach, DOE can receive better understanding and cooperation from stakeholders in a changing budgetary landscape. Furthermore, a set-aside competitive program would encourage efficiency and innovation that could lead to further cost savings for the government while providing extra funding for cleanup efforts. (authors)

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Safety Assessment for the Kozloduy National Disposal Facility in Bulgaria - 13507

Due to the early decommissioning of four Water-Water Energy Reactors (WWER) 440-V230 reactors at the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) near the city of Kozloduy in Bulgaria, large amounts of low and intermediate radioactive waste will arise much earlier than initially scheduled. In or-der to manage the radioactive waste from the early decommissioning, Bulgaria has intensified its efforts to provide a near surface disposal facility at Radiana with the required capacity. To this end, a project was launched and assigned in international competition to a German-Spanish consortium to provide the complete technical planning including the preparation of the Intermediate Safety Assessment Report. Preliminary results of operational and long-term safety show compliance with the Bulgarian regulatory requirements. The long-term calculations carried out for the Radiana site are also a good example of how analysis of safety assessment results can be used for iterative improvements of the assessment by pointing out uncertainties and areas of future investigations to reduce such uncertainties in regard to the potential radiological impact. The computer model used to estimate the long-term evolution of the future repository at Radiana predicted a maximum total annual dose for members of the critical group, which is carried to approximately 80 % by C-14 for a specific ingestion pathway. Based on this result and the outcome of the sensitivity analysis, existing uncertainties were evaluated and areas for reasonable future investigations to reduce these uncertainties were identified. (authors)

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Evolution Of USDOE Performance Assessments Over 20 Years

Performance assessments (PAs) have been used for many years for the analysis of post-closure hazards associated with a radioactive waste disposal facility and to provide a reasonable expectation of the ability of the site and facility design to meet objectives for the protection of members of the public and the environment. The use of PA to support decision-making for LLW disposal facilities has been mandated in United States Department of Energy (USDOE) directives governing radioactive waste management since 1988 (currently DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management). Prior to that time, PAs were also used in a less formal role. Over the past 20+ years, the USDOE approach to conduct, review and apply PAs has evolved into an efficient, rigorous and mature process that includes specific requirements for continuous improvement and independent reviews. The PA process has evolved through refinement of a graded and iterative approach designed to help focus efforts on those aspects of the problem expected to have the greatest influence on the decision being made. Many of the evolutionary changes to the PA process are linked to the refinement of the PA maintenance concept that has proven to be an important element of USDOE PA requirements in the context of supporting decision-making for safe disposal of LLW. The PA maintenance concept represents the evolution of the graded and iterative philosophy and has helped to drive the evolution of PAs from a deterministic compliance calculation into a systematic approach that helps to focus on critical aspects of the disposal system in a manner designed to provide a more informed basis for decision-making throughout the life of a disposal facility (e.g., monitoring, research and testing, waste acceptance criteria, design improvements, data collection, model refinements). A significant evolution in PA modeling has been associated with improved use of uncertainty and sensitivity analysis techniques to support efficient implementation of the graded and iterative approach. Rather than attempt to exactly predict the migration of radionuclides in a disposal unit, the best PAs have evolved into tools that provide a range of results to guide decision-makers in planning the most efficient, cost effective, and safe disposal of radionuclides.

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Using Green's Functions to Compute 3 Dimensional Neutron Flux Maps - 16016

The knowledge of the radionuclide content of radioactive waste is of utmost importance for safety and waste management reasons. Numerical simulations are used by EDF-DP2D to anticipate dismantling and radioactive waste management. The main numerical activation schemes include the computing of a 3 dimensional neutron flux map, obtained on the basis of a neutron propagation calculation. The codes used solve the transport equation called the Boltzmann equation without simplification. The Monte Carlo method is used to solve the Boltzmann equation. Random series of numbers are used to simulate the lives of millions of neutrons. The codes follow each neutron individually, from its birth to its disappearance by leakage, absorption, or fission, and then the neutron flux map is calculated at the nominal power rating conditions. The main drawback of the Monte Carlo codes is the large computing time needed to converge within acceptable statistical criteria. This extended time period is incompatible with the multiple fuel managements used by EDF to operate its NPPs because it is necessary to make a Monte Carlo calculation for each fuel loading pattern. The solution developed by EDF-DP2D is to use the importance factors of Green's Functions to simplify the computing of the 3 dimensional neutron flux maps. Physicists talk about Green's Functions where mathematicians talk about elementary solutions of linear equations with constant coefficients. With an activation scheme based on the Green's Functions approach the 3D neutron flux is obtained on the basis of the convolution of the normalized source contributions (i.e. normalized response matrices) with the neutrons emitted by the fuel assemblies. The response matrices to unitary sources are computed with the Monte Carlo code MCNP for different tallies of interest and the neutron sources emitted by the fuel are computed with a core code for different fuel loading patterns. The principal interest of this approach is the calculation of the response matrices to unitary sources that can be used for all power distributions, thus limiting the Monte Carlo computing time. (authors)

