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At least 1,081 records · Page 60

Simulation of carbon dioxide injection at the FutureGen2.0 site: Class VI permit model and local sensitivity analysis

Numerical simulation was conducted to evaluate supercritical CO 2 (scCO 2 ) storage in the Mt. Simon sandstone at the FutureGen 2.0 site in Morgan County, Illinois. The simulations illustrate the recent modeling effort conducted to successfully obtain a Class VI permit under the Underground Injection Control Program of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The scCO2 was injected into a highly stratified reservoir, distributed among four lateral wells. Results show that each of the multiple reservoir layers with low permeability traps a fraction of the scCO 2 beneath it so that the injected scCO 2 does not reach the top of the reservoir by the end of the simulation period. Hence, all of the injected scCO 2 is considered to be safely trapped by the stratified structure within the reservoir. A local sensitivity analysis (LSA) was conducted for injectivity and plume size at the end of the 20 year injection period. The LSA indicates that the imposed initial conditions and the hydraulic properties of the injection layer contribute the most to the sensitivity. Overall, the simulation outputs are very sensitive to only a small fraction of the inputs. However, the parameters that are important for controlling CO 2 injectivity are not the same as those controlling the plume area. The three most sensitive inputs for injectivity are the horizontal permeability and the residual aqueous saturation of the injection layer, and the initial fracture-pressure gradient. For the plume area, the most sensitive inputs are the horizontal permeability of the injection layer and the residual aqueous saturation of the two adjacent layers above the injection layer. Furthermore, the advantages of requiring just a single set of simulation results, scalability to the proper parameter errors, and straightforward calculation of the composite sensitivities make the proposed analysis attractive for guiding site characterization, injection well design, estimating AoR uncertainty and, and monitoring network design.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Skin Cancer Prevention Behaviors Among Agricultural and Construction Workers in the United States, 2015

Introduction: Nearly 5 million people are treated for skin cancer each year in the United States. Agricultural and construction workers (ACWs) may be at increased risk for skin cancer because of high levels of ultraviolet radiation exposure from the sun. This is the first study that uses nationally representative data to assess sun-protection behaviors among ACWs. Methods: We analyzed data from the 2015 National Health Interview Survey Cancer Control Supplement to examine the prevalence of sun-protection behaviors among ACWs. We calculated national, weighted, self-reported prevalence estimates. We used χ 2 tests to assess differences between ACWs by industry and occupation. Results: Most of the 2,298 agricultural and construction workers studied were male (by industry, 72.4% in agriculture and 89.3% in construction; by occupation, 66.1% in agriculture and 95.6% in construction) and non-Hispanic white. About one-third had at least 1 sunburn in the past year. The prevalence of sunscreen use and shade seeking was low and did not significantly differ among groups, ranging from 15.1% to 21.4% for sunscreen use and 24.5% to 29.1% for shade seeking. The prevalence of wearing protective clothing was significantly higher among agricultural workers than among construction workers by industry (70.9% vs 50.7%) and occupation (70.5% vs 53.0%). Conclusion: Our findings could be used to improve occupational health approaches to reducing skin cancer risk among ACWs and to inform education and prevention initiatives addressing skin cancer. Sunsafety initiatives may include modifying work sites to increase shade and adding sun safety to workplace policies and training. Employers can help reduce occupational health inequities and protect workers by creating workplaces that facilitate sun protection.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Critical issues in connection with human missions to Mars: protection of and from the Martian environment

Human missions to Mars are planned to happen within this century. Activities associated therewith will interact with the environment of Mars in two reciprocal ways: (i) the mission needs to be protected from the natural environmental elements that can be harmful to human health, the equipment or to their operations; (ii) the specific natural environment of Mars should be protected so that it retains its value for scientific and other purposes. The following environmental elements need to be considered in order to protect humans and the equipment on the planetary surface: (i) cosmic ionizing radiation, (ii) solar particle events; (iii) solar ultraviolet radiation; (iv) reduced gravity; (v) thin atmosphere; (vi) extremes in temperatures and their fluctuations; and (vii) surface dust. In order to protect the planetary environment, the requirements for planetary protection as adopted by COSPAR for lander missions need to be revised in view of human presence on the planet. Landers carrying equipment for exobiological investigations require special consideration to reduce contamination by terrestrial microorganisms and organic matter to the greatest feasible extent. Records of human activities on the planet's surface should be maintained in sufficient detail that future scientific experimenters can determine whether environmental modifications have resulted from explorations. c2002 COSPAR. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Extraterrestrial Environment↗

