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DOE OSTI2022

Scenario Exploration and Timeline Analysis for Advanced Reactors [Slides]

Slides created to discuss the report "Approach and Model Used to Represent a Timeline Analysis for Security Design Enhancements" (August 2022 INL/ RPT-22-68664) for an upcoming DOE security workshop. Advanced reactors will be able to use risk insights for many design aspects. We need realistic scenarios for input into the licensing basis safety-case. These scenarios must include timing and physics. We need to automate the safety-case creation as much as possible.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2023

Validation of MFUEL Metal Fuel Performance Models of SAS4A/SASSYS-1

The fuel characterization models of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 (SAS) have recently been extended to include a new U-Pu-Zr metal fuel model, MFUEL. MFUEL is equipped with mechanistic physics based models to predict the pre-transient characterization and transient response of metal fuel, with emphasis on fuel melting, cladding failure, and the metal fuel’s impact on core reactivity. The MFUEL model will be available in the full version of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 5.7, which is scheduled to be released in June 2023. Fast reactor fuel pins that operated in EBR-II and FFTF with low smear density U-Zr and U-Pu-Zr metal fuels and irradiation resistant ferritic-martensitic cladding showed significant advantages in achieving high burnups and assuring inherent safety characteristics during anticipated transients, design basis events, and beyond design basis events. For safety analysis, a fuel performance model must be able to predict (1) Fuel pin mechanics and compositional and dimensional changes, (2) Clad failure, and (3) Fuel pin thermal resistance. Achieving these high level goals accurately is strongly related to the model performance of individual physical processes taking place within a fuel pin during its lifetime. Metal fuels typically operate above the mid-point temperature of melting during normal, as well as off-normal, conditions. At these elevated temperatures, the availability of thermal activation provides a driving force for various diffusional processes leading to complex phase transformations, micro-structure evolution, significant amounts of fuel swelling, interconnected porosity formation, excessive amounts of fission gas release, and fuel clad chemical interactions. Clad failure in fast reactors primarily occurs as a result of creep rupture augmented by clad wastage formation. The reaction is driven by thermal creep induced dislocation motion, grain boundary cavity nucleation, growth and breakup of grain boundaries. The high level complexity and limited available data requires introducing physics-based modeling approaches to gain extrapolation ability and sensitivity with respect to various conditions. The objective of this report is to perform validation of MFUEL using the experimental data for (1) Normal operation EBR-II fuel behavior, (2) Normal operation PHENIX fuel behavior, (3) HT9 Pressure tube ramp-and-hold creep rupture tests, (4) Whole Pin Furnace (WPF) creep strain, creep rupture and eutectic tests, (5) Fuel Behavior Test Apparatus (FBTA) eutectic tests, and (6) TREAT M5-7 OverPower tests up to clad failure. Section-2 includes a brief description of the MFUEL models. A detailed description of the MFUEL physics-based, semi-empirical models will be presented in the SAS V 5.7 theory manual. Section-3, 4, and 5 describes the validation effort for the pre-transient irradiation, furnace transients, and TREAT M-Series transients, respectively.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2026

Fuel-Cladding Eutectic Study of Legacy Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) MFF HT9/U-10Zr Metallic Fuel

