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Adaptation of the NWM Cloud Environment for an ISF Project

The DOE-NE NWM Cloud was designed to be a generic set of tools and applications for any nuclear waste management program. As policymakers continue to consider approaches that emphasize consolidated interim storage and transportation of spent nuclear fuel, a gap analysis of the tools and applications provided for spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste disposal in comparison those needed for siting, licensing, and developing a consolidated interim storage facility and/or for a transportation campaign will help prepare DOE for implementing such potential policy direction. This report evaluates the points of alignment and potential gaps between the applications on the NWM Cloud that supported SNF disposal project, and the applications needed to address QA requirements and for other project support needs of an SNF storage project.

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Distribution Integrity Management Plan (DIMP): Los Alamos National Laboratory Natural Gas Distribution System

This document is the distribution integrity management plan (Plan) for the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Natural Gas Distribution System. This Plan meets the requirements of 49 CFR Part 192, Subpart P Distribution Integrity Management Programs (DIMP) for the LANL Natural Gas Distribution System. This Plan was developed by reviewing records and interviewing LANL personnel. The records consist of the design, construction, operation and maintenance for the LANL Natural Gas Distribution System. The records system for the LANL Natural Gas Distribution System is limited, so the majority of information is based on the judgment of LANL employees; the maintenance crew, the Corrosion Specialist and the Utilities and Infrastructure (UI) Civil Team Leader. The records used in this report are: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) 7100.1-1, Report of Main and Service Line Inspection, Natural Gas Leak Survey, Gas Leak Response Report, Gas Leak and Repair Report, and Pipe-to-Soil Recordings. The specific elements of knowledge of the infrastructure used to evaluate each threat and prioritize risks are listed in Sections 6 and 7, Threat Evaluation and Risk Prioritization respectively. This Plan addresses additional information needed and a method for gaining that data over time through normal activities. The processes used for the initial assessment of Threat Evaluation and Risk Prioritization are the methods found in the Simple, Handy Risk-based Integrity Management Plan (SHRIMP™) software package developed by the American Pipeline and Gas Agency (APGA) Security and Integrity Foundation (SIF). SHRIMP™ uses an index model developed by the consultants and advisors of the SIF. Threat assessment is performed using questions developed by the Gas Piping Technology Company (GPTC) as modified and added to by the SHRIMP™ advisors. This Plan is required to be reviewed every 5 years to be continually refined and improved. Records for all piping system installed after the effective date of this Plan will be captured and retained in the UI records documentation system. Primary Utility Asbuilts are maintained by Utilities Mapping (UMAP) and additional records are maintained on the N drive. Engineering Change Notices (ECNs) are stored on the N drive under configuration management and kept up by Utilities and Infrastructure Division Office (UI-DO). Records include, at a minimum, the location where new piping and appurtenances are installed and the material of which they are constructed.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Missile Captive Carry Monitoring and Helicopter Identification Using a Capacitive Microelectromechanical Systems Accelerometer

Military missiles are exposed to many sources of mechanical vibration that can affect system reliability, safety, and mission effectiveness. The U. S. Army Aviation and Missile Research Development and Engineering Center (AMRDEC) has been developing missile health monitoring systems to assess and improve reliability, reduce life cycle costs, and increase system readiness. One of the most significant exposures to vibration occurs when the missile is being carried by a helicopter or other aviation platform, which is a condition known as captive carry. Recording the duration of captive carry exposure during the missile’s service life can enable the implementation of predictive maintenance and resource management programs. Since the vibration imparted by each class of helicopter varies in frequency and amplitude, tracking the vibration exposure from each helicopter separately can help quantify the severity and harmonic content of the exposure. Under the direction of AMRDEC staff, engineers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory have developed a Captive Carry Health Monitor (CCHM) for the Hellfire II missile. The CCHM is an embedded usage monitoring device installed on the outer skin of the Hellfire II missile to record the cumulative hours the host missile has been in captive carry mode. To classify the vibration by class of helicopter, the CCHM analyzes the amplitude and frequency content of the vibration with the Goertzel algorithm to detect the presence of distinctive rotor harmonics. Cumulative usage data are accessible in theater from an external display; monthly usage histograms are accessible through an internal download connector. This paper provides an overview of the CCHM electrical and package design, describes field testing and data analysis techniques used to monitor captive carry identify and the class of helicopter, and discusses the potential application of missile health and usage data for real-time reliability analysis and fleet management.

