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Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: October 1, 2013, through December 31, 2014

On April 24, 1957, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, now the Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted the Project 57 safety experiment in western Emigrant Valley north east of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) on lands withdrawn by the Department of Defense (DoD) for the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). The test was undertaken to develop (1) a means of estimating plutonium distribution resulting from a nonnuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of surface decontamination; and (4) instruments and field procedures for prompt estimation of alpha contamination (Shreve, 1958). Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the land surface. Following the experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DoD. Various radiological surveys have been performed in the area and in 2007, the DOE expanded the demarked contamination area by posting signs 200 to 400 feet (60 to 120 meters) outside of the original fence. Plutonium in soil is thought to attach preferentially to smaller particles. Therefore, redistribution of soil particulates by wind (dust) is the mechanism most likely to transport plutonium beyond the boundary of the Project 57 contamination area. In 2011, DRI installed two instrumentation towers to measure radiological, meteorological, and dust conditions. The monitoring activity was implemented to determine if radionuclide contamination was detectable in samples of airborne dust and characterize meteorological and environmental parameters that influence dust transport. Collected data also permits comparison of radiological conditions at the Project 57 monitoring stations to conditions observed at Community Environmental Monitoring Program (CEMP) stations around the NTTR. Biweekly samples of airborne particulates are submitted for laboratory assessment of gross alpha and gross beta radioactivity and for determination of gamma-emitting radionuclides. Annual average gross alpha values at the Project 57 monitoring stations are in the same range as the highest two values reported for the CEMP stations surrounding the NTTR. Annual average gross beta values at the Project 57 monitoring stations are slightly higher than the lowest value reported for the CEMP stations surrounding the NTTR. Gamma spectroscopy analyses on samples collected from the Project 57 stations identified only naturally occurring radionuclides. No manmade radionuclides were detected. Thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) indicated that the average annual radioactivity dose at the monitoring stations is higher than the dose determined at surrounding CEMP stations but approximately half of the estimated national average dose received by the general public as a result of exposure to natural sources. The TLDs at the Project 57 monitoring stations are exposed to both natural sources (terrestrial and cosmic) and radioactive releases from the Project 57 contamination area. These comparisons show that the gross alpha, gross beta, and gamma spectroscopy levels at the Project 57 monitoring stations are similar to levels observed at the CEMP stations but that the average annual dose rate is higher than at the CEMP stations. Winds in excess of approximately 15 mph begin to generate dust movement by saltation (migration of sand at the ground surface) or direct suspension in the air. Saltated sand, PM10 (inhalable) dust, and PM2.5 (fine particulate dust) exhibit an approximately exponential increase with increasing wind speed. The greatest concentrations of dust occur for winds exceeding 20 mph. During the reporting period, winds in excess of 20 mph occurred approximately 1.6 percent of the time. Preliminary assessment of individual wind events suggests that dust generation is highly variable likely because of the influence of other meteorological and environmental parameters. Although winds sufficient to generate significant amounts of dust occur at the Project 57 site, they are infrequent and of short duration. Additionally, the potential for wind transport of dust is dependent on other parameters whose influence have not yet been assessed.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Summary Report of a Specialized Workshop on Nuclear Structure and Decay Data (NSDD) Evaluations

A three-day specialised workshop on Nuclear Structure and Decay Data Evaluations was organised and held at the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria, from 27 to 29 April 2015. This workshop covered a wide range of important topics and issues addressed when evaluating and maintaining the Evaluated Nuclear Structure Data File (ENSDF). The primary aim was to improve evaluators’ abilities to identify and understand the most appropriate evaluation processes to adopt in the formulation of individual ENSDF data sets. Participants assessed and reviewed existing policies, procedures and codes, and round-table discussions included the debate and resolution of specific difficulties experienced by ENSDF evaluators (i.e., all workshop participants). The contents of this report constitute a record of this workshop, based on the presentations and subsequent discussions.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Technologies for pre-screening IAEA swipe samples

