Results for “Protection” — Page 60

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Particle-Based Fiber Models of Woven Materials for Earth Entry Thermal Protection

Applications requiring materials with layer-to-layer strength, from basketry to thermal protection systems, use interlaced, three-dimensional woven materials. NASA is developing and deploying woven material heat shields for missions, including Artemis I (3D-MAT for compression pads) and potentially Mars Sample Return - Earth Entry System. These materials are complex, hierarchical and must protect from extreme environments and phenomena, such as deformation, impact and high-enthalpy heating. Woven material performance depends on microstructure, damage and weave geometry. Therefore, fiber-specific models are needed to simulate fiber contacts within the weave hierarchical geometry (fiber to tow to yarn to weave) and the inherent directionality of fibers. Explicit fiber models can simulate how weave microstructure evolution affects thermal and mechanical properties. We parameterize a discrete element bonded particle models (DEM-BPM) of fibers to capture thermal and mechanical behavior within and between fibers, with bonded and contact forces, respectively. We study the proportion of heat transfer and stress via the contact network, fiber bonds and the weave geometry, for example, with respect to yarn warp-weft identity (whether it interlaces weave layers). Our results demonstrate the importance of explicit fiber modeling for connecting microstructure with thermal and mechanical properties.

woven material↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

ISS External Microorganisms: Collecting Planetary Protection Samples During Extravehicular Activity

Introduction: We have designed1, built, and tested a sampling kit (Fig. 1) to aseptically collect microbiological samples from exterior surfaces on the ISS (International Space Station). The kit was flown to ISS as part of the NG-19 commercial cargo mission in August of 2023. Astronauts will use the kit to collect samples from six exterior surfaces on ISS. These samples will be frozen at -80°C after collection and returned to the ground for next generation DNA sequencing. The results of this experiment will help inform planetary protection requirements for crewed missions. We hypothesize that there are detectable microbial communities outside ISS and that these communities originate from inside ISS. Current life support systems do not include any components for reducing microbial leakage. Gases are vented from inside ISS without filtration and there are currently no protocols in place to minimize bioburden on space suit exteriors prior to use. It is important to quantify the bioburden on current vehicles so that achievable limits can be set for crewed missions to astrobiologically relevant locations like Mars. Figure 1: The sampling kit contains eight swab canisters in total (six on the top and two on the bottom). A resuable end effector (1) is used to remove and reinstall the swabs. The kit also contains a handrail (2), tether loop (3), and, bayonet probes(4) to allow easy manipulation during EVA. Methods: We have designed a kit to carry 8 commercially available foam swabs into and out of vacuum without compromising the swabs’ sterility. The specially designed swab canisters contain a 0.2 µm Teflon filter that allows the canister to accommodate pressure changes without introducing unwanted contaminants. The kit meets existing EVA (Extravehicular Activity) safety requirements and has been used by human test subjects in the neutral buoyance lab and at vacuum in test chambers at the Johnson Space Center. In the early part of 2024, astronauts will use this sampling kit to swab six surfaces on the exterior of ISS. We will collect samples from: the airlock vestibule, the interior surface of the airlock thermal cover, an exterior handrail, a vent connected to the CO2 removal system, and a vent connected to the payload vacuum system inside ISS. Approximately 300 cm2 will be swabbed at each location. A seventh swab will be exposed to the vacuum of space without touching any surfaces as a blank. The eighth swab will remain sealed as a process control. After the EVA the swab kit will be frozen at -80°C and returned to earth at the earliest possible opportunity. The samples will remain frozen until they are thawed for next generation DNA sequencing on earth. We will use amplicon sequencing to identify any bacteria, archaea or fungi present in the samples. If there is enough DNA present, we will use shotgun metagenomic sequencing to further characterize the microbial ecology outside ISS. Preliminary Results: Results from ground-based testing demonstrate that the swab kit is capable of cycling in and out of vacuum without contaminating the swabs. Test subjects, wearing flight-like EVA gloves could remove swabs from the canister and sample discrete locations without inadvertently touching any other surfaces. Several types of bacteria and fungi were collected during these ground tests and survived up to 6 hours at vacuum. This includes non-spore forming bacterial like Staphyloccus capitis that are not traditionally considered extremophiles. Shotgun metagenomic sequencing of the ground-test samples revealed bacteria associated with human skin and airways on the exterior of space suits used during these tests 2 In addition to these results we will present preliminary results from our space-flight samples. We will also present lessons learned from attempting to collect microbiological samples during an EVA and describe how our results will affect planetary protection requirements for future crewed missions.

