Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “CLOSURES”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 1,099 records · Page 61

Defining Probe Closure Offset and Scan Stitching Methodology for Element Contact Profilometry in the Hot Fuel Examination Facility

The Element Contact Profilometer (ECP) is a non-destructive post-irradiation examination (PIE) method established in the Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) Hot Fuel Examination Facility (HFEF). The ECP suspends a fuel rod with a standard end-fitting in a vertical orientation and draws it between two opposed Sony probes with sapphire rod tips, which measure the diameter directly as a function of vertical stage position through contact profilometry. The ECP is equipped with concave rollers, which pinch the rod to maintain a consist position between these sapphire probe tips. A schematic of the analysis head is shown in Figure 1. The gripper that suspends the rod end-fitting is able to rotate to allow measuring of any azimuthal angle around the rod. This system is used to characterize the diameter of full-length light water reactor (LWR) irradiated fuel rods at multiple azimuthal angles in support of the Advanced Fuels Campaign (AFC).

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

ANALYSIS OF DAMAGE TO WASTE PACKAGES CAUSED BY SEISMIC EVENTS DURING POST-CLOSURE

This paper presents methodology and results of an analysis of damage due to seismic ground motion for waste packages emplaced in a nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. A series of three-dimensional rigid body kinematic simulations of waste packages, pallets, and drip shields subjected to seismic ground motions was performed. The simulations included strings of several waste packages and were used to characterize the number, location, and velocity of impacts that occur during seismic ground motion. Impacts were categorized as either waste package-to-waste package (WP-WP) or waste package-to-pallet (WP-P). In addition, a series of simulations was performed for WP-WP and WP-P impacts using a detailed representation of a single waste package. The detailed simulations were used to determine the amount of damage from individual impacts, and to form a damage catalog, indexed according to the type, angle, location and force/velocity of the impact. Finally, the results from the two analyses were combined to estimate the total damage to a waste package that may occur during an episode of seismic ground motion. This study addressed two waste package types, four levels of peak ground velocity (PGV), and 17 ground motions at each PGV. Selected aspects of waste package degradation, such as effective wall thickness and condition of the internals, were also considered. As expected, increasing the PGV level of the vibratory ground motion increases the damage to the waste packages. Results show that most of the damage is caused by WP-P impacts. TAD-bearing waste packages with intact internals are highly resistant to damage, even at a PGV of 4.07 m/s, which is the highest level analyzed.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Rocky Flats Closure: the Role of Models in Facilitating Scientific Communication With Stakeholder Groups

The Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site (RFETS) was a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) environmental cleanup site for a previous manufacturing plant that made components for the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. The facility was shut down in 1989 to address environmental and safety concerns, and left behind a legacy of contaminated facilities, soils, surface and ground water. In 1995, the Site contractor established the Actinide Migration Evaluation (AME) advisory group to provide advice and technical expertise on issues of actinide behavior and mobility in the air, surface water, groundwater, and soil. Through a combination of expert judgment supported by state-of-the-art scientific measurements, it was shown that under environmental conditions at Rocky Flats, plutonium and americium form insoluble oxides that adhere to small soil, organic, and mineral particles and colloids, or are colloidal materials themselves. A series of models ranging from conceptual, geostatistical, and large-scale wind and surface water erosion models were used to guide stakeholder interactions. The nature of these models, and their use in public communication is described.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A pressure relaxation closure model for one-dimensional, two-material Lagrangian hydrodynamics based on the Riemann problem

