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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Fork Union EPC Installation Observation Report

On June 22nd and 23rd, a representative from Savannah River National Lab (SRNL) traveled to the Fork Union substation in Fork Union, Virginia (owned and operated by Dominion Energy) to observe the installation, calibration, and commissioning of three Electric Phenomena Cluster (EPC) sensors. The installation in its entirety included the physical securing of the EPC sensors by Dominion Energy, fiber optic cable (furnished by SmartSenseComm) being run in conduits and cable trays from the EPC sensor to the Optical Processing Unit (OPU) located in the substation switch house. The location of the EPC sensors, OPU, and cable routing can be seen in the figures included.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber Resilient Flexible Alternating Current Transmission Systems (XFACTS)

This report summarizes the activities conducted under the DOE-OE funded project DEOE0000897, Cyber Attack Resilient Flexible AC Systems – XFACTS. Hitachi Energy (HE), in collaboration with ABB Inc. (ABB), Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), Iowa State University (ISU), and University of Idaho (UI) pursued the development of a system of defense for Flexible Alternating current Transmission Systems against cyber-attacks (XFACTS). A FACTS substation enhanced with XFACTS defense mechanisms will be capable of mitigating cyberattacks especially those that seek to control electrical parameters like voltage or current and interrupt the power flow in AC lines. It empowers existing FACTS controllers and associated intelligent electronic devices to detect and mitigate malicious intents to depress system voltages, destabilize power flows, trip AC circuit breakers, corrupt currents, and voltages, even if the malicious commands and the measurements have correct syntax. The XFACTS functions utilize the physics of active power electronic systems, control and protection, electric power engineering principles, and state estimation to bring more in-depth cyber defense closer to the protected FACTS substation devices.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

California Energy Systems for the 21st Century (CES-21) Program, CRADA TC02200 (Final Report)

The following report representsthe culmination of a five-year Cybersecurity Research and Development (R&D) program performed by California’s Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and funded by the IOUs’ electricity ratepayers as authorized by California Legislation and the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). The cybersecurity R&D, which was intensely technical in nature, was broken into three major workstreams: 1. The development of a modeling & simulation platform, to explore the potential effects of various threat and response scenarios at grid scale; 2. The establishment of a physical testbed with separate substation instances from each of the IOUs, to evaluate threats and responses on actual substation equipment; 3. The development of a research package consisting of several capabilities to support the industry’s evolution towards automated threat response and other next-generation cybersecurity techniques Throughout the program, there was extensive collaboration between the program team and national laboratories, federal departments, academic institutions and industry organizations. Several of the tools developed through the program have been made available to the open source community, to enable faster adoption and continued development of important cybersecurity capabilities. While this program began to develop much of the foundation for automated threat response, much work remains to be done, and this report recommends a series of next steps. While the Executive Summary below has been simplified as much as possible, the very technical nature of the subject matter would make further reduction difficult without causing meaning to be lost. Due to the sensitive nature of the research, some topics are intentionally covered at a high level to protect the research and therefore the electric grid and customers of California and the Nation. For further detail, clarification or questions we suggest discussion with the program team.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Electrical Fault Detection, Power Quality, Distributed Energy Resource Use Cases, and Cyber Event Applications with the Cyber Grid Guard System Using Distributed Ledger Technology