Goertzel, HUMS↗

Future Challenges in Managing Human Health and Performance Risks for Space Flight

The global economy forces many nations to consider their national investments and make difficult decisions regarding their investment in future exploration. To enable safe, reliable, and productive human space exploration, we must pool global resources to understand and mitigate human health & performance risks prior to embarking on human exploration of deep space destinations. Consensus on the largest risks to humans during exploration is required to develop an integrated approach to mitigating risks. International collaboration in human space flight research will focus research on characterizing the effects of spaceflight on humans and the development of countermeasures or systems. Sharing existing data internationally will facilitate high quality research and sufficient power to make sound recommendations. Efficient utilization of ISS and unique ground-based analog facilities allows greater progress. Finally, a means to share results of human research in time to influence decisions for follow-on research, system design, new countermeasures and medical practices should be developed. Although formidable barriers to overcome, International working groups are working to define the risks, establish international research opportunities, share data among partners, share flight hardware and unique analog facilities, and establish forums for timely exchange of results. Representatives from the ISS partnership research and medical communities developed a list of the top ten human health & performance risks and their impact on exploration missions. They also drafted a multilateral data sharing plan to establish guidelines and principles for sharing human spaceflight data. Other working groups are also developing methods to promote international research solicitations. Collaborative use of analog facilities and shared development of space flight research and medical hardware continues. Establishing a forum for exchange of results between researchers, aerospace physicians and program managers takes careful consideration of researcher concerns and decision maker needs. Active participation by researchers in the development of this forum is essential, and the benefit can be tremendous. The ability to rapidly respond to research results without compromising publication rights and intellectual property will facilitate timely reduction in human health and performance risks in support of international exploration missions.

Corbin, Barbara J.↗

PUBLIC AND REGULATORY ACCEPTANCE OF BLENDING OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE VS DILUTION

On April 21, 2009, the Energy Facilities Contractors Group (EFCOG) Waste Management Working Group (WMWG) provided a recommendation to the Department of Energy's Environmental Management program (DOE-EM) concerning supplemental guidance on blending methodologies to use to classify waste forms to determine if the waste form meets the definition of Transuranic (TRU) Waste or can be classified as Low-Level Waste (LLW). The guidance provides specific examples and methods to allow DOE and its Contractors to properly classify waste forms while reducing the generation of TRU wastes. TRU wastes are much more expensive to characterize at the generator's facilities, ship, and then dispose at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) than Low-Level Radioactive Waste's disposal. Also the reduction of handling and packaging of LLW is inherently less hazardous to the nuclear workforce. Therefore, it is important to perform the characterization properly, but in a manner that minimizes the generation of TRU wastes if at all possible. In fact, the generation of additional volumes of radioactive wastes under the ARRA programs, this recommendation should improve the cost effective implementation of DOE requirements while properly protecting human health and the environment. This paper will describe how the message of appropriate, less expensive, less hazardous blending of radioactive waste is the 'right' thing to do in many cases, but can be confused with inappropriate 'dilution' that is frowned upon by regulators and stakeholders in the public. A proposal will be made in this paper on how to communicate this very complex and confusing technical issue to regulatory bodies and interested stakeholders to gain understanding and approval of the concept. The results of application of the proposed communication method and attempt to change the regulatory requirements in this area will be discussed including efforts by DOE and the NRC on this very complex subject.