During the course of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, many samples are taken for the purpose of verifying the declared facility activities and identifying any possible undeclared activities. One of these sampling techniques is the environmental swipe sample. Due to the large number of samples collected, and the amount of time that is required to analyze them, prioritizing these swipes in the field or upon receipt at the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) will allow sensitive or mission-critical analyses to be performed sooner. As a result of this study, technologies were placed into one of three categories: recommended, promising, or not recommended. Both neutron activation analysis (NAA) and X-ray fluorescence (XRF) are recommended for further study and possible field deployment. These techniques performed the best in initial trials for pre-screening and prioritizing IAEA swipes. We learned that for NAA more characterization of cold elements (such as calcium and magnesium) would need to be emphasized, and for XRF it may be appropriate to move towards a benchtop XRF versus a handheld XRF due to the increased range of elements available on benchtop equipment. Promising techniques that will require additional research and development include confocal Raman microscopy, fluorescence microscopy, and infrared (IR) microscopy. These techniques showed substantive responses to uranium compounds, but expensive instrumentation upgrades (confocal Raman) or university engagement (fluorescence microscopy) may be necessary to investigate the utility of the techniques completely. Point-and-shoot (handheld) Raman and attenuated total reflectance–infrared (ATR-IR) measurements are not recommended, as they have not shown enough promise to continue investigations.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Assessment of the National Research Universal Reactor Proposed New Stack Sampling Probe Location for Compliance with ANSI/HPS N13.1-1999

This document reports on a series of tests conducted to assess the proposed air sampling location for the National Research Universal reactor (NRU) complex exhaust stack, located in Chalk River, Ontario, Canada, with respect to the applicable criteria regarding the placement of an air sampling probe. Due to the age of the equipment in the existing monitoring system, and the increasing difficulty in acquiring replacement parts to maintain this equipment, a more up-to-date system is planned to replace the current effluent monitoring system, and a new monitoring location has been proposed. The new sampling probe should be located within the exhaust stack according to the criteria established by the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society (ANSI/HPS) N13.1-1999, Sampling and Monitoring Releases of Airborne Radioactive Substances from the Stack and Ducts of Nuclear Facilities. These criteria address the capability of the sampling probe to extract a sample that represents the effluent stream. The internal Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) project for this task was 65167, Atomic Energy Canada Ltd. Chalk River Effluent Duct Flow Qualification. The testing described in this document was guided by the Test Plan: Testing of the NRU Stack Air Sampling Position (TP-STMON-032).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Spent fuel measurements. passive neutron albedo reactivity (PNAR) and photon signatures

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of a diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material from peaceful activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. An important IAEA task towards meeting this objective is the ability to accurately and reliably measure spent nuclear fuel (SNF) to verify reactor operating parameters and verify that the fuel has not been removed from reactors or SNF storage facilities. This dissertation analyzes a method to improve the state-of-the-art of nuclear material safeguards measurements using two combined measurement techniques: passive neutron albedo reactivity (PNAR) and passive spectral photon measurements.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Passive Noise Analysis for Advanced Tamper Indication. End of Year Report 2015

Idaho National Laboratory (INL) is part of a multi-lab project assessing front-end electronics for unattended measurement (FEUM) being developed for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unattended systems. The FEUM development activity provides an opportunity to address tampering detection between FEUM and the detector, signal integrity from FEUM to the data acquisition systems, and data validity – long-standing challenges for the IAEA. This report summarizes the INL activities in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 to characterize and test passive noise analysis as a potential tamper-indicating approach for implementation into FEUM or as a stand-alone method. The project’s primary objectives in FY-15 were to (1) determine detectable tamper scenarios using four pre-amplifier/detector systems, (2) perform tests of tampering scenarios with three common cable types used by the IAEA, (3) separate radio-frequency-induced events from inherent effect by means of an anechoic chamber, and (4) perform tests at an industrial facility. General conclusions were reached in several areas.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NEET Enhanced Micro Pocket Fission Detector for High Temperature Reactors - FY15 Status Report