Aaron B. Regberg↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Sustaining Thermal Protection Systems Needed for Uranus Probes

Summary: Achieving Uranus in-situ science objectives through deploying probes in the atmosphere requires thermal protection systems capable of withstanding extreme entry environments. NASA’s 3-D Woven based thermal protection systems (TPS), developed specifically to meet this challenge, are mature, efficient, and capable of withstanding such entry. These science-enabling capabilities need to be sustained, otherwise mission implementation risk may increase to the point that the mission is untenable. The heatshield technology has been developed in concert with industry, and manufacturing processes have been technology transferred. Current technology readiness does not guarantee future availability. Sustainment requires maintaining expertise within NASA as well as ensuring that proven industrial expertise and capabilities will be readily available in the future. A constant awareness and risk assessment followed by risk mitigation are required. The scientific community needs to be aware of these challenges. It needs to engage NASA to ensure these capabilities will be available when needed. As was the case with the atrophy of heritage carbon phenolic that led to developing the 3-D Woven capabilities, our vigilance is again needed to sustain these enabling TPS capabilities for Uranus and for other missions. Background: NASA invested in and developed Heatshield for Extreme Entry Environment Technology (HEEET) TPS that was matured to TRL 6 in 2019 as a tiled system with seams and gap-fillers. Manufacturing readiness included development of specialized looms, molding, and infusion processes using commercial partners. In support of the Mars Sample Return mission, a single-layer, seamless, single-piece variant referred to as 3MDCP (3-D woven Mid-Density Carbon-Phenolic) was developed and is limited to a 1.3m maximum diameter scale due to weaving width limitations of 80”. Molding techniques developed to transform a flat, 2”-thick 3-D woven preform into a sphere-cone shape prior to phenolic resin infusion has been demonstrated. A team at NASA Ames is currently working with industry to demonstrate infusion at full-scale. By 2026, 3MDCP will be at a high level of maturity in technical, manufacturing, and integration readiness as well as material characterization. HEEET and 3MDCP for Uranus Entry: Several system studies have evaluated and baselined 3-D Woven TPS for Uranus entry, both HEEET as well as 3MDCP. If the aeroshell carrying the descent probe is 1.3m or less, then 3MDCP is a very capable and the most mass-efficient choice. If the aeroshell is bigger than 1.3m diameter, then HEEET can meet the mission need as it allows for an aeroshell of any diameter. HEEET and 3MDCP are capable of Saturn in-situ science missions prioritized in the New Frontiers-5 draft Announcement of Opportunity (AO) and if Saturn is the mission of choice, there is a pathway for sustaining the capability. Capability Sustainment: Given NASA’s current budgetary constraints, the postponement of the next New Frontiers AO to no earlier than 2026 and the unknown delay in starting the UOP flagship effort point to potential gap years for the HEEET and 3MDCP capabilities. The first step in capability sustainment is to understand the risks as they emerge, assess those risks, and develop plans to mitigate them. Keeping the science community, who are interested in UOP as well as the larger Giant Planet missions, informed of the emerging challenges requires continuous risk assessment/mitigation. Without these steps, atrophy is more likely within the industrial partners with which NASA has partnered. This presentation will provide more details as well as steps NASA can take to minimize the impact to the UOP mission.