Engineering Controls Database

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

Source record↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) – Engineered Controls Database and Use

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber-attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 2, March-April 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 127 Quality Assurance in the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants by Sidney A. Bernsen, 141 1974 ANS Topical Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety by M. H. Fontana; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 150 GBR-4 Protection Systems: Failures and Their Consequences by Peter Burgsmüller, J. J. Dekais, Albert Krähe, Raffaello Pignatelli, and Gottfried Vieider, 162 Standby Emergency Power Systems. Part 2—The Later Plants by E. W. Hagen; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 180 Radiotoxic Hazard Measure for Buried Solid Radioactive Waste by J. Hamstra, 190 The Thirteenth AEC Air-Cleaning Conference by D. W. Moeller, D. W. Underhill, and M. W. First, 203 Book Review: Nuclear Criticality Safety; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 204 Environmental Radiation Effects of Nuclear Facilities in New York State by M. S. Terpilak and B. L. Jorgensen, 222 Book Review: Thermal Ecology; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 223 Set-Point Drift in Nuclear Power-Plant Safety-Related Instrumentation Adapted by the Nuclear Safety Staff, 224 Diesel-Generator Operating Experience at Nuclear Power Plants, 227 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Jan. 1, 1975, 232 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in November and December 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto, 235 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 243 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 251 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 266 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B Cottrell, 268 Proposed Rule Changes as of Jan. 1, 1975; MISCELLANY: 149 Course in Italy on High-Energy Radiation Dosimetry and Protection (Announcement), 250 Course at Northwestern on Safety of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Announcement), 266 Symposium of the Combined Effects on the Environment of Radioactive, Chemical, and Thermal Releases from the Nuclear Industry (Announcement), 271 Short Course on Engineering for Extreme Winds and Tornadoes (Announcement), 272 Three 1-Week Courses at MIT on Nuclear Power-Reactor Safety (Announcement), 272 Harvard University Short Courses (Announcement).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Imaging for dismantlement verification: information management and analysis algorithms

The level of detail discernible in imaging techniques has generally excluded them from consideration as verification tools in inspection regimes. An image will almost certainly contain highly sensitive information, and storing a comparison image will almost certainly violate a cardinal principle of information barriers: that no sensitive information be stored in the system. To overcome this problem, some features of the image might be reduced to a few parameters suitable for definition as an attribute, which must be non-sensitive to be acceptable in an Information Barrier regime. However, this process must be performed with care. Features like the perimeter, area, and intensity of an object, for example, might reveal sensitive information. Any data-reduction technique must provide sufficient information to discriminate a real object from a spoofed or incorrect one, while avoiding disclosure (or storage) of any sensitive object qualities. Ultimately, algorithms are intended to provide only a yes/no response verifying the presence of features in the image. We discuss the utility of imaging for arms control applications and present three image-based verification algorithms in this context. The algorithms reduce full image information to non-sensitive feature information, in a process that is intended to enable verification while eliminating the possibility of image reconstruction. The underlying images can be highly detailed, since they are dynamically generated behind an information barrier. We consider the use of active (conventional) radiography alone and in tandem with passive (auto) radiography. We study these algorithms in terms of technical performance in image analysis and application to an information barrier scheme.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Smart Coatings for Corrosion Protection

Nearly all metals and their alloys are subject to corrosion that causes them to lose their structural integrity or other critical functionality. It is essential to detect corrosion when it occurs, and preferably at its early stage, so that action can be taken to avoid structural damage or loss of function. Protective coatings are the most commonly used method of corrosion control. However, progressively stricter environmental regulations have resulted in the ban of many commercially available corrosion protective coatings due to the harmful effects of their solvents or corrosion inhibitors. This work concerns the development of a multifunctional, smart coating for the autonomous control of corrosion. This coating is being developed to have the inherent ability to detect the chemical changes associated with the onset of corrosion and respond autonomously to indicate it and control it.