Electrical utilities continue to deploy more intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) inside and outside electrical substation and are associated with distributed energy resources (DERs). The integrity and confidentiality of data from IEDs is crucial, and distributed ledger technology (DLT) could improve the resilience of microgrids by helping to make these data more secure. The most popular applications using blockchain technology for electrical utilities is in the field is based on energy trading. However, the dynamism of the penetration of customer owned DERs and the deployment of sensors with IEDs have led to the identification of new applications using DLT that are focused on other areas, such as monitoring, operation and management of the grid and its assets. In addition, the majority of studies on electrical grid applications with blockchain were validated with software simulations. Although general monitoring of power systems for using DLT could be evaluated in operational electric grids, other DLT research applications such as defense against cyber-attacks and/or electrical fault detection are not likely to be performed in a real infrastructure because of possible risks to the network/equipment security. This report summarizes the application of power system applications using distributed ledger technology (DLT), providing a secure DLT framework for collecting data from IEDs like power meters and protective relays inside and outside of an electrical substation and/or between two different electrical utilities. In this study, the use case scenarios were created and assessed for different power system application by using DLT. The electrical fault detection for faulted phases (1), power quality monitoring of phase voltage magnitudes, frequency levels and load power factor (2), DERs use case monitoring (3), and cyber-event applications (4) were performed in a test bed with a Cyber-Grid Guard (CGG) system using DLT. It had a real-time simulator with power meters and protective relays in-the-loop. The first section of this report presents a literature review of power system applications using blockchain at research level. The second section shows the theory and equations used on this report. The third section shows the description of the test bed, equipment, architecture, and electrical grid diagrams. The fourth section shows the experimental models and use case scenarios that were performed for the electrical fault detection, power quality, DERs use case, and cyber event applications with the CGG system using DLT. The fifth section shows the results collected from the tests based on comparing the time stamped events of the analog signals from the IEDs, DLT computer and real time simulator. The sixth section performed the discussion of the results for the use case scenarios. Finally, section seven presents the conclusions for this report were presented.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2024

Seasonal Cost-Benefit Analysis of Automated Distribution Feeder Upgrades with Advanced Mitigation Technologies

The increasing deployment of distributed solar photovoltaics (DPV) to meet clean energy goals can trigger adverse grid operation issues, such as voltage excursions and the violation of thermal loading constraints of the power delivery elements (e.g., lines and transformers) on the evolving electricity infrastructure. Such integration issues would require distribution upgrades with associated costs to mitigate them and to maintain reliable and resilient grid operating conditions. Traditional distribution network upgrade approaches use a specific single snapshot analysis that is overly conservative. This study considers a multi-time point analysis to capture both moderate (probable bounds) and extreme grid operating conditions using time points such as minimum load with minimum photovoltaics (PV), maximum load with maximum PV, maximum load with minimum PV, and minimum load with maximum PV. Further, this study investigates seasonal variation impacts and associated distribution upgrade costs for a spring season case (March, representing a low load and high PV scenario) and a summer case (July, representing a high load and high PV scenario). Such seasonal analysis will allow system operators to characterize upgrade requirements and associated costs across various periods. Because the spatial distribution of DPV can impact upgrade and associated costs, this study investigates three common DPV deployment scenarios - randomly deployed, close to the substation, and far from the substation - at different penetration levels. Apart from spatial distribution impacts, this project evaluates the techno-economic impacts of the nodal photovoltaic penetration factor (NPPF) for generating the various DPV deployment scenarios at increasing penetration levels. This project investigates the impact of varying nodal PV-to-load ratios using conservative and extreme NPPF values of 3 and 10, respectively. This study investigates the deployment of traditional infrastructure upgrade strategies, such as installing new voltage regulating equipment, transformers and lines replacements, and the activation of advanced inverter functionality (e.g., autonomous volt/VAR) in expanding PV hosting capacity. Existing DPV systems are assumed to operate with the legacy unity power factor, and we considered the possibility of retrofitting such systems with the activation of volt/VAR control as integration standards and regulations continue to evolve to allow such functions. The cost-benefit analysis metrics used in study include distribution upgrade costs, average cost per watt of the upgrade cost, average marginal cost per watt of the upgrade cost, and power losses.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2023

