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DOE OSTI2021

FY2020 performance assessment annual review for the E-area low-level waste facility

The Savannah River Site (SRS) E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF) consists of six types of disposal units described in the Performance Assessment (PA) (WSRC, 2008): Low Activity Waste Vault (LAWV), Intermediate Level Vault (ILV), Trenches [Slit Trenches (STs), Engineered Trenches (ETs), and Component-in-Grout (CIG) Trenches], and Naval Reactor Component Disposal Areas (NRCDAs). The ELLWF is a part of the Solid Waste Management Facility (SWMF). SWMF is managed and operated by the SRS Management and Operations prime contractor, Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). Within SRNS, the Solid Waste Management (SWM) organization is responsible for operating the SWMF, and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) is the technical agency responsible for preparing and maintaining the PA. SWMF operations have been performed at SRS since 1952. The mission of the SWMF is to provide storage, processing, disposal, and shipment of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed waste. The SWMF is committed to treat, store, and dispose of these waste products in a manner that protects the environment and the health and safety of the facility worker, the co-located worker, and the offsite general public. Wastes handled in the SWMF include low level waste, transuranic waste, hazardous waste, Toxic Substances Control Act waste, and mixed waste (containing both hazardous and radioactive constituents). The FY2020 PA Annual Review for the ELLWF affirms that the disposal facility continued to operate within the bounds of the current PA and Composite Analysis (CA) baseline and the subsequent SA’s and satisfied all the requirements, conditions, and limitations identified in the 2008 DAS (DOE 2008a), RWMB SRNL_STI-2020-00588 Revision 0 vi (McGill, 2020), and ELLWF Low-Level Waste Acceptance Criteria (SRS-1S, 2014). This annual review affirms that the supporting studies performed in FY2020 do not alter the conclusions of the ELLWF PA (WSRC, 2008) and that there is a reasonable expectation that the ELLWF will meet the performance objectives delineated in DOE Manual 435.1-1 (DOE 2011)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Lightning Burnthrough to Containment Breach of 55-Gallon TRU Waste Drums

We investigated by arc-plasma heating the feasibility of attributing inherent lightning protection to 55-gallon DOT 7A, Type A, open head carbon steel drums made of 1.5 millimeter painted carbon steel, designed to protect Department of Energy transuranic nuclear waste. The Sandia Lightning Simulator transferred continuing current in 300 ampere (A), 400 A, and 500 A tests to achieve a 350 coulomb charge transfer and simulate cloud-to-ground lightning attachment to test coupons and 9 drums. A tungsten electrode was placed 0.75 inch from the drums. High-speed photography was recorded to observe the exterior containment breach, or "first light," seen on camera when burnthrough opened a hole in the containment. Sheet metal burnthrough occurred between 18 and 71 coulombs in lid and rolling hoop tests, but 12-gauge closure ring tests did not result in burnthrough, which suggests this feature may provide an inherent air terminal protective feature.

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DOE OSTI2020

An Enhanced Safeguards Approach for Accelerator Driven Systems utilized to Close the Fuel Cycle

Further to our previous safeguards approach for Accelerator Driven Systems, which focused on estimates of fissile material production using relevant proton accelerator systems and corresponding safeguards needs for fuel storage, the subcritical reactor, and spent fuel storage material balances areas, this report is more expansive and considers utilization of ADS for either burning of transuranics or breeding of fissile materials. We find that the recycled fuels likely intended for ADS will be thermally and radioactively hot to such a degree that it is likely reprocessing and fuel fabrication will have to be co - located with the ADS reactor facility to avoid impractical hot fuel transportation issues. As such, we consider in detail the full ADS system to include material balance areas for spent fuel receiving, reprocessing, storage & cooling, fuel fabrication, subcritical reactor area, and waste storage & handling. Furthermore, aqueous - based separation methods like PUREX cannot tolerate the intense heat of the ADS fuels, so pyroprocessing will likely be required. With these considerations, we developed an Enhanced Safeguards Approach for ADS beyond the work done in our first report, and conclude that significant diagnostic development is needed , a nd provide safeguards recommendations. We have also included an appendix regarding some country programs, in particular the Chinese ADANES burner/breeder program a nd the Indian thorium - based breeder program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

