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Proposed Risk-Informed Seismic Hazard Periodic Reevaluation Methodology for Complying with DOE Order 420.1C

Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear facilities must comply with DOE Order 420.1C Facility Safety, which requires that all such facilities review their natural phenomena hazards (NPH) assessments no less frequently than every ten years. The Order points the reader to Standard DOE-STD-1020-2012. In addition to providing a discussion of the applicable evaluation criteria, the Standard references other documents, including ANSI/ANS-2.29-2008 and NUREG-2117. These documents provide supporting criteria and approaches for evaluating the need to update an existing probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA). All of the documents are consistent at a high level regarding the general conceptual criteria that should be considered. However, none of the documents provides step-by-step detailed guidance on the required or recommended approach for evaluating the significance of new information and determining whether or not an existing PSHA should be updated. Further, all of the conceptual approaches and criteria given in these documents deal with changes that may have occurred in the knowledge base that might impact the inputs to the PSHA, the calculated hazard itself, or the technical basis for the hazard inputs. Given that the DOE Order is aimed at achieving and assuring the safety of nuclear facilities—which is a function not only of the level of the seismic hazard but also the capacity of the facility to withstand vibratory ground motions—the inclusion of risk information in the evaluation process would appear to be both prudent and in line with the objectives of the Order. The purpose of this white paper is to describe a risk-informed methodology for evaluating the need for an update of an existing PSHA consistent with the DOE Order. While the development of the proposed methodology was undertaken as a result of assessments for specific SDC-3 facilities at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), and it is expected that the application at INL will provide a demonstration of the methodology, there is potential for general applicability to other facilities across the DOE complex. As such, both a general methodology and a specific approach intended for INL are described in this document. The general methodology proposed in this white paper is referred to as the “seismic hazard periodic review methodology,” or SHPRM. It presents a graded approach for SDC-3, SDC-4 and SDC-5 facilities that can be applied in any risk-informed regulatory environment once risk-objectives appropriate for the framework are developed. While the methodology was developed for seismic hazard considerations, it can also be directly applied to other types of natural hazards.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Surrogate modeling for efficiently, accurately and conservatively estimating measures of risk

We present a surrogate modeling framework for conservatively estimating measures of risk from limited realizations of an expensive physical experiment or computational simulation. Risk measures combine objective probabilities with the subjective values of a decision maker to quantify anticipated outcomes. Given a set of samples, we construct a surrogate model that produces estimates of risk measures that are always greater than their empirical approximations obtained from the training data. These surrogate models limit over-confidence in reliability and safety assessments and produce estimates of risk measures that converge much faster to the true value than purely sample-based estimates. We first detail the construction of conservative surrogate models that can be tailored to a stakeholder’s risk preferences and then present an approach, based on stochastic orders, for constructing surrogate models that are conservative with respect to families of risk measures. Our surrogate models include biases that permit them to conservatively estimate the target risk measures. We provide theoretical results that show that these biases decay at the same rate as the L 2 error in the surrogate model. Numerical demonstrations confirm that risk-adapted surrogate models do indeed overestimate the target risk measures while converging at the expected rate.

42 ENGINEERING↗

FY2020 Savannah River Site Composite Analysis Annual Summary Review

This document provides the Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1 and its manual, Radioactive Waste Management (DOE 2021a, 2021b) required Annual Review for the Savannah River Site (SRS) Composite Analysis (CA). Progress made to-date toward addressing the secondary issue from the LFRG review of the 2010 SRS CA has focused primarily upon inventory estimate improvements. Inventory impacts dose in a linear fashion and reduces the uncertainty with the CA conclusions. Maintenance items are addressed, as funding allows, based on the relative risk associated with meeting the performance objectives. Currently, there is minimal risk in exceeding the DOE 100 mrem/yr CA primary dose limit or the DOE 30 mrem/yr dose constraint (administrative limit). Proposed activities, discoveries, new information and changes potentially affecting the 2010 SRS CA are documented in this and earlier Annual Summary reports, and a consolidated list of changes since the 2010 CA is documented in this report. The impact to the CA of changes arising from updated performance assessment (PA) baselines [i.e., Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF), E-Area Low-Level Waste Facility (ELLWF), and F & H Tank Farm (FTF & HTF) closures] is expected to be minor for the following reasons: The primary contributors to the SRS CA dose impact at the Upper Three Runs (UTR) point of assessment (POA) are the H-Canyon and Mixed Waste Management Facility (MWMF), contributing 68% and 9%, respectively, to the dose impact at that POA. The combined contribution to the UTR dose impact from all PA’s (SDF, ELLWF, FTF and HTF) is ~2% of this total. The 2010 SRS CA model validation performed indicates that the CA projected dose, while generally conservative, provides a reasonable representation of the maximum annual doses. Doses evaluated are well below the SRS established 15 mrem/yr administrative limit (Crapse et al. 2011). Based on the assessment presented within this annual review and collective engineering judgement, the conclusions of the 2010 SRS CA remain valid and there is reasonable assurance that SRS will meet the performance objectives delineated in DOE Manual 435.1-1. The 2010 SRS CA should be updated to incorporate PA changes, proposed changes to inventories and sources and model improvements accumulated since the 2010 CA. The timing will be dependent on the completion of the ongoing E-Area PA revision.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

