Results for “Lessons learned” — Page 60

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Automated Software for Crewed Spacecraft - Bridging the Gap from Sci Fi to Reality

With a voice command or a few taps on the console, the spacecraft pivots on a dime at high velocity and gently docks to an orbiting space platform. This is the image most people have of the complex software computations and integrated hardware performance necessary for a spacecraft to successfully perform an automated launch, rendezvous, and docking. Today’s reality is that while computer operations are advancing rapidly, science fiction over-simplifies and over-sells current capabilities. This paper discusses the integration of spacecraft computer automation into the operation of one of the United States’ new Commercial Crew vehicles - the Boeing CST-100 Starliner. Lessons learned by the Boeing Mission Operations team, a private-public partnership with NASA, from conceptual design through real-time operation of the first test flight will be discussed. Focus will center on how operations has learned to use the automated software to their advantage while also knowing how to adjust the automation in response to spacecraft or mission anomalies. One goal of advanced spacecraft automation is the ability to reduce both the crew workload and the ground control footprint while at the same time increasing spacecraft and mission flexibility. Historically, crewed spacecraft required a large number of operators on the ground to use a plethora of tools to compute nominal and contingency mission trajectories. Moving those sophisticated software tools to being onboard the vehicle can reduce the need for such complex ground support. Given that today’s spacecraft software is not yet as capable or as flexible in all circumstances as the computers depicted in movies, there is usually a trade-off between software automation cost and the flexibility of that software resulting in a trade-off between what is performed on the spacecraft and what is left to onboard crew or ground control. For missions that go beyond the Moon, software that autonomously controls nearly every aspect of a crewed mission will become a necessity given the long time delays between the spacecraft and Earth’s ground control teams. The lessons learned by Boeing and its Mission Operations team, through the design and implementation of Starliner’s hardware and software automation, will be able to inform future public and private spacecraft design. As the technologies and capabilities evolve, incorporating lessons learned in successful low Earth orbit commercial crew vehicle missions, spacecraft designs will continue to improve and be able to better enable safe execution of human missions to the Moon and beyond.

Robert C Dempsey↗

NASA NTRS2011

Space Shuttle Guidance, Navigation, and Rendezvous Knowledge Capture Reports

This document is a catalog and readers guide to lessons learned, experience, and technical history reports, as well as compilation volumes prepared by United Space Alliance personnel for the NASA/Johnson Space Center (JSC) Flight Dynamics Division.1 It is intended to make it easier for future generations of engineers to locate knowledge capture documentation from the Shuttle Program. The first chapter covers observations on documentation quality and research challenges encountered during the Space Shuttle and Orion programs. The second chapter covers the knowledge capture approach used to create many of the reports covered in this document. These chapters are intended to provide future flight programs with insight that could be used to formulate knowledge capture and management strategies. The following chapters contain descriptions of each knowledge capture report. The majority of the reports concern the Space Shuttle. Three are included that were written in support of the Orion Program. Most of the reports were written from the years 2001 to 2011. Lessons learned reports concern primarily the shuttle Global Positioning System (GPS) upgrade and the knowledge capture process. Experience reports on navigation and rendezvous provide examples of how challenges were overcome and how best practices were identified and applied. Some reports are of a more technical history nature covering navigation and rendezvous. They provide an overview of mission activities and the evolution of operations concepts and trajectory design. The lessons learned, experience, and history reports would be considered secondary sources by historians and archivists.

John L Goodman↗

NASA NTRS2004

Planning Mars Memory: Learning from the MER Mission

This viewgraph presentation discusses ways in which the lessons learned from a mission can be systematically remembered, retained, and applied by individuals and by an organization as a whole. The presentation cites lessons learned from the Mars Exploration Rover (MER) Mission as examples.