Coatings↗

HTGR Resilient Control System Strategy

A preeminent objective for corporate and government organizations is the protection of major investments, which is attained by achieving state awareness, a comprehensive understanding of security and safety, for critical infrastructures. Given the dependence of critical infrastructure on control systems for automation, the integrity of these systems and their ability to provide owner/operators a high degree of state awareness is essential in attaining a high degree of investment protection and public acceptance. Operators as well as government are therefore burdened to ensure they have a timely understanding of the status of their plant or all plants, respectively, to ensure efficient operations and investment and public protection. “This characterization is a significant objective that must consider many aspects of instrumentation, control, and intelligent systems in order to achieve the required result. These aspects include sensory, communication, analysis, decision, and human system interfaces necessary to achieve fusion of data and presentation of results that will provide an understanding of what issues are important and why.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Toughened Thermal Blanket for MMOD Protection

Thermal blankets are used extensively on spacecraft to provide passive thermal control of spacecraft hardware from thermal extremes encountered in space. Toughened thermal blankets have been developed that greatly improve protection from hypervelocity micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts. These blankets can be outfitted if so desired with a reliable means to determine the location, depth and extent of MMOD impact damage by incorporating an impact sensitive piezoelectric film. Improved MMOD protection of thermal blankets was obtained by adding selective materials at various locations within the thermal blanket. As given in Figure 1, three types of materials were added to the thermal blanket to enhance its MMOD performance: (1) disrupter layers, near the outside of the blanket to improve breakup of the projectile, (2) standoff layers, in the middle of the blanket to provide an area or gap that the broken-up projectile can expand, and (3) stopper layers, near the back of the blanket where the projectile debris is captured and stopped. The best suited materials for these different layers vary. Density and thickness is important for the disrupter layer (higher densities generally result in better projectile breakup), whereas a highstrength to weight ratio is useful for the stopper layer, to improve the slowing and capture of debris particles.

Christiansen, Eric L.↗

Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) - Evolution and Lessons Learned During the Shuttle Program

The Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) element integrates all the subsystems needed for ascent flight, entry, and recovery of the combined Booster and Motor system. These include the structures, avionics, thrust vector control, pyrotechnic, range safety, deceleration, thermal protection, and retrieval systems. This represents the only human-rated, recoverable and refurbishable solid rocket ever developed and flown. Challenges included subsystem integration, thermal environments and severe loads (including water impact), sometimes resulting in hardware attrition. Several of the subsystems evolved during the program through design changes. These included the thermal protection system, range safety system, parachute/recovery system, and others. Obsolescence issues occasionally required component recertification. Because the system was recovered, the SRB was ideal for data and imagery acquisition, which proved essential for understanding loads and system response. The three main parachutes that lower the SRBs to the ocean are the largest parachutes ever designed, and the SRBs are the largest structures ever to be lowered by parachutes. SRB recovery from the ocean was a unique process and represented a significant operational challenge; requiring personnel, facilities, transportation, and ground support equipment. The SRB element achieved reliability via extensive system testing and checkout, redundancy management, and a thorough postflight assessment process. Assembly and integration of the booster subsystems was a unique process and acceptance testing of reused hardware components was required for each build. Extensive testing was done to assure hardware functionality at each level of stage integration. Because the booster element is recoverable, subsystems were available for inspection and testing postflight, unique to the Shuttle launch vehicle. Problems were noted and corrective actions were implemented as needed. The postflight assessment process was quite detailed and a significant portion of flight operations. The SRBs provided fully redundant critical systems including thrust vector control, mission critical pyrotechnics, avionics, and parachute recovery system. The design intent was to lift off with full redundancy. On occasion, the redundancy management scheme was needed during flight operations. This paper describes some of the design challenges, how the design evolved with time, and key areas where hardware reusability contributed to improved system level understanding.