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PHOSPHATE MANAGEMENT: FY2010 RESULTS OF PHOSPHATE PRECIPITATION TESTS

The Phosphate Management program seeks to develop treatment options for caustic phosphate solutions resulting from the caustic leaching of the bismuth phosphate sludge. The SRNL subtask investigated the precipitation of phosphate salts from caustic solutions through addition of fluoride and by crystallization. The scoping tests examined the: precipitation of phosphate by the addition of sodium fluoride to form the sodium fluorophosphate double salt, Na{sub 7}F(PO{sub 4}){sub 2} {center_dot} 19H{sub 2}O, crystallization of phosphate by reducing the temperature of saturated phosphate solutions, and combinations of precipitation and crystallization. A simplified leachate simulant was used in the study produced by dissolving sodium phosphate in 1 M to 3.5 M sodium hydroxide solutions. The results show that all three processes; precipitation with sodium fluoride, crystallization, and combined precipitation/crystallization can be effective for removing large amounts of phosphate from solution. The combined process of precipitation/crystallization showed >90% removal of phosphate at all hydroxide concentrations when cooling a non-saturated phosphate solution from 65 C to 25 C. Based on the measured solubility of sodium phosphate, pH adjustment/caustic addition will also remove large amounts of phosphate from solution (>80%). For all three processes, the phosphate concentration in the caustic solution must be managed to keep the phosphate from becoming too concentrated and thereby potentially forming a solid mass of sodium phosphate after an effective phosphate removal process.

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Evaluation of Cavity Collapse and Surface Crater Formation for Selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Tests - 2011

This report evaluates collapse evolution for selected Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) underground nuclear tests at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly called the Nevada Test Site). The work is being done at the request of National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec) and supports the Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration for the Nevada Site Office Borehole Management Program (BMP). The primary objective of this program is to close (plug) weapons program legacy boreholes that are deemed no longer useful. Safety decisions must be made before a crater area, or potential crater area, can be reentered for any work. Our statements on cavity collapse and crater formation are input into their safety decisions. The BMP is an on-going program to address hundreds of boreholes at the NTS. Each year NSTec establishes a list of holes to be addressed. They request the assistance of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory Containment Programs to provide information related to the evolution of collapse history and make statements on completeness of collapse as relates to surface crater stability. These statements do not include the effects of erosion that may modify the collapse craters over time. They also do not address possible radiation dangers that may be present. Subject matter experts from the LLNL Containment Program who had been active in weapons testing activities performed these evaluations. Information used included drilling and hole construction, emplacement and stemming, timing and sequence of the selected test and nearby tests, geology, yield, depth of burial, collapse times, surface crater sizes, cavity and crater volume estimations, ground motion, and radiological release information. Both classified and unclassified data were reviewed. Various amounts of information are available for these tests, depending on their age and other associated activities. Lack of data can hamper evaluations and introduce uncertainty. We make no attempt to quantify this uncertainty. The following unclassified summary statements describe collapse evolution and crater stability in response to a recent request to review 3 LLNL test locations in areas 2 and 12: Kennebec in U2af, Cumberland in U2e, and Yuba in U12b.10.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Status of HLW disposal in the USA and rational, progressive, paths forward based upon lessons learned in the USA and abroad since 1973 - 15103

