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Final Reports of the 2020 Los Alamos National Laboratory Computational Physics Student Summer Workshop

For the past ten years, the workshop has been bringing a highly talented and diverse group of student every summer. Students work in teams of two, alongside typically two mentors, on research projects reflecting a broad range of topics within computational physics. In addition, students attend a series of lectures on topics within computational physics, facility tours, and networking events. The program lasts ten weeks, with this year’s workshop running from June 8 to August 14. At the end of the summer, students give a final presentation, along with a written report. Those reports are what make up the remaining sections of this document. Admission to the workshop is by a competitive process, with the mentors forming the selection committee. One of the important accomplishments of the workshop has been to create a student pipeline from diverse schools that sometimes are not normally tapped by LANL recruiting. Many workshop students maintain a continuing relationship with LANL, returning as students interns, post-doctoral researchers, and staff members. Additionally, workshop alumni act as ambassadors for LANL. The result is a wider awareness both of LANL as a potential employer, and of the technical work that happens at LANL. This year, the workshop format was changed in several ways, in order to accommodate the off-site, virtual format. Students worked on LANL virtual desktop systems remotely, also accessing LANL HPC resources. In order to facilitate communication, student were given accounts on both Webex, a video teleconferencing platform, and Mattermost, an online team collaboration and chat platform, similar to Slack. Daily communication between students and mentors was primarily on Mattermost, with Webex conferencing as needed. The lectures were all done on Webex. Given the difficulty of the virtual format, and a concern that students might have video teleconferencing burn-out after an academic semester largely moved to that format, all lectures were optional this year. In spite of this, the attendance was generally high. Lecturers were asked to try to move to a more high-level, ”What is it?,” format. Once again, the students did a tremendous job. Over the course of ten weeks, they did important research across a staggering array of disciplines. The following pages contain the final report for each team’s research efforts. We hope you will find reading them as exciting as it was for us to produce them.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

UPC++ v1.0 Specification, Revision 2020.10.0

UPC++ is a C++11 library providing classes and functions that support Partitioned Global Address Space (PGAS) programming. The key communication facilities in UPC++ are one-sided Remote Memory Access (RMA) and Remote Procedure Call (RPC). All communication operations are syntactically explicit and default to non-blocking; asynchrony is managed through the use of futures, promises and continuation callbacks, enabling the programmer to construct a graph of operations to execute asynchronously as high-latency dependencies are satisfied. A global pointer abstraction provides system-wide addressability of shared memory, including host and accelerator memories. The parallelism model is primarily process-based, but the interface is thread-safe and designed to allow efficient and expressive use in multi-threaded applications. The interface is designed for extreme scalability throughout, and deliberately avoids design features that could inhibit scalability.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Securing Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

As the US electrifies the transportation sector, cyber attacks targeting vehicle charging could bring consequences to electrical system infrastructure. This is a growing area of concern as charging stations increase power delivery and must communicate to a range of entities to authorize charging, sequence the charging process, and manage load (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, charging network operators, etc.). The research challenges are numerous and are complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors interests involved. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), electric vehicle (EV), or grid communication system cybersecurity could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks - or public perception of such - ripples across the industry and has lasting and devastating effects. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. There is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured interfaces. Thus, comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project is providing the power, security, and automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, determining technology gaps, and identifying or developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team is creating a cybersecurity threat model and performing a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders can better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Cybersecurity of Networked Microgrids: Challenges Potential Solutions and Future Directions