FY2021 Savannah River Site Composite Analysis Annual Summary Review

This document provides the Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1 and its manual, Radioactive Waste Management (DOE 2021a, 2021b) required Annual Review for the Savannah River Site (SRS) Composite Analysis (CA). Progress made to-date toward addressing the secondary issue from the LFRG review of the 2010 SRS CA has focused primarily upon inventory estimate improvements. Inventory impacts dose in a linear fashion and reduces the uncertainty with the CA conclusions. Maintenance items are addressed, as funding allows, based on the relative risk associated with meeting the performance objectives. Currently, there is minimal risk in exceeding the DOE 100 mrem/yr CA primary dose limit or the DOE 30 mrem/yr dose constraint (administrative limit).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Tau PET and multimodal brain imaging in patients at risk for chronic traumatic encephalopathy

OBJECTIVE: To characterize individual and group-level neuroimaging findings in patients at risk for Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE). METHODS: Eleven male patients meeting criteria for Traumatic Encephalopathy Syndrome (TES, median age: 64) underwent neurologic evaluation, 3-Tesla MRI, and PET with [ 18 F]-Flortaucipir (FTP, tau-PET) and [ 11 C]-Pittsburgh compound B (PIB, amyloid-PET). Six patients underwent [ 18 F]-Fluorodeoxyglucose-PET (FDG, glucose metabolism). We assessed imaging findings at the individual patient level, and in group-level comparisons with modality-specific groups of cognitively normal older adults (CN). Tau-PET findings in patients with TES were also compared to a matched group of patients with mild cognitive impairment or dementia due to Alzheimer's disease (AD). RESULTS: All patients with TES sustained repetitive head injury participating in impact sports, ten in American football. Three patients met criteria for dementia and eight had mild cognitive impairment. Two patients were amyloid-PET positive and harbored the most severe MRI atrophy, FDG hypometabolism, and FTP-tau PET binding. Among the nine amyloid-negative patients, tau-PET showed either mildly elevated frontotemporal binding, a "dot-like" pattern, or no elevated binding. Medial temporal FTP was mildly elevated in a subset of amyloid-negative patients, but values were considerably lower than in AD. Voxelwise analyses revealed a convergence of imaging abnormalities (higher FTP binding, lower FDG, lower gray matter volumes) in frontotemporal areas in TES compared to controls. CONCLUSIONS: Mildly elevated tau-PET binding was observed in a subset of amyloid-negative patients at risk for CTE, in a distribution consistent with CTE pathology stages III-IV. FTP-PET may be useful as a biomarker of tau pathology in CTE but is unlikely to be sensitive to early disease stages.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

SU-E-T-498: Energy Minimization and Dose-Volume Inverse Optimization in Prostate Cancer

Purpose: To compare dose-volume (DVH) and energy minimization-based (EM) optimization for prostate cancer cases. Methods: A dozen of prostate plans were retrospectively studied. For each case two IMRT plans were generated, one with DVH and the other with EM objective cost function. Those different objective functions were used only for the organs at risk (OARs), while target objectives were achieved through DVH cost functions. The plans used the same beam angles, maximum number of segments per plan, minimum segment area and MUs per segment. Both plans were normalized such that 95% of the PTV was covered by the same prescription dose. After prescription was achieved, doses to the OARs were iteratively lowered until the standard deviation of the dose across the PTV was ~3.5%. Plan quality was evaluated by several dose indices (DIs). A DI represents the dose delivered to certain volume of a structure. Tallied DIs were for rectum and bladder 10%, 40%, 60% volumes, and 1% volumes of the femoral heads as surrogate for maximum doses. Statistical significance in the differences among DIs was quantified with two-tailed paired t-tests. Results: On average EM plans performed better than DVH plans. Statistically significant dose reduction in rectum DI10, DI40, and DI60, were 2.6%, 25.7%, and 35.9%, respectively. For bladder DI10, DI40, and DI60 the differences were 1.1%, 20.8%, and 29.7%. Left and right femoral head DI1s were better by 33.8% and 27.8% in EM plans. The quoted dose reduction is with respect to EM absolute doses for the DIs. Conclusion: The performance of EM optimization with respect to DVH optimization is patient and DI dependent. While in some cases specific DIs were better with DVH optimization, on average the energy minimization allows better (ranging from 1% to ~40%) OAR sparing than DVH optimization. NIH-NCI.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