Kanner, Howard S.↗

Computer Security for I and C Systems at Nuclear Facilities - 116

Cyber-attacks on Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems may jeopardize the safety and security of nuclear facilities by contributing to sabotage or aiding in the unauthorized removal of nuclear material. The effects of cyber-attacks on I and C systems important to safety to safety may result in a wide range of consequences, such as a temporary loss of process control or unacceptable radiological consequences. Public awareness of cyber-attacks that affect I and C systems may also undermine confidence in the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes the need for the guidance on the protection of I and C systems that provide safety, security, or auxiliary functions at nuclear facilities from cyber-attacks. To meet this need, The IAEA has developed a new Nuclear Security Series publication with the provisional title Computer Security of Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Facilities which builds upon and expands the guidance published in Nuclear Security Series No. 17 Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (2011) . This publication will be formally released in 2017 as Technical Guidance and will be the second international consensus publication dedicated to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities. It was developed in parallel with the new IAEA Nuclear Safety publications providing recommendations on I and C systems at research reactors (RR) and nuclear power plants (NPP) . The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of this publication and its application. The paper will also discuss its relation to other IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) publications on computer security. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Fuel system protection

The hazardous nature of most fuels and the potential for catastrophe if ignition should occur was investigated in regard to the design of adequate lightning protection for aircraft fuel systems. Typical aircraft fuel flammability characteristics and possible ways to control fuel flammability and ignition were reviewed. Guidelines for effective protection of fuel systems were delineated.

Franklin A Fisher↗

A Novel Sliding Mode Network Perimeter Controller

Congestion in urban areas is a chronic problem that faces many US and worldwide cities. It results in inefficient use of the infrastructure as well as increased fuel consumption and vehicle emissions. Congestion is intertwined with delay. Road users waste precious hours on the road, which reduces productivity. Throughout this decade researchers were and are developing tools and systems that alleviate this problem. Network perimeter control is one of these tools that has been studied extensively. It attempts to control the flow of vehicles entering a protected area so as not to reach the congested regime that is pre-determined using the Network Fundamental Diagram (NFD). In this paper, we present a novel and simple approach derived from sliding mode control theory that achieves the desired objective. Its main advantages over other control strategies include but are not limited to (1) ease of implementation, (2) minimal and straightforward model tuning, and (3) high performance. This controller was implemented and tested on a congested grid network. The results show that, the new logic performs as expected, producing network-wide delay savings that are consistent with other control approaches described in the literature. Furthermore, unlike other controllers, we demonstrate that the controller is robust to its hyper-parameter values, making the algorithm easy to implement and calibrate to local conditions. http://pubsindex.trb.org/

Sliding mode control, network perimeter control, n↗

Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) Flight System Integration at Its Best

The Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) element integrates all the subsystems needed for ascent flight, entry, and recovery of the combined Booster and Motor system. These include the structures, avionics, thrust vector control, pyrotechnic, range safety, deceleration, thermal protection, and retrieval systems. This represents the only human-rated, recoverable and refurbishable solid rocket ever developed and flown. Challenges included subsystem integration, thermal environments and severe loads (including water impact), sometimes resulting in hardware attrition. Several of the subsystems evolved during the program through design changes. These included the thermal protection system, range safety system, parachute/recovery system, and others. Because the system was recovered, the SRB was ideal for data and imagery acquisition, which proved essential for understanding loads, environments and system response. The three main parachutes that lower the SRBs to the ocean are the largest parachutes ever designed, and the SRBs are the largest structures ever to be lowered by parachutes. SRB recovery from the ocean was a unique process and represented a significant operational challenge; requiring personnel, facilities, transportation, and ground support equipment. The SRB element achieved reliability via extensive system testing and checkout, redundancy management, and a thorough postflight assessment process. However, the in-flight data and postflight assessment process revealed the hardware was affected much more strongly than originally anticipated. Assembly and integration of the booster subsystems required acceptance testing of reused hardware components for each build. Extensive testing was done to assure hardware functionality at each level of stage integration. Because the booster element is recoverable, subsystems were available for inspection and testing postflight, unique to the Shuttle launch vehicle. Problems were noted and corrective actions were implemented as needed. The postflight assessment process was quite detailed and a significant portion of flight operations. The SRBs provided fully redundant critical systems including thrust vector control, mission critical pyrotechnics, avionics, and parachute recovery system. The design intent was to lift off with full redundancy. On occasion, the redundancy management scheme was needed during flight operations. This paper describes some of the design challenges and technical issues, how the design evolved with time, and key areas where hardware reusability contributed to improved system level understanding.