Charlotte, Linde↗

NASA NTRS2017

A Comparison of the SOCIT and DebriSat Experiments

This paper explores the differences between, and shares the lessons learned from, two hypervelocity impact experiments critical to the update of orbital debris environment models. The procedures and processes of the fourth Satellite Orbital Debris Characterization Impact Test (SOCIT) were analyzed and related to the ongoing DebriSat experiment. SOCIT was the first hypervelocity impact test designed specifically for satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). It targeted a 1960's U.S. Navy satellite, from which data was obtained to update pre-existing NASA and DOD breakup models. DebriSat is a comprehensive update to these satellite breakup models- necessary since the material composition and design of satellites have evolved from the time of SOCIT. Specifically, DebriSat utilized carbon fiber, a composite not commonly used in satellites during the construction of the US Navy Transit satellite used in SOCIT. Although DebriSat is an ongoing activity, multiple points of difference are drawn between the two projects. Significantly, the hypervelocity tests were conducted with two distinct satellite models and test configurations, including projectile and chamber layout. While both hypervelocity tests utilized soft catch systems to minimize fragment damage to its post-impact shape, SOCIT only covered 65% of the projected area surrounding the satellite, whereas, DebriSat was completely surrounded cross-range and downrange by the foam panels to more completely collect fragments. Furthermore, utilizing lessons learned from SOCIT, DebriSat's post-impact processing varies in methodology (i.e., fragment collection, measurement, and characterization). For example, fragment sizes were manually determined during the SOCIT experiment, while DebriSat utilizes automated imaging systems for measuring fragments, maximizing repeatability while minimizing the potential for human error. In addition to exploring these variations in methodologies and processes, this paper also presents the challenges DebriSat has encountered thus far and how they were addressed. Accomplishing DebriSat's goal of collecting 90% of the debris, which constitutes well over 100,000 fragments, required addressing many challenges stemming from the very large number of fragments. One of these challenges arose in identifying the foam-embedded fragments. DebriSat addressed this by X-raying all of the panels once the loose debris were removed, and applying a detection algorithm developed in-house to automate the embedded fragment identification process. It is easy to see how the amount of data being compiled would be outstanding. Creating an efficient way to catalog each fragment, as well as archiving the data for reproducibility also posed a great challenge for DebriSat. Barcodes to label each fragment were introduced with the foresight that once the characterization process began, the datasheet for each fragment would have to be accessed again quickly and efficiently. The DebriSat experiment has benefited significantly by leveraging lessons learned from the SOCIT experiment along with the technological advancements that have occurred during the time between the experiments. The two experiments represent two ages of satellite technology and, together, demonstrate the continuous efforts to improve the experimental techniques for fragmentation debris characterization.

Ausay, Erick↗

NASA NTRS2006

Archiving Mars Mission Data Sets with the Planetary Data System

This viewgraph presentation reviews the use of the Planetary Data System (PDS) to archive the datasets that are received from the Mars Missions. It reviews the lessons learned in the actual archiving process, and presents an overview of the actual archiving process. It also reviews the lessons learned from the perspectives of the projects, the data producers and the data users.

Planetary Data System (PDS)↗

NASA NTRS2009

Rocketdyne - Lunar Ascent Engine

The ascent engine was the last one from the moon, and I want to focus on the idea of redundancy and teams in regard to the engine. By teams, I mean teamwork - not just within Rocketdyne. It was teamwork within Rocketdyne; it was teamwork within Grumman; it was teamwork within NASA. These were all important elements leading to the successful development of the lunar excursion module (LEM) engine. Communication, rapid response, and cooperation were all important. Another aspect that went into the development of the ascent engine was the integration of technology and of lessons learned. We pushed all the above, plus technology and lessons learned, into a program, and that led to a successful result. One of the things that I like to think about - again in retrospect - is how it is very "in" now to have integrated product and process teams. These are buzzwords for teamwork in all program phases. That s where you combine a lot of groups into a single organization to get a job done. The ascent engine program epitomized that kind of integration and focus, and because this was the mid- to late-1960s; this was new ground for Rocketdyne, Grumman, and NASA. Redundancy was really a major hallmark of the Apollo Program. Everything was redundant. Once you got the rocket going, you could even lose one of the big F-1 engines, and it would still make it to orbit. And once the first stage separated from the rest of the vehicle, the second stage could do without an engine and still make a mission. This redundancy was demonstrated when an early Apollo launch shut down a J-2 second-stage engine. Actually, they shut down two J-2 engines on that flight. Even the third stage, with its single J-2 engine, was backed up because the first two stages could toss it into a recoverable orbit. If the third stage didn't work, you were circling the earth, and you had time to recover the command module and crew. Remember how on the Apollo 13 flight, there was sufficient system redundancy even when we lost the service module. That was a magnificent effort. TRW Inc. really ought to be proud of their engine for that. (See Slide 2, Appendix I) We had planned for redundancy; we had landed on the moon. However, weight restrictions in the architecture said, "You can t have redundancy for ascent from the moon. You've got one engine. It s got to work. There is no second chance. If that ascent engine doesn't work, you re stuck there." It would not have looked good for NASA. It wouldn't have looked good for the country. There was a letter written that President Richard Nixon would read if the astronauts got stuck on the moon, expressing how sorry we were and so forth. It was a scary letter, really. The ascent engine was an engine that had to work. (See Slide 3, Appendix I).

