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At least 1,099 records · Page 61

Developing a Supply Chain Security Program

Amid growing concerns over foreign manufacturing for components and devices deployed in critical energy infrastructure, this research from the national labs will highlight best practices for developing and maintaining a supply chain security program. Tools for asset inventory, tips for developing and maintaining software- and hardware-bills-of-materials (SBOMs and HBOMs), recommended contractual language for vendor agreements, and identification of responsibilities will be shared. We discuss the one-time requirements to enable a successful supply chain security program and the best ways to operationalize this program for maximum impact, including development of robust practices for vulnerability tracking, patch management, and workarounds, with understanding of the reliability and uptime requirements for utilities. The recommendations shared are based on a cyber-informed engineering approach to identification of high-consequence impacts and the engineering controls related to supply chain management that can best mitigate these impacts. This approach allows for prioritization of resources. Additionally, we highlight relative up-front and ongoing costs associated with recommended controls. Viewers will leave with an understanding what a supply chain security program is, and what steps, prioritized for resource-constrained organizations, can build a robust program.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

WPTO Navigator

Protecting hydroelectric plants from incidents that adversely impact their cyber-physical systems presents unique challenges due to the plants’ widely dispersed geographic locations and varied configurations as well as the relative nascent nature of the cyberattacks targeting these facilities. To help hydroelectric plants better respond to and mitigate cybersecurity incidents, this Department of Energy Water Power Technologies Office Navigator aligns the processes within the National Institute of Standards 800-61r2 Computer Security Incident Handling Guide with the emergency actions within the FEMA 64 Emergency Action Plan Framework. This work is to be used at a hydroelectric plant to quickly understand how the plant responds to a cyber incident in relationship to the actions involved in an emergency action plan involving a hydroelectric plant. In addition to this product, there are three other products meant to be distributed to a hydroelectric plant to assist in their cyber incident response and recovery. The first, a report on the processes of building a R&R flip book based on a large set of existing guidance. The second, a handy flip book meant to be distributed to hydroelectric plants to assist them during a cybersecurity incident occurring on a hydroelectic plant. And the third is a comprehensive set of resources to assist an operator in locating appropriate guidance during the recovery process.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

Assessing and mitigating cybersecurity risks of traffic light systems in smart cities

Intelligent traffic lights are critical cyber‐physical systems that help smart cities to cut road congestion and vehicle emissions. However, they also open a new frontier of cybersecurity. Security researchers have demonstrated ways to compromise the traffic lights to cause potential traffic disruption and public safety degradation. This study aims to raise the public awareness of the cybersecurity issues in traffic light systems. The authors present a bi‐level game‐theoretic framework for assessing cybersecurity risks of traffic light systems, as the first step towards understanding and mitigating the security vulnerabilities. Additionally, they propose a minimax‐regret‐based methodology to guide the deployment of defensive measures in traffic light systems against cyberattacks.

Li, Zhiyi↗

Methodology for Preliminary Design of Electrical Microgrids

Many critical loads rely on simple backup generation to provide electricity in the event of a power outage. An Energy Surety MicrogridTM can protect against outages caused by single generator failures to improve reliability. An ESM will also provide a host of other benefits, including integration of renewable energy, fuel optimization, and maximizing the value of energy storage. The ESM concept includes a categorization for microgrid value propositions, and quantifies how the investment can be justified during either grid-connected or utility outage conditions. In contrast with many approaches, the ESM approach explicitly sets requirements based on unlikely extreme conditions, including the need to protect against determined cyber adversaries. During the United States (US) Department of Defense (DOD)/Department of Energy (DOE) Smart Power Infrastructure Demonstration for Energy Reliability and Security (SPIDERS) effort, the ESM methodology was successfully used to develop the preliminary designs, which direct supported the contracting, construction, and testing for three military bases.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Mapping SIEM Vulnerabilities in STIG

SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) tools monitor network traffic and allow users to quickly detect problems in their networks. Because of the valuable information processed by SIEM tools, it is important to understand their vulnerabilities. STIG (Structured Threat Intelligence Graph) is an application created at INL used to visualize data related to cyber threats. Using STIG can allow users to understand vulnerabilities related to their SIEM products and how to protect their systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Introduction to the special section on learning and security for multi-agent systems

This report features six articles that provide an overview of the emerging research topics at the intersection learning, security, and multi-agent systems. Recent years have witnessed a surge in the number of works at their intersections, and they have appeared in system and control communities as well as many other communities in artificial intelligence, cyber–physical systems, and economics. The articles in this special section give accessible and comprehensive tutorials and surveys for a broad systems and control audience, covering topics including adversarial machine learning, multi-agent reinforcement learning, cyber resilience, resilient control systems, and game design. It is hopeful that this special section will spawn future interest and cross-disciplinary collaborations in this emerging transdisciplinary research area.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Assessing the Benefits and Implementations of Secure Embedded Intelligence

This is a poster submission, so we do not have a formal abstract; however, we have included a couple of the main points of the poster. Motivation Current ICS/IIoT reference architectures are ill-suited to continue to meet industry demands. Architectures such as the Purdue Model and ISA-95 split cyber-physical systems into distinct levels; however, business needs and cybersecurity requirements constantly require cross-cutting solutions. Further, newly defined IIoT architectures are better suited for Industry 4.0 systems, but they leave out the feedback seen in Purdue and ISA-95. This underscores a need for new architectures, without which IT and OT boundaries will continue to grow. Secure embedded intelligence (SEI) should drive the creation of these new architectures. Secure Embedded Intelligence Advances in sensing, computation, and automated analysis have opened new possibilities for increased security, performance, and cost savings. SEI enables advanced technology to be utilized to drive new reference architectures to achieve these possibilities while integrating trust and risk.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Securing The Future: 2026 Manufacturing & Critical Infrastructure Threat Landscape

This report outlines the current state of manufacturing weaknesses introduced by the complexities of modern environments, including cloud services and Internet of Things (IoT) devices, with particular attention paid to the unique vulnerabilities encountered by SMMs. It also highlights CyManII’s strategic initiatives and collaborative solutions to mitigate these risks and strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the manufacturing ecosystem. Utilizing data from 2025 to inform forward-looking mitigation strategies, this report provides manufacturers with a clear understanding of both current and emerging cybersecurity threats, as well as practical opportunities to strengthen their cyber ecosystems. The following sections detail key vulnerabilities and threat vectors, along with actionable mitigation strategies, many of which have been developed or piloted through CyManII-led efforts. A thorough understanding of these risks and mitigation strategies is essential for manufacturers seeking to strengthen the security and resilience of their manufacturing operations.

3D Printing↗

Cyber Physical Grid-Interactive Distributed Energy Resources Control for VPP Dispatch and Regulation

This paper presents a cyber-physical algorithm for grid-interactive Distributed Energy Resource (DER) control to enable two features of Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) dispatch and grid voltage regulation, considering the communication and security impacts. We first formulate the DER dispatch problem as a real-time, iterative, and grid-interactive DER control problem. Thereafter, we consider a probabilistic traffic model to characterize packet delays and loss in a communication network, and study how the delays enter the process of information exchange among the grid measurement units, local DER controllers and the grid control center that coordinately execute this dispatch algorithm. Finally, a strategy combining delay threshold and modified message update rules is proposed to immune the asynchrony resulting from the communications network traffic and it avoids possible numerical instabilities and sensitivities of the tracking and regulation capabilities of this DER control algorithm. By implementing the proposed cyber-physical algorithm on the modified IEEE 37-node system, our preliminary results exhibit that the uncertainties of the underlying communications infrastructure must be considered for the VPP tracking and regulation capabilities of any DER in a generic Cyber-Physical System (CPS), because the delayed voltage measurements in the uplink/bi-link cases result in the off-track in VPP dispatch and jittery in voltage regulation.

cyber-physical algorithm↗

Detection, Localization, and Tracking of Unauthorized UAS and Jammers

Small unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) are expected to take major roles in future smart cities, for example, by delivering goods and merchandise, potentially serving as mobile hot spots for broadband wireless access, and maintaining surveillance and security. Although they can be used for the betterment of the society, they can also be used by malicious entities to conduct physical and cyber attacks to infrastructure, private/public property, and people. Even for legitimate use-cases of small UASs, air traffic management (ATM) for UASs becomes of critical importance for maintaining safe and collusion-free operation. Therefore, various ways to detect, track, and interdict potentially unauthorized drones carries critical importance for surveillance and ATM applications. In this paper, we will review techniques that rely on ambient radio frequency signals (emitted from UASs), radars, acoustic sensors, and computer vision techniques for detection of malicious UASs. We will present some early experimental and simulation results on radar-based range estimation of UASs, and receding horizon tracking of UASs. Subsequently, we will overview common techniques that are considered for interdiction of UASs.

surveillance↗

Resilient Hierarchical Networked Control Systems: Secure Controls for Critical Locations and at Edge

Integration of information and communication technology (ICT) offers new opportunities in improving the management and operation of critical infrastructures such as power systems as it allows connection of different sensors and control components via a communication network, leading to the so-called networked control systems (NCS). However, the use of open and pervasive ICT such as the Internet or wireless communication technologies comes at a price of making NCS vulnerable to cyber intrusions/attacks which may cause physical damage. Here, this chapter presents control algorithms to ensure resilient and safe operation of NCS under unknown cyberattacks. Specifically, a variant of dynamic watermarking strategies is presented by embedding encoding/decoding components of chaotic signals into the NCS for secure control for critical locations where the measurement/control signals are transmitted to/from the control center via a communication network. In addition, resilient cooperative control algorithms are discussed to ensure safe operation at edge of the NCS which consists of a large number of distributed controllable devices. Several numerical examples are provided to illustrate the proposed control strategies.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

A Cyber-Resilience Risk Management Architecture for Distributed Wind

Distributed wind is an electric energy resource segment with strong potential to be deployed in many applications, but special consideration of resilience and cybersecurity is needed to address the unique conditions associated with distributed wind. Distributed wind is a strong candidate to help meet renewable energy and carbon-free energy goals. However, care must be taken as more systems are installed to ensure that the systems are reliable, resilient, and secure. The physical and communications requirements for distributed wind mean that there are unique cybersecurity considerations, but there is little to no existing guidance on best practices for cybersecurity risk management for distributed wind systems specifically. This research develops an architecture for the consideration of cyber risks associated with distributed wind systems. The architecture takes into account the configurations, challenges, and standards for distributed wind to create a risk-focused perspective that considers of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, with special emphasis on what sets distributed wind systems apart from other distributed energy resources (DER). We discuss common distributed wind architectures and how they are interconnected to larger power systems. Because cybersecurity cannot exist independently, the cyber-resilience architecture must consider the system holistically. Finally, we discuss the implementation of a risk assessment process that uses the cyber-resilience framework to address challenges specific to distributed wind.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems Cyber Range

As digital technologies expand to meet the needs of a more autonomous, interconnected, and advanced power system, new cybersecurity complexities and vulnerabilities arise. The ARIES Cyber Range enables the energy sector to evaluate these evolutions and validate cybersecurity solutions without impacting live systems. Combining power grid-scale hardware with emulation and simulation approaches, the ARIES Cyber Range can faithfully replicate modern energy systems - from grid physics to communication networks, and everything in between - with real-world fidelity. At NLR, researchers and partners are answering complex power system cybersecurity questions, examining emerging threats to the electric sector, and de risking new security technologies, all at a mission-relevant speed that keeps pace with rapidly evolving systems and hazards.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Mathematical approaches to secure in-vehicle networks