The development of the USA's only candidate (since 1987) HLW-repository at the Yucca Mountain (YM) site, Nevada, was halted by the Obama administration in 2009. Four years later, the Obama administration proposed a new strategy for the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle that would open a consent-based HLW repository 'by 2048'. At the end of 2014, both the YM HLW repository and the new HLW-disposition (storage and disposal) strategy remain on hold due to lack of enabling legislation. With this as background, and based upon our active involvement in, monitoring of, and reporting on HLW management programs in the USA and abroad since 1973, we submit that: 1. Politics, political will, and legal actions and outcomes will continue to govern progress. 2. Public acceptance and sustained support (PASS) may influence politics and political will. 3. PASS is time-dependent and governed by: a. Ideologies; b. Perceived benefits and risks; c. Level and equity of radiation protection provided by applicable regulations; d. Perceived robustness/safety of the proposed disposition concept; and e. Perceived credibility and competency vested in the involved organizations and their respective leaders (= TRUST). We therefore recommend that the USA concurrently pursues at least two, 'centralized' HLW-storage and -disposal solutions based upon best-available relevant knowledge and majority-PASS at facility-host locations. Furthermore, safe(r) and more secure disposal of defense/government-generated HLW could probably commence at least 15 years earlier than 'by 2048' in/at: 1. The YM repository/site. 2. The WIPP repository/site. 3. 'Local' deep boreholes. (authors)

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Minimizing treatment planning errors in proton therapy using failure mode and effects analysis

Purpose: Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is a widely used tool to evaluate safety or reliability in conventional photon radiation therapy. However, reports about FMEA application in proton therapy are scarce. The purpose of this study is to apply FMEA in safety improvement of proton treatment planning at their center. Methods: The authors performed an FMEA analysis of their proton therapy treatment planning process using uniform scanning proton beams. The authors identified possible failure modes in various planning processes, including image fusion, contouring, beam arrangement, dose calculation, plan export, documents, billing, and so on. For each error, the authors estimated the frequency of occurrence, the likelihood of being undetected, and the severity of the error if it went undetected and calculated the risk priority number (RPN). The FMEA results were used to design their quality management program. In addition, the authors created a database to track the identified dosimetric errors. Periodically, the authors reevaluated the risk of errors by reviewing the internal error database and improved their quality assurance program as needed. Results: In total, the authors identified over 36 possible treatment planning related failure modes and estimated the associated occurrence, detectability, and severity to calculate the overall risk priority number. Based on the FMEA, the authors implemented various safety improvement procedures into their practice, such as education, peer review, and automatic check tools. The ongoing error tracking database provided realistic data on the frequency of occurrence with which to reevaluate the RPNs for various failure modes. Conclusions: The FMEA technique provides a systematic method for identifying and evaluating potential errors in proton treatment planning before they result in an error in patient dose delivery. The application of FMEA framework and the implementation of an ongoing error tracking system at their clinic have proven to be useful in error reduction in proton treatment planning, thus improving the effectiveness and safety of proton therapy.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Large Plate Experiment of Chloride-induced Stress Corrosion Cracking in Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Canisters

This report provides a description of the testing (in progress at the Savannah River National Laboratory) to evaluate the corrosion behavior of a large section of welded plate material harvested from the Sandia National Laboratories’ full-size mockup of a spent nuclear fuel (SNF) dry storage canister. The details of the establishment of this plate test, the interim corrosion results (from visual examination), and the general plan for examination of the plate in CY21 to evaluate crack growth behavior (if any) are provided. This work is intended to inform aging management programs for SNF canisters under conditions of extended dry storage. A “large plate” (approximately 51 x 46 cm with thickness 16 mm and weight about 30 kg) and containing a circumferential weldment from the mockup is the test specimen. The knowledge of the salt, temperature, humidity conditions for chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC) including the threshold stress intensity factor, K iscc , were used to setup the large plate test in which a set of part-through-wall and through-wall electrical discharge machined (EDM) defects were positioned in the weld residual stress field of the welded plate material from the mockup canister. A marine salt solution was applied to this plate specimen with an air-brush spray, then dried, and then exposed to a sustained 71-73% RH condition at an ambient room temperature of 22 °C. The salt loading and environmental condition is expected to be aggressive to cause CISCC

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Systems and Tools to Facilitate Aging Management Inspections of Used Nuclear Fuel Dry Storage Systems - 18382