Despite decades of development, Lagrangian hydrodynamics of strengthfree materials presents numerous open issues, even in one dimension. We focus on the problem of closing a system of equations for a two-material cell under the assumption of a single velocity model. There are several existing models and approaches, each possessing different levels of fidelity to the underlying physics and each exhibiting unique features in the computed solutions. We consider the case in which the change in heat in the constituent materials in the mixed cell is assumed equal. An instantaneous pressure equilibration model for a mixed cell can be cast as four equations in four unknowns, comprised of the updated values of the specific internal energy and the specific volume for each of the two materials in the mixed cell. The unique contribution of our approach is a physics-inspired, geometry-based model in which the updated values of the sub-cell, relaxing-toward-equilibrium constituent pressures are related to a local Riemann problem through an optimization principle. This approach couples the modeling problem of assigning sub-cell pressures to the physics associated with the local, dynamic evolution. We package our approach in the framework of a standard predictor-corrector time integration scheme. We evaluate our model using idealized, two material problems using either ideal-gas or stiffened-gas equations of state and compare these results to those computed with the method of Tipton and with corresponding pure-material calculations.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗

Device-scale CFD modeling of gas-liquid multiphase flow and amine absorption for CO2 capture

In this paper we aim to develop a validated device-scale CFD model that can predict quantitatively both hydrodynamics and CO2 capture efficiency for an amine-based solvent absorber column with random Pall ring packing. A Eulerian porous-media approach and a two-fluid model were employed, in which the momentum and mass transfer equations were closed by literature-based empirical closure models. We proposed a hierarchical approach for calibrating the parameters in the closure models to make them accurate for the packed column. Specifically, a parameter for momentum transfer in the closure was first calibrated based on data from a single experiment. With this calibrated parameter, a parameter in the closure for mass transfer was next calibrated under a single operating condition. Last, the closure of the wetting area was calibrated for each gas velocity at three different liquid flow rates. For each calibration, cross validations were pursued using the experimental data under operating conditions different from those used for calibrations. This hierarchical approach can be generally applied to develop validated device-scale CFD models for different absorption columns.

Pan, Wenxiao↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 544: Cellars, Mud Pits, and Oil Spills, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 544, Cellars, Mud Pits, and Oil Spills, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Corrective Action Unit 544 comprises the following 20 corrective action sites (CASs) located in Areas 2, 7, 9, 10, 12, 19, and 20 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS): • 02-37-08, Cellar & Mud Pit • 02-37-09, Cellar & Mud Pit • 07-09-01, Mud Pit • 09-09-46, U-9itsx20 PS #1A Mud Pit • 10-09-01, Mud Pit • 12-09-03, Mud Pit • 19-09-01, Mud Pits (2) • 19-09-03, Mud Pit • 19-09-04, Mud Pit • 19-25-01, Oil Spill • 19-99-06, Waste Spill • 20-09-01, Mud Pits (2) • 20-09-02, Mud Pit • 20-09-03, Mud Pit • 20-09-04, Mud Pits (2) • 20-09-06, Mud Pit • 20-09-07, Mud Pit • 20-09-10, Mud Pit • 20-25-04, Oil Spills • 20-25-05, Oil Spills This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing each CAS. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 544 using the SAFER process. Using the approach approved for previous mud pit investigations (CAUs 530–535), 14 mud pits have been identified that • are either a single mud pit or a system of mud pits, • are not located in a radiologically posted area, and • have no evident biasing factors based on visual inspections. These 14 mud pits are recommended for no further action (NFA), and further field investigations will not be conducted. For the sites that do not meet the previously approved closure criteria, additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible recommendation for closure of the remaining CASs in CAU 544. This will be presented in a closure report (CR) that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 27, 2010, by representatives of NDEP and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO). The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine and implement appropriate corrective actions for each CAS in CAU 544. The DQO process developed for this CAU identified the following expected closure options: (1) investigation and confirmation that no contamination exists above the final action levels (FALs) leading to an NFA declaration, (2) characterization of the nature and extent of contamination leading to closure in place with use restrictions, (3) clean closure by remediation and verification, (4) closure in place with use restrictions with no investigation if CASs are in crater areas that have been determined to be unsafe to enter, or (5) NFA if the mud pit CAS meets the criteria established during the CAUs 530–535 SAFER investigation. The following summarizes the SAFER activities that will support the closure of CAU 544: • Perform visual inspection of all CASs. • Perform site preparation activities (e.g., utilities clearances, construction of temporary site exclusion zones). • Removal of easily managed, nonhazardous, and nonradioactive debris, including vegetation (e.g., tumbleweeds), at various CASs that interfere with sampling, if required to inspect soil surface or collect soil sample. • Collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., mud pits, cellars, stained soil) to confirm or disprove the presence of contaminants of concern (COCs) as necessary to supplement existing information. • If no COCs are present at a CAS, establish NFA as the corrective action. • If COCs exist, collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., clean soil adjacent to contaminated soil) and submit for laboratory analyses to define the extent of COC contamination. • If a COC is present at a CAS, either - Establish clean closure as the corrective action. The material to be remediated will be removed, disposed of as waste, and verification samples will be collected from remaining soil, or - Establish closure in place as the corrective action and implement the appropriate use restrictions. • Confirm the preferred closure option is sufficient to protect human health and the environment.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (Rev.1)

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) has been prepared for the 92-Acre Area, the southeast quadrant of the Radioactive Waste Management Site, located in Area 5 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The 92-Acre Area includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 92-Acre Area, which includes CAU 111. The result of the DQO process was that the 92-Acre Area is sufficiently characterized to provide the input data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) without the collection of additional data. The DQOs are included as Appendix A of this document. This CADD/CAP identifies and provides the rationale for the recommended CAA for the 92-Acre Area, provides the plan for implementing the CAA, and details the post-closure plan. When approved, this CADD/CAP will supersede the existing Pit 3 (P03) Closure Plan, which was developed in accordance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, 'Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.' This document will also serve as the Closure Plan and the Post-Closure Plan, which are required by 40 CFR 265, for the 92-Acre Area. After closure activities are complete, a request for the modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit that governs waste management activities at the NNSS will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring. Four CAAs, ranging from No Further Action to Clean Closure, were evaluated for the 92-Acre Area. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of the data used to develop the conceptual site model; a review of past, current, and future operations at the site; and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, Closure in Place with Administrative Controls is the preferred CAA for the 92-Acre Area. Closure activities will include the following: (1) Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover over the 92-Acre Area; (2) Installing use restriction (UR) warning signs, concrete monuments, and subsidence survey monuments; (3) Establishing vegetation on the cover; (4) Implementing a UR; and (5) Implementing post-closure inspections and monitoring. The Closure in Place with Administrative Controls alternative meets all requirements for the technical components evaluated, fulfills all applicable federal and state regulations for closure of the site, and will minimize potential future exposure pathways to the buried waste at the site.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

E AREA LOW LEVEL WASTE FACILITY DOE 435.1 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

This Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility was prepared to meet requirements of Chapter IV of the Department of Energy Order 435.1-1. The Order specifies that a Performance Assessment should provide reasonable assurance that a low-level waste disposal facility will comply with the performance objectives of the Order. The Order also requires assessments of impacts to water resources and to hypothetical inadvertent intruders for purposes of establishing limits on radionuclides that may be disposed near-surface. According to the Order, calculations of potential doses and releases from the facility should address a 1,000-year period after facility closure. The point of compliance for the performance measures relevant to the all pathways and air pathway performance objective, as well as to the impact on water resources assessment requirement, must correspond to the point of highest projected dose or concentration beyond a 100-m buffer zone surrounding the disposed waste following the assumed end of active institutional controls 100 years after facility closure. During the operational and institutional control periods, the point of compliance for the all pathways and air pathway performance measures is the SRS boundary. However, for the water resources impact assessment, the point of compliance remains the point of highest projected dose or concentration beyond a 100-m buffer zone surrounding the disposed waste during the operational and institutional control periods. For performance measures relevant to radon and inadvertent intruders, the points of compliance are the disposal facility surface for all time periods and the disposal facility after the assumed loss of active institutional controls 100 years after facility closure, respectively. The E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility is located in the central region of the SRS known as the General Separations Area. It is an elbow-shaped, cleared area, which curves to the northwest, situated immediately north of the Mixed Waste Management Facility. The E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility is comprised of 200 acres for waste disposal and a surrounding buffer zone that extends out to the 100-m point of compliance. Disposal units within the footprint of the low-level waste facilities include the Slit Trenches, Engineered Trenches, Component-in-Grout Trenches, the Low-Activity Waste Vault, the Intermediate-Level Vault, and the Naval Reactor Component Disposal Area. Radiological waste disposal operations at the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility began in 1994. E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility closure will be conducted in three phases: operational closure, interim closure, and final closure. Operational closure will be conducted during the 25-year operation period (30-year period for Slit and Engineered Trenches) as disposal units are filled; interim closure measures will be taken for some units. Interim closure will take place following the end of operations and will consist of an area-wide runoff cover along with additional grading over the trench units. Final closure of all disposal units in the E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility will take place at the end of the 100-year institutional control period and will consist of the installation of an integrated closure system designed to minimize moisture contact with the waste and to serve as a deterrent to intruders. Radiological dose to human receptors is analyzed in this PA in the all-pathways analysis, the inadvertent intruder analysis and the air pathway analysis, and the results are compared to the relevant performance measures. For the all-pathways analysis, the performance measure of relevance is a 25-mrem/yr EDE to representative members of the public, excluding dose from radon and its progeny in air. For the inadvertent intruder, the applicable performance measures are 100-mrem/yr EDE and 500 mrem/yr EDE for chronic and exposure scenarios, respectively. The relevant performance measure for the air pathway is 10-mrem/yr EDE via the air pathway, excluding dose from radon and its progeny in air. Protection of groundwater resources is addressed by comparing calculated compliance point concentrations in groundwater with the relevant performance measure, which was determined to be the Safe Drinking Water Act MCLs for beta-gamma and alpha-emitting radionuclides, and for radium and uranium. Radon fluxes for each disposal unit are calculated and compared to the average flux of 20 pCi/m{sup 2}/s upper limit specified in the relevant performance objective. Thirty-five parent radionuclides are addressed in the groundwater transport calculations, 15 radionuclides in the air pathway calculations, and 78 parent radionuclides in the intruder analysis for all disposal units. Radon-222 fluxes are also evaluated for all disposal units.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan for the 92-Acre Area and Corrective Action Unit 111: Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

This Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) has been prepared for the 92-Acre Area, the southeast quadrant of the Radioactive Waste Management Site, located in Area 5 of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The 92-Acre Area includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' Data Quality Objectives (DQOs) were developed for the 92-Acre Area, which includes CAU 111. The result of the DQO process was that the 92-Acre Area is sufficiently characterized to provide the input data necessary to evaluate corrective action alternatives (CAAs) without the collection of additional data. The DQOs are included as Appendix A of this document. This CADD/CAP identifies and provides the rationale for the recommended CAA for the 92-Acre Area, provides the plan for implementing the CAA, and details the post-closure plan. When approved, this CADD/CAP will supersede the existing Pit 3 (P03) Closure Plan, which was developed in accordance with Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 265, 'Interim Status Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities.' This document will also serve as the Closure Plan and the Post-Closure Plan, which are required by 40 CFR 265, for the 92-Acre Area. After closure activities are complete, a request for the modification of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit that governs waste management activities at the NTS will be submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to incorporate the requirements for post-closure monitoring. Four CAAs, ranging from No Further Action to Clean Closure, were evaluated for the 92-Acre Area. The CAAs were evaluated on technical merit focusing on performance, reliability, feasibility, safety, and cost. Based on the evaluation of the data used to develop the conceptual site model; a review of past, current, and future operations at the site; and the detailed and comparative analysis of the potential CAAs, Closure in Place with Administrative Controls is the preferred CAA for the 92-Acre Area. Closure activities will include the following: (1) Constructing an engineered evapotranspiration cover over the 92-Acre Area; (2) Installing use restriction (UR) warning signs, concrete monuments, and subsidence survey monuments; (3) Establishing vegetation on the cover; (4) Implementing a UR; and (5) Implementing post-closure inspections and monitoring. The Closure in Place with Administrative Controls alternative meets all requirements for the technical components evaluated, fulfills all applicable federal and state regulations for closure of the site, and will minimize potential future exposure pathways to the buried waste at the site.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Using in-situ strain measurements to evaluate the accuracy of stress estimation procedures from fracture injection/shut-in tests