Harmon, Tim↗

NASA NTRS2011

SPASE: Current Uses, Tools, and Plans

The Space Physics Archive Search and Extract (SPASE) project is an international collaboration among Heliophysics (solar and space physics) groups concerned with data acquisition and archiving. Within this community there are a variety of old and new data centers, resident archives, "virtual observatories", etc. acquiring, holding, and distributing data. The main product of the SPASE group is an XML-based SPASE Data Model now in operational use to enable searches for and ultimate acquisition of data of interest to a researcher. The SPASE Data Model defines the content of resource descriptions (metadata). The intent is to describe all SCientifically usable Heliophysics data sets using the Data Model. Another product of the SPASE group, in collaboration with NASA's Virtual Observatories, is a set of tools and services which work with SPASE meta data. This includes Registry Services which can retrieve and render metadata using resource identifiers and facilitate the downloading of the data referenced by the meta data. The SPASE Data Model has also been used as a vocabulary in specialized data models. One example is the Heliophysics Event List Manager (HELM) model. The SPASE Data Model is also being expanded to provide the means for more detailed description of data sets with the aim of enabling more automated ingestion and use of the data through detailed format descriptions. The evolution is based on a number of lessons learned and feedback from our community. Some of the lessons learned are unique to Heliophysics, and some are common to the various data diSCiplines. We will discuss the present state of SPASE usage, the role the SPASE Data Model can play in speCialized data models and how we foresee the development direction in the future.

Thieman, J. R.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of the Suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis for Identification of Top Injury Risks in Lunar Missions and Training

A new Exploration Extravehicular Activity Suit (xEVAS) is being designed to replace the current Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Artemis program to return astronauts to the lunar surface. This new suit will allow for increased range of motion compared the current EMU and Apollo era suits and will have additional features that will enhance the health and safety of exploration. With the design of lunar missions and the xEVAS progressing, it is important to consider possible injuries and injury mechanisms that could occur in the suit. To address these concerns, the suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis (IMEA) was developed to outline suited injury scenarios and rank them based on risk score. The IMEA documents possible scenarios and underlying mechanisms of injury while wearing an extravehicular activity (EVA) suit. Tasks during lunar surface EVA as well as training events to prepare for lunar missions were considered as history has shown that more suit injuries occur during training than in flight. Each scenario is ranked with a consequence and likelihood scoring based on our current understanding of the suit and Artemis design reference missions to identify high-risk cases that will drive further work in suited injury. Injuries, mechanisms of injury, and mitigation strategies are evaluated within each scenario. The Suited Injury Summit was held on January 5, 2022, to vet the IMEA with external experts. This was an all-day virtual meeting with the suited injury team, ergonomists, suit engineers, safety engineers, the flight operations directorate, flight doctors, astronauts, astronaut strength, conditioning, and rehabilitation specialists (ASCRS), and external subject matter experts (SMEs). External SMEs consisted of surgeons with varying specialties. The intent of this meeting was to walk through the top injury risks identified in the analysis, identify any gaps that were not captured, and discuss mitigations. With participation from all groups, countless lessons-learned came from the Summit meeting. Using the lessons-learned and discussion from the Summit, the top 10 risks have been identified: neutral buoyancy laboratory training, hand/glove injuries, poor suit fit, field training, specific EVA tasks/design of task, boots/ankle injuries, falls from heights, background radiation, repetitive contact, and ambulation/long-distance ambulation. Mitigation steps have also been determined for each of the top risks. The IMEA and documentation of top risks is a living document. Yearly meetings are planned to update the analysis and reevaluate top risks and mitigations. The IMEA is being used to drive work in suited injury, and this work will continue to evolve with IMEA and lunar mission updates.

