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DOE OSTI2026

Improbability of Post-Closure Criticality in Array of Transuranic Waste Containers after Compaction by Salt Creep at Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Based on the rationale presented, post-closure nuclear criticality is improbable when room closure compacts containers disposing transuranic (TRU) waste emplaced at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), an operating repository in bedded salt in southeastern New Mexico. As described in the original WIPP certification, a qualitative estimate of the probability of post-closure criticality in TRU waste produced from atomic energy defense activities has been low either because remote-handled TRU waste canisters are neutronically isolated by the bedded salt or because the low fissile mass in an array of contact-handled TRU waste drums cannot be compacted sufficiently by room closure from salt creep. These situations are still valid for the majority of TRU waste that is disposed at WIPP without any disposal constraints, as updated herein. This report also qualitatively evaluates the probability of criticality after disposal of TRU waste in pipe overpack containers (POC) where every POC in a shipment may have the maximum 200 fissile gram equivalent of 239Pu content. The probability of criticality for a disposal room filled with POCs is estimated during four representative phases of repository evolution: (1) a large salt block falls onto POCs in the first 20 years, (2) salt creep closes a disposal room in the first 1000 years without brine seepage and subsequent gas generation, which permits maximum compaction, (3) some brine seepage occurs into the closed room, which initiates consumption of the fiberboard (cellulose) impact absorber in the POC in the second 1000 years, and (4) full brine inundation of a room and consumption of all fiberboard thereafter. Salt-block fall in the first phase does not greatly disrupt three tiers of POCs. The compacted spacing of POCs in the later three repository conditions is calculated through high-fidelity, geomechanical modeling. Criticality evaluation of compacted 200-g 239 Pu spheres at the compacted spacing shows that neither 12-inch nor 6-inch POCs are critical after the first 1000 years, the second 1000 years, or thereafter as the sea of reflector material changes to represent the three repository conditions. Specifically, fiberboard and iron isolates 239 Pu while dry, and brine reduces the reactivity when a room is partially and fully inundated. Because POC behavior bounds behavior of other standard TRU waste containers, post-closure criticality caused by room closure compacting containers is omitted in the performance assessments for the 2019 and 2026 WIPP compliance re-certification applications to the US Environmental Protection Agency.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2025

Results of Re-evaluation of FEPs Related to Higher Fissile Content in HLW Glass at SRS

One of the objectives of the United States Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy’s Office of Spent Fuel and High-Level Waste Disposition is to better understand the technical bases, risks, and uncertainties associated with the safe and secure disposition of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. Domestic defense and research activities have generated a few thousand metric tons of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, much of which has been or will be processed and vitrified into high-level waste glass. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act 1982 makes the Department of Energy responsible for disposal of these materials.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

MH-1A Sturgis Decommissioning and Dismantlement - 20281

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) with its prime contractor, Aptim Federal Services, LLC (APTIM), recycled 5,260 metric tons (11.6 million pounds) of material from Sturgis Barge (Sturgis) during the Decommissioning and Dismantlement of the MH-1A nuclear power reactor. The overall objective of the project was to reduce residual radioactivity associated with MH-1A to levels that permitted release of Sturgis for dismantlement and termination of the Army Reactor Office permit. By effectively applying waste hierarchy's three Rs - reduce, reuse and recycle - the Sturgis project not only minimized the amount of waste that required disposal at landfills, but also reduced the potential for long-term environmental liability emanating from these landfills. The project team completed the physical decommissioning efforts in June 2018 in Galveston, TX. In September 2018, radiological surveys were completed to demonstrate the vessel could be released for shipbreaking. Sturgis was towed from Galveston, TX to Brownsville, TX in late September 2018. Shipbreaking, dismantlement and recycling efforts began in early October 2018 and were completed on 15 March 2019. As part of the decommissioning effort in Galveston, the team shipped 69 shipments (860 metric tons) of low-level radioactive waste and radioactive components to the Waste Control Specialist (WCS) facility in Andrews TX for disposal. Certain radioactive components had to be transferred to the Department of Energy prior to placing the materials into the Federal Waste Facility located within WCