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NASA NTRS2016

Exploring the Science Trade Space with the JPL Innovation Foundry A-Team

The JPL Innovation Foundry has established a new approach for exploring, developing, and evaluating early concepts with a group called the Architecture Team (A-Team). The A-Team combines innovative collaborative methods and facilitated sessions with subject matter experts and analysis tools to help mature mission concepts. Science, implementation, and programmatic elements are all considered during an ATeam study. In these studies, Concept Maturity Levels (CML) are used to group methods. These levels include idea generation and capture (CML 1), initial feasibility assessment (CML 2), and trade space exploration (CML 3). Methods used for exploring the science objectives, feasibility, and scope will be described including use of a new technique for understanding the most compelling science, called a Science Return Diagram (SRD). In the process of developing the SRD, gradients in the science trade space are uncovered along with their implications for implementation and mission architecture. Special attention is paid towards developing complete investigations, establishing a series of logical claims that lead to the natural selection of a measurement approach. Over 20 science-focused A-Team studies have used these techniques to help science teams refine their mission objectives, make implementation decisions and reveal the mission concept’s most compelling science. This paper will describe the A-Team process for exploring the mission concept's science trade space and the Science Return Diagram technique.In June of 2011 a new collaborative engineering approach forearly concept formulation began in the JPL InnovationFoundry [1], six months later becoming the “A-Team” [2].Responding to a need for exploring mission architecturelevel trades [3], the A-Team precedes Team X [4,5] in asequence of concurrent engineering teams at JPL that can beused to mature a concept from a “cocktail napkin” level ideato a complete mission point design. The A-Team efficientlyexplores the science, implementation, and programmatictrade space in early concept formulation. Small, facilitatedgroups of experts generate innovative ideas, quantitativelyassess feasibility, and discover key sensitivities in the tradespace through collaborative analysis and use of advancedmethods and tools. The A-Team process builds off theexperience within JPL and other recent approaches to earlyconcept formulation [6] including best practices of the JPLInnovation Foundry, Project Systems Engineering &Formulation Section, Team Eureka and the Rapid MissionArchitecture Team[7].The A-Team is a focal point for innovative formulationapproaches and people within JPL. It relies on a largebackground of study resources, creative thinkers and “greybeard” scrutinizers, advanced tools, and subject matterexperts with both breadth and depth in experience andexpertise that are all available at JPL. The A-Team isdesigned to be a rapid and efficient process takingapproximately 6 weeks (the entire process can be as short asjust a few days or as long as up to three months) and costingthe equivalent of a work-month of a full-time employee orless. Studies begin with detailed planning and client reviewfollowed by study sessions, analysis work, and reporting.The staffing on each study is customized to the study goalsand objectives, and it is addressed early in the A-Teamprocess. Sessions are generally half-day or whole-day eventsand conducted over a series of days with focused agendas thatare moderated by a trained facilitator. Preliminary results andknowledge capture are available within hours of each session,and a final report is generally available two weeks later.One of the biggest challenges facing early conceptdevelopment is understanding the gradient in science returnversus various available mission scenarios and payload options. Often times, major areas of scientific inquiry havealready been prioritized by science groups, including throughthe National Research Council’s Decadal Studies inAstronomy, Planetary, and Earth Science. Yet science teamscontinue to struggle, especially in competitive missionsolicitations, to capture the right amount of scope that’sachievable within the cost constraints of the opportunity.Often the desire to completely and comprehensively study ascience area in just one mission (after all, true missionopportunities are rare) drives teams to take on too much,providing requirements that are unachievable within theresources of the opportunity without inducing unacceptableimplementation risk. Alternatively, science teams can seekto reduce risk by using an established instrument, but havenot thought through the traceability and key aspects of thescience question to justify its use. Both scenarios lead to badassumptions at the beginning of the concept development thatcan then ripple through implementation option choices,potentially preventing what would have been a good scienceinvestigation from being selected.The purpose of this paper is first to provide some additionalbackground and summary of the A-Team process, tools,people, and facilities. We then focus on the A-Teammethodology for overcoming the barriers of defining thescience scope well at the early concept development stage.This includes understanding the science story andtraceability, and then examining the gradient in science returnversus key characteristics of observables, developing theright payload and mission requirement specification throughexamining the science and implementation trade space.