Networked microgrids are clusters of geographically-close, islanded microgrids that can function as a single, aggregate island. This flexibility enables customer-level resilience and reliability improvements during extreme event outages and also reduces utility costs during normal grid operations. To achieve this cohesive operation, microgrid controllers and external connections (including advanced communication protocols, protocol translators, and/or internet connection) are needed. However, these advancements also increase the vulnerability landscape of networked microgrids, and significant consequences could arise during networked operation, increasing cascading impact. To address these issues, this report seeks to understand the unique components, functions, and communications within networked microgrids and what cybersecurity solutions can be implemented and what solutions need to be developed. A literature review of microgrid cybersecurity research is provided and a gap analysis of what is additionally needed for securing networked microgrids is performed. Relevant cyber hygiene and best practices to implement are provided, as well as ideas on how cybersecurity can be integrated into networked microgrid design. Lastly, future directions of networked microgrid cybersecurity R&D are provided to inform next steps.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Automated Cyber Security Testing Platform for Industrial Control Systems

Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) are a complex system of coupled physics controlled by a network of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs). These PLCs communicate process data across the network to coordinate control actions with each other and inform the operators of process variables and control decisions. Networking the PLCs allows more effective process control and provides the operator more information which results in more efficient plant operation. This interconnectivity creates new security issues, as operators have more access to the plant controls, so will bad actors. As plant networks become more digitized and encompass more sophisticated controllers, the network surface exposed to cyber interference grows. Understanding the dynamics of these coupled systems of physics, control logic, and network communications is critical to their protection. The research into the cybersecurity of the Operational Technologies of NPPs is developing and requires a platform that can allow high fidelity physics simulations to interact with digital networks of controllers. This will require three main components: a network simulation environment, a physics simulator, and virtual PLCs (vPLC) that represent typical industry hardware. A platform that incorporates these three components to provide the most accurate representation of actual NPP networks and controllers is developed in this paper.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Securing Distributed Energy Resource Integration

The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) is growing at much higher rates than predicted 20 years ago. Far from being used only in residential settings, DER are now installed on distribution and transmission circuits. In this position, they do not have the same properties as traditional generators and are more flexible in many cases. The growing penetration and range of uses for DER motivate the need to reliably and safely integrate them into the grid. Operators must be able to rely on them not only for normal operation, but also during abnormal conditions like black starts or adverse cyber scenarios. To that end, we study the communications, device interfaces, and potential consequences of DER operation under abnormal and adversarial conditions. The weaknesses of communications networks are studied based on the industrial protocols used, and the benefits of security features are examined. The device interfaces are found to be vulnerable to attack based on the requirements in the IEEE-1547 standard for DER interconnection and interoperability, which is expected to be adopted in the next ten years. In addition to exploring the requirements of the standard, we show that these vulnerabilities and others do exist and can be used maliciously in a modern storage system DER. Consequences of these vulnerabilities range from exacerbated grid instability, to simultaneous loss of large portions of DER penetration, to physical damage to inverters or DER themselves and other sensitive equipment. We tie these outcomes to specific attacker actions in an effort to give operators a better threat intelligence view that allows them to prioritize mitigations. Finally, we discuss mitigations that could prevent many of the adversarial scenarios described. Some solutions can be added to existing infrastructure, while others may require longer term planning for grid modernization with consideration for security.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Materials Challenges and Opportunities for Energy Generation, Conversion, Delivery, and Storage (Applied Energy Tri-Laboratory Consortium Workshop Report)