This report presents the first systematic investigation of fuel-cladding eutectic interaction (FCEI) in irradiated HT9/U-10Zr metallic fuel from the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) Materials Fuels Form (MFF) program, using differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) coupled with scanning electron microscopy (SEM) and energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopy (EDS). Two irradiated fuel cross-sections, MNT07H (9.5 at% burnup, x/L = 0.78) and MNT08H (7.0 at% burnup, x/L = 0.93), were subjected to three successive isothermal annealing rounds (R1–R3) at 820°C for 20 minutes each, yielding a cumulative transient duration of one hour. This study directly addresses a recognized gap in the existing FCEI database, which previously lacked irradiated HT9/U-10Zr data at burnup levels above 8 at%. Two principal findings emerge from the study. First, for both samples, FCEI remained spatially confined within the pre-existing fuel-cladding chemical interaction (FCCI) zone boundaries after R3, with no measurable eutectic penetration into unaffected cladding beyond the original FCCI layer. This self-limiting behavior is consistent with historical Fuel Behavior Test Apparatus (FBTA) results and is attributed to the near-eutectic phase composition of the FCCI zone, which rapidly absorb the available eutectic-forming constituents and then stall penetration once the FCCI zone is consumed. A comparison with unirradiated surrogate data further supports this mechanism: whereas a U–34 at.% Fe sample would be expected to show ~176 µm of iron penetration under comparable conditions, the irradiated samples exhibited only ~20 µm, a discrepancy attributed to irradiation-induced interfacial porosity and pre-existing FCCI composition gradients. Second, for MNT08H, FCEI was observed exclusively on the half of the cladding circumference where pre-existing steady-state FCCI was present, with no detectable FCEI on the opposite half. Three hypotheses are proposed to explain this asymmetry: the inhibiting role of a zirconium-rich rind at the fuel-cladding interface; the chemical sequestration of iron by redistributed zirconium within the fuel matrix; and the persistence of fuel-cladding gaps on the FCEI-free half that preclude direct contact. All three hypotheses require further experimental investigation. The results extend the empirical FCEI database into higher-burnup territory and demonstrate the viability of DSC-based testing as a substitute for the no-longer-available FBTA apparatus. Future work will include additional cross-section testing, compilation of the full FCEI dataset, model evaluation, and DSC testing of ternary fuel compositions to broaden the experimental basis for safety assessment of sodium-cooled fast reactor systems.

11 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

NASA NTRS1992

An assessment of waste processing/resource recovery technologies for lunar/Mars life applications

NASA's future manned missions to explore the solar system are by nature of long duration, mandating extensive regeneration of life support consumables from wastes generated in space-based habitats. Long-duration exploration missions would otherwise be prohibitive due to the number and frequency of energy-intensive resupply missions from Earth. Resource recovery is therefore a critical component of the controlled ecological life support system (CELSS). In order to assess resource recovery technologies for CELSS applications, the Crew and Thermal Systems Division at NASA-Johnson Space Center convened a three-day workshop to assess potential resource recovery technologies for application in a space-based CELSS. This paper describes the methodology of assessing and ranking of these technologies. Recommendations and issues are identified. Evaluations focused on the processes for handling and treatment of inedible plant biomass, human waste, and human generated trash. Technologies were assessed on the basis of safety, reliability, technology readiness, and performance characteristics.

Verostko, Charles E.↗

DOE OSTI2021

Presentation: Scenario Timeline Exploration

Slides to discuss a current project with DOE. Topic focus is on: - Advanced reactors will be able to use risk insights for many design aspects - We need bounding scenarios for screening and scoping purposes - We need realistic scenarios for input into the licensing basis safety-case - We need to manage inherent uncertainty - We need to automate the safety-case creation as much as possible

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2023

NNSS 3013 Staging Status Update

Explore the source record for details and available documents.

3013, Safety Basis, Packages↗

DOE OSTI2020

Modernization of Technical Requirements for Licensing of Advanced Non-Light Water Reactors: Risk-Informed and Performance-Based Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth Adequacy