Ziemer, John K.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Architecture Modeling on the Europa Project

In 2015 NASA chartered a partnership between the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) to begin planning a mission to study the Jovian moon Europa. The project has adopted a Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) approach to its architecting process since its early formulation, developing certain modeling practices and tools as needed, with the expectation that this process would result in a more consistent and verifiable architecture than with a more traditional document-based approach. A sound architecture is essential to provide the rationale for requirements on the system design, and to define the trade space of acceptable design points within which technical and programmatic concerns as well as project objectives can be addressed. This paper provides an overview of the framework used by the Europa project to describe the mission architecture and discusses how a system model was instrumental in providing a single-source-of-truth for this description. Several key modeling patterns to represent the architecture are presented, along with audit methods to ensure the consistency and the correctness of the model. Finally, the benefits and challenges of using a model-based approach to generate traditional requirements documents and other gate products are assessed.

Dubos, Gregory F.↗
NASA NTRS2019

History of NASA's Determination of Offgassed Products (Test 7)

NASA's Determination of Offgassed Products (Test 7) from materials and assembled articles for spaceflight has evolved since the Apollo program for over 50 years to meet various habitable spacecraft nonmetallic programmatic requirements. Now mandated by NASA STD-6016A, Standard Materials and Processes Requirements for Spacecraft, all nonmetallic materials used in habitable flight compartments, with the exception of ceramics, metal oxides, inorganic glasses, and materials used in sealed containers, must meet the offgassing requirements in NASA-STD-6001B Test 7. This manuscript presents the history of Test 7, beginning with the Apollo spacecraft nonmetallic materials selection guidelines and test requirements in 1967, in which tests were performed in mostly oxygen atmospheres. It progresses through Skylab, Space Shuttle, International Space Station nonmetals testing, and acceptance requirements with milder test environments. This review of the history of Test 7 presents the reader with a perspective on the development and changes undergone since inception to the present. Related NASA standard tests (some now former, discontinued, combined, or supplemental) including Test 6, Odor Assessment, Test 16, Determination of Offgassed Products from Assembled Articles, and Test 12, Total Spacecraft Cabin Offgassing, are discussed in context

Greene, Benjamin↗
NASA NTRS2019

Structural Analysis of Test Flight Vehicles for Application of Multifunctional Energy Storage System

Under the NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Convergent Aeronautical Solutions (CAS) project, NASA Glenn Research Center has been leading Multifunctional Structures for High Energy Lightweight Load-bearing Storage (M-SHELLS) research efforts. The technology of integrating load-carrying structures with electrical energy storage capacity has the potential to reduce the overall weight of future electric aircraft. The proposed project goals were to develop M-SHELLS in the form of honeycomb coupons and subcomponents, integrate them into the structure, and conduct low-risk flight-tests onboard a remotely piloted small aircraft. Experimental M-SHELLS energy-storing coupons were fabricated and tested in the laboratory for their electrical and mechanical properties. In this report, finite element model development and structural analyses of two small test aircraft candidates are presented. The finite element analysis of the initial two-spar wing is described for strain, deflection, and weight estimation. After a test aircraft Tempest was acquired, a load-deflection test of the wing was conducted. A finite element model of the Tempest was then developed based on the test aircraft dimensions and construction detail. The component weight analyses from the finite element model and test measurements were correlated. Structural analysis results with multifunctional energy storage panels in the fuselage of the test vehicle are presented. Although the flight test was cancelled because of programmatic reasons and time constraints, the structural analysis results indicate that the mid-fuselage floor composite panel could provide structural integrity with minimal weight penalty while supplying electrical energy. To explore potential future applications of the multifunctional structure, analyses of the NASA X-57 Maxwell electric aircraft and a NASA N+3 Technology Conventional Configuration (N3CC) fuselage are presented. Secondary aluminum structures in the fuselage sub-floor and cargo area were partially replaced with reinforced five-layer composite panels with M-SHELLS honeycomb core. The N3CC fuselage weight reduction associated with each design without risking structural integrity are described. The structural analysis and weight estimation with the application of composite M-SHELLS panels to the N3CC fuselage indicate a 3.2% reduction in the fuselage structural weight, prior to accounting for the additional weight of core material required to complete the energy storage functionality.