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A Preliminary Analysis on the Applicability of Deep Borehole Disposal for Spent Fuels in Korea - 15496

A deep geological disposal system, the disposal depth is about 500 m below ground, is considered as the safest method to isolate the spent fuels (SF) or high-level radioactive waste from the human environment with the best available technology at present time. The disposal safety of this system has been demonstrated with underground research laboratory and some advanced countries such as Finland and Sweden are implementing their disposal project on commercial stage. However, if these high-level radioactive wastes can be disposed of in deeper and more stable rock formation than deep geological disposal depth, it has several advantages. Therefore, as an alternative disposal concept, i.e., deep borehole disposal technology is under consideration in number of countries in terms of its outstanding safety and cost effectiveness. In this paper, the general concept for deep borehole disposal of spent fuels or high level radioactive wastes was reviewed. And the key technologies and challenges in development of this disposal method with the nuclear environment were analyzed. Also, very preliminary deep borehole disposal concept including disposal canister concept was developed according to the nuclear environment. These results will be used as an input for the analyses of applicability for DBD in Korea. (authors)

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Oxidation of Organics in the Defense Waste Processing Facility Condensate

Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF): The state of South Carolina currently holds 35 million gallons of radioactive waste in 51 underground tanks. DWPF was built in an effort to convert the waste into a more stable form. It turns the sludge waste from the tanks into glass, which will keep the waste stable for 10,000 years. Currently, DWPF uses formic acid in its flowsheet and there is one major problem associated with its use: it decomposes into hydrogen, a flammable gas. Glycolic acid, however, has been found as a possible alternative that performs similarly to formic acid but does not directly form hydrogen. One of the main issues with the glycolic acid flowsheet is the potential for there to be glycolate and other organics in DWPF's Recycle Collection Tank (RCT). These organics could lead to hydrogen generation later in the downstream evaporators and must be destroyed in the RCT in order for glycolic acid to be a suitable replacement for formic acid. Oxidants can be added to the RCT to destroy the organics. Two oxidizers, permanganate and Fenton's reagent (iron catalyzed hydrogen peroxide), are possible candidates. Find optimum processing conditions for the oxidation of organic species in a typical RCT simulant. A reactor served as a small-scale version of the RCT. During each run, an RCT simulant with 8 added organics, including glycolate, was created in the reactor. Either permanganate or peroxide was slowly added for each run through a syringe pump. Each experiment lasts 6 hours and a total of 23 runs are scheduled. Variables of Interest: Oxidizer (Permanganate or Peroxide); Temperature (15 deg. C to 50 deg. C); Oxidant addition time (10 mins to 2 hours); Amount of oxidant (1 x to 1.5 x stoichiometric requirements); Solution pH (3 to 13); Glycolate concentration (125 to 250 mg/kg). Offgas Analyzers: Mass spectrometer and FTIR spectrometer. Samples: pulled at 7 different times throughout the run to determine the amount of organic and inorganic carbon and concentrations of various organics through ion chromatography (IC). Only 3 of the runs have been completed at this point, all with permanganate. Based on the first 3 runs, permanganate seems to oxide the majority of the organics and the run at pH 8 and 32.5 deg. C had the most effective oxidation. The rest of the runs will need to be performed to determine the best oxidant and optimum values of the other variables of interest. Once the experiment is completed, DWPF will select one of the oxidants. Testing will continue to determine its performance during foam-over and other non-ideal conditions. Finally, the oxidant will be tested with actual radioactive waste to confirm its effectiveness.