This document supports the work contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 18-04 “Risk-Informed Performance-Based Technology Inclusive Guidance for Advanced Reactor Licensing Basis Development” Revision 0. NEI 18-04 presents a modern, technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based (TI-RIPB) process for selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs); safety classification of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) and associated risk-informed special treatments; and determination of defense-in-depth (DID) adequacy for non-LWRs. The NEI guidance document provides one acceptable means for addressing the aforementioned topics as part of demonstrating a specific design provides reasonable assurance of adequate radiological protection. This report provides the framework and associated methodology guidelines and discussion for establishing, then evaluating, confirming, and documenting the adequacy of defense-in-depth (DID) for advanced non-light-water reactor technologies. It was developed as part of the Licensing Modernization Project led by Southern Company and cost-shared by the United States Department of Energy and has benefited from considerable NRC formal reviews and public workshops. The methodology converts the DID philosophy into a structured process that is implementable, embraces existing United States and international definitions and philosophies of DID that set the foundation for the process. It builds on the DID framework developed in the Department of Energy Next Generation Nuclear Plant Project and earlier works on this subject. The approach to establishing DID adequacy involves the incorporation of DID attributes into the plant capabilities and programmatic elements of DID. The integrated evaluation of DID adequacy includes both quantitative elements to incorporate risk-informed and performance-based (RIPB) considerations and qualitative elements that address uncertainties and limitations in the quantitative models and supporting data. Demonstration of DID adequacy ensures that there are multiple layers of defense for risk-significant challenges to the design and that the plant capabilities and programs that support each layer are provided in a manner that minimizes dependencies among these layers. The focus of this report is assurance of DID adequacy with respect to protection of the public from radiological exposures resulting from accidental releases of radioactive material. While other hazards are not specifically addressed, this methodology is expected to be beneficial for determining DID adequacy for them as well. Risk-informed evaluation of DID considers the integrated performance of all plant SSCs and associated programs to manage daily operational activities, transients, and accidents, including the evaluation of strategies for accident prevention and mitigation. The RIPB LBE scenario methodology used in this evaluation defines the challenges to the plant safety features included in the plant design basis and beyond, and the scope of all deterministic and probabilistic safety evaluations. By examining event sequences across the whole spectrum of LBEs, a systematic assessment of DID can be accomplished.

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS2015

"Evidence" Under a Magnifying Glass: Thoughts on Safety Argument Epistemology

Common definitions of "safety case" emphasize that evidence is the basis of a safety argument, yet few widely referenced works explicitly define "evidence". Their examples suggest that similar things can be regarded as evidence. But the category evidence seems to contain (1) processes for finding things out, (2) information resulting from such processes, and (3) relevant documents. Moreover, any item of evidence could be replaced by further argument. Normative models of informal argumentation do not offer clear guidance on when a safety argument should cite evidence rather than appeal to a more detailed argument. Disciplines such as the law address the problem with a practical, domain-specific epistemology. In this paper, we explore these problems associated with evidence citations in safety arguments, identify goals for a theory of safety argument evidence and a practical safety argument epistemology, propose a model of safety evidence citation that advances the identified goals, and present a related extension to the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN).

Graydon, P. J.↗

DOE OSTI2021

TCR Input to NUREG-1537 Process for Advanced Nuclear Technologies Derived from Additive Manufacturing

There has been a renewed interest by several advanced reactor developers to use NUREG-1537 “Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors” as a basis for their safety analysis report content and organization. Recently, SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC (SHINE), which is a non-power, Aqueous Homogenous Reactor design radioisotope production facility, received a construction permit based around their NUREG-1537 safety evaluation report (ADAMS No. ML16229A140). Advanced reactor developers are interested in using NUREG-1537 as a basis for their safety analysis report content and organization because of its successful application towards research reactors, graded approach, and simplicity in structure and requirements. However, NUREG-1537 is still largely geared toward light water reactors (LWRs) and many improvements could be made or supported through guidance documents for advanced reactors. For nuclear power to play a role in the future zero-carbon energy portfolio, a supportive regulatory structure is needed to lower regulatory uncertainty and barriers to deployment. At the time of this report, no such document or pathway exists for advanced nuclear technologies, including those derived from nontraditional technology such as advanced manufacturing technology (AMT) and, specifically, additive manufacturing. This report will explore and provide recommendations as to how advanced nuclear technologies derived from additive manufacturing technologies could employ the use of an ISG, other guidance document, or revisions to NUREG-1537 to lower the regulatory uncertainty and barriers for adoption.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA NTRS2002

Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

This Annual Report of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) presents results of activities during calendar year 2001. The year was marked by significant achievements in the Space Shuttle and International Space Station (ISS) programs and encouraging accomplishments by the Aerospace Technology Enterprise. Unfortunately, there were also disquieting mishaps with the X-43, a LearJet, and a wind tunnel. Each mishap was analyzed in an orderly process to ascertain causes and derive lessons learned. Both these accomplishments and the responses to the mishaps led the Panel to conclude that safety and risk management is currently being well served within NASA. NASA's operations evidence high levels of safety consciousness and sincere efforts to place safety foremost. Nevertheless, the Panel's safety concerns have never been greater. This dichotomy has arisen because the focus of most NASA programs has been directed toward program survival rather than effective life cycle planning. Last year's Annual Report focused on the need for NASA to adopt a realistically long planning horizon for the aging Space Shuttle so that safety would not erode. NASA's response to the report concurred with this finding. Nevertheless, there has been a greater emphasis on current operations to the apparent detriment of long-term planning. Budget cutbacks and shifts in priorities have severely limited the resources available to the Space Shuttle and ISS for application to risk-reduction and life-extension efforts. As a result, funds originally intended for long-term safety-related activities have been used for operations. Thus, while safety continues to be well served at present, the basis for future safety has eroded. Section II of this report develops this theme in more detail and presents several important, overarching findings and recommendations that apply to many if not all of NASA's programs. Section III of the report presents other significant findings, recommendations and supporting material applicable to specific program areas. Appendix A presents a list of Panel members. Appendix B contains the reaction of the ASAP to NASA's response to the calendar year 2000 findings and recommendations. In accordance with a practice started last year, this Appendix includes brief narratives as well as classifications of the responses as 'open,' 'closed,' or 'continuing.' Appendix C details the Panel's activities during the reporting period.

Source record↗

DOE OSTI2023

Application of the ANSI/ANS-8.3-2022 Minimum Accident to Tube Vault Storage

In support of planned site activities, the existing basis for criticality safety in nuclear facilities is being revisited. One such technical basis is the demonstration of Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) coverage in tube vaults at Y-12 National Security Complex. The configuration of the vaults places significant shielding between the source and the detector stations and is dissimilar to drum storage or other processes. This paper describes tube vault storage at Y-12, describes the basis for the application of the 2022 minimum accident for system design (MASD) to the analysis, and presents how the accident is implemented in the analysis.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

NASA NTRS2014

Querying Safety Cases

Querying a safety case to show how the various stakeholders' concerns about system safety are addressed has been put forth as one of the benefits of argument-based assurance (in a recent study by the Health Foundation, UK, which reviewed the use of safety cases in safety-critical industries). However, neither the literature nor current practice offer much guidance on querying mechanisms appropriate for, or available within, a safety case paradigm. This paper presents a preliminary approach that uses a formal basis for querying safety cases, specifically Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) argument structures. Our approach semantically enriches GSN arguments with domain-specific metadata that the query language leverages, along with its inherent structure, to produce views. We have implemented the approach in our toolset AdvoCATE, and illustrate it by application to a fragment of the safety argument for an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) being developed at NASA Ames. We also discuss the potential practical utility of our query mechanism within the context of the existing framework for UAS safety assurance.

Safety Case↗

DOE OSTI2024

An Integrated Framework for Risk Assessment of Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants: Methodology Advancement and Application

This report documents activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during fiscal year (FY) 2024 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, Digital Instrumentation and Control (DI&C) Risk Assessment project. The goal of the RISA Pathway is to optimize safety margins and minimize uncertainties to achieve economic efficiencies while maintaining high levels of safety. This is accomplished by providing scientific basis to better represent safety margins and factors that contribute to cost and safety, and by developing new technologies that reduce operating costs. The research efforts for FY 2024 encompass methodology refinement and exploration. The efforts include: (1) The implementation of a natural language processing tool to expedite key aspects of the reliability analysis methods developed by INL; (2) advances to support intersystem CCF analysis by providing guidance for and identification of coupling mechanisms that may contribute to CCF; (3) the investigation of how generative artificial intelligence tools can aid in hazard analysis and diversity and defense in depth (i.e., D3) assessments; (4) Industry collaboration, allowing the demonstration of and INL's risk assessment tools to support risk assessment of DI&C systems at early and late stages of development; (4) a roadmap for the development of a software for each of INL's risk assessment tools; (5) The development of a theory and methodology manual for a risk quantification methodology; (6) the development of a reliability analysis for machine learning (ML)-integrated control systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

NASA NTRS1979

Safety, reliability, maintainability and quality provisions for the Space Shuttle program