A new project, that is a collaboration between the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), the Kansas State University (KSU), and the French Atomic Energy Agency, Commissariat à l'Énergie Atomique et aux Energies Alternatives, (CEA), has been initiated by the Nuclear Energy Enabling Technologies (NEET) Advanced Sensors and Instrumentation (ASI) program for developing and testing High Temperature Micro-Pocket Fission Detectors (HT MPFD), which are compact fission chambers capable of simultaneously measuring thermal neutron flux, fast neutron flux and temperature within a single package for temperatures up to 800 °C. The MPFD technology utilizes a small, multi-purpose, robust, in-core parallel plate fission chamber and thermocouple. As discussed within this report, the small size, variable sensitivity, and increased accuracy of the MPFD technology represent a revolutionary improvement over current methods used to support irradiations in US Material Test Reactors (MTRs). Previous research conducted through NEET ASI1-3 has shown that the MPFD technology could be made robust and was successfully tested in a reactor core. This new project will further the MPFD technology for higher temperature regimes and other reactor applications by developing a HT MPFD suitable for temperatures up to 800 °C. This report summarizes the research progress for year one of this three year project. Highlights from research accomplishments include: A joint collaboration was initiated between INL, KSU, and CEA. Note that CEA is participating at their own expense because of interest in this unique new sensor. An updated HT MPFD design was developed. New high temperature-compatible materials for HT MPFD construction were procured. Construction methods to support the new design were evaluated at INL. Laboratory evaluations of HT MPFD were initiated. Electrical contact and fissile material plating has been performed at KSU. Updated detector electronics are undergoing evaluations at KSU. A project meeting was held at KSU to discuss the roles and responsibilities between INL and KSU for development of the HT MPFDs. Provide input to various irradiation programs for installation of the MPFD technology in irradiation tests. As documented in this report, FY15 funding has allowed the project to meet year one planned accomplishments to develop a HT MPFD that offers US MTR users enhanced capabilities for real-time measurement of flux and temperature with a single detector. In addition, the accomplishments of this project have attracted funding from other Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) programs for additional applications. The work in those programs will build on current activities completed in this NEETASI HT MPFD project, but the MPFD will be specifically tailored to meet their program needs.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Safeguards Technology Factsheet 3 He-free Neutron Coincidence Counter

A full scale thermal neutron coincidence counter (High Level Neutron Counter – Boron: HLNB) based on 3 He alternative detection technology was designed and built at LANL and field tested at Plutonium Conversion Development Facility (PCDF) of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) during FY15. HLNB is based on boron-lined proportional plates that replace the traditional 3 He proportional tubes and was designed as a direct alternative to 3 He-based High Level Neutron Coincidence Counter (HLNC-II). During the JAEA field trial the HLNB demonstrated comparable performance to HLNC-II, which represents a key development in the area of 3 He alternative technologies and provides a complete demonstration of the technology for nuclear safeguards applications including high mass MOX samples.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

On Line Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) UF 6 Tests for 1.5" Sch40 SS Pipe, Revision 1

As global uranium enrichment capacity under international safeguards expands, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is challenged to develop effective safeguards approaches at gaseous centrifuge enrichment plants while working within budgetary constraints. The “Model Safeguards Approach for Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants” (GCEPs) developed by the IAEA Division of Concepts and Planning in June 2006, defines the three primary Safeguards objectives to be the timely detection of: 1) diversion of significant quantities of natural (NU), depleted (DU) or low-enriched uranium (LEU) from declared plant flow, 2) facility misuse to produce undeclared LEU product from undeclared feed, and 3) facility misuse to produce enrichments higher than the declared maximum, in particular, highly enriched uranium (HEU). The ability to continuously and independently (i.e. with a minimum of information from the facility operator) monitor not only the uranium mass balance but also the 235 U mass balance in the facility could help support all three verification objectives described above. Two key capabilities required to achieve an independent and accurate material balance are 1) continuous, unattended monitoring of in-process UF 6 and 2) monitoring of cylinders entering and leaving the facility. The continuous monitoring of in-process UF 6 would rely on a combination of load-cell monitoring of the cylinders at the feed and withdrawal stations, online monitoring of gas enrichment, and a high-accuracy net weight measurement of the cylinder contents. The Online Enrichment Monitor (OLEM) is the instrument that would continuously measure the time-dependent relative uranium enrichment, E(t), in weight percent 235 U, of the gas filling or being withdrawn from the cylinders. The OLEM design concept combines gamma-ray spectrometry using a collimated NaI(Tl) detector with gas pressure and temperature data to calculate the enrichment of the UF 6 gas within the unit header pipe as a function of time. The OLEM components have been tested on ORNL UF 6 flow loop. Data were collected at five different enrichment levels (0.71%, 2.97%, 4.62%, 6.0%, and 93.7%) at several pressure conditions. The test data were collected in the standard OLEM N.4242 file format for each of the conditions with a 10-minute sampling period and then averaged over the span of constant pressures. Analysis of the collected data has provided enrichment constants that can be used for 1.5” stainless steel schedule 40 pipe measurement sites. The enrichment constant is consistent among all the wide range of enrichment levels and pressures used.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Emerging Technologies and Techniques for Wide Area Radiological Survey and Remediation