Mukhopadhyay, Vivek↗
NASA NTRS2019

History of NASA's Determination of Offgassed Products (Test 7)

NASA's Determination of Offgassed Products (Test 7) from materials and assembled articles for spaceflight has evolved since the Apollo program for over 50 years to meet various habitable spacecraft non-metallic programmatic requirements. Now mandated by NASA-STD-6016B Standard Materials and Processes Requirements for Spacecraft, all nonmetallic materials used in habitable flight compartments,with the exception of ceramics, metal oxides, inorganic glasses, and materials used in sealed containers must meet the offgassing requirements of in NASA-STD-6001B Test 7. This manuscript presents the history of Test 7 beginning with the Apollo spacecraft nonmetallic materials selection guidelines and test requirements in 1967

Greene, Benjamin↗
NASA NTRS2016

The Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter Mission: 10 Years of Exploration from Mars Orbit

The Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter (MRO) entered Mars orbit on March 10, 2006. After five months of aerobraking, a series of propulsive maneuvers were used to establish the desired low-altitude science orbit. The spacecraft has been on station in its 255 x 320 km, sun-synchronous (~3 am-pm), primary science orbit since September 2006 performing both scientific and Mars programmatic support functions. This paper will provide a summary of the major achievements of the mission to date and the major flight activities planned for the remainder of its third Extended Mission (EM3). Some of the major flight challenges the flight team has faced are also discussed.

MRO↗
NASA NTRS2016

Transitioning Autonomous Systems Technology Research to a Flight Software Environment

NASA has developed methods and algorithms for autonomous spacecraft operations,including automated planning and scheduling, fault diagnostics and impact determination,procedure management and display. Making the transition from technology research tooperational flight software requires overcoming significant technical, programmatic andcultural challenges. Technology research is aimed at developing methods that performspecific functions correctly, but the resulting software may not be designed for flightprocessors with limited CPU, memory and network resources, and may not be easilyintegrated into spacecraft flight software. Our objective in the Autonomous Systems andOperations Project is to make significant strides toward the transformation from technologyto operational use. Our focus was twofold: maturing research grade autonomy software intoa flight software environment using broadly accepted languages and tools; and integratingautonomy applications with each other and with representative systems and their data andcommand interfaces. For a target flight software environment, we chose Core FlightSoftware, developed by Goddard Space Flight Center as a common operating systemindependent framework. Our hardware integration environment was provided by theIntegrated Power and Avionics Systems (iPAS) Lab at Johnson Space Center, in whichvarious subsystem development has been conducted to address engineering challenges forthe vehicles and systems required for long-duration missions into the solar system. The iPASand its network of connected facilities provides realistic subsystem hardware or simulationsof spacecraft power, life support, guidance, navigation and control, and command and datahandling subsystems. Interfaces between autonomy applications and the subsystems beingassessed and controlled were developed, assessed and refined. The hardware and softwareenvironment using CFS and the iPAS facility has proven to be a highly flexible and realisticenvironment in which to rapidly integrate applications in an iterative, low cost setting. Usingthe integration environment we have developed, we will turn our focus to performance andsizing analysis to determine the computational requirements for full-scale deployment ofautonomy technology. Scalability of reasoners and the spacecraft models upon which theyoperate, and robustness across the full range of spacecraft conditions and environments willbe explored and improved. We are making significant contributions to the future programsthat will build the spacecraft that will take humans beyond the Earth-Moon system, in whichprogram Systems Engineers will be able to accurately and confidently design in accurate,robust and mature autonomous operations systems.