Ethiraj Venkatapathy↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

ISS External Microorganisms: Collecting Planetary Protection Samples During Extravehicular Activity

Introduction: We have designed1, built, and tested a sampling kit (Fig. 1) to aseptically collect microbiological samples from exterior surfaces on the ISS (International Space Station). The kit was flown to ISS as part of the NG-19 commercial cargo mission in August of 2023. Astronauts will use the kit to collect samples from six exterior surfaces on ISS. These samples will be frozen at -80°C after collection and returned to the ground for next generation DNA sequencing. The results of this experiment will help inform planetary protection requirements for crewed missions. We hypothesize that there are detectable microbial communities outside ISS and that these communities originate from inside ISS. Current life support systems do not include any components for reducing microbial leakage. Gases are vented from inside ISS without filtration and there are currently no protocols in place to minimize bioburden on space suit exteriors prior to use. It is important to quantify the bioburden on current vehicles so that achievable limits can be set for crewed missions to astrobiologically relevant locations like Mars. Figure 1: The sampling kit contains eight swab canisters in total (six on the top and two on the bottom). A resuable end effector (1) is used to remove and reinstall the swabs. The kit also contains a handrail (2), tether loop (3), and, bayonet probes(4) to allow easy manipulation during EVA. Methods: We have designed a kit to carry 8 commercially available foam swabs into and out of vacuum without compromising the swabs’ sterility. The specially designed swab canisters contain a 0.2 µm Teflon filter that allows the canister to accommodate pressure changes without introducing unwanted contaminants. The kit meets existing EVA (Extravehicular Activity) safety requirements and has been used by human test subjects in the neutral buoyance lab and at vacuum in test chambers at the Johnson Space Center. In the early part of 2024, astronauts will use this sampling kit to swab six surfaces on the exterior of ISS. We will collect samples from: the airlock vestibule, the interior surface of the airlock thermal cover, an exterior handrail, a vent connected to the CO2 removal system, and a vent connected to the payload vacuum system inside ISS. Approximately 300 cm2 will be swabbed at each location. A seventh swab will be exposed to the vacuum of space without touching any surfaces as a blank. The eighth swab will remain sealed as a process control. After the EVA the swab kit will be frozen at -80°C and returned to earth at the earliest possible opportunity. The samples will remain frozen until they are thawed for next generation DNA sequencing on earth. We will use amplicon sequencing to identify any bacteria, archaea or fungi present in the samples. If there is enough DNA present, we will use shotgun metagenomic sequencing to further characterize the microbial ecology outside ISS. Preliminary Results: Results from ground-based testing demonstrate that the swab kit is capable of cycling in and out of vacuum without contaminating the swabs. Test subjects, wearing flight-like EVA gloves could remove swabs from the canister and sample discrete locations without inadvertently touching any other surfaces. Several types of bacteria and fungi were collected during these ground tests and survived up to 6 hours at vacuum. This includes non-spore forming bacterial like Staphyloccus capitis that are not traditionally considered extremophiles. Shotgun metagenomic sequencing of the ground-test samples revealed bacteria associated with human skin and airways on the exterior of space suits used during these tests 2 In addition to these results we will present preliminary results from our space-flight samples. We will also present lessons learned from attempting to collect microbiological samples during an EVA and describe how our results will affect planetary protection requirements for future crewed missions.

Aaron B. Regberg↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Smooth Particle Hydrodynamic Code Predictions for Meteoroid Damage to Thermal Protection Systems Shielded By Composite Structures

Interplanetary spacecraft are exposed to meteoroid fluxes with characteristics far exceeding the physical simulation capabilities of test facilities for predicting the likelihood that a meteoroid will penetrate a spacecraft’s critical systems. Accurate risk predictions are crucial to ensuring that important interplanetary missions, such as sample returns, can survive years of exposure to the meteoroid environment and safely reenter the Earth’s atmosphere with their scientific cargo. In this paper, we summarize a series of meteoroid impact damage computational simulations into two types of spacecraft composite protective structures using the Smooth Particle Hydrodynamics Code. We consider the effects of both meteoric materials and non-meteoric materials on a shielded forebody thermal protection system (TPS) for an extreme entry environment and on an unshielded aftbody TPS that is similar to the material covering the space shuttle’s external tank.