MARSAME Radiological Release Report TA-50, TRU Liquid Waste Construction Soil

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship (EPC-ES) has determined that the soil associated with Technical Area 50 (TA-50), Transuranic (TRU) Liquid Waste construction project (TLW) meets the criteria for unrestricted release to the public under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1, Radiation Protection for the Public and the Environment (DOE 2020, NNSA 2021). This conclusion is based on the known history of the area combined with soil sample data collected in 2021; the findings are consistent with DOE Order 458.1 and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Functional Series Document EPC ES-FSD-004, Environmental Radiation Protection (LANL 2020a). Sampling and data analysis, as described in this report, were sufficient to meet measurement quality objectives under the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) manual (MARSAME 2000) and LANL procedures (LANL 2020b). Final approvals for waste disposition will come from LANL’s Waste Management Program. The scope of this final release report includes the TLW construction site soil located south of TA-50, Building 001.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

Improbability of Nuclear Criticality in Compacted Criticality Control Overpacks after Room Closure by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Based on the rationale presented, nuclear criticality is improbable after salt creep causes compaction of criticality control overpacks (CCOs) disposed at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, an operating repository in bedded salt for the disposal of transuranic (TRU) waste from atomic energy defense activities. For most TRU waste, the possibility of post-closure criticality is exceedingly small either because the salt neutronically isolates TRU waste canisters or because closure of a disposal room from salt creep does not sufficiently compact the low mass of fissile material. The criticality potential has been updated here because of the introduction of CCOs, which may dispose up to 380 fissile gram equivalent plutonium-239 in each container. The criticality potential is evaluated through high-fidelity geomechanical modeling of a disposal room filled with CCOs during two representative conditions: (1) large salt block fall, and (2) gradual salt compaction (without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation to permit maximum room closure). Geomechanical models of rock fall demonstrate three tiers of CCOs are not greatly disrupted. Geomechanical models of gradual room closure from salt creep predict irregular arrays of closely packed CCOs after 1000 years, when room closure has asymptotically approached maximum compaction. Criticality models of spheres and cylinders of 380 fissile gram equivalent of plutonium (as oxide) at the predicted irregular spacing demonstrate that an array of CCOs is not critical when surrounded by salt and magnesium oxide, provided the amount of hydrogenous material shipped in the CCO (usually water and plastics) is controlled or boron carbide (a neutron poison) is mixed with the fissile contents.

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DOE OSTI2022

Discrete-event Simulation Process Model for the Pyrochemical Processing of Plutonium at Los Alamos National Laboratory

The pyrochemical metal production operations that occur in the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory perform plutonium purification with the aim to provide plutonium metal for a variety of defense- and non-defense missions within the National Nuclear Security Administration. The demands and constraints associated with the pyrochemical processing of plutonium are complex, making decision analyses challenging for program managers who require plutonium production for their mission applications. The construction of a discrete-event simulation process model is proposed to measure and report the process capacity, material throughput, equipment requirements, and dose accumulation for operators of the pyrochemical metal production operations. The process model, constructed in the ExtendSim™ software, will represent the cause-and-effect relationships between the pyrochemical processing environment and the process constraints, including criticality limitations, material control and accountability measures, chemical analysis requirements, and equipment availability. An accurate representation of the pyrochemical metal production process capacity through simulation modeling will be helpful to program managers in their efforts to forecast plutonium availability for mission applications. Furthermore, the proposed process model will be vital for future analyses that will measure the interactions between the pyrochemical metal production operations and the aqueous reprocessing operations and their ability to minimize transuranic waste disposal.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2021