This report documents the outcomes of the Tri-Laboratory Materials Workshop that was held July 31 and August 1, 2019 to begin addressing the needs, opportunities, and challenges associated with the development, fabrication, and testing of the needed materials and components for integrated hybrid energy systems (i.e., incorporating nuclear, fossil, and renewables for electric and thermal applications). This was accomplished by assembling the research program leads and principal investigators at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), and National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), who support the research and development of new technology and system integration. The team then identified and prioritized key materials development needs. This effort was intended to enhance communications and synergy among the Tri-Lab partners. Advanced functional and structural materials are central to transformative energy technologies for energy generation, conversion, delivery, and storage. With that in mind, the workshop focused on identifying and assessing the foundational materials research needs at both the basic and applied levels. Materials challenges include the ability to withstand harsh environments, such as high temperatures and pressures, corrosion, oxidation, or irradiation while maintaining flexible mission profiles and long service lifespans. Advanced energy system material challenges and needs range from materials for the capture, upgrading/concentration, storage, and delivery of low-grade heat to materials for high temperature environments that involve liquid metals, molten salt, and very high temperature gas heat delivery and storage systems. Material improvements are needed for hybrid energy systems due to accelerated corrosion and stress-fatigue failure of materials and equipment, which results from increased frequency and amplitude of thermal, mechanical, and electrical cycling of systems components. Multifunctional materials are needed for high temperature solid-oxide fuel cells, advanced electrochemical reactors, and in-process separation. Relative to materials manufacturing, application of advanced additive and subtractive methods need to be understood to develop both thin-layer homogenous materials and materials of graded composition. Materials modeling and machine learning will be critical to accelerate the design and production of power electronics, and nuclear reactor materials and fuel, as well as to gain an understanding of beneficial materials phenomena or deleterious microstructure evolution. There is also a need for standardized models, computational structures, data reporting protocols and modeling tools across the three laboratories. This would allow consistent results, analysis, and data sharing. Combining computational capabilities between the three laboratories (e.g., hardware, software) would greatly increase computational capabilities and throughput. The workshop identified the need for laboratories to anticipate and address problems that will occur during scale-up. Laboratory work must connect with industry to ensure that research focuses on processes that are scalable and marketable. Industry input and perspective are essential to guide laboratory research to meet these requirements and deploy new technology in industrial demonstrations. Another aspect of scale-up is the integration of multiple systems since new challenges often arise at the subsystem interfaces. Establishing a scale-up manufacturing demonstration/pilot plant, potentially as an industrial user facility, would be beneficial to the laboratories and industry. That modular scale-up manufacturing demonstration/pilot plant would allow researchers to find and resolve interface problems that cannot be identified by focusing only on individual parts. Communication exchanges among the organizers, attendees, and workshop survey responses indicate that the workshop was successful in achieving its goal to identify key technology gaps and research needs. Strong positive feedback was received on the sharing of ideas, capabilities, talent, and passion to move forward on the materials-related action items.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

FLC Award: QED: Quantum Ensured Defense of the Smart Electric Grid

A reliable electric power supply is crucial for modern day life as well as national security, economic productivity, and life-and-death essentials. During the COVID pandemic, internet and cell communications became a “must-have” for government and business operations, education, and communicating COVID testing for vaccine information. Loss of electric power quickly leads to human health and national security emergencies. When a major winter storm hit Texas in mid-February 2021, the system was overwhelmed and over 4M people lost power. Although this crisis arose from an unprecedented weather event - not a cyberattack - it serves as a vivid illustration of the impact power disruption can have on our American way of life. The recent cyberattack on the Colonial Oil Pipeline also provides a stark reminder that infrastructure supporting our daily lives has vulnerabilities.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Final Reports of the 2021 Los Alamos National Laboratory Computational Physics Student Summer Workshop

Since 2011, the Los Alamos National Laboratory Computational Physics Student Summer Workshop has been bringing together a highly talented and diverse group of students every summer. Students work in teams of two, alongside typically two mentors, on research projects reflecting a broad range of topics within computational physics. In addition, students attend a series of lectures on topics within computational physics, facility tours, and networking events. The program lasts ten weeks, with this year’s workshop running from June 7 to August 13. At the end of the summer, students give a final presentation, along with a written report. Those reports are what make up the remaining sections of this document. Admission to the workshop is by a competitive process, with the mentors forming the selection committee. One of the important accomplishments of the workshop has been to create a student pipeline from diverse schools that sometimes are not normally tapped by LANL recruiting. Many workshop students maintain a continuing relationship with LANL, returning as student interns, post-doctoral researchers, and staff members. Additionally, workshop alumni act as ambassadors for LANL. The result is a wider awareness both of LANL as a potential employer, and of the technical work that happens at LANL. This year, the workshop was once again in an off-site, virtual format. Students worked on LANL virtual desktop systems remotely, also accessing LANL HPC resources. In order to facilitate communication, student were given accounts on both Webex, a video teleconferencing platform, and Mattermost, an online team collaboration and chat platform, similar to Slack. Daily communication between students and mentors was primarily on Mattermost, with Webex conferencing as needed. The lectures were all done on Webex. Given the difficulty of the virtual format, and a concern that students might have video teleconferencing burn-out, all lectures were optional this year. In spite of this, the attendance was generally high. Lecturers were asked to try to move to a more high-level, ”What is it?,” format. Once again, the students did a tremendous job. Over the course of ten weeks, they did important research across a staggering array of disciplines. The following pages contain the final report for each team’s research efforts. Enjoy!