Teresa Reiber↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development of the Suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis for Identification of Top Injury Risks in Lunar Missions and Training

A new Exploration Extravehicular Activity Suit (xEVAS) is being designed to replace the current Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Artemis program to return astronauts to the lunar surface. This new suit will allow for increased range of motion compared the current EMU and Apollo era suits and will have additional features that will enhance the health and safety of exploration. With the design of lunar missions and the xEVAS progressing, it is important to consider possible injuries and injury mechanisms that could occur in the suit. To address these concerns, the suited Injury Modes and Effects Analysis (IMEA) was developed to outline suited injury scenarios and rank them based on risk score. The IMEA documents possible scenarios and underlying mechanisms of injury while wearing an extravehicular activity (EVA) suit. Tasks during lunar surface EVA as well as training events to prepare for lunar missions were considered as history has shown that more suit injuries occur during training than in flight. Each scenario is ranked with a consequence and likelihood scoring based on our current understanding of the suit and Artemis design reference missions to identify high-risk cases that will drive further work in suited injury. Injuries, mechanisms of injury, and mitigation strategies are evaluated within each scenario. The Suited Injury Summit was held on January 5, 2022, to vet the IMEA with external experts. This was an all-day virtual meeting with the suited injury team, ergonomists, suit engineers, safety engineers, the flight operations directorate, flight doctors, astronauts, astronaut strength, conditioning, and rehabilitation specialists (ASCRS), and external subject matter experts (SMEs). External SMEs consisted of surgeons with varying specialties. The intent of this meeting was to walk through the top injury risks identified in the analysis, identify any gaps that were not captured, and discuss mitigations. With participation from all groups, countless lessons-learned came from the Summit meeting. Using the lessons-learned and discussion from the Summit, the top 10 risks have been identified: neutral buoyancy laboratory training, hand/glove injuries, poor suit fit, field training, specific EVA tasks/design of task, boots/ankle injuries, falls from heights, background radiation, repetitive contact, and ambulation/long-distance ambulation. Mitigation steps have also been determined for each of the top risks. The IMEA and documentation of top risks is a living document. Yearly meetings are planned to update the analysis and reevaluate top risks and mitigations. The IMEA is being used to drive work in suited injury, and this work will continue to evolve with IMEA and lunar mission updates.