Fracture injection/shut-in tests are commonly used to measure the state of stress. Injection creates a hydraulic fracture (or in some cases, opens a preexisting fracture), and then the pressure after shut-in is monitored to identify fracture closure. Different interpretation procedures have been proposed for estimating closure, and the procedures sometimes yield significantly different results. In this study, direct, in-situ strain measurements are used to observe fracture reopening and closure. The tests were performed as part of the EGS Collab project, a mesoscale project performed at 1.25 and 1.5 km depth at the Sanford Underground Research Facility. The tests were instrumented with the SIMFIP tool, a double-packer probe with a high-resolution three-dimensional borehole displacement sensor. The measurements provide a direct observation of the fracture closure signature, enabling a high-fidelity estimate of the fracture closure stress (ie, the normal stress on the fracture). In two of the four tests, injection created an opening mode fracture, and so the closure stress can be interpreted as the minimum principal stress. In the other two tests, injection probably opened preexisting natural fractures, and so the closure stress can be interpreted as the normal stress on the fractures. The strain measurements are compared against different proposed methods for estimating closure stress from pressure transients. The shut-in transients are analyzed with two techniques that are widely used in the field of petroleum engineering – the ‘tangent’ method and the ‘compliance’ method. In three of the four tests, the tangent method significantly underestimates the closure stress. The compliance method is reasonably accurate in all four tests. Closure stress is also interpreted using two other commonly-used methods – ‘first deviation from linearity’ and the method of Hayashi and Haimson. In comparison with the SIMFIP data, these methods tend to overestimate the closure stress, evidently because they identify closure from early-time transient effects, such as near-wellbore tortuosity. In two of the tests, microseismic imaging provides an independent estimate of the size of the fracture created by injection. When combined with a simple mass balance calculation, the SIMFIP stress measurements yield predictions of fracture size that are reasonably consistent with the estimates from microseismic. In conclusion, the calculations imply an apparent fracture toughness 2-3x higher than typical laboratory-derived values.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 130: Storage Tanks, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 130, Storage Tanks, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended February 2008). Corrective Action Unit 130 consists of the seven following corrective action sites (CASs) located in Areas 1, 7, 10, 20, 22, and 23 of the Nevada Test Site: • 01-02-01, Underground Storage Tank • 07-02-01, Underground Storage Tanks • 10-02-01, Underground Storage Tank • 20-02-03, Underground Storage Tank • 20-99-05, Tar Residue • 22-02-02, Buried UST Piping • 23-02-07, Underground Storage Tank This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing each CAS. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 130 using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. This will be presented in a Closure Report that will be prepared and submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) for review and approval. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) finalized on April 3, 2008, by representatives of NDEP; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine and implement appropriate corrective actions for each CAS in CAU 130. The DQO process developed for this CAU identified the following expected closure options: (1) investigation and confirmation that no contamination exists above the final action levels, leading to a no further action declaration; (2) characterization of the nature and extent of contamination, leading to closure in place with use restrictions; or (3) clean closure by remediation and verification. The following text summarizes the SAFER activities that will support the closure of CAU 130: • Perform site preparation activities (e.g., utilities clearances, geophysical surveys). • Move or remove and dispose of debris at various CASs, as required. • Collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., stained soil) to confirm or disprove the presence of contaminants of concern (COCs) as necessary to supplement existing information. • If no COCs are present at a CAS, establish no further action as the corrective action. • If COCs exist, collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., clean soil adjacent to contaminated soil) and submit for laboratory analyses to define the extent of COC contamination. • If a COC is present at a CAS, either: - Establish clean closure as the corrective action. The material to be remediated will be removed, disposed of as waste, and verification samples will be collected from remaining soil, or - Establish closure in place as the corrective action and implement the appropriate use restrictions. • Obtain consensus from NDEP that the preferred closure option is sufficient to protect human health and the environment. • Close the underground storage tank(s) and their contents, if any, in accordance with Nevada Administrative Code regulations. • Remove the lead brick(s) found at any CAS in accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 114: Area 25 EMAD Facility Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 114, Area 25 EMAD Facility, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Corrective Action Unit 114 comprises the following corrective action sites (CASs) located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site: • 25-41-03, EMAD Facility • 25-99-20, EMAD Facility Exterior Releases This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing each CAS. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 114 using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. It is anticipated that the results of the field investigation and implementation of a corrective action of clean closure will support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. If it is determined that complete clean closure cannot be accomplished during the SAFER, then a hold point will have been reached and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) will be consulted to determine whether the remaining contamination will be closed under the alternative corrective action of closure in place. This will be presented in a closure report that will be prepared and submitted to NDEP for review and approval. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 30, 2009, by representatives of NDEP; U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office; Stoller-Navarro Joint Venture; and National Security Technologies, LLC. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine and implement appropriate corrective actions for each CAS in CAU 114. The following text summarizes the SAFER activities that will support the closure of CAU 114: • Perform site preparation activities (e.g., utilities clearances, radiological surveys). • Collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., stained soil) to confirm or disprove the presence of contaminants of concern (COCs) as necessary to supplement existing information. • Collect samples of materials to determine whether potential source material (PSM) is present that may cause the future release of a COC to environmental media. • If no COCs or PSMs are present at a CAS, establish no further action as the corrective action. • If COCs exist, collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., clean soil adjacent to contaminated soil) and submit for laboratory analyses to define the extent of COC contamination. • If a COC or PSM is present at a CAS, either: - Establish clean closure as the corrective action. The material to be remediated will be removed, disposed of as waste, and verification samples will be collected from remaining soil, or - Establish closure in place as the corrective action and implement the appropriate use restrictions. • Confirm the selected closure option is sufficient to protect human health and the environment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Streamlined Approach for (SAFER) Plan for Corrective Action Unit 566: E-MAD Compound, Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration (SAFER) Plan addresses the actions needed to achieve closure for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 566, EMAD Compound, identified in the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO). Corrective Action Unit 566 comprises the following corrective action site (CAS) located in Area 25 of the Nevada Test Site: • 25-99-20, EMAD Compound This plan provides the methodology for field activities needed to gather the necessary information for closing CAS 25-99-20. There is sufficient information and process knowledge from historical documentation and investigations of similar sites regarding the expected nature and extent of potential contaminants to recommend closure of CAU 566 using the SAFER process. Additional information will be obtained by conducting a field investigation before selecting the appropriate corrective action. It is anticipated that the results of the field investigation and implementation of a corrective action of clean closure will support a defensible recommendation that no further corrective action is necessary. If it is determined that complete clean closure cannot be accomplished during the SAFER, then a hold point will have been reached and the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP) will be consulted to determine whether the remaining contamination will be closed under the alternative corrective action of closure in place. This will be presented in a closure report that will be prepared and submitted to NDEP for review and approval. The data quality objective (DQO) strategy for CAU 566 was developed at a meeting on April 30, 2009, by representatives of NDEP and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to determine and implement appropriate corrective actions for CAU 566. The following text summarizes the SAFER activities that will support the closure of CAU 566: • Perform site preparation activities (e.g., utilities clearances, radiological surveys). • Collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., stained soil) to confirm or disprove the presence of contaminants of concern (COCs) as necessary to supplement existing information. • Collect samples of materials to determine whether potential source material (PSM) is present that may cause the future release of a COC to environmental media. • If no COCs or PSMs are present at a CAS, establish no further action as the corrective action. • If COCs exist, collect environmental samples from designated target populations (e.g., clean soil adjacent to contaminated soil) and submit for laboratory analyses to define the extent of COC contamination. • If a COC or PSM is present at a CAS, either: - Establish clean closure as the corrective action. The material to be remediated will be removed, disposed of as waste, and verification samples will be collected from remaining soil, or - Establish closure in place as the corrective action and implement the appropriate use restrictions. • Confirm the selected closure option is sufficient to protect human health and the environment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Three dimensional simulations of plasma filaments in the scrape off layer: A comparison with models of reduced dimensionality