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

UPC++ v1.0 Specification, Revision 2021.9.0

UPC++ is a C++ library providing classes and functions that support Partitioned Global Address Space (PGAS) programming. The key communication facilities in UPC++ are one-sided Remote Memory Access (RMA) and Remote Procedure Call (RPC). All communication operations are syntactically explicit and default to non-blocking; asynchrony is managed through the use of futures, promises and continuation callbacks, enabling the programmer to construct a graph of operations to execute asynchronously as high-latency dependencies are satisfied. A global pointer abstraction provides system-wide addressability of shared memory, including host and accelerator memories. The parallelism model is primarily process-based, but the interface is thread-safe and designed to allow efficient and expressive use in multi-threaded applications. The interface is designed for extreme scalability throughout, and deliberately avoids design features that could inhibit scalability.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Using the CYBER-Champ Model to Determine Cyber Competencies and Role Alignment

Cybersecurity roles, tasks, and skills are seen by many organizations as nonessential, abstract, or complicated. Although standards are in place, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800-181 document titled “Workforce Framework for Cybersecurity (NICE Framework)” available since September 2012, companies are still showing security vulnerabilities in their cyber networks (Hatzes, 2020). Barriers towards creating a cyber-ready workforce are not always due to a lack of resources, but often caused by organizational structure. The need for cyber-cognizant job postings, improved communication between Operational Technology (OT) and Information Technology (IT) employees, increases in staffing and funding for cyber teams, and better communication of standards and training can all contribute to increasing an organization’s cyber resilience. Cybersecurity Competency Health and Maturity Progression model (CYBER-CHAMP) is a model aimed at evaluating an organization’s structure and individual employee’s cyber knowledge and helps develop a plan to reach competency. This model was used to engage with organizations to promote proper cyber protocols and policies. The aim of this paper is to answer if it is possible for an organization to build a cyber-ready workforce by providing education and training options for current employees and prepare the future workforce to be ready on day one of employment. Both open source and firsthand interviews with organizations were used to conduct the research contained in this document. Further research may include additional development to the CYBER-CHAMP model and its delivery platform.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Storage Futures Study: The Challenge of Defining Long-Duration Energy Storage

This document explores the definition of "long duration" as applied to energy storage. Given the growing use of this term, a uniform definition could aid in communication and consistency among various stakeholders. There is large and growing use of the ARPA-E definition of greater than 10 hours. However, the term "long-duration energy storage" is often used as shorthand for storage with sufficient duration to provide firm capacity and support grid resource adequacy. The actual duration needed for this application varies significantly from as little as a few hours to potentially multiple days. This leads to the unsatisfying conclusion that there cannot be a simple, uniform, and static definition of long duration storage that captures its ability to provide firm capacity and also aids consistent communication.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Recommended Practices for Managing Induced Seismicity Risk Associated with Geologic Carbon Storage