Tessa Reiber↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

High-Altitude ADS-B/GPS LPV Flight Tests on a NASA ER-2 Research Airplane

The research presented in this paper describes the conceptual design of a system architecture that integrates Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Global Positioning System (GPS) Localizer Performance Vertical (LPV) guidance technology onto a unique high-altitude research airplane: a United States Air Force (USAF) / Lockheed Martin (Bethesda, Maryland) Aeronautics U-2S airplane. The design features modern display capabilities to provide air-to-air surveillance and precision navigation, to adhere to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification standards for operations in upper Class E airspace. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) variant of the U-2S, now called the Earth Resources (ER-2) airplane, remains unrivaled in the art of sustained high-altitude flight for scientific expeditions. Capable of routinely cruising above flight level (FL) 650 that had been considered, at inception, the domain of only the most elite experimental research aircraft types. Nicknamed the Dragon Lady, this U-2S research testbed is still one of the most advanced aircraft in the world. The exceptional military design of the vehicle, security guidelines, and the performance envelope of the ER-2 posed unique challenges to the integration of modern civilian avionics. ADS-B epitomizes the next generation of surveillance technology, incorporating both air and ground aspects. ADS-B provides air traffic control (ATC) with a more accurate picture of the three-dimensional positioning of aircraft in various phases of flight, including en route, terminal, approach, and ground operations. The airborne surveillance system broadcasts its identification, position, altitude, velocity, and other information. GPS LPV represents a significant advancement in aviation technology, emphasizing the pivotal role that GPS and Performance-Based Navigation concepts will play in the foreseeable future. This technology represents a shift from sensor-based navigation to performance-based navigation, allowing for more flexible and efficient use of airspace. This research described herein is structured as follows: Section II, “Systems Background,” provides a systems background and description of an ADS-B and GPS LPV system equipped on the high-altitude ER-2 research airplane to satisfy the FAA airworthiness requirements for high-altitude flight operations. Section III, “Flight Test System,” describes the flight-test airplane systems. Section IV, “Analysis of GPS SBAS, Safety, and Ground Tests,” provides an overview of the GPS Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS) and an analysis of the GPS LPV metrics, safety, and ground tests. Section V, “High-Altitude Flight Tests,” describes the high-altitude flight tests, including 3 flight-test results, analysis, human factors, and lessons learned. Section VI, the conclusion, draws insights from the lessons learned, discusses the design challenges associated with ADS-B and GPS LPV, and showcases the paramount significance of these pivotal technologies in aircraft surveillance and navigation.

Ricardo A. Arteaga↗

NASA NTRS2003

Experiences with Testing the Largest Ground System NASA Has Ever Built

In the 1980s, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) embarked upon a major Earth-focused program called Mission to Planet Earth. The Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) was selected to manage and develop a key component - the Earth Observing System (EOS). The EOS consisted of four major missions designed to monitor the Earth. The missions included 4 spacecraft. Terra (launched December 1999), Aqua (launched May 2002), ICESat (Ice, Cloud, and Land Elevation Satellite, launched January 2003), and Aura (scheduled for launch January 2004). The purpose of these missions was to provide support for NASA s long-term research effort for determining how human-induced and natural changes affect our global environment. The EOS Data and Information System (EOSDIS), a globally distributed, large-scale scientific system, was built to support EOS. Its primary function is to capture, collect, process, and distribute the most voluminous set of remotely sensed scientific data to date estimated to be 350 Gbytes per day. The EOSDIS is composed of a diverse set of elements with functional capabilities that require the implementation of a complex set of computers, high-speed networks, mission-unique equipment, and associated Information Technology (IT) software along with mission-specific software. All missions are constrained by schedule, budget, and staffing resources, and rigorous testing has been shown to be critical to the success of each mission. This paper addresses the challenges associated with the planning, test definition. resource scheduling, execution, and discrepancy reporting involved in the mission readiness testing of a ground system on the scale of EOSDIS. The size and complexity of the mission systems supporting the Aqua flight operations, for example, combined with the limited resources available, prompted the project to challenge the prevailing testing culture. The resulting success of the Aqua Mission Readiness Testing (MRT) program was due in no small measure to re-structuring the traditional programmatic and technical approach to a more efficient and robust program. Programmatically, it meant gaining the endorsement, commitment, and cooperation of the numerous subsystem element managers and other stakeholder organizations. Technically, it required an MRT program that was agile, could rapidly adapt to requirements changes, and was flexible in its overall approach. Furthermore, this paper addresses the following questions: 1. What are the key ingredients (e.g., test tools, organization) needed to conduct a successful MRT program? 2. What distinguishes EOS MRT from the traditional system testing approach? 3. Where should the focus of testing be since it is infeasible to test every element or subsystem? 4. How can MRT be applied effectively to other systems or missions? To provide answers to these questions, this paper relies heavily on real-life, hands-on experiences ("lessons learned") gained during mission readiness testing of the Terra ground system and, most recently, the Aqua and ICESat missions. Moreover, this paper explores how lessons learned were turned into lessons applied for the upcoming Aura mission. Although derived from the EOS missions, MRT techniques and strategies can be applied to enhance the testing of other missions.