Brooke Corbett↗

NASA NTRS2025

Informing Planetary Protection Policies for the Future Exploration of Ceres: State of Understanding after the Dawn Mission

We review the current state of understanding of Ceres as it relates to planetary protection policy for future landed missions, including for sample return, to the dwarf planet. The Dawn mission found Ceres to be an intriguing target for a mission, with evidence for the presence of regional, possibly extensive liquid at depth, and local expressions of recent and potentially ongoing activity. The Dawn mission also found a high abundance of carbon in the regolith, interpreted as a mix of carbonates and amorphous carbon, as well as locally high concentrations of organic matter. Key findings from this review are as follows: (1) outside of the region of Occator crater, Ceres shows no geological evidence for conduits from the surface to the interior; and (2) considering the biological potential of Ceres’ deep interior, a surface sample return mission should be considered Category V restricted, unless it can be demonstrated that evaporites sourced from Ceres’ deep brine region, and recently exposed in Occator crater, have not been scattered to the rest of Ceres’ surface; in that case, the probability of returning an unsterilized particle to an acceptably low value is to be determined by a future study. Key Words: Ceres—Planetary protection—Brines—Future missions.

Julie Castillo-Rogez↗

DOE OSTI2021

Lithium metal—seawater battery cells having protected lithium electrodes

Active metal and active metal intercalation electrode structures and battery cells having ionically conductive protective architecture including an active metal (e.g., lithium) conductive impervious layer separated from the electrode (anode) by a porous separator impregnated with a non-aqueous electrolyte (anolyte). This protective architecture prevents the active metal from deleterious reaction with the environment on the other (cathode) side of the impervious layer, which may include aqueous or non-aqueous liquid electrolytes (catholytes) and/or a variety electrochemically active materials, including liquid, solid and gaseous oxidizers. Safety additives and designs that facilitate manufacture are also provided.

Visco, Steven J.↗

DOE OSTI2022

Solving Critical Problems of the Muon Collider Higgs Factory: Optics, Magnets and their Protection, Detector Backgrounds

A low-energy medium-luminosity Muon Collider (MC) is being studied as a possible Higgs Factory (HF). Electrons from muon decays will deposit more than 300 kW in superconducting magnets of the HF collider ring. This imposes significant challenges to superconducting (SC) magnets used in the MC storage ring (SR) and interaction regions (IR). Magnet designs are proposed which provide high operating gradient and magnetic field in a large aperture to accommodate the large size of muon beams (due to low beta*), as well as a cooling system to intercept the large heat deposition from the showers induced by decay electrons. The distribution of heat deposition in the MC SR lattice elements requires large-aperture magnets in order to accommodate thick high-Z absorbers to protect the SC coils. Based on the developed MARS15 model and intensive simulations, a sophisticated radiation protection system was designed for the collider SR and IR to bring the peak power density in the superconducting coils below the quench limit and reduce the dynamic heat deposition in the cold mass by a factor of 100. The system consists of tight tungsten masks in the magnet interconnect regions and elliptical tungsten liners in the magnet aperture optimized individually for each magnet. These also reduce the background particle fluxes in the collider detector.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Experience With Machine Protection Systems At PIP2IT

The PIP-II Injector Test 1 PIP2IT facility accelerator was assembled in multiple stages in 2014 $-$ 2021 to test concepts and components of the future PIPII linac that is being constructed at Fermilab. In its final configuration, PIP2IT accelerated a 0.55 ms x 20 Hz x 2 mA H$-$ beam to 16 MeV. To protect elements of the beam line, a Machine Protection System MPS was implemented and commissioned. The beam was interrupted faster than 10$\mu$s when excessive beam loss was detected. The paper describes the MPS architecture, methods of the loss detection, procedure of the beam interruption, and operational experience at PIP2IT.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