Flight Software↗
NASA NTRS2019

Evolving Management Strategies to Improve NASA Flagship's Cost and Schedule Performance: LUVOIR as a Case Study

The LUVOIR study process has brought to fruition an extremely exciting scientific mission concept. The 3.5 year LUVOIR study duration enabled an unprecedented level of scientific, engineering, and technology thoroughness prior to the Astro2020 Decadal. This detail also shed light on many technical and programmatic challenges for efficiently developing a mission of this scale. While NASA's flagships perform exquisitely once on-orbit, there is understandable growing frustration in their development cost and schedule overruns. We felt it incumbent upon ourselves to ask how we could improve on delivering LUVOIR (or any of NASA's future flagships) on schedule and on budget, not just for the next mission, but for all NASA large strategic missions to come. We researched past and current NASA flagship's lessons learned publications and other large government projects that pointed to some systemic challenges that will only grow with larger and more complex strategic missions. Our findings pointed us to some ways that could potentially evolve NASA's current flagship management practices to help improve on their development cost and schedule performance despite their growing complexity.. This paper briefly comments on the science motivation for NASA's flagships and on the science motivation for a LUVOIR-like mission. We argue the motivation for improving NASA's flagships development cost and schedule performance. We review the specific challenges of NASA's flagships to acknowledge their specific issues. We then examine the most repeated systemic challenges we found from previous NASA flagship and other large government project lessons learned/observed. Lastly, we offer recommendations to tackle these repeated systemic challenges facing NASA's flagships. The recommendations culminate into a proactive integrated development and funding framework to enable improving the execution of NASA's future flagship's cost and schedule performance.

Crooke, Julie A.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Evolving Management Strategies to Improve NASA Flagship's Cost and Schedule Performance: LUVOIR as a Case Study

The large ultraviolet optical infrared surveyor (LUVOIR) study process has brought to fruition an extremely exciting scientific mission concept. The 3.5 year LUVOIR study duration enabled an unprecedented level of scientific, engineering, and technology thoroughness prior to the Astro2020 Decadal. This detail also shed light on many technical and programmatic challenges for efficiently developing a mission of this scale within the context of NASA’s flagships cost and schedule performances to date. While NASA’s flagships perform exquisitely once on orbit, there is understandable growing frustration in their development cost and schedule overruns. We felt it incumbent upon ourselves to ask how we could improve on delivering LUVOIR (or any of NASA’s future flagships) on schedule and on budget, not just for the next mission, but for all NASA large strategic missions to come. We researched past and current NASA flagship’s lessons learned publications and other large government projects that pointed to some systemic challenges that will only grow with larger and more complex strategic missions. Our findings pointed us to some ways that could potentially evolve NASA’s current flagship management practices to help improve on their development cost and schedule performance despite their growing complexity. This paper briefly comments on the motivations for NASA’s flagships and on the science motivations for a LUVOIR-like mission. We argue the incentives for improving NASA’s flagships development cost and schedule performance. We review the specific additional challenges of NASA’s flagships to acknowledge their specific issues. We then examine the most repeated systemic challenges we found from previous NASA flagships and other large government projects lessons learned/observed. Lastly, we offer recommendations to tackle these repeated systemic challenges facing NASA’s flagships. The recommendations culminate into a proactive integrated development and funding framework to enable improving the execution of NASA’s future flagship’s cost and schedule performance.

Crooke, Julie A.↗
NASA NTRS2019

NASA’s Space Launch System: Exploration Mission-1 Hardware Nears Completion

The Space Launch System (SLS) Program completed several significant production milestones in 2018 for the launch vehicle’s first mission (Fig. 1) and is poised for greater accomplishments in 2019. With manufacturing and hardware installation finished, Boeing completed the core stage forward join and shipped the liquid hydrogen tank structural test article to Marshall Space Flight Center for testing. The core stage aft join and LOX tank STA are expected to be completed in 2019 on the way to final stage integration. The four EM-1 engines are poised for stage integration in 2019. The Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter completed outfitting at Marshall and will be shipped to Kennedy Space Center in 2019. All solid rocket motor segments for the EM-1 boosters are cast, inspected and ready for shipment to KSC. The upper stage, the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS), and the Orion Stage Adapter (OSA), where 13 6U CubeSats will ride to deep space on EM-1, were completed and delivered to Exploration Ground Systems at KSC in 2017 and 2018, respectively. The Program continues to work toward first launch of the nation’s new super heavy lift deep space capability in fiscal 2020. SLS is designed, engineered and tested to launch the most challenging exploration missions, minimizing risk and providing the greatest opportunity for mission success. This paper will discuss the technical and programmatic successes and challenges of the past year and look ahead to plans for 2019.