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022

The Industroyer2 and Wiper Malware Targeting Ukrainian Energy Provider 2022 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Industroyer2 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. An adversary attempted to cause a blackout in Ukraine in April 2022 by using the Industroyer2 malware against a regional Ukrainian energy provider. The adversary targeted eight high-voltage electrical substations and utilized the malware in tandem with disk wipers for Windows, Linux, and Solaris operating systems in an attempt to make response and recovery efforts more difficult. The adversary reused a piece of the original Industroyer malware designed to open circuit breakers and de-energize target substations. The adversary gained initial access to the victim’s enterprise network through unknown means in February 2022 and was able to perform reconnaissance, pivot to the operations network, and reside in the system for at least 51 days. This gave the adversary a detailed understanding of the environment and allowed them to customize the Industroyer2 malware to the victim’s operations network. However, defenders detected and stopped the attack before the adversary could achieve their intended impact. Had the Industroyer2 attack been successful, it could have caused a blackout for more than two million people during the early stages of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Researchers and analysts identified 22 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 31 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 297 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-three of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer2 cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 224 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 122 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 51 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

Strategies for Flood Resilience and Grid Investment Among Iowa's Electric Distribution Utilities

Flooding poses a growing threat to Iowa's electric distribution system, yet utilities face significant data and modeling challenges in planning effective resilience investments. This report provides a foundational assessment of how distribution utilities in Iowa, investor-owned, municipal, and cooperative, approach resilience planning, with a focus on flood risk. It combines hazard characterization, review of state and utility practices, and application of NLR's Energy Resilience Analysis for Distribution Systems (ERAD) and Capacity Expansion Decision Support for Distribution Networks (CADET) tools. Using FEMA floodplains, Iowa Flood Center depth grids, and utility infrastructure data, the analysis quantifies asset exposure, simulates outage risks, and evaluates resilience strategies such as pole hardening, undergrounding, and substation protection. Results indicate that while feeder-level upgrades provide incremental benefits, the most significant reductions in outage risk are achieved through targeted substation interventions. The report highlights key data gaps, such as limited elevation data and fragility functions, and underscores the need for probability-weighted investment frameworks to address both frequent and catastrophic flood events. These insights aim to support utilities, state agencies, and federal partners in prioritizing resilience investments that safeguard Iowa's electric grid against future flooding.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Comparative Study of High-Resolution LysB29(Nε-myristoyl) des(B30) Insulin Structures Display Novel Dynamic Causal Interrelations in Monomeric-Dimeric Motions

The treatment of insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus is characterized by artificial supplementation of pancreatic β-cell ability to regulate sugar levels in the blood. Even though various insulin analogs are crucial for reasonable glycemic control, understanding the dynamic mechanism of the insulin analogs may help to improve the best-protracted insulin analog to assist people with type 1 diabetes (T1D) to live comfortably while maintaining tight glycemic control. Here, we present the high-resolution crystal structure of NN304, known as insulin detemir, to 1.7 Å resolution at cryogenic temperature. We computationally further investigated our crystal structure’s monomeric-dimeric conformation and dynamic profile by comparing it with a previously available detemir structure (PDB ID: 1XDA). Our structure (PDB ID: 8HGZ), obtained at elevated pH, provides electrostatically triggered minor movements in the equilibrium between alternate conformational substates compared to the previous structure, suggesting it might induce an intermediate state in the dissociation pathway of the insulin detemir’s hexamer:dihexamer equilibrium. Supplemented with orientational cross-correlation analysis by a Gaussian network model (GNM), this alternate oligomeric conformation offers the distinct cooperative motions originated by loose coupling of distant conformational substates of a protracted insulin analog that has not been previously observed.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Connecting Risk and Resilience for a Power System Using the Portland Hills Fault Case Study

Active seismic faults in the Pacific Northwest area have encouraged electric utilities in the region to deeply contemplate and proactively intervene to support grid resilience. To further this effort this research introduces Monte Carlo (MC)-based power system modeling as a means to inform the Performance Based Earthquake Engineering method and simulates 100,000 sample earthquakes of a 6.8 magnitude (M6.8) Portland Hills Fault (PHF) scenario in the Portland General Electric (PGE) service territory as a proof of concept. This paper also proposes the resilience metric Seismic Load Recovery Factor (SLRF) to quantify the recovery of a downed power system and thus can be used to quantify earthquake economic risk. Using MC results, the SLRF was evaluated to be 19.7 h and the expected economic consequence cost of a M6.8 PHF event was found to be $\$180$ million with an annualized risk of $\$90,000$ given the event’s 1 in 2000 year probability of occurrence. The MC results also identified the eight most consequential substations in the PGE system—i.e., those that contributed to maximum load loss. This paper concludes that retrofitting these substations reduced the expected consequence cost of a M6.8 PHF event to $117 million.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Assessing climate-change-induced flood risk in the Conasauga River watershed: an application of ensemble hydrodynamic inundation modeling