Modeling 233 Pa Generation in Thorium-fueled Reactors for Safeguards

Thorium has been considered as a possible alternative to uranium for nuclear fuel for many decades. It is three to four times more abundant in the earth than uranium and produces significantly less long-lived transuranic nuclear waste. Some claim thorium poses fewer proliferation concerns than other fuel types largely due to 232 U buildup (and associated high energy gamma-emitting decay products) in the irradiated thorium fuel. However, to fully explore potential proliferation concerns, generation and subsequent decay of 233 Pa produced in the reactor core still must be studied. With its half-life of 27 days, 233 Pa decays to 233 U, which is an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defined special fissionable material that can be used for nuclear weapons production. With more research being dedicated to thorium-fueled reactors, and several of these reactor designs possessing online fuel processing (allowing for on-site protactinium separation), it is important to understand this potential proliferation pathway. In particular, it is theoretically possible to extract protactinium from the irradiated fuel salt before it decays into 233 U. This hypothetical potential diversion can become an even greater proliferation concern if the extracted protactinium is purified through a second separation of protactinium approximately ten days later to remove the short half-life decay products of 232 Pa and 234 Pa, thus resulting in a higher concentration of the 233 Pa isotope, which decays into weapons usable 233 U with hardly any 232 U or 234 U in it. To estimate the concern of this potential proliferation challenge of thorium, different nuclear material accountancy techniques were reviewed for their viability to quantify 233 Pa if extracted from used thorium fuel. Characteristics of interest included technology maturity, cost, precision, and time taken to acquire results. Some technologies, like hybrid K-edge densitometry and passive gamma spectroscopy, appear to be viable techniques based on current literature. Due to the limited scope of this project, only passive gamma spectroscopy was further investigated. Three different reactor types (PWR, CANDU, MSR) were modeled with mixed thorium-uranium oxide fuels that were burned until the fuel was spent. The protactinium in the used fuel was extracted at the time of shutdown and the change in isotopic content of the protactinium quantified. Gamma spectroscopy simulations were performed for the protactinium isotopes and their decay products at various decay times. Given the simplicity of the models and large assumptions made (e.g. no background, no shielding, no self-attenuation), the initial results indicate that though 233 Pa is detectible for all the reactor types modeled at all decay times (0 to 300 days), more work should be done with higher fidelity models.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

DOE OSTI2022

OPP-B332-032 Rev AD

The purpose of this procedure is to provide the approved method for converting transuranic (TRU) contaminated liquid waste into acceptable TRU waste forms.

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DOE OSTI2022

OPP-B332-035 Rev AD

This procedure provides instructions for converting transuranic (TRU) contaminated liquid waste into acceptable TRU waste forms.

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DOE OSTI2022

Analysis of a Bulk 237 Np Oxide Sample for Trace Actinides

A neptunium oxide sample was dissolved and trace actinide constituents were measured by isotope dilution ICP-MS (for 239–244 Pu, 233–238 U, 237 Np, 241–243 Am) and alpha spectrometry ( 238 Pu, 242 Cm, 244 Cm). This material contained significant quantities of transuranic elements, notably americium and curium. The isotopic composition of the material will continue to evolve over time due to radioactive decay; the measurements reported here include all isotopes decay corrected to a reference date of 1/1/2022. These factors may be considerations in criticality studies of the related 237 Np sphere.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

DOE OSTI2022

Options for the Removal of Cesium and Strontium from Acidic Uranyl Sulfate Solutions from Molybdenum-99 Production