Honeycutt, John↗
NASA NTRS2019

NASA’s Space Launch System: First Mission Hardware Nears Completion

The Space Launch System (SLS) Program (Fig. 1) completed several significant production milestones in 2018 for its first mission and is poised for greater accomplishments in 2019. With manufacturing and hardware installation complete, Boeing completed the core stage forward join and shipped the liquid hydrogen tank structural test article to Marshall Space Flight Center for testing. The core stage aft join and LOX tank STA are expected to be completed in 2019 on the way to final stage integration. The four EM-1 engines are poised for stage integration in 2019. The Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter completed outfitting at Marshall and will be shipped to Kennedy Space Center in 2019. All solid rocket motor segments for the EM-1 boosters are cast, inspected and ready for shipment to KSC. The Program continues to work toward first launch of the nation’s new super heavy lift deep space capability in fiscal 2020. SLS is designed, engineered and tested to launch the most challenging exploration missions, minimizing risk and providing the greatest opportunity for mission success and scientific discovery. This paper will discuss the technical and programmatic successes and challenges of the past year and look ahead to plans for 2019.

Honeycutt, John↗
NASA NTRS2019

Radiation Hardness Assurance: Evolving for NewSpace

During the past decade, numerous small satellites have been launched into space, with dramatically expanded dependence on advanced commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and systems required for mission success. While the radiation effects vulnerabilities of small satellites are the same as those of their larger, traditional relatives, revised approaches are needed for risk management because of differences in technical requirements and programmatic resources. While moving to COTS components and systems may reduce direct costs and procurement lead times, it undermines many cost-reduction strategies used for conventional radiation hardness assurance (RHA). Limited resources are accompanied by a lack of radiation testing and analysis, which can pose significant risks - or worse, be neglected altogether. Small satellites have benefited from short mission durations in low Earth orbits with respect to their radiation response, but as mission objectives grow and become reliant on advanced technologies operating for longer and in harsher environments, requirements need to reflect the changing scope without hindering developers that provide new capabilities.

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA)↗
NASA NTRS2019

Radiation Hardness Assurance: Evolving for NewSpace

During the past decade, government agencies, private companies and academic institutions, have launched hundreds of small satellites into space, with dramatically expanded dependence on advanced commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and systems required for mission success. While the radiation effects vulnerabilities of components within small satellites are the same as those of their larger, traditional relatives, revised approaches are needed for risk management because of differences in technical requirements and programmatic resources. While moving to COTS components and systems may reduce direct costs and procurement lead times, it undermines many cost-reduction strategies used for conventional radiation hardness assurance (RHA). Limited resources are accompanied by a lack of radiation testing and analysis, which can pose significant risks. Small satellites have benefited from short mission durations in low Earth orbits with respect to their radiation response, but as mission objectives grow and become reliant on advanced technologies operating for longer and in harsher environments, requirements need to reflect the changing scope without hindering developers that provide new capabilities. In this course we suggest RHA strategies that engineers and scientists can apply to a wide range of aerospace systems, including constellations, with a focus on how to manage aggressive system scaling for smaller platforms.