Modern vehicles rely on numerous small computers called electronic control units (ECUs) that continually communicate life-critical messages, e.g., wheel speeds and steering angle, through a few controller area networks (CANs). Originally designed as a closed network for the life of the vehicle, CAN protocol developed bereft of security features (e.g., authentication or encryption). For emission testing, updates, and other diagnostics, vehicle CANs are now physically accessible, but this comes with vulnerability to cyber attack. Mandatory on-board diagnostic ports (OBD-II) provide adversaries with direct access to the vehicle. Remote attacks, e.g., via Bluetooth or cellular connections, are possible but require deep expertise. In short, the critical networks for vehicle functionality are exposed to remote and local cyber attacks with little to no built-in defenses. Most notably, the infamous 2015 research of Miller and Valasek exhibited a remote takeover of a Jeep’s brakes resulting in a massive recall and ample media coverage.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Identifying Vulnerabilities and Hardening Attack Graphs for Networked Systems

We investigate efficient security control methods for protecting against vulnerabilities in networked systems. A large number of interdependent vulnerabilities typically exist in the computing nodes of a cyber-system; as vulnerabilities get exploited, starting from low level ones, they open up the doors to more critical vulnerabilities. These cannot be understood just by a topological analysis of the network, and we use the attack graph abstraction of Dewri et al. to study these problems. In contrast to earlier approaches based on heuristics and evolutionary algorithms, we study rigorous methods for quantifying the inherent vulnerability and hardening cost for the system. We develop algorithms with provable approximation guarantees, and evaluate them for real and synthetic attack graphs.

attack graphs↗

Nuclear-Integrated Energy Units: Advancing Cybersecurity for Resilient Energy Systems

Rapidly increasing usage of nuclear-integrated energy units has created new challenges in terms of cybersecurity. This paper discusses the potential cyberthreat challenges and cyber risks associated with the widespread adoption of these units, and the role of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) techniques in enhancing the security and resilience of these systems.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Integrating Cybersecurity with System Operations and Restoration

This presentation covers the interaction of the discipline of system operations with the discipline of cybersecurity. First, a common mental model for risk - both cybersecurity and all-hazards - is presented, followed by a discussion of high-level management strategies for different kinds of cyber harm facing system operators, based on the consequences and frequencies of the harm. The next section covers the importance of cybersecurity for a system operator organization and explains some general concepts to understand the relationships. Finally the role of system operators in the security of the grid as a larger system of systems is discussed over the framework of a resilience event.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Electrical Fault and Power Quality Detection Algorithms and Customer-Owned DERs Monitoring with a Cyber Grid Guard System and DLT

In this study, the electrical fault and power quality detection algorithms and customer-owned DERs monitoring use cases were implemented, with a Cyber Grid Guard system and DLT. Electrical utilities continue to deploy more intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) inside and outside electrical substations, and are associated with customer-owned distributed energy resources (DERs). Data from these IEDs, such as power meters and protection relays, must be kept confidential and of high integrity. Blockchain technology has the potential to increase microgrid resilience by enhancing data sharing security. The growing use of IEDs and customer-owned renewable energy sources (DERs) may make it necessary to connect Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) with power system applications. We implemented the electrical faulted phase detection and power quality monitoring algorithms with a Cyber Grid Guard (CGG) system using DLT. In addition, the DERs (wind turbine farms) use case and protective relay cyber-event tests were assessed, by using the CGG system with DLT. In the experimental model, the testbed was created by using a real-time simulator and CGG system with power meters/ protective relays in the loop. The data collected from the CGG system and IEDs were compared with the same time stamp source. These results showed the successful assessment of protection, control and monitoring applications using a CGG system with DLT. In the future, power system applications for the ESGT with DERs and the CGG system will be based on executing smart contracts between electrical utilities and customer-owned DERs.

Piesciorovsky, Emilio↗