A small laboratory-scale column process aimed at removing fission products from prototypical acidic sulfate solution wastes from a prototypical Mo-99 recovery process has been operated in a radioactive materials hood at Savannah River National Laboratory. This equipment has been operated with realistic concentrations of uranium (0.4 wt % 235 U), plutonium ( 239 Pu), neptunium ( 237 Np), non-radioactive surrogates of common fission products (including Cs and Sr) and two promising absorbents AMP-PAN and CST R91290-B. The goal of this work was to demonstrate the removal and concentration of high specific activity isotopes which are expected to dominate the classification of the low-level waste from the production of 99 Mo. Both AMP-PAN and CST R9120-B are attractive absorbents for the removal of 137 Cs from an acidic sulfate waste stream. They do not provide a solution for the removal of 90 Sr from the acidic solutions, but CST should be investigated at a higher pH. Limited removal of transuranic species and almost no removal of uranium was observed in this testing. This could be important due to the relatively large amount of uranium expected to be present in such waste streams. The capacity of these absorbents for 137 Cs will likely be dependent on the Cs concentration in the solutions processed but loading in the range of 0.2 to 5 mg Cs per gram of absorbent appears to be achievable.

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DOE OSTI2022

Solubility of An(OH) 3 am and An(OH) 3 cr in the presence of Citrate and EDTA

The solubility of An(III), which pertains to Pu(III), Am(III), and Cm(III), in brine is an important contributor in WIPP (Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) performance assessment (PA) models to calculate the potential release of transuranic elements in the near-field environment of the WIPP repository. Americium, although present in much smaller quantities than plutonium (~ 336 kg on year 2033 is potentially WIPP-bound primarily as Am-241), has a significant impact on release due to its higher activity during the earlier times of repository history (~26% initially, decreasing to 17% and ~0% at 1000 and 10,000 years after emplacement) (SOTERM, 2019). Lanthanide analogues such as Nd 3+ possess physical and chemical characteristics that allow them to be used to examine the chemical behavior of trivalent actinides (Lucchini, et al., 2007).

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

DOE OSTI2023

Exploratory Synthesis for Reactive f-Element Separations without Solvent

Solvent extraction is commonly used to separate different f-metals found in spent nuclear fuel, but this process results in large volumes of highly contaminated liquid waste that must be remediated or stored at significant expense. The project funded under this award was aimed at addressing solvent-related issues encountered in conventional f-metal separations. Our strategy focused on using solvent-free mechanochemical reactions to prepare lanthanide and actinide borohydride complexes so that they could be separated based on differences in their volatility. Key deliverables described in this report include proof-of-principle results demonstrating that borohydrides called aminodiboranates can be used for volatile lanthanide/lanthanide and lanthanide/uranium separations, as we proposed. Moreover, exploration of a closely related class of borohydrides called phosphinodiboranates allowed us to identify underlying chemical factors that control the volatility of trivalent lanthanide and uranium borohydride complexes with identical structures. Details of published and pending research products are provided, and these include comprehensive synthesis and characterization efforts required to support fundamental studies related to the proposed separations. These technical efforts supported the training of nine graduate students and three undergraduate researchers, and they established air-sensitive transuranic capabilities at the University of Iowa to enhance radiochemical workforce development.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

DOE OSTI2022

Measurement Plan for Uncertainty Contributions to 252 Cf Waste Measurements

This measurement plan establishes the methodology for performing and analyzing mock-up measurements of Building 7930 Cell G Cf waste generated from 252 Cf product preparation to better determine the measurement uncertainty contributors. Understanding the uncertainty contributors will establish the total measurement uncertainty. This is critical because it will impact the administrative threshold at which personnel can discriminate between low-level waste (LLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste.