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FOURTH QUARTER / ANNUAL TRANSPORTATION REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2021

Waste Shipments to and from the Nevada National Security Site, Radioactive Waste Management Complex. This report satisfies the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) commitment to prepare a quarterly summary of waste shipments to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) in Area 5.

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Thermal Testing of Waste Packages for a Storage Environment

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard TRU waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. The POC consists of an inner Pipe Container (PC) surrounded by organic fiber dunnage inside of a 7A drum. The PC was design to maintain separation of fissile material and to provide shielding from radiation. The POC has many design features that are similar to Type B packages that do provide protection from engulfing fires. However, it was not specifically designed to prevent release of stored material during a long-duration fire. POCs are now being used to store combustible TRU waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites (e.g., Waste Isolation Pilot Plant). Radioactive waste storage operators would like to be able to claim some level of protection is provided by the POCs for thermal assaults that could occur within storage facilities when these POCs contain PCs with combustibles. In 1997 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provide during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drums generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the PC to the fire environment. However, these tests are not bounding for POC/PC containing combustibles. With the addition of combustible materials in the PC, the possibility exists for generation of higher quantities of gases and much higher pressures inside the PC, which can lead to early rupture of the PC filter and higher radioactive aerosol release fractions. Therefore, a new series of tests was required to determine the temperature response of the exposed PC and determine the amount of material that could be released. DOE contacted SNL in 2015 to discuss the 1997 SNL tests and came to the conclusion that those tests were not bounding for POC/PC containing combustibles Therefore, DOE commission a new set of tests at SNL. Starting in 2015, SNL conducted fire tests to examine whether the contents of the PC would reach a temperature that would result in generation of sufficient gas to cause overpressurization of the PC, and subsequent release of its content. This paper will describe the various test conducted thus far, and present preliminary results from these tests.

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Radioactive Water Treatment at a United States Environmental Protection Agency Superfund Site - 12322

A water treatment system at a United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) Superfund site impacted by radiological contaminants is used to treat water entering the site. The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is actively managing the remedial action for the USEPA using contracts to support the multiple activities on site. The site is where former gas mantle production facilities operated around the turn of the century. The manufacturing facilities used thorium ores to develop the mantles and disposed of off-specification mantles and ore residuals in the surrounding areas. During Site remedial actions, both groundwater and surface water comes into contact with contaminated soils and must be collected and treated at an on-site treatment facility. The radionuclides thorium and radium with associated progeny are the main concern for treatment. Suspended solids, volatile organic compounds, and select metals are also monitored during water treatment. The water treatment process begins were water is pumped to a collection tank where debris and grit settle out. Stored water is pumped to a coagulant tank containing poly-aluminum chloride to collect dissolved solids. The water passes into a reaction tube where aspirated air is added or reagent added to remove Volatile Organic Compounds (VOC'S) by mass transfer and convert dissolved iron to a solid. The water enters the flocculent polymer tank to drop solids out. The flocculated water overflows to a fluidized bed contact chamber to increase precipitation. Flocculation is where colloids of material drop out of suspension and settle. The settled solids are periodically removed and disposed of as radioactive waste. The water is passed through filters and an ion exchange process to extract the radionuclides. Several million liters of water are processed each year from two water treatment plants servicing different areas of the remediation site. Ion exchange resin and filter material are periodically replaced and disposed of as radioactive waste. A total of 0.85 m{sup 3} of waste sludge per year requires disposal on average, in addition to another 6.6 m{sup 3} of waste cartridge filters. All water discharges are regulated by a state of New Jersey Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit implemented by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act). Laboratory analyses are required to satisfy requirements of the state NPDES permit. Specific monitoring parameters and discharge rates will be provided. Use of the water treatment systems drastically reduces the amount of contaminated water requiring solidification and water disposal to near zero. Millions of liters of potentially contaminated water from excavation activities is treated and released within permit limits. A small volume of solid radioactive waste (21 cubic meters) is generated annually from water treatment process operations. Management of ground and surface water is effectively controlled in remediation areas by the use of sumps, erosion control measures and pumping of water to storage vessels. Continued excavations can be made as water impacting the site is effectively controlled. (authors)

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Human machine interface (hmi) evaluation of rooms ta-50-1-60/60a at the radioactive liquid waste treatment facility (rlwtf)