Abstract. This study evaluates the impact of potential future climate change on flood regimes, floodplain protection, and electricity infrastructures across the Conasauga River watershed in the southeastern United States through ensemble hydrodynamic inundation modeling. The ensemble streamflow scenarios were simulated by the Distributed Hydrology Soil Vegetation Model (DHSVM) driven by (1) 1981–2012 Daymet meteorological observations and (2) 11 sets of downscaled global climate models (GCMs) during the 1966–2005 historical and 2011–2050 future periods. Surface inundation was simulated using a GPU-accelerated Two-dimensional Runoff Inundation Toolkit for Operational Needs (TRITON) hydrodynamic model. A total of 9 out of the 11 GCMs exhibit an increase in the mean ensemble flood inundation areas. Moreover, at the 1 % annual exceedance probability level, the flood inundation frequency curves indicate a ∼ 16 km2 increase in floodplain area. The assessment also shows that even after flood-proofing, four of the substations could still be affected in the projected future period. The increase in floodplain area and substation vulnerability highlights the need to account for climate change in floodplain management. Overall, this study provides a proof-of-concept demonstration of how the computationally intensive hydrodynamic inundation modeling can be used to enhance flood frequency maps and vulnerability assessment under the changing climatic conditions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

Package Data for CERF-Data Centers

This dataset contains sample input 100m resolution raster files for running the CERF-DC python package (see https://github.com/IMMM-SFA/cerf_data_centers) at the state level across the CONUS. Due to data availability constraints, some of the items included in this dataset are proxies or assumptions for siting factors used in the model. These are individually noted in the item descriptions and can be exchanged with more detailed information upon availability. Data Descriptions The following raster files are included in the data download: state_siting_region.tif — State areas identified by state FIPS code composite_siting_suitability.tif — Value of 1 indicates suitable siting location, 0 otherwise. The following areas are excluded from siting: Areas within 300m of a federal airport runway Waterbodies Areas with slope >16% Areas susceptible to sinkholes High coastal or inland flood risk areas Local, state, and federal parks, leisure areas, and cemeteries Areas >2 km away from electric substations Areas >5 km away from a municipal water supplier service area Areas >2 km away from high-speed fiber provider service territory Protected Areas Database of the United States (PAD-US) areas Railroads, major roadways, and minor roadways Military areas and training grounds Developed lands Areas >0.8 km (0.5 miles) from developed lands land_value_dollar_per_sqft.tif — USD per square foot (sqft) derived from USDA $/acre land cost personal_property_tax_rate.tif — Personal property tax rate by state. Uses an assumed 0.0125 personal property tax rate for states with personal property tax, 0 for states without personal property tax. real_property_tax_rate.tif — Real property tax rate. Based on county level residential real estate property tax rates. sales_tax_rate.tif — Sales tax rate by state. mechanical_cooling_fraction.tif — Fraction of year (values between 0 and 1, inclusive) that the data center would be cooled through mechanical processes based on local water stress and humidity levels. water_cooling_fraction.tif — Fraction of year (values between 0 and 1, inclusive) that the data center would be cooled through evaporative (water cooled) processes based on local water stress and humidity levels. distance_to_substation.tif — Distance to nearest substation in hundreds of meters (i.e., value of 1 equals a distance of 100m). Offshore areas have a value of 0. industrial_electricity_rates_dollar_per_kwh.tif — USD/kWh industrial electricity rates. Represents the average industrial rate across all utilities that operate within a given county. Values are derived from the US Utility Rate Database. commercial_electricity_rates_dollar_per_kwh.tif — USD/kWh commercial electricity rates. Represents the average commercial rate across all utilities that operate within a given county. Values are derived from the US Utility Rate Database. data_center_market_locations.tif — Grid cells with positive values represent the centroid of existing data center market clusters. The value of non-zero grid cells represents the number of data centers in the market cluster. All other grid cells have a value of 0. Geospatial Metadata CRS: Albers Equal Area Conic (ESRI:102003) Extent: -2415585.0000000023283064,-1441981.2605773280374706 : 2384414.9999999976716936,1708018.7394226719625294 Dimensions: X: 48000 Y: 31500 Bands: 1 Origin: -2415585.0000000023283064,1708018.7394226719625294 Pixel Size: 100,-100 Acknowledgment IM3 is a multi-institutional effort led by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and supported by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Science as part of research in MultiSector Dynamics, Earth and Environmental Systems Modeling Program. License This data is made available under a CCBY4.0 License Disclaimer This material was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the United States Department of Energy, nor the Contractor, nor any or their employees, nor any jurisdiction or organization that has cooperated in the development of these materials, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness or any information, apparatus, product, software, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or Battelle Memorial Institute. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORYoperated byBATTELLEfor theUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYunder Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830