The Used Nuclear Fuel (UNF) dry storage systems (DSSs) are currently used at almost all the nuclear plants in the USA for the storage of their UNF as the spent fuel pools are running out of capacity to store any additional discharged fuel. Even though these DSSs are supposed to be at the reactor site for a short amount of time, they are expected to be at the reactor sites for an extended duration due to the unavailability of Interim Storage Facilities (ISF) or a permanent disposal sites like Yucca Mountain. Maintaining the integrity of the DSS canisters and storage overpacks so they can safely protect the fuel and maintain the integrity of UNF is of utmost importance during storage at reactor site ISFSI or at the ISF. Comprehensive and robust Aging Management Program (AMP) is an important aspect for DSSs to satisfy these requirements. In order to address this industry need, TN Americas have developed an enhanced NUHOMS{sup R} DSS licensed by NRC under 10 CFR Part 72 regulations and a comprehensive AMP development which includes prevention, inspection, monitoring and mitigation of any corrosion or degradation of DSS components. For DSC and HSM inspection, two remotely operating delivery systems have been developed using non-destructive examination (NDE) methods including robotic crawler and inspection ring system. This paper describes details of these developments and status of their deployment for implementation at various utility ISFSI sites. TN Americas completed the detailed design of the DSC inspection system and conducted functional tests of the inspection system on a DSC mockup and the system is ready for deployment at any NUHOMS{sup R} ISFSI site. TN Americas is committed to offer the most robust and comprehensive AMP systems, tools and services to the industry to assure the safety of the deployed DSS at the utility sites. (authors)

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Investigation into Reductive Separation of Tc-99 from Low Activity Waste Off-Gas Condensate by Zero Valent Iron Materials - 20311

This study is investigating the potential for reductive separation of technetium-99 (Tc) from off-gas condensate generated from vitrification of legacy tank waste at the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. Management of Tc is a high-priority activity for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) complex, which must be addressed based on knowledge gaps and technology development needs outlined in the DOE-EM Technetium Management Program Plan [1]. Technetium is one of the main risk drivers in the permanent disposal of low activity waste (LAW) by vitrification at the Hanford Site due to its high volatility and only fractional incorporation into borosilicate glass. Volatilized Tc will be captured by an off-gas treatment system, and the current plan is to continuously recycle generated condensate back to the LAW glass melter feed. Off-gas recycling is effective at increasing Tc loading in the LAW glass, but it also disproportionately increases concentrations of sulfate, halides, and other volatile compounds impeding overall LAW processing leading to significantly greater waste glass volume requirements. Removal of Tc from secondary liquid waste offers an alternative disposal route to continuous off-gas recycling which may result in significant reduction of the volumes of LAW waste glass and substantial cost savings. The objective of this research funded by the DOE-EM Minority Serving Institutions Partnership Program (MSIPP) is to determine the suitability of zero valent iron (ZVI) as a separation technology to remove Tc from the off-gas condensate stream to minimize its recycle. While ZVI has been proposed for various remediation applications with Tc, it has not been studied for its suitability for removing Tc from the LAW off-gas condensate. The goal is to identify the optimal conditions for which Tc{sup (VII)} will be reduced to Tc{sup (IV)} species and incorporated into an iron matrix. This paper presents a programmatic overview of our evaluation of commercial ZVI materials for their efficiency towards Tc{sup (VII)} reductive removal from simplified off-gas simulant solutions under aerobic conditions. Tc concentrations in solutions were monitored for up to 30 days to determine efficiency and kinetics of reductive removal of Tc. The best performing candidate materials were selected for further experiments evaluating the effects of (1) variable ionic strength, (2) the presence of chromium and corrosive anions, and (3) ZVI aging on Tc{sup (VII)} reductive removal in batch experiments. (authors)

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Demolition of the K-27 Building at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) - 17423