DOE OSTI2022

Recommendations for Secure Transport: Material Conveyance Physical Protection Technology

Nuclear material is at higher risk of theft and sabotage during transport than during any other phase of the nuclear fuel lifecycle. Nuclear materials are transported in the public domain where adversaries have an upper hand by taking advantage of the time and location of the theft or sabotage attempt. As such, even modest threat profiles for transport of nuclear and radioactive material can require substantial detection and delay measures to support timely response. Conveyance tracking augmented with technology that improves on-the-scene situational awareness at a remote monitoring center has been adopted as a de-facto standard approach for transportation security. At present, the extended tracking and situational awareness capabilities needed for a nuclear material shipment, as is provided by the purpose designed, Transportation – Security, Tracking and Reporting (T-STAR) System, do not exist in a single commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solution. Typically, the COTS systems that excel in one area are deficient in other areas, presenting challenges to designing well-rounded, robust systems. Still, COTS solutions can offer the basic set of tracking and situational awareness capabilities by indicating last update time, current location, and route taken. By incorporating vehicle and driver performance measures via the vehicle’s controller area network (CAN bus) and video alongside other data streams allows telemetry and other shipment information to be assessed in novel ways.This paper describes the operation, capabilities and features of various conveyance protection systems and approaches, assesses emerging technologies and how they could be used through a unified interface, and enumerates additional ways to provide early detection using vehicle, onboard technologies, effective delay technologies and approaches and simple equipment to improve protection during transport.

Shannon, Michael↗

DOE OSTI2023

Making lithium metal—seawater battery cells having protected lithium electrodes

Active metal and active metal intercalation electrode structures and battery cells having ionically conductive protective architecture including an active metal (e.g., lithium) conductive impervious layer separated from the electrode (anode) by a porous separator impregnated with a non-aqueous electrolyte (anolyte). This protective architecture prevents the active metal from deleterious reaction with the environment on the other (cathode) side of the impervious layer, which may include aqueous or non-aqueous liquid electrolytes (catholytes) and/or a variety electrochemically active materials, including liquid, solid and gaseous oxidizers. Safety additives and designs that facilitate manufacture are also provided.

Visco, Steven J.↗

DOE OSTI2024

Software and Firmware-logic Design for the PIP-II Machine Protection System Mode and Configuration Control at Fermilab

The PIP-II Machine Protection System (MPS) requires a dedicated set of tools for configuration control and management of the machine modes and beam modes of the accelerator. The protection system reacts to signals from various elements of the machine according to rules established in a setup database in the form of a Look-Up-Table filtered by the program Mode Controller. This is achieved in accordance with commands from the operator and governed by the firmware logic of the MPS. This paper describes the architecture, firmware logic, and implementation of the program mode controller.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

DOE OSTI2023

IP Protection in TinyML

Tiny machine learning (TinyML) is an essential component of emerging smart microcontrollers (MCUs). How- ever, the protection of the intellectual property (IP) of the model is an increasing concern due to the lack of desktop/server-grade resources on these power-constrained devices. In this paper, we propose STML, a system and algorithm co-design to Secure IP of TinyML on MCUs with ARM TrustZone. Our design jointly optimizes memory utilization and latency while ensuring the security and accuracy of emerging models. We implemented a prototype and benchmarked with 7 models, demonstrating STML reduces 40% of model protection runtime overhead on average.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2024

The Potential for Solar Farms to Protect Crops Against Extreme Weather Events

With climate change posing serious risks to crop production, solar PV has the potential to protect agriculture against extreme climate events. This concept has significant implications for agrivoltaics, but large gaps exist in the physical understanding of the climate resiliency that solar PV can bring to agriculture, and current studies focus on one-off designs ideal to protect against specific climate events. This study investigates key climate events that threaten agriculture throughout the year, including winter, spring, and summer climate threats.