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA)↗
NASA NTRS2014

Low-cost, Risk-Reduction Testing of Class D Spacecraft Photovoltaic Systems

The end-to-end verification of a spacecraft photovoltaic power generation system requires light! A low-cost, portable, and end-to-end photovoltaic-system test appropriate for NASAs new generation of Class D missions is presented. High risk, low-cost, and quick-turn satellites rarely have the resources to execute the traditional approaches from higher-class (A-C) missions. The Class D approach, as demonstrated on the Lunar Atmospheric and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE), utilizes a portable, metal-halide, theatre lamp for an end-to-end photovoltaic system test. While not as precise and comprehensive as the traditional Large Area Pulsed Solar Simulator (LAPSS) test, the LADEE method leverages minimal resources into an ongoing assessment program that can be applied through numerous stages of the mission. The project takes a true Class D approach in assessing the technical value of a costly, high-fidelity performance test versus a simpler approach with less programmatic risk. The resources required are a fraction of that for a LAPSS test, and is easy to repeat due to its portability. Further, the test equipment can be handed down to future projects without building an on-site facility.At the vanguard of Class D missions, the LADEE team frequently wrestled with and challenged the status quo. The philosophy of risk avoidance at all cost, typical to Class A-C missions, simply could not be executed. This innovative and simple testing solution is contextualized to NASA Class D programs and a specific risk encountered during development of the LADEE Electrical Power System (EPS). Selection of the appropriate lamp and safety concerns are discussed, with examples of test results. Combined with the vendors panel-level data and periodic inspection, the method ensures system integrity from Integration and Test (IT) through launch. Following launch, mission operations tools are utilized to assess system performance based on a scant amount of available data.

photovoltaic↗
NASA NTRS2019

Managing Flagship Missions to Reduce Cost and Schedule

Flagship missions are highly complex with highly nested systems. This level of complexity poses unique management problems as complexity influences risk which, in turn, affects cost and schedule. Establishing a strong technical and programmatic leadership team is critical to mission success. Developing and using a mission architecture is critical to informing the management organization, product ownership, interface and integration relationships, schedule organization, and integration and test paths. In highly nested systems, the mission phasing can be significantly out of sync with product phasing. Targeted technology development prior to Phase A is critical to reducing risk. Early architecture, concept design, and requirements development is critical to reducing risk. Modular design; pathfinders; parallel manufacturing and integration and test paths; and properly handling institutional requirements across interfaces are all management techniques that can be applied to reduce risk. NASA’s large strategic missions, sometimes referred to as flagship missions, are designed to provide answers to some of the most compelling scientific questions being asked. These types of missions are a series of highly nested subsystems that pose unique management problems when compared to more traditional instrument and spacecraft designs. They typically have an overall architecture that is very complex and nested; they typically require a tremendous amount of technology development; they typically involve many contractors and subcontractors with many associated contracts; and they typically involve staff from all over the world. Successful management of a flagship requires the balance between science requirements, engineering and technology capabilities, and resource constraints. Mismanaging these flagship missions can and will lead to significant cost and schedule growth, both of which are detrimental to NASA’s overall reputation which, in turn, is detrimental to the development of future flagship missions. While many of the same management principles used on smaller instruments and spacecraft are relevant, managing flagship missions requires an evolution of those current best practices to better address the specific needs and additional complexity and vastness of these missions. This paper explores how to leverage lessons learned from previous flagship missions to better manage flagship missions in the future.

Hylan, Jason↗
NASA NTRS2016

The IOAG Recommendations on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support