On February 8, 2016, URS - CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) initiated the demolition of the East Tennessee Technology Park's (ETTP's) final gaseous diffusion building in DOE's Oak Ridge Environmental Management program. Building K-27 was a 35,582 m{sup 2} (383,000 ft{sup 2}) gaseous diffusion building that contained approximately 92,903 m{sup 2} (1 million ft{sup 2}) of floor space. It was one of five gaseous diffusion buildings at the site, formerly known as the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The actual demolition of this facility took approximately seven months to complete; however, planning and preparation took more than three years. The deactivation process was a critical element in preparing the building for demolition. UCOR's K-27 deactivation activities began in April 2012 with the installation of safe walking paths and fall protection systems to allow safe work access. Next, all mechanical and electrical systems associated with the facility were shut down and isolated, a process known as 'cold and dark.' More than 19.3 km (12 mi) of process piping and components were marked and measured. Additionally, workers performed nondestructive assay (NDA) and vent-purge-and-drain activities and applied foam to piping and components as needed [1]. Based on characterization results, approximately 4.8 km (3 mi) of process piping, and 372 converters and compressors were removed and shipped offsite prior to demolition. Lower-hazard materials and equipment were demolished with the building structure and transported to onsite disposal facilities. Upfront waste characterization and ongoing monitoring were key to the successful disposal of demolition debris at onsite facilities. Due to process improvements in waste loading recommended by work crews, the project achieved a 50 percent improvement in the daily hauling rate during the 9,000-truckload shipping campaign. Crews worked in high-risk, high-hazard conditions and were exposed to radiological and chemical contaminants, extreme temperatures, and deteriorating infrastructure. However, the hazard controls that were put in place, based on the Integrated Safety Management System (ISMS) walk-downs and hazard determination, made the effort manageable. The overall safety performance during demolition of the facility was excellent, with no significant injuries, and exceeded industry standards and DOE target levels. Outstanding safety performance was a testament to the dedication of the workforce, given the significant hazards presented by the demolition of the Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility. Another key element to the success of the K-27 demolition was the support and approval of all stakeholders involved in this effort, including DOE, the surrounding communities, the State of Tennessee, the UCOR management team, and, most importantly, the workforce that performed this highly hazardous work. This $52 million demolition project was completed ahead of schedule with no significant injuries and in compliance with all DOE orders, site procedures, and environmental controls. (authors)

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US/UK second level panel discussions on the health and value of: Ageing and lifetime predictions (u)

Many healthy physics, engineering, and materials exchanges are being accomplished in ageing and lifetime prediction that directly supports US and UK Stockpile Management Programs. Lifetime assessment studies of silicon foams under compression - Joint AWE/LANLlLLNL study of compression set in stress cushions completed. Provides phenomenological prediction out to 50 years. Polymer volatile out-gassing studies - New exchange on the out-gassing of Ethylene Vinyl Acetate (EVA) using isotopic {sup 13}C labeling studies to interrogate mechanistic processes. Infra-red (IR) gas cell analytical capabilities developed by AWE will be used to monitor polymer out-gassing profiles. Pu Strength ageing Experiments and Constitutive Modeling - In recently compared modeling strategies for ageing effects on Pu yield strength at high strain rates, a US/UK consensus was reached on the general principle that the ageing effect is additive and not multiplicative. The fundamental mechanisms for age-strengthening in Pu remains unknown. Pu Surface and Interface Reactions - (1) US/UK secondment resulted in developing a metal-metal oxide model for radiation damaged studies consistent with a Modified Embedded Atom Method (MEAM) potential; and (2) Joint US/UK collaboration to study the role of impurities in hydride initiation. Detonator Ageing (wide range of activities) - (1) Long-term ageing study with field trials at Pantex incorporating materials from LANL, LLNL, SNL and AWE; (2) Characterization of PETN growth to detonation process; (3) Detonator performance modeling; and (4) Performance fault tree analysis. Benefits are a unified approach to lifetime prediction that Includes: materials characterization and the development of ageing models through improved understanding of the relationship between materials properties, ageing properties and detonator performance.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Baseline levels of bioaerosols and volatile organic compounds around a municipal waste incinerator prior to the construction of a mechanical-biological treatment plant