The geologic storage of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) is one method to help reduce or eliminate atmospheric CO 2 emissions. The sequestered CO 2 is originally captured from the atmosphere or from a stationary industrial source and subsequently injected into a deep subsurface porous rock formation. To facilitate the successful deployment of field scale carbon storage projects, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is developing tools and protocols for defensible, science-based frameworks to quantify and mitigate risks associated with the long-term storage of CO 2 . This protocol specifically addresses the risk of induced seismicity due to injection in a geologic carbon storage (GCS) site. This integrated and risk-based protocol is a product of the U.S. DOE Fossil Energy’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP), a multi-year collaborative research effort of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). These recommended practices describe a set of 7 steps to evaluate, manage, communicate, and mitigate the risk of induced seismicity at GCS sites. The base methodology of the recommended practices follows a framework similar to the Protocol for Addressing Induced Seismicity Associated with Enhanced Geothermal Systems (Majer et al., 2012), developed for the Geothermal Technology Office of the U.S. DOE. These recommended practices present a framework to systematically assess the induced seismicity risk and quantify the associated uncertainties. These recommendations are based on current research and are sufficiently general to allow for modification and application to a variety of different types of sites. The substance of the recommended practices contained herein includes both technical and non-technical issues, and covers all operational stages of the GCS project lifecycle. They start at the preliminary risk assessment phase, continue through site assessment and characterization, include best practice communication and seismic monitoring plan methodologies, discuss the evaluation and mitigation of seismic hazard and risk, and closes with an exploration of operational management plans, which conclude when the induced seismicity risk abates back to background level. The focus of these recommendations is on actively managing the risks associated with induced seismicity by developing an actionable risk management plan that starts at the project proposal stage and continues through site closure through an iterative assessment and improvement process. The audience of this document is expected to include all interested stakeholders (e.g., operators, project developers, regulators, and the general public) and is expressly written to be accessible to this broad range of partners. This document is intended to disseminate knowledge gained through recent advances in the science of induced seismicity hazard and risk assessments, to provide updates based on recent experience gained by similar corollary injection-induced seismicity cases, and most importantly to establish a uniform framework to carry out a successful induced seismicity risk management plan for carbon storage projects in the future. These recommendations do not directly address any domestic or international regulations or standards. A complementary NRAP report makes recommendations for the assessment and management of environmental subsurface risks associated with unwanted fluid migration at GCS sites (Thomas et al., 2021) and should be referred to in order to address those additional GCS site risks.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Evidence of Completion of Milestone 4: Simulation Testbed Validated with Experimental Data

Milestone 4 is given in the SOPO as being due in quarter 5 (ending 9/11/2020) and is described thus: Milestone 4: Enhanced Simulation Testbed Validated with Experimental Data (UM, Mathieu). Simulation testbed validated with data obtained from experimental testbed, specifically, nonlinear load behaviors and communication network issues observed in the experimental testbed will be modeled in the simulation testbed. The simulation testbed should accurately capture TCL real and reactive power consumption (including during extreme events associated with nonlinear behaviors and communication network failures) to within 5% RMSE error with respect to data obtained from the experimental testbed. The Tasks comprising the work to achieve Milestone 4 are outlined here.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Recommended Practices for Managing Induced Seismicity Risk Associated with Geologic Carbon Storage