In 2014, the Inter-agency Operations Advisory Group (IOAG) chartered a multi-agency team effort to study how to best handle spacecraft emergency as part of cross support among network assets. The original intent is to put in place for the first time a process and guidelines to make emergency support as part of a permanent cross-support capability between space agencies. From the perspective of space communications service providers, a few key issues, common to all agencies, concerning the Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support (SECS) have been explored. They are: context of emergency support, provision of emergency support under a cross-support agreement, provision of emergency support with no cross-support agreement, legal and liability issues, response time, support priority, services provided, sustaining emergency support capabilities, and charge for the support. The positions of the various participating agencies with respect to these issues have been collected, analyzed, and finally harmonized to form the recommended IOAG positions. A central challenge most communications service providers are facing is that since the spacecraft emergency is an unplanned critical event, it typically requires fast response to the emergency call, hence lacking an international standard process for the operational interfaces seems to exacerbate the difficulty in providing SECS. For reducing the response time, i.e. from the time of accepting a request for SECS to the readiness for support, it is recommended that a “cross-support emergency system” be established by IOAG member agencies. Along with it, the IOAG core services, just-in-time ground communications line, cross support service management (CSSM), and standard operations procedures (SOP) for operational interfaces form the basic foundation of the “cross support emergency system”. Of the above, new to the cross support conducted thus far in the IOAG community is the concept of the SOP specifically for the interfaces between the service provider and service user during the SECS. Use cases, salient features, and definition of the key operational activities/tasks relevant to the interfaces are addressed by the effort. Underpinning such a system is the availability of the RF license granted by the local authority, at national and/or regional level, for a given ground station to communicate with and track the spacecraft in emergency mode at the uplink and downlink frequencies assigned to that spacecraft. That means it is critical for the IOAG member agencies to obtain a priori all-band licenses (for the entire X-band or S-band) for some, if not all, of their ground stations that are most capable of or likely to provide SECS. It is also recommended that certain prior arrangements be made with the relevant local licensing authorities for a process that will allow expedited authorization to transmit/receive signals to/from the declared spacecraft over the declared ground stations specifically and solely for the emergency case. Our analysis of the SECS has also uncovered a few fundamental programmatic issues. Recognizing any IOAG positions reached on these issues do not necessarily lead to any binding authority, it is recommended that they, along with those key attributes of the cross support emergency system, be explicitly stated as multi-agency guidelines to guide the implementation and provision of the SECS. The paper will present the results of the working group on Spacecraft Emergency Cross Support and, in particular, its findings, products and recommendations. It will also identify the next steps of this work that may include the production of some international standards as an extension of this work, or the process to make this emergency system usable by other spacecraft operators beyond the space agencies.

Tai, Wallace S.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Radiation Hardness Assurance: Evolving for NewSpace

During the past decade, numerous small satellites have been launched into space, with dramatically expanded dependence on advanced commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and systems required for mission success. While the radiation effects vulnerabilities of small satellites are the same as those of their larger, traditional relatives, revised approaches are needed for risk management because of differences in technical requirements and programmatic resources. While moving to COTS components and systems may reduce direct costs and procurement lead times, it undermines many cost-reduction strategies used for conventional radiation hardness assurance (RHA). Limited resources are accompanied by a lack of radiation testing and analysis, which can pose significant risks—or worse, be neglected altogether. Small satellites have benefited from short mission durations in low Earth orbits with respect to their radiation response, but as mission objectives grow and become reliant on advanced technologies operating for longer and in harsher environments, requirements need to reflect the changing scope without hindering developers that provide new capabilities.

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA)↗
NASA NTRS2019

Space Research Project Management Can Benefit from Engineering Technology Selection Methods

Many engineering methods have been developed to help management select technology for a system design or further research. The simplest way to compare technologies is to use a checklist containing all the more or less important selection criteria, so that nothing is overlooked. The criteria usually include cost, safety, reliability and maintainability, and potential problems such as noise generation and microgravity sensitivity. The next step typically is to weight and score all the criteria. The process of weighting and scoring is helpful in bringing out different priorities and reaching a shared point of view. Group technology selection methods are designed to highlight initial disagreements and produce a shared consensus. Often a frank discussion led by management rather than decision analysts can be more effective. The final selection depends on management and engineering judgment and may include programmatic and organizational factors that are beyond the engineering checklist. The objective of engineering technology selection methods is to provide engineering information to assist management in making sound decisions. Project management and technology selection are assumed to use rational engineering analytic methods, but they often do not. The reason is that human insight, intuition, and “gut feel,” rather than logic, more frequently determine our decisions. Project selection and management are strongly influenced by nonrational psychological influences, which can produce unjustified confidence and determination. Nevertheless, there is a strong need for space projects to do rational project analysis and selection. Demonstrating a rational spirit is necessary for a scientific and technical organization. Professional ethics at its best requires an open, honest, and fair process, without damaging politics. Rational analysis can help improve good projects and avoid selecting bad ones. A sanity check using rational analysis guided by a checklist can help avoid egregious and damaging errors.

Jones, Harry W.↗