Williams, Henry J↗

DOE OSTI2026

Machine-Protection System for the PIP-II Linear Accelerator: Architecture and Data Processing Schemes

PIP-II at Fermilab features a brand-new, 800 MeV leading-edge Linear Accelerator (Linac) that will enable the Fermilab complex to deliver more than a megawatt of beam power to the Long Base-line Neutrino Facility (LBNF), requiring a robust Machine Protection System (MPS) to prevent beam-induced damage to delicate cryomodules and vacuum components. Signals in various accelerator components, in both analog and digital format, are collected and processed to assest the operating conditions of the accelerator. In the situation a potential damage is foreseen, the beam permit signal will be drop. A critical element of this system is the fast Analog Machine Protection System, a high-bandwidth platform designed for real-time beam loss monitoring. The system utilizes a modular, FPGA-based architecture to digitize signals from beam-sensing devices, such as AC Current Transformers (ACCTs), non-invasive Ring Pickups (RPUs) and beam scrapers. To eliminate both high frequency as well as 60 Hz noise that might be picked up in the industrial environment, data processing schemes beyond regular digital filtering are planned and implemented.

Wu, Jinyuan [Fermilab] (ORCID:0000000344329521)↗

DOE OSTI2020

Estimating a protection factor from homemade facemasks for Los Alamos radioactive aerosols

The Los Alamos National Laboratory has required usage of facemasks “whenever interacting with or near others." The present document estimates the respiratory protection factor of homemade facemasks to be 1.4 and 1.2 for aerosol particles, below and above 0.3 μm diameter, respectively. This includes an estimated leakage of 70% and 52% for aerosol particles below and above 0.3 μm diameter, respectively.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2021

A bespoke health risk assessment methodology for the radiation protection of astronauts

An alternative approach that is particularly suitable for the radiation health risk assessment (HRA) of astronauts is presented. The quantity, Radiation Attributed Decrease of Survival (RADS), representing the cumulative decrease in the unknown survival curve at a certain attained age, due to the radiation exposure at an earlier age, forms the basis for this alternative approach. Results are provided for all solid cancer plus leukemia incidence RADS from estimated doses from theoretical radiation exposures accumulated during long-term missions to the Moon or Mars. For example, it is shown that a 1000-day Mars exploration mission with a hypothetical mission effective dose of 1.07 Sv at typical astronaut ages around 40 years old, will result in the probability of surviving free of all types of solid cancer and leukemia until retirement age (65 years) being reduced by 4.2% (95% CI 3.2; 5.3) for males and 5.8% (95% CI 4.8; 7.0) for females. RADS dose–responses are given, for the outcomes for incidence of all solid cancer, leukemia, lung and female breast cancer. Results showing how RADS varies with age at exposure, attained age and other factors are also presented. The advantages of this alternative approach, over currently applied methodologies for the long-term radiation protection of astronauts after mission exposures, are presented with example calculations applicable to European astronaut occupational HRA. Some tentative suggestions for new types of occupational risk limits for space missions are given while acknowledging that the setting of astronaut radiation-related risk limits will ultimately be decided by the Space Agencies. Suggestions are provided for further work which builds on and extends this new HRA approach, e.g., by eventually including non-cancer effects and detailed space dosimetry.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2021

Optically stimulated luminescence dosimetry on mobile phone back protective glass

Protective glasses from the back of modern smartphones were tested as potential emergency dosimeters using optically stimulated luminescence (OSL). The glasses were shown to exhibit several favorable dosimetric properties including a strong sensitivity to radiation, a linear dose-response relationship from 0.1 to 8 Gy, a 3% reproducibility, and a minimum detectable dose in the low tens of milligray, even after significant fading. The OSL signal was observed to lose ~78% and ~90% of the original intensity over 1 h and 1 week, respectively; however, a fading curve was developed to correct for any such signal loss. A dose-recovery test demonstrated that reconstructed doses were capable of accuracies within 20%.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