Technologies to survey and decontaminate wide-area contamination and process the subsequent radioactive waste have been developed and implemented following the Chernobyl nuclear power plant release and the breach of a radiological source resulting in contamination in Goiania, Brazil. These civilian examples of radioactive material releases provided some of the first examples of urban radiological remediation. Many emerging technologies have recently been developed and demonstrated in Japan following the release of radioactive cesium isotopes (Cs-134 and Cs-137) from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in 2011. Information on technologies reported by several Japanese government agencies, such as the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA), the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) and the National Institute for Environmental Science (NIES), together with academic institutions and industry are summarized and compared to recently developed, deployed and available technologies in the United States. The technologies and techniques presented in this report may be deployed in response to a wide area contamination event in the United States. In some cases, additional research and testing is needed to adequately validate the technology effectiveness over wide areas. Survey techniques can be deployed on the ground or from the air, allowing a range of coverage rates and sensitivities. Survey technologies also include those useful in measuring decontamination progress and mapping contamination. Decontamination technologies and techniques range from non-destructive (e.g., high pressure washing) and minimally destructive (plowing), to fully destructive (surface removal or demolition). Waste minimization techniques can greatly impact the long-term environmental consequences and cost following remediation efforts. Recommendations on technical improvements to address technology gaps are presented together with observations on remediation in Japan.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Safeguards by Design Challenge

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines Safeguards as a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. IAEA oversees safeguards worldwide. Safeguards by Design (SBD) involves incorporation of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation during the design phase of a facility, rather that after the fact. Design challenge goals are the following: Design a system of safeguards technologies, techniques, and instrumentation for inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials. Cost should be minimized to work with the IAEA’s limited budget. Dose to workers should always be as low are reasonably achievable (ALARA). Time is of the essence in operating facilities and flow of material should not be interrupted significantly. Proprietary process information in facilities may need to be protected, thus the amount of information obtained by inspectors should be the minimum required to achieve the measurement goal. Then three different design challenges are detailed: Plutonium Waste Item Measurement System, Marine-based Modular Reactor, and Floating Nuclear Power Plant (FNPP).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

ATF Neutron Irradiation Program Technical Plan

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) under the Civil Nuclear Energy Working Group (CNWG) is engaged in a cooperative research effort with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to explore issues related to nuclear energy, including research on accident-tolerant fuels and materials for use in light water reactors. This work develops a draft technical plan for a neutron irradiation program on the candidate accident-tolerant fuel cladding materials and elements using the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR). The research program requires the design of a detailed experiment, development of test vehicles, irradiation of test specimens, possible post-irradiation examination and characterization of irradiated materials and the shipment of irradiated materials to JAEA in Japan. This report discusses the technical plan of the experimental study.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Best Practices for NPT Transit Matching

Transit matching is the process for relating or matching reports of shipments and receipts submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Transit matching is a component used by the IAEA in drawing safeguards conclusions and performing investigative analysis. Transit matching is part of IAEA safeguards activities and the State evaluation process, and it is included in the annual Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR). Annually, the IAEA currently receives reports of ~900,000 nuclear material transactions, of which ~500,000 are for domestic and foreign transfers. Of these the IAEA software can automatically match (i.e., machine match) about 95% of the domestic transfers and 25% of the foreign transfers. Given the increasing demands upon IAEA resources, it is highly desirable for the machine-matching process to match as many transfers as possible. Researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) have conducted an investigation funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration through the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative to identify opportunities to strengthen IAEA transit matching. Successful matching, and more specifically machine matching, is contingent on quality data from the reporting States. In February 2016, ORNL hosted representatives from three States, the IAEA, and Euratom to share results from past studies and to discuss the processes, policies, and procedures associated with State reporting for transit matching. Drawing on each entity's experience and knowledge, ORNL developed a best practices document to be shared with the international safeguards community to strengthen transit matching. This paper shares the recommendations that resulted from this strategic meeting and the next steps being taken to strengthen transit matching.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory - An Isolated Nuclear Research Establishment

Early in his twenty-five year career as the Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Norris Bradbury wrote at length about the atomic bomb and the many implications the bomb might have on the world. His themes were both technical and philosophical. In 1963, after nearly twenty years of leading the nation’s first nuclear weapons laboratory, Bradbury took the opportunity to broaden his writing. In a paper delivered to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s symposium on the “Criteria in the Selection of Sites for the Construction of Reactors and Nuclear Research Centers,” Bradbury took the opportunity to talk about the business of nuclear research and the human component of operating a scientific laboratory. This report is the transcript of his talk.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Active Time-Domain Reflectometry for Unattended Safeguards Systems FY15 Report