This effort addressed an evaluation of human machine interfaces (HMIs) in Room TA-50-1-60/60A of the Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLWTF). The evaluation was performed in accordance with guidance outlined in DOE-STD-3009, DOE Standard Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Documented Safety Analyses, 2006 [DOE 2006]. Specifically, Chapter 13 of DOE 2006 highlights the 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management, 2012, [CFR 2012] and DOE G 421.1-2 [DOE 2001a] requirements as they relate to the human factors process and, in this case, the safety of the RLWTF. The RLWTF is a Hazard Category 3 facility and, consequently, does not have safety-class (SSCs). However, safety-significant SSCs are identified. The transuranic (TRU) wastewater tanks and associated piping are the only safety-significant SSCs in Rooms TA-50-1-60/60A [LANL 2010]. Hence, the human factors evaluation described herein is only applicable to this particular assemblage of tanks and piping.

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Decommissioning of the NPP A-1 heavy water management system - 15121

The paper deals with experience and techniques in the application of decontamination technology and remotely controlled robotic devices for the decontamination and dismantling of the heavy water management system during undergoing decommissioning process of the A-1 NPP as well as treatment of arising liquid waste All of these activities are characterized by high level of radioactivity and contamination. During operation of the A-1 NPP the heavy water management system fulfilled several functions: (1) cooling of the moderator, (2) topping up of the moderator in the active zone, (3) drainage, feed and storage of heavy water, (4) capture of leaked heavy water. Closely associated with heavy water management were systems for separation and isotopic purification of heavy water (distilling station, removing organic impurities station, isotopic purification station). The NPP heavy water system is located inside the power block building in several rooms where the inner surface contamination is up to the level of 10 E4 Bq.cm{sup -2}, dose rate up to 15,0 mGy.h{sup -1} and the feeding pipeline contained liquid RAW with high tritium content. Pre-dismantling decontamination of the heavy water management system and associated systems had to be performed with the intention of improving the radiation situation, i.e. reducing contamination of internal surface and dose rates in the vicinity of the equipment. Various sophisticated procedures such as retrieval of sludge using remotely operated devices and loop chemical decontamination of internal surfaces were applied. The generated radioactive waste such as spent decontamination solutions and sludge were immediately solidified on-site into a geo-polymer matrix using a mobile conditioning facility. For dismantling and fragmentation of some devices, mobile robotic systems MT80 and MT15 were applied which had been developed, designed and constructed as general-purpose decommissioning equipment. Special tooling was developed for application with the robots, such as hydraulic shears, circular saw, reciprocating saw, circular pipe cutter and a system for quick tool-change without direct intervention of the operators. Most of the operations are remotely controlled on basis of visual information from four cameras, with consistent radiation protection of the operators. The implementation of partial decommissioning tasks in such hard and unfavorable radiation conditions (moreover accompanied by generation of specific high-content alpha radwaste) has introduced in practice several new unique decontamination and dismantling techniques and new procedures for the effective on-site processing of generated secondary radioactive waste, including sludge and sorbents. These advantageous techniques, equipment and experience will be exploited in the continuation of the A-1 NPP decommissioning process which has been organized according to distinctively licensed phases and are also being applied in the decommissioning of other NPP in Slovakia as well as abroad. (authors)

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Overview of the DOE nuclear fuels storage and transportation planning project - 15444

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy is conducting planning activities within the Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation Planning Project (NFST) to lay the groundwork for implementing interim storage, including associated transportation, per the Administration's Strategy for the Management and Disposal of Used Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste, and to develop a foundation for a new nuclear waste management organization. The purpose of the NFST is to make progress on this important national issue within existing legislative and budgetary authorizations. The objective of the NFST is to develop and begin implementation of an integrated plan to (1) implement interim storage; (2) improve the overall integration of storage as a planned part of the waste management system; (3) prepare for the large-scale transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, with an initial focus on removing SNF from the shutdown reactor sites; and (4) develop foundational information, resources, and capabilities needed to support the aforementioned objectives and future implementation decisions and actions. An over-arching goal is to develop options for decision-makers on the design of an integrated waste management system. The planning activities are divided into four major topical areas: (1) Consent-Based Siting, (2) Storage, (3) Transportation, and (4) Strategic Crosscuts. This paper provides an overview of the NFST and its activities. (authors)

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