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DOE OSTI2021

Waste Compliance and Tracking System (WCATS) Version 3 Requirements Document

This document describes the end-user requirements for the Waste Compliance and Tracking System (WCATS) project in accordance with the WCATS Software Quality Management Plan, EPC-WMP-WCATSPLAN-001. The WCATS application shall support the generation, characterization, processing, and shipment of LANL radioactive, hazardous, and industrial waste. Regulatory drivers include RCRA hazardous waste, DOT shipping, NNSA nuclear material control and accountability, DOE nuclear safety, TSDF permit, and transuranic waste certification requirements. The system will utilize a task-based architecture that supports the spectrum of treatment, storage, disposal, administrative, and characterization based unit operations necessary to manage waste from cradle to grave. The application design shall readily accommodate new facilities, processes, workflow, signature requirements, and so forth, via end-user established metadata. WCATS will provide support for representing waste storage and disposal facilities, buildings, rooms, and grid layouts (x, y, z) to support waste and radioactive material inventory management. Nuclear material at risk (MAR), DOE hazard rating (e.g., Category II facility) compliance per DOE-STD-1027, and permit inventory requirements will be configurable for any storage or disposal facility, or waste operation, and the system will automatically evaluate and enforce those requirements. In addition, the application will support the characterization and management of the entire range of hazardous and radioactive wastes (TRU, MTRU, LLW, MLLW, hazardous waste, etc.) that might be colocated or processed at a permitted facility. Some capabilities not found in traditional systems include user-defined tank systems for liquid waste, user-defined work paths (i.e., sequence of operations), and an equipment subsystem for tracking the calibration, maintenance, and inspection of tools used to process waste, such as torque wrenches, scales, pH probes, etc. The application incorporates a desktop and mobile user interface as shown in Figure 1. The mobile interface supports field operations, such as waste item characterization, intra-facility transfers, internal and external audits, and shipment preparation and receipt.

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DOE OSTI2023

Options for the Removal of Cesium and Strontium from Acidic Uranyl Sulfate Solutions from Molybdenum-99 Production: Part II The Effect of Sodium Carbonate Adjustment to pH 9 on Strontium Removal

A small laboratory-scale column process aimed at removing fission products from prototypical acidic sulfate solution wastes from a prototypical Mo-99 recovery process has been operated in a radioactive materials hood at Savannah River National Laboratory. This equipment has been operated with realistic concentrations of uranium (0.4 wt % 235 U), plutonium ( 239 Pu), neptunium ( 237 Np), non-radioactive surrogates of common fission products (including Cs and Sr) and two promising absorbents – AMP-PAN and CST R9120-B. The goal of this work was to demonstrate the removal and concentration of high specific activity isotopes which are expected to dominate the classification of the low-level waste from the production of 99 Mo. Both AMP-PAN and CST R9120-B are attractive absorbents for the removal of 137 Cs from an acidic sulfate waste stream. They do not provide a solution for the removal of 90 Sr from the acidic solutions. CST was shown to be useful at removing both Cs and Sr after adjustment of the acidic sulfate solution with sodium carbonate to pH 9. Limited removal of transuranic species and almost no removal of uranium was observed for CST R9120B absorbent. This could be important due to the relatively large amount of uranium expected to be present in such waste streams. The capacity of these absorbents for 137 Cs will likely be dependent on the Cs concentration in the solutions processed but loading in excess of 0.7 mg Cs per gram of CST absorbent while loading 0.14 mg Sr per gram of CST absorbent appears to be achievable from pH 9 carbonate solution.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2023

Report on the Analysis of Plutonium-238 Oxide, Campaign #P5PO

Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is currently producing Plutonium-238 oxide for NASA space programs. Through the irradiation of NpO 2 pellets in the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR), the production of Pu-238 oxide will be used for electrical power and heat on NASA spacecraft such as the Curiosity Mars Rover and the Voyager 1 and 2. The Transuranium Analytical Laboratory (TAL) leads the analytical effort for this project, which includes the dissolution of plutonium product oxide (PUP) and the analysis of the dissolved product solution using both radiological and inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) techniques that are required to meet product specifications. The Transuranic Analytical Laboratory received three samples of Pu-238 oxide for analysis in January of 2022. This report documents the analytical protocols performed by the TAL along with the results produced from said analytical protocols. This report also includes a comparison with the general-purpose heat source (GPHS) specifications.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

DOE OSTI2024

Exploratory Synthesis for Reactive f-Element Separations without Solvent

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