Wood, T. David↗

INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEM CYBER SECURITY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELEVANT TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY

Typical questions surrounding industrial control system (ICS) cyber security always lead back to: What could a cyber attack do to my system(s) and; how much should I worry about it? These two leading questions represent only a fraction of questions asked when discussing cyber security as it applies to any program, company, business, or organization. The intent of this paper is to open a dialog of important pertinent questions and answers that managers of nuclear facilities engaged in nuclear facility security and safeguards should examine, i.e., what questions should be asked; and how do the answers affect an organization's ability to effectively safeguard and secure nuclear material. When a cyber intrusion is reported, what does that mean? Can an intrusion be detected or go un-noticed? Are nuclear security or safeguards systems potentially vulnerable? What about the digital systems employed in process monitoring, and international safeguards? Organizations expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against physical threats. However, cyber threats particularly on ICSs may not be well known or understood, and often do not receive adequate attention. With the disclosure of the Stuxnet virus that has recently attacked nuclear infrastructure, many organizations have recognized the need for an urgent interest in cyber attacks and defenses against them. Several questions arise including discussions about the insider threat, adequate cyber protections, program readiness, encryption, and many more. These questions, among others, are discussed so as to raise the awareness and shed light on ways to protect nuclear facilities and materials against such attacks.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Scientific Opportunities for Monitoring of Environmental Remediation Sites (SOMERS) - 12224

The US Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for risk reduction and cleanup of its nuclear weapons complex. DOE maintains the largest cleanup program in the world, currently spanning over a million acres in 13 states. The inventory of contaminated materials includes 90 million gallons of radioactive waste, 6.4 trillion liters of groundwater, and 40 million cubic meters of soil and debris. It is not feasible to completely restore many sites to pre-disposal conditions. Any contamination left in place will require monitoring, engineering controls and/or land use restrictions to protect human health and environment. Research and development efforts to date have focused on improving characterization and remediation. Yet, monitoring will result in the largest life-cycle costs and will be critical to improving performance and protection. Through an inter-disciplinary effort, DOE is addressing a need to advance monitoring approaches from sole reliance on cost- and labor-intensive point-source monitoring to integrated systems-based approaches such as flux-based approaches and the use of early indicator parameters. Key objectives include identifying current scientific, technical and implementation opportunities and challenges, prioritizing science and technology strategies to meet current needs within the DOE complex for the most challenging environments, and developing an integrated and risk-informed monitoring framework. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radiation Impact of Very Low Level Radioactive Steel Reused in Building Industry with Emphasis on External Exposure Pathway - 12569

Considerable quantities of various materials are accumulated during the decommissioning process of nuclear installations. Some of arising materials are activated or contaminated. However, many of them continue to have an economic value and exist in a form that can be recycled or reused for special purposes. Furthermore much of the material generated during decommissioning process will contain only small amounts of radionuclides. For these materials there exist environmental and economic incentives to maximize the use of the concept of clearance from further regulatory control. This impact analysis is devoted to mentioned incentives. The aim is to conditionally clear maximum amount of the scrap steel and consequently recycle and reuse it in form of reinforcing components in tunnel and bridge building scenarios. Recent calculations relevant for external exposure pathway indicate that concept of conditional clearance represent a feasible option for the management of radioactive materials. Even in chosen specific industrial applications it is possible to justify new, approximately one order of magnitude higher, clearance levels. However analysis of other possible exposure pathways relevant for particular scenario of reuse of conditionally cleared materials has to be performed in order to confirm indications from partially obtained results. Basically, the concept of conditional clearance can bring two basic benefits. Firstly it is saving of considerable funds, which would be otherwise used for treatment, conditioning and disposal of materials at appropriate radioactive waste repository. Moreover materials with intrinsic value (particularly metals) can be recycled and reused in industrial applications instead of investing resources on mining and production process in order to obtain new, 'fresh' materials. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