Lehtonen, Ken↗

NASA NTRS1984

Some aerodynamic discoveries and related NACA/NASA research programs following World War 2

The World War 2 time period ushered in a new era in aeronautical research and development. The air conflict during the war highlighted the need of aircraft with agility, high speed, long range, large payload capability, and in addition, introduced a new concept in air warfare through the use of guided missiles. Following the war, the influx of foreign technology, primarily German, led to rapid advances in jet propulsion and speed, and a host of new problem areas associated with high-speed flight designs were revealed. The resolution of these problems led to a rash of new design concepts and many of the lessons learned, in principle, are still effective today. In addition to the technical lessons learned related to aircraft development programs, it might also be noted that some lessons involving the political and philosophical nature of aircraft development programs are worth attention.

Spearman, M. L.↗

NASA NTRS2009

CSM RCS Design Considerations and Failure Modes

Objectives include: a) Define major Command and Service Module (CSM) design considerations; b) List Command Module (CM) RCS failures and lessons learned; and c) List Service Module (SM) RCS failures and lessons learned.

Interbartolo, Michael↗

NASA NTRS2010

NASA Astronaut Selection 2009: Behavioral Overview

NASA's multi-phase U.S. astronaut selection process seeks to identify the most qualified astronaut candidates from a large number of applicants. With the approaching retirement of the Space Shuttle, NASA focused on selecting those individuals who were most suited to the unique demands of long-duration spaceflight. In total, NASA received 3,535 applications for the 2009 astronaut selection cycle. Of these, 123 were invited to NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) for Round 1 initial screening and interviews, which consisted of an Astronaut Selection Board (ASB) preliminary interview, medical review, and psychological testing. Of these, 48 individuals were invited to return for Round 2. This round consisted of medical testing, further behavioral assessments, and a second ASB interview. Following this, nine astronaut candidates (ASCANs) were ultimately chosen to go forward to basic training. The contents, benefits, and lessons learned from implementing this phased process will be discussed. The lessons learned can benefit the future selection of space flyers, whether they are NASA or commercial. Learning Objective: 1) Familiarization with the 2009 NASA behavioral screening process for astronaut applicants.

Holland, A. W.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Exploration Extravehicular Mobility Unit (xEMU) Pressure Garment System (PGS) Cycle Testing Overview and Results

With the development of NASA’s next generation spacesuit, the hardware life expectations for the new spacesuit required evaluation. The xPGS team designed and performed a test series to assess the new hardware against the life requirements. The EMU on the International Space Station (ISS) today tests the life of the suit and new components by performing isometric individual joint cycle motions with the requirements based on previously performed Extra-Vehicular Activities (EVAs). The xPGS includes new designs for suit components to provide increased mobility for performance of lunar operations, thus the requirements for the life cycle of the suit had to be developed and tested with these new operations in mind. Cycle requirements shifted to cycles of functional tasks in lieu of isometric cycles to better understand the life of the suit. Manned cycle testing of the xPGS was conducted by performing repetitions of a series of tasks that reflect predicted Lunar EVA operations. The test series utilized a gravity offload system to simulate Lunar gravity environment. Cycle testing concluded after 30 test days in October of 2022 with lessons learned that will be critical for future spacesuit design. Specific lessons learned with regards to suit performance and test methodology will be provided.

spacesuit↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Learning from Past Missions for Today’s Case Studies

As the small spacecraft industry continues to grow, the extensive selection of subsystem parts and service providers can present unique challenges in mission implementation. These challenges include inadequate trade studies, missing lessons learned, and unknown solutions to common pitfalls. Trade studies frequently fall short because products and services ultimately do not meet customer expectations; the actual outcomes of a particular service or technology are not always shared with others seeking similar practices. It is difficult to: quantify the viability and robustness of the desired products and services, truly understand what solutions exist, and account for unique failures from previous smallsat missions. One reason for the lack of information as input for trade studies is that it is problematic to capture and disseminate the relevant lessons learned, experienced anomalies, and programmatic issues in both the laboratory and on-orbit setting as these types of information can be extremely sensitive and are specific to each unique mission. Therefore, they are not always made publicly available. The utilization and sharing of existing tools, databases, and literature can help distribute useful information for future smallsat missions to hopefully avoid these common pitfalls. This paper will provide the required framework for current and future smallsat mission implementation by providing best practices and identifying helpful resources to assist with subsystem parts and services trade study selection.