Mongird, Kendall↗
DOE OSTI2026

Package Data for CERF-Data Centers

This dataset contains sample input 100m resolution raster files for running the CERF-DC python package (see https://github.com/IMMM-SFA/cerf_data_centers) at the state level across the CONUS. Due to data availability constraints, some of the items included in this dataset are proxies or assumptions for siting factors used in the model. These are individually noted in the item descriptions and can be exchanged with more detailed information upon availability. Data Descriptions The following raster files are included in the data download: state_siting_region.tif — State areas identified by state FIPS code composite_siting_suitability.tif — Value of 1 indicates suitable siting location, 0 otherwise. The following areas are excluded from siting: Areas within 300 m of a federal airport runway or within an airport area boundary Waterbodies Areas with slope >16% Areas susceptible to sinkholes High coastal or inland flood risk areas Local, state, and federal parks, leisure areas, and cemeteries Areas >2 km away from electric substations Areas >5 km away from a municipal water supplier service area Areas >2 km away from high-speed fiber provider service territory USGS Protected Areas Database of the United States (PAD-US) GAP status 1, 2, or 3 areas US National Parks Wetlands USFWS critical habitats BIA land areas Railroads, major roadways, and minor roadways Military areas and training grounds NLCD developed lands Areas >0.8 km (0.5 miles) from NLCD developed lands land_value_dollar_per_sqft.tif — USD per square foot (sqft) derived from USDA $/acre land cost personal_property_tax_rate.tif — Personal property tax rate by state. Uses an assumed 0.0125 personal property tax rate for states with personal property tax, 0 for states without personal property tax. real_property_tax_rate.tif — Real property tax rate. Based on county level residential real estate property tax rates. sales_tax_rate.tif — Sales tax rate by state. mechanical_cooling_fraction.tif — Fraction of year (values between 0 and 1, inclusive) that the data center would be cooled through mechanical processes based on local water stress and humidity levels. water_cooling_fraction.tif — Fraction of year (values between 0 and 1, inclusive) that the data center would be cooled through evaporative (water cooled) processes based on local water stress and humidity levels. distance_to_substation.tif — Distance to nearest substation in hundreds of meters (i.e., value of 1 equals a distance of 100m). Offshore areas have a value of 0. industrial_electricity_rates_dollar_per_kwh.tif — USD/kWh industrial electricity rates. Represents the average industrial rate across all utilities that operate within a given county. Values are derived from the US Utility Rate Database. commercial_electricity_rates_dollar_per_kwh.tif — USD/kWh commercial electricity rates. Represents the average commercial rate across all utilities that operate within a given county. Values are derived from the US Utility Rate Database. data_center_market_locations.tif — Grid cells with positive values represent the centroid of existing data center market clusters. The value of non-zero grid cells represents the number of data centers in the market cluster. All other grid cells have a value of 0. Geospatial Metadata CRS: Albers Equal Area Conic (ESRI:102003) Extent: -2415585.0000000023283064,-1441981.2605773280374706 : 2384414.9999999976716936,1708018.7394226719625294 Dimensions: X: 48000 Y: 31500 Bands: 1 Origin: -2415585.0000000023283064,1708018.7394226719625294 Pixel Size: 100,-100 Acknowledgment IM3 is a multi-institutional effort led by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and supported by the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of Science as part of research in MultiSector Dynamics, Earth and Environmental Systems Modeling Program. License This data is made available under a CCBY4.0 License Disclaimer This material was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the United States Department of Energy, nor the Contractor, nor any or their employees, nor any jurisdiction or organization that has cooperated in the development of these materials, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness or any information, apparatus, product, software, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof, or Battelle Memorial Institute. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORYoperated byBATTELLEfor theUNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGYunder Contract DE-AC05-76RL01830