New waste management programs are currently aimed at developing alternative treatment technologies such as mechanical-biological treatment (MBT) and composting plants. However, there is still a high uncertainty concerning the chemical and microbiological risks for human health, not only for workers of these facilities, but also for the population living in the neighborhood. A new MBT plant is planned to be constructed adjacently to a municipal solid waste incinerator (MSWI) in Tarragona (Catalonia, Spain). In order to evaluate its potential impact and to differentiate the impacts of MSWI from those of the MBT when the latter is operative, a pre-operational survey was initiated by determining the concentrations of 20 volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and bioaerosols (total bacteria, Gram-negative bacteria, fungi and Aspergillus fumigatus) in airborne samples around the MSWI. The results indicated that the current concentrations of bioaerosols (ranges: 382-3882, 18-790, 44-926, and <1-7 CFU/m{sup 3} for fungi at 25 deg. C, fungi at 37 deg. C, total bacteria, and Gram-negative bacteria, respectively) and VOCs (ranging from 0.9 to 121.2 {mu}g/m{sup 3}) are very low in comparison to reported levels in indoor and outdoor air in composting and MBT plants, as well in urban and industrial zones. With the exception of total bacteria, no correlations were observed between the environmental concentrations of biological agents and the direction/distance from the facility. However, total bacteria presented significantly higher levels downwind. Moreover, a non-significant increase of VOCs was detected in sites closer to the incinerator, which means that the MSWI could have a very minor impact on the surrounding environment.

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Physical Protection of Spent Fuel Shipments: Resolution of Stakeholder Concerns Through Rulemaking - 12284

In 1999, the State of Nevada brought its concerns about physical protection of current spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments, and future SNF shipments to a federal repository, before the NRC in a 1999 petition for rulemaking (PRM-73-10). In October 2010, the NRC published a rulemaking decision which would significantly strengthen physical protection of SNF in transit. The newest articulation of the rule (10 CFR 73.37) incorporates regulatory clarifications and security enhancements requested in Nevada's 1999 petition for rulemaking, codifies the findings of the Nuclear NRC and DOE consequence analyses into policy guidance documents and brings forward into regulations the agency and licensee experience gained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although at present DOE SNF shipments would continue to be exempt from these NRC regulations, Nevada considers the rule to constitute a largely satisfactory resolution to stakeholder concerns raised in the original petition and in subsequent comments submitted to the NRC. This paper reviews the process of regulatory changes, assesses the specific improvements contained in the new rules and briefly describes the significance of the new rule in the context of a future national nuclear waste management program. Nevada's petition for rulemaking led to a generally satisfactory resolution of the State's concerns. The decade plus timeframe from petition to rulemaking conclusion saw a sea change in many aspects of the relevant issues - perhaps most importantly the attacks on 9/11 led to the recognition by regulatory bodies that a new threat environment exists wherein shipments of SNF and HLW pose a viable target for human initiated events. The State of Nevada has always considered security a critical concern for the transport of these highly radioactive materials. This was one of the primary reasons for the original rulemaking petition and subsequent advocacy by Nevada on related issues. NRC decisions on the majority of the concerns expressed in the petition, additional developments by other regulatory bodies and the change in how the United States sees threats to the homeland - all of these produced a satisfactory resolution through the rulemaking process. While not all of the concerns expressed by Nevada were addressed in the proposed rule and significant challenges face any programmatic shipment campaign in the future, the lesson learned on this occasion is that stakeholder concerns can be resolved through rulemaking. If DOE would engage with stakeholders on its role in transport of SNF and HLW under the NWPA, these concerns would be better addressed. Specifically the attempts by DOE to resist transportation and security regulations now considered necessary by the NRC for the adequate protection of the shipments of highly radioactive materials, these DOE efforts seem ill advised. One clear lesson learned from this successful rulemaking petition process is that the system of stakeholder input can work to better the regulatory environment. (authors)

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