The geologic storage of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) is one method to help reduce or eliminate atmospheric CO 2 emissions. The sequestered CO 2 is originally captured from the atmosphere or from a stationary industrial source and subsequently injected into a deep subsurface porous rock formation. To facilitate the successful deployment of field scale carbon storage projects, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is developing tools and protocols for defensible, science-based frameworks to quantify and mitigate risks associated with the long-term storage of CO 2 . This protocol specifically addresses the risk of induced seismicity due to injection in a geologic carbon storage (GCS) site. This integrated and risk-based protocol is a product of the U.S. DOE Fossil Energy’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP), a multi-year collaborative research effort of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), National Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL), and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). These recommended practices describe a set of 7 steps to evaluate, manage, communicate, and mitigate the risk of induced seismicity at GCS sites. The base methodology of the recommended practices follows a framework similar to the $\textit{Protocol for Addressing Induced Seismicity Associated with Enhanced Geothermal Systems}$ (Majer et al., 2012), developed for the Geothermal Technology Office of the U.S. DOE. These recommended practices present a framework to systematically assess the induced seismicity risk and quantify the associated uncertainties. These recommendations are based on current research and are sufficiently general to allow for modification and application to a variety of different types of sites. The substance of the recommended practices contained herein includes both technical and non-technical issues, and covers all operational stages of the GCS project lifecycle. They start at the preliminary risk assessment phase, continue through site assessment and characterization, include best practice communication and seismic monitoring plan methodologies, discuss the evaluation and mitigation of seismic hazard and risk, and closes with an exploration of operational management plans, which conclude when the induced seismicity risk abates back to background level. The focus of these recommendations is on actively managing the risks associated with induced seismicity by developing an actionable risk management plan that starts at the project proposal stage and continues through site closure through an iterative assessment and improvement process. The audience of this document is expected to include all interested stakeholders (e.g., operators, project developers, regulators, and the general public) and is expressly written to be accessible to this broad range of partners. This document is intended to disseminate knowledge gained through recent advances in the science of induced seismicity hazard and risk assessments, to provide updates based on recent experience gained by similar corollary injection-induced seismicity cases, and most importantly to establish a uniform framework to carry out a successful induced seismicity risk management plan for carbon storage projects in the future. These recommendations do not directly address any domestic or international regulations or standards. A complementary NRAP report makes recommendations for the assessment and management of environmental subsurface risks associated with unwanted fluid migration at GCS sites (Thomas et al., 2021) and should be referred to in order to address those additional GCS site risks

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Adapting Secure MultiParty Computation to Support Machine Learning in Radio Frequency Sensor Networks

In this project we developed and validated algorithms for privacy-preserving linear regression using a new variant of Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) we call "Hybrid MPC" (hMPC). Our variant is intended to support low-power, unreliable networks of sensors with low-communication, fault-tolerant algorithms. In hMPC we do not share training data, even via secret sharing. Thus, agents are responsible for protecting their own local data. Only the machine learning (ML) model is protected with information-theoretic security guarantees against honest-but-curious agents. There are three primary advantages to this approach: (1) after setup, hMPC supports a communication-efficient matrix multiplication primitive, (2) organizations prevented by policy or technology from sharing any of their data can participate as agents in hMPC, and (3) large numbers of low-power agents can participate in hMPC. We have also created an open-source software library named "Cicada" to support hMPC applications with fault-tolerance. The fault-tolerance is important in our applications because the agents are vulnerable to failure or capture. We have demonstrated this capability at Sandia's Autonomy New Mexico laboratory through a simple machine-learning exercise with Raspberry Pi devices capturing and classifying images while flying on four drones.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Olympus System Backplane Definition

The purpose of this document is to define the backplane of the Olympus firing system, a modular system based on SpaceWire communication between modules. The backplane provides the connection between the modules, controller (embedded in the front module), the SpaceWire router, and an alternative switch. Those connections include SpaceWire links, interlocks, a key, a dead-man switch (DMS)/charge, timing lines, power distribution, geographical addresses, and communication to the human-machine interface (HMI). This backplane is based on the VMEBus International Trade Association (VITA) 46 Specification (VPX) and OpenVPX standards for a 3U backplane. Unless otherwise specified, those standards apply for signal definitions and mechanical specifications.

42 ENGINEERING↗

ENG 572 Interim Report

Sandia National Laboratories is a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) founded in 1949 with the mission of developing and testing the non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons. Sandia has since been involved with numerous projects to support the Department of Defense’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). One such set of projects has been implementing over-the-road transportation security enhancements. Under this program, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has worked to develop interface compatibility modifications for existing shipping configurations. This summer I will be working with a line of trailers that have been used to transport high asset cargo. These vehicles have successfully traveled millions of miles without any accidents over the course of 15 years. The primary motivation for the work that I will complete this summer is to provide support for existing electronic communication technologies implemented at SNL. As part of an ongoing project to implement modifications to a trailer system, I will focus primarily on the characterization and testing of thermal electric coolers (TEC). Within the scope of the trailer project, these devices provide temperature control for lasers used on optical communication boards (OCB).

42 ENGINEERING↗