Mongird, Kendall↗
NASA NTRS1983

Photovoltaic central station step and touch potential considerations in grounding system design

The probability of hazardous step and touch potentials is an important consideration in central station grounding system design. Steam turbine generating station grounding system design is based on accepted industry practices and there is extensive in-service experience with these grounding systems. A photovoltaic (PV) central station is a relatively new concept and there is limited experience with PV station grounding systems. The operation and physical configuration of a PV central station is very different from a steam electric station. A PV station bears some similarity to a substation and the PV station step and touch potentials might be addressed as they are in substation design. However, the PV central station is a generating station and it is appropriate to examine the effect that the differences and similarities of the two types of generating stations have on step and touch potential considerations.

Engmann, G.↗
NASA NTRS1986

The laboratory millimeter-wave spectrum of methyl formate in its ground torsional E state

Over 250 rotational transitions of the internal rotor methyl formate (HCOOCH3) in its ground v(t) = 0 degenerate (E) torsional substate have been measured in the millimeter-wave spectral region. These data and a number of E-state lines identified by several other workers have been analyzed using an extension of the classical principal-axis method in the high barrier limit. The resulting rotational constants allow accurate prediction of the v(t) = 0 E substate methyl formate spectrum below 300 GHz between states with angular momentum J not greater than 30 and rotational energy of not more than 350/cm. The calculated transition frequencies for the E state, when combined with the results of the previous analysis of the ground-symmetric, nondegenerate state, account for over 200 of the emission lines observed toward Orion in a recent survey of the 215-265 GHz band.

Plummer, G. M.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Real-time disaggregation of renewable energy generation on an electricity distribution system

Techniques are described for disaggregation of renewable energy generation on an electricity distribution system. Aggregate power measurements are identified a distribution substation. Active power load of the distribution substation and active power generated by renewable energy sites can be disaggregated from the aggregate power measurements.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Performance Evaluation of Peer-to-Peer Distributed Microgrids Coordination for Voltage Regulation: Preprint

This paper presents the performance evaluation of a peer-to-peer microgrids coordination algorithm for sub-transmission systems. As distributed energy resources (DERs) in distribution system start to show negative impact to the bulk power system, a paradigm shift is needed for transmission planning and operation. Because distribution substations are located far from the sub-transmission system, and it is hard to use traditional centralized control for real-time control and coordination. Thus, distributed control is a natural choice because it requires less communication and central computation. In this paper, each distribution substation is treated as a microgrid, and the peer-to-peer distributed microgrids control is formulated as a real-time optimal power flow problem to reduce the negative impact in sub-transmission systems. A distributed primal-dual optimization algorithm is adopted to solve the problem. Validation of the peer-to-peer algorithm is performed through the simulation of a real-world sub-transmission system composing of many distribution systems with high renewable penetration. Simulation results show that the peer-to-peer algorithm can achieve satisfactory performance (e.g., voltage regulation) in sub-transmission system by coordinating and controlling DERs in distribution systems.

distributed control↗