NSR&D Program Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 Call for Proposals Mitigation of Seismic Risk at Nuclear Facilities using Seismic Isolation

Seismic isolation (SI) has the potential to drastically reduce seismic response of structures, systems, or components (SSCs) and therefore the risk associated with large seismic events (large seismic event could be defined as the design basis earthquake (DBE) and/or the beyond design basis earthquake (BDBE) depending on the site location). This would correspond to a potential increase in nuclear safety by minimizing the structural response and thus minimizing the risk of material release during large seismic events that have uncertainty associated with their magnitude and frequency. The national consensus standard America Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Standard 4, Seismic Analysis of Safety Related Nuclear Structures recently incorporated language and commentary for seismically isolating a large light water reactor or similar large nuclear structure. Some potential benefits of SI are: 1) substantially decoupling the SSC from the earthquake hazard thus decreasing risk of material release during large earthquakes, 2) cost savings for the facility and/or equipment, and 3) applicability to both nuclear (current and next generation) and high hazard non-nuclear facilities. Issue: To date no one has evaluated how the benefit of seismic risk reduction reduces cost to construct a nuclear facility. Objective: Use seismic probabilistic risk assessment (SPRA) to evaluate the reduction in seismic risk and estimate potential cost savings of seismic isolation of a generic nuclear facility. This project would leverage ongoing Idaho National Laboratory (INL) activities that are developing advanced (SPRA) methods using Nonlinear Soil-Structure Interaction (NLSSI) analysis. Technical Approach: The proposed study is intended to obtain an estimate on the reduction in seismic risk and construction cost that might be achieved by seismically isolating a nuclear facility. The nuclear facility is a representative pressurized water reactor building nuclear power plant (NPP) structure. Figure 1: Project activities The study will consider a representative NPP reinforced concrete reactor building and representative plant safety system. This study will leverage existing research and development (R&D) activities at INL. Figure 1 shows the proposed study steps with the steps in blue representing activities already funded at INL and the steps in purple the activities that would be funded under this proposal. The following results will be documented: 1) Comparison of seismic risk for the non-seismically isolated (non-SI) and seismically isolated (SI) NPP, and 2) an estimate of construction cost savings when implementing SI at the site of the generic NPP.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Quantifying Investment Risk: Analysis of the Purchase Decision of a Nuclear Power Plant (Presentation)

Cost overruns are an ill-fated part of the deployment history of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the United States, and yet studies increasingly show the important role nuclear technologies must play in decarbonizing the U.S. economy. Paradoxically, then, a key piece of a coherent decarbonization strategy depends on attracting investor action to a purchase where historical cost overruns have been sizable. To address this challenge, this study aims to develop a financial model that quantifies the risk of cost overruns in the decision-making process for purchasing advanced reactor concepts. Using the concept of value at risk (VaR), the model is built to evaluate financial risk nuclear construction with the aim to identify risk mitigation strategies. The objective is to identify strategies to mitigate cost-risk challenges and assess the potential reduction in investor risk exposure. This paper presents the initial development and preliminary verification of the financial risk analysis model. The development of this model involved a comprehensive approach to estimating financial risk over the operating life of NPP that stems from construction uncertainties. By utilizing net present value (NPV) with discounted cash flows, the model captures the complex interconnections of project costs, construction timelines, revenue, and uncertainties. Verifying the model involved testing historical data from previous reactor construction projects against the construction project of Vogtle 3 and 4. This paper’s results present the comparison of the preconstruction cost overrun prediction with the current cost estimates from a nearly complete Vogtle 3 and 4.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Quantifying Investment Risk: Analysis of the Purchase Decision of a Nuclear Power Plant