This publication establishes common safety, reliability, maintainability and quality provisions for the Space Shuttle Program. NASA Centers shall use this publication both as the basis for negotiating safety, reliability, maintainability and quality requirements with Shuttle Program contractors and as the guideline for conduct of program safety, reliability, maintainability and quality activities at the Centers. Centers shall assure that applicable provisions of the publication are imposed in lower tier contracts. Centers shall give due regard to other Space Shuttle Program planning in order to provide an integrated total Space Shuttle Program activity. In the implementation of safety, reliability, maintainability and quality activities, consideration shall be given to hardware complexity, supplier experience, state of hardware development, unit cost, and hardware use. The approach and methods for contractor implementation shall be described in the contractors safety, reliability, maintainability and quality plans. This publication incorporates provisions of NASA documents: NHB 1700.1 'NASA Safety Manual, Vol. 1'; NHB 5300.4(IA), 'Reliability Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors'; and NHB 5300.4(1B), 'Quality Program Provisions for Aeronautical and Space System Contractors'. It has been tailored from the above documents based on experience in other programs. It is intended that this publication be reviewed and revised, as appropriate, to reflect new experience and to assure continuing viability.

M S Malkin↗

NASA NTRS1981

Safety aspects of nuclear waste disposal in space

Safety issues involved in the disposal of nuclear wastes in space as a complement to mined geologic repositories are examined as part of an assessment of the feasibility of nuclear waste disposal in space. General safety guidelines for space disposal developed in the areas of radiation exposure and shielding, containment, accident environments, criticality, post-accident recovery, monitoring systems and isolation are presented for a nuclear waste disposal in space mission employing conventional space technology such as the Space Shuttle. The current reference concept under consideration by NASA and DOE is then examined in detail, with attention given to the waste source and mix, the waste form, waste processing and payload fabrication, shipping casks and ground transport vehicles, launch site operations and facilities, Shuttle-derived launch vehicle, orbit transfer vehicle, orbital operations and space destination, and the system safety aspects of the concept are discussed for each component. It is pointed out that future work remains in the development of an improved basis for the safety guidelines and the determination of the possible benefits and costs of the space disposal option for nuclear wastes.

Rice, E. E.↗

NASA NTRS2008

Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT and E) Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems

A team directed by the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) collected methodologies for how best to develop safe and reliable human rated systems and how to identify the drivers that provide the basis for assessing safety and reliability. The team also identified techniques, methodologies, and best practices to assure that NASA can develop safe and reliable human rated systems. The results are drawn from a wide variety of resources, from experts involved with the space program since its inception to the best-practices espoused in contemporary engineering doctrine. This report focuses on safety and reliability considerations and does not duplicate or update any existing references. Neither does it intend to replace existing standards and policy.

Miller, James↗

NASA NTRS2008

Design Development Test and Evaluation (DDT and E) Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated Spacecraft Systems

Miller, James↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Safety Expertise and the Perils of Novelty

Emerging aviation markets such as urban air mobility are giving rise to new technologies and means of operation. However, novelty may hide ‘unknown unknowns,’ raising new hazards. This paper examines how expertise and safety techniques enable transformative technologies such as reduced crew operations, hybrid wing-borne and rotor-born flight, federated air traffic services, and urban operations. We explore how analysts use expertise to address common-cause failures, collect and interpret safety data, and perform exacting tradeoffs between dissimilarity, redundancy, independence, and diversity (human, process lifecycle, or otherwise) to ensure safety. When novelty is present, analysts might not possess the expertise needed to fully understand the implications of design decisions and tradeoffs being made, especially in early lifecycle phases, on emergent properties such as safety. Safety expertise must be carefully cultivated. The conflicting views of safety experts must be unpacked to identify the divergence in fundamental assumptions, models, means, and methods that may be causing them. Once systems venture beyond the basis of what safety expertise can reliably guarantee, projects take on risk that must be managed. The paper contains key takeaways and actionable recommendations for novel OEMs and regulators touching on topics such as robust monitoring; clear and transparent reporting; incremental approaches to fielding novel systems in hazard-rich, risk-tolerant environments; the cultivation of safety culture and expertise in an organization; and the use of scientific study to reduce epistemic uncertainty in novel operations with new technologies. Since excessive novelty in aviation can undermine the current foundation of safety, humility and incrementalism are necessary to enable emerging aviation markets safely.

safety expertise↗