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to expand its use of unattended measurement systems. An increasing number of systems and an expanding family of instruments create challenges in terms of deployment efficiency and the implementation of data authentication measures. In collaboration with the IAEA, tamper-indicating measures to address data-transmission authentication challenges with unattended safeguards systems are under investigation. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is studying the viability of active time-domain reflectometry (TDR) along two parallel but interconnected paths: (1) swept-frequency TDR as the highly flexible, laboratory gold standard to which field-deployable options can be compared, and (2) a low-cost commercially available spread-spectrum TDR technology as one option for field implementation. This report describes PNNL’s FY15 progress in the viability study including: an overview of the TDR methods under investigation; description of the testing configurations and mock tampering scenarios; results from a preliminary sensitivity comparison of the two TDR methods; demonstration of a quantitative metric for estimating field performance that acknowledges the need for high detection probability while minimizing false alarms. FY15 progress reported here sets the stage for a rigorous comparison of the candidate TDR methods, over a range of deployment scenarios and perturbing effects typical of IAEA unattended monitoring systems.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Feasibility of a Fieldable Mass Spectrometer FY 2015 Year-end Report

Currently, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors the production of enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 ) at declared facilities by collecting a few grams of product in sample tubes that are then sent to central laboratories for processing and isotope ratio analysis by thermal ionization mass spectrometry. Analysis of results may not be available for some time after collection. In addition, new shipping regulations will make it more difficult to transport this amount of UF 6 to a laboratory. The IAEA is interested in an isotope ratio technique for uranium in UF 6 that can be moved to and operated at the enrichment facility itself. This report covers the tasks and activities of the Feasibility of a Fieldable Mass Spectrometer Project for FY 2015, which investigates the feasibility of an in-field isotope ratio technique— the forward deployment of a technique to the non-laboratory situation of a protected room with power and heat at the facility of interest. A variety of nontraditional elemental ionization techniques were considered. It was determined that only two of these should be moved forward for testing with the candidate in-field mass spectrometer and with the adsorbed UF 6 sample types.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Report on Concepts & Approaches for SSBD for eCHEM

The verification of special nuclear material (SNM) in spent fuel pyroprocessing is an important safeguards challenge. The detection of spontaneous fission (SF) neutrons from curium is an accepted, non-destructive technique that has been applied to verify special nuclear material (SNM) content in used fuel and other materials in the fuel cycle. The nuclear material accounting (NMA) technique at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute’s Reference Engineering-scale Pyroprocessing Facility (REPF) is based on the Cm balance technique. Several publications have demonstrated the safeguards benefit from using process monitoring (PM) on nuclear facilities as a complementary measure to NMA. More recently, this concept was expanded and preliminarily demonstrated for pyroprocessing. The concept of Signature Based Safeguards (SBS) is part of this expansion, and is built around the interpretation of input from various sensors in a declared facility coupled with complementary NMA methods to increase confidence and lower standard error inventory differences (SEID). The SBS methodology was conceptually developed and relies on near real time analysis of process monitoring data to detect material diversion complemented by robust containment and surveillance (C/S) measures. This work demonstrates one example of how the SBS framework can be used in the electrorefiner. In this SBS application, a combination of cyclic voltammetry (CV) and neutron counting is applied to track and monitor Pu mass balance. The main purpose of this experiment is to determine if meaningful information can be gained from CV measurements with regard to the Mg/Gd ratio. This data will be coupled with ICP-MS to verify Gd concentrations and analyzed for statistical significance. It is expected the CV data will register a significant change under the off-normal operating conditions. Knowing how to identify and interpret those changes may help inform how to target more traditional neutron counting methods, which could support a more efficient safeguards system. The experimental results will be compared with theoretical calculations and the ERAD simulations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The Postwar Laboratory

Recent discussion of project policy has met with a widespread feeling that important alternatives were not being properly considered. These alternatives will be discussed here from the point of view of research personnel concerned with formulation a laboratory policy based on the wartime experience of Los Alamos. This policy is discussed on the primary assumption that the national investment here in facilities, in tradition, and in the existence of an going research and development laboratory organization ought not to be lightly discarded, but also ought not to be wholly continued without reexamination under the new conditions of peace. Others will discuss this policy more broadly, and others will make the decision of continuation; but the purpose of the present document is to suggest a policy which might help answer the question of what to do with Los Alamos.It is the thesis of this document that fundamental research in fields underlying the military utilization of atomic energy ought to be separated from all development testing and production. It still remains to argue which of these separate functions this mesa should carry out. In the next sections it is proposed to describe what this laboratory can do and what it should stop trying to do, and on this detailed basis a general program is proposed.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