Cost overruns are an ill-fated part of the deployment history of nuclear power plants (NPPs) in the United States, and yet studies increasingly show the important role nuclear technologies must play in decarbonizing the U.S. economy. Paradoxically, then, a key piece of a coherent decarbonization strategy depends on attracting investor action to a purchase where historical cost overruns have been sizeable. To address this challenge, this study aims to develop a financial model that quantifies risk of cost overruns in the decision-making process for purchasing advanced reactor concepts. Using the concept of Value at Risk (VaR), the model is built to evaluate financial risk nuclear construction with the aim to identify risk mitigation strategies. The objective is to identify strategies to mitigate cost-risk challenges and to assess the potential reduction in investor risk exposure. The paper presents the initial development and preliminary verification of the financial risk analysis model. The development of this model involved a comprehensive approach to estimating financial risk over the operating life of NPP that stems from construction uncertainties. By utilizing net present value (NPV) with discounted cash flows, the model captures the complex interconnections of project costs, construction timelines, revenue, and uncertainties. Verification of the model involved testing historical data from previous reactor construction projects against the construction project of Vogtle 3 and 4. The results of this paper present the comparison of the preconstruction cost overrun prediction with the current cost estimates from a nearly complete Vogtle 3 and 4.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Risk analysis approach

The assessment of the carbon fiber hazard is outlined. Program objectives, requirements of the risk analysis, and elements associated with the physical phenomena of the accidental release are described.

Huston, R. J.↗

Independent Orbiter Assessment: Assessment of the FMEA/CIL Instructions and Ground Rules

The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company was selected to conduct an independent assessment of the Orbiter Failure Mode and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL). Part of this effort involved an examination of the FMEA/CIL preparation instructions and ground rules. Assessment objectives were to identify omissions and ambiguities in the ground rules that may impede the identification of shuttle orbiter safety and mission critical items, and to ensure that ground rules allow these items to receive proper management visibility for risk assessment. Assessment objectives were followed during the performance of the assessment without being influenced by external considerations such as effects on budget, schedule, and documentation growth. Assessment personnel were employed who had a strong reliability background but no previous space shuttle FMEA/CIL experience to ensure an independent assessment would be achieved. The following observations were made: (1) not all essential items are in the CIL for management visibility; (2) ground rules omit FMEA/CIL coverage of items that perform critical functions; (3) essential items excluded from the CIL do not receive design justification; and (4) FMEAs/CILs are not updated in a timely manner. In addition to the above issues, a number of other issues were identified that correct FMEA/CIL preparation instruction omissions and clarify ambiguities. The assessment was successful in that many of the issues have significant safety implications.

Traves, S. T.↗

Space Launch System (SLS) Safety, Mission Assurance, and Risk Mitigation

SLS Driving Objectives: I. Safe: a) Human-rated to provide safe and reliable systems for human missions. b) Protecting the public, NASA workforce, high-value equipment and property, and the environment from potential harm. II. Affordable: a) Maximum use of common elements and existing assets, infrastructure, and workforce. b) Constrained budget environment. c) Competitive opportunities for affordability on-ramps. III. Sustainable: a) Initial capability: 70 metric tons (t), 2017-2021. 1) Serves as primary transportation for Orion and exploration missions. 2) Provides back-up capability for crew/cargo to ISS. b) Evolved capability: 105 t and 130 t, post-2021. 1) Offers large volume for science missions and payloads. 2) Modular and flexible, right-sized for mission requirements.

May, Todd↗

Statistical Issues for Uncontrolled Reentry Hazards

A number of statistical tools have been developed over the years for assessing the risk of reentering objects to human populations. These tools make use of the characteristics (e.g., mass, shape, size) of debris that are predicted by aerothermal models to survive reentry. The statistical tools use this information to compute the probability that one or more of the surviving debris might hit a person on the ground and cause one or more casualties. The statistical portion of the analysis relies on a number of assumptions about how the debris footprint and the human population are distributed in latitude and longitude, and how to use that information to arrive at realistic risk numbers. This inevitably involves assumptions that simplify the problem and make it tractable, but it is often difficult to test the accuracy and applicability of these assumptions. This paper looks at a number of these theoretical assumptions, examining the mathematical basis for the hazard calculations, and outlining the conditions under which the simplifying assumptions hold. In addition, this paper will also outline some new tools for assessing ground hazard risk in useful ways. Also, this study is able to make use of a database of known uncontrolled reentry locations measured by the United States Department of Defense. By using data from objects that were in orbit more than 30 days before reentry, sufficient time is allowed for the orbital parameters to be randomized in the way the models are designed to compute. The predicted ground footprint distributions of these objects are based on the theory that their orbits behave basically like simple Kepler orbits. However, there are a number of factors - including the effects of gravitational harmonics, the effects of the Earth's equatorial bulge on the atmosphere, and the rotation of the Earth and atmosphere - that could cause them to diverge from simple Kepler orbit behavior and change the ground footprints. The measured latitude and longitude distributions of these objects provide data that can be directly compared with the predicted distributions, providing a fundamental empirical test of the model assumptions.