This paper presents simulations of isolated 3D filaments in a slab geometry obtained using a newly developed 3D reduced fluid code, written using the BOUT++ framework. First, systematic scans were performed to investigate how the dynamics of a filament are affected by its amplitude, perpendicular size, and parallel extent. The perpendicular size of the filament was found to have a strong influence on its motions, as it determined the relative importance of parallel currents to polarization and viscous currents, whilst drift-wave instabilities were observed if the initial amplitude of the blob was increased sufficiently. Next, the 3D simulations were compared to 2D simulations using different parallel closures; namely, the sheath dissipation closure, which neglects parallel gradients, and the vorticity advection closure, which neglects the influence of parallel currents. The vorticity advection closure was found to not replicate the 3D perpendicular dynamics and overestimated the initial radial acceleration of all the filaments studied. In contrast, a more satisfactory comparison with the sheath dissipation closure was obtained, even in the presence of significant parallel gradients, where the closure is no longer valid. Specifically, it captured the contrasting dynamics of filaments with different perpendicular sizes that were observed in the 3D simulations which the vorticity advection closure failed to replicate. However, neither closure successfully replicated the Boltzmann spinning effects nor the associated poloidal drift of the blob that was observed in the 3D simulations. Although the sheath dissipation closure was concluded to be more successful in replicating the 3D dynamics, it is emphasized that the vorticity advection closure may still be relevant for situations where the parallel current is inhibited from closing through the sheath due to effects such as strong magnetic shear around X points or increased resistivity near the targets.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