Small Spacecraft↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The SSRI Knowledge Base Tool: Current Tool Functionality Review and Planned Future Enhancements

NASA’s Small Satellite Reliability Initiative (SSRI), in conjunction with NASA’s Small Spacecraft Systems Virtual Institute (S3VI), has developed the SSRI Knowledge Base to improve mission confidence for small spacecraft. The SSRI Knowledge Base provides vetted, high-quality sources of information on elements that are key to successful small spacecraft missions. These resources include SSRI working group generated documents and presentations in addition to existing guides, publications, standards, software tools, websites, and books. The Knowledge Base is fully searchable, offers downloadable content when possible, and otherwise links to or references content directly from within the tool. All 58 of the planned topic pages that comprise the SSRI Knowledge Base have been recently completed and include over 450 unique resources that are now available for review. Over the past several months significant enhancements to the tool’s capabilities have been developed and implemented. These enhancements consist of the completed baseline content; development of an Application Programming Interface (API); improved user interfaces; scalable and searchable Best Practices and Lessons Learned (BPLL) lists with ratings; and custom website analytics. The SSRI Knowledge Base is a comprehensive and searchable online tool that consolidates and organizes resources, best practices, and lessons learned from previous small spacecraft missions sponsored by NASA, other government agencies, and academia. This free, publicly available tool is available to the entire SmallSat community at: NASA SSRI Knowledge Base | Explore. This presentation will discuss the motivation for and development of the SSRI Knowledge Base, demonstrate the existing tool, share how the smallsat community can get involved and outline plans for further enhancement development. The SSRI is a collaborative activity with broad participation from civil, Department of Defense, and both national and international commercial space systems providers and stakeholders. The S3VI is jointly sponsored by NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate and Science Mission Directorate.

Small Spacecraft↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The SSRI Knowledge Base Tool: Current Tool Functionality Review and Planned Future Enhancements

NASA’s Small Satellite Reliability Initiative (SSRI), in conjunction with NASA’s Small Spacecraft Systems Virtual Institute (S3VI), has developed the SSRI Knowledge Base to improve mission confidence for small spacecraft. The SSRI Knowledge Base provides vetted, high-quality sources of information on elements that are key to successful small spacecraft missions. These resources include SSRI working group generated documents and presentations in addition to existing guides, publications, standards, software tools, websites, and books. The Knowledge Base is fully searchable, offers downloadable content when possible, and otherwise links to or references content directly from within the tool. All 58 of the planned topic pages that comprise the SSRI Knowledge Base have been recently completed and include over 450 unique resources that are now available for review. Over the past several months significant enhancements to the tool’s capabilities have been developed and implemented. These enhancements consist of the completed baseline content; development of an Application Programming Interface (API); improved user interfaces; scalable and searchable Best Practices and Lessons Learned (BPLL) lists with ratings; and custom website analytics. The SSRI Knowledge Base is a comprehensive and searchable online tool that consolidates and organizes resources, best practices, and lessons learned from previous small spacecraft missions sponsored by NASA, other government agencies, and academia. This free, publicly available tool is available to the entire SmallSat community at: NASA SSRI Knowledge Base | Explore. This presentation will discuss the motivation for and development of the SSRI Knowledge Base, demonstrate the existing tool, share how the smallsat community can get involved and outline plans for further enhancement development. The SSRI is a collaborative activity with broad participation from civil, Department of Defense, and both national and international commercial space systems providers and stakeholders. The S3VI is jointly sponsored by NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate and Science Mission Directorate.

Small Spacecraft↗