Matney, Mark↗

Empirical Tests of the Predicted Footprint for Uncontrolled Satellite Reentry Hazards

A number of statistical tools have been developed over the years for assessing the risk of reentering object to human populations. These tools make use of the characteristics (e.g., mass, material, shape, size) of debris that are predicted by aerothermal models to survive reentry. The statistical tools use this information to compute the probability that one or more of the surviving debris might hit a person on the ground and cause one or more casualties. The statistical portion of the analysis relies on a number of assumptions about how the debris footprint and the human population are distributed in latitude and longitude, and how to use that information to arrive at realistic risk numbers. Because this information is used in making policy and engineering decisions, it is important that these assumptions be tested using empirical data. This study uses the latest database of known uncontrolled reentry locations measured by the United States Department of Defense. The predicted ground footprint distributions of these objects are based on the theory that their orbits behave basically like simple Kepler orbits. However, there are a number of factors in the final stages of reentry - including the effects of gravitational harmonics, the effects of the Earth s equatorial bulge on the atmosphere, and the rotation of the Earth and atmosphere - that could cause them to diverge from simple Kepler orbit behavior and possibly change the probability of reentering over a given location. In this paper, the measured latitude and longitude distributions of these objects are directly compared with the predicted distributions, providing a fundamental empirical test of the model assumptions.

Matney, Mark↗

Statistical Issues for Uncontrolled Reentry Hazards Empirical Tests of the Predicted Footprint for Uncontrolled Satellite Reentry Hazards

A number of statistical tools have been developed over the years for assessing the risk of reentering objects to human populations. These tools make use of the characteristics (e.g., mass, material, shape, size) of debris that are predicted by aerothermal models to survive reentry. The statistical tools use this information to compute the probability that one or more of the surviving debris might hit a person on the ground and cause one or more casualties. The statistical portion of the analysis relies on a number of assumptions about how the debris footprint and the human population are distributed in latitude and longitude, and how to use that information to arrive at realistic risk numbers. Because this information is used in making policy and engineering decisions, it is important that these assumptions be tested using empirical data. This study uses the latest database of known uncontrolled reentry locations measured by the United States Department of Defense. The predicted ground footprint distributions of these objects are based on the theory that their orbits behave basically like simple Kepler orbits. However, there are a number of factors in the final stages of reentry - including the effects of gravitational harmonics, the effects of the Earth s equatorial bulge on the atmosphere, and the rotation of the Earth and atmosphere - that could cause them to diverge from simple Kepler orbit behavior and possibly change the probability of reentering over a given location. In this paper, the measured latitude and longitude distributions of these objects are directly compared with the predicted distributions, providing a fundamental empirical test of the model assumptions.

Matney, Mark↗

Mission design challenges posed by the Voyager 2 Neptune encounter

A major challenge for the Voyager 2 Neptune encounter lies in the detailed design of a trajectory that achieves science objectives at the planet as well as at its large satellite, Triton. This achievement demands a close flyby of the primary, whereas the planet's great distance makes such an undertaking especially challenging. Changing estimates and uncertainties of parameters characterizing the Neptune environment, particularly ring, atmosphere and radiation models, affect the mission design. These effects are investigated and trade-offs among candidate trajectories are examined with respect to spacecraft performance, avoidance of risk and science objective achievement.

Cesarone, R. J.↗

Cost, capability, and risk for planetary operations

The three key factors for flight projects - cost, capability, and risk - are examined with respect to their interplay, the uplink process, cost drivers, and risk factors. Scientific objectives are translated into a computer program during the uplink process, and examples are given relating to the Voyager Interstellar Mission, Galileo, and the Comet Rendezvous Asteroid Flyby. The development of a multimission sequence system based on these uplinks is described with reference to specific subsystems such as the pointer and the sequence generator. Operational cost drivers include mission, flight-system, and ground-system complexity, uplink traffic, and work force. Operational risks are listed in terms of the mission operations, the environment, and the mission facilities. The uplink process can be analyzed in terms of software development, and spacecraft operability is shown to be an important factor from the initial stages of spacecraft development.

Mclaughlin, William I.↗

How Engineers Really Think About Risk: A Study of JPL Engineers

The objectives of this work are: To improve risk assessment practices as used during the mission design process by JPL's concurrent engineering teams. (1) Developing effective ways to identify and assess mission risks (2) Providing a process for more effective dialog between stakeholders about the existence and severity of mission risks (3) Enabling the analysis of interactions of risks across concurrent engineering roles.

risk identification↗