F-Tank Farm Performance Assessment Updates through the Special Analysis Process at Savannah River Site - 12169

The F-Area Tank Farm (FTF) is owned by the U.S. Department of Energy and operated by Savannah River Remediation, LLC (SRR), Liquid Waste Operations contractor at DOE's Savannah River Site (SRS). The FTF is in the north-central portion of the SRS and occupies approximately 22 acres within F-Area. The FTF is an active radioactive waste storage facility consisting of 22 carbon steel waste tanks and ancillary equipment such as transfer lines, evaporators and pump tanks. An FTF Performance Assessment (PA) was prepared to support the eventual closure of the FTF underground radioactive waste tanks and ancillary equipment. The PA provides the technical basis and results to be used in subsequent documents to demonstrate compliance with the pertinent requirements identified below for final closure of FTF. The FTank Farm is subject to a state industrial waste water permit and Federal Facility Agreement. Closure documentation will include an F-Tank Farm Closure Plan and tank-specific closure modules utilizing information from the performance assessment. For this reason, the State of South Carolina and the Environmental Protection Agency must be involved in the performance assessment review process. The residual material remaining after tank cleaning is also subject to reclassification prior to closure via a waste determination pursuant to Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2005. The projected waste tank inventories in the FTF PA provide reasonably bounding FTF inventory projections while taking into account uncertainties in the effectiveness of future tank cleaning technologies. As waste is removed from the FTF waste tanks, the residual contaminants will be sampled and the remaining residual inventory is characterized. In this manner, tank specific data for the tank inventories at closure will be available to supplement the waste tank inventory projections currently used in the FTF PA. For FTF, the new tank specific data will be evaluated through the Special Analysis process. The FTF Special Analyses process will be utilized to evaluate information regarding the final residual waste that will be grouted in place in the FTF Tanks and assess the potential impact the new inventory information has on the FTF PA assumptions and results. The Special Analysis can then be used to inform decisions regarding FTF tank closure documents. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the Special Analysis process and share insights gained while implementing this process. An example of an area of interest in the revision process is balancing continuous improvement versus configuration control of agreed upon methodologies. Other subjects to be covered include: 1) defining the scope of the revisions included in the Special Analysis, 2) determining which PA results should be addressed in the Special Analysis, and 3) deciding whether the Special Analysis should utilize more qualitative or quantitative assessments. For the SRS FTF, an FTF PA has been prepared to provide the technical basis and results to be used in subsequent documents to demonstrate compliance with the pertinent requirements for final closure of FTF. The FTF Special Analyses process will be utilized to evaluate the impact new information has on the FTF PA assumptions and results. The Special Analysis can then be used to inform decisions regarding FTF tank closure documents. In preparing SAs, it is crucial that the scope of the SA be well defined within the SA, since the specific scope will vary from SA to SA. Since the SAs are essentially addendums to the PA, the SA scope should utilize the PA as the baseline from which the SA scope is defined. The SA needs to focus on evaluating the change associated with the scope, and not let other changes interfere with the ability to perform that evaluation by masking the impact of the change. In preparing the SA, it is also important to let the scope determine whether the Special Analysis should utilize more qualitative or quantitative assessments and also which results from the PA should be addressed in the Special Analysis. These decisions can vary from SA and should not be predetermined. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

BWR Full Fuel Assembly Testing and Validation

This report describes the Consortium for Advanced Simulation of Light Water Reactors (CASL) work conducted for completion of the Thermal Hydraulics Methods (THM) Level 3 milestone THM.CLS.P15.10: BWR Full Fuel Assembly Testing and Validation. The extension of existing boiling closure designed for Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) to the high void fraction condition of Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) is one of the challenges for Multiphase Computational Fluid Dynamics (M-CFD) applications. In the efforts aimed at developing the advanced boiling closure for BWRs, the baseline closure model, so-called ‘Zero’ closure, has been developed based on the GEN-I closure for PWRs which was used as a starting point. Since this simplest closure model is robust but does not contain any explicit description of the complex high void fraction mechanisms, the applicability of M-CFD needs to be evaluated before developing advanced closures for BWRs. To support this need, the high fidelity M-CFD simulation with Zero closure has been conducted for the BWR full fuel assembly. The capabilities of M-CFD with Zero closure were evaluated against the international OECD/NRC BFBT benchmark data. The scalability of the M-CFD application to the nuclear fuel assembly was demonstrated with the INL High Performance Computing (HPC) system. This report presents the recent view of the best practices on M-CFD for BWRs to provide a useful reference to identify and overcome common challenges in the M-CFD applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Magnetohydrodynamic motion of a two-fluid plasma

Here, the two-fluid Maxwell system couples frictionless electron and ion fluids via Maxwell’s equations. When the frequencies of light waves, Langmuir waves, and single-particle cyclotron motion are scaled to be asymptotically large, the two-fluid Maxwell system becomes a fast-slow dynamical system. This fast-slow system admits a formally-exact single-fluid closure that may be computed systematically with any desired order of accuracy through the use of a functional partial differential equation. In the leading order approximation, the closure reproduces magnetohydrodynamics (MHD). Higher order truncations of the closure give an infinite hierarchy of extended MHD models that allow for arbitrary mass ratio, as well as perturbative deviations from charge neutrality. The closure is interpreted geometrically as an invariant slow manifold in the infinite-dimensional two-fluid phase space, on which two-fluid motions are free of high-frequency oscillations. This perspective shows that the full closure inherits a Hamiltonian structure from two-fluid theory. By employing infinite-dimensional Lie transforms, the Poisson bracket for the all-orders closure may be obtained in closed form. Thus, conservative truncations of the single-fluid closure may be obtained by simply truncating the single-fluid Hamiltonian. Moreover, the closed-form expression for the all-orders bracket gives explicit expressions for a number of the full closure’s conservation laws. Notably, the full closure, as well as any of its Hamiltonian truncations, admits a pair of independent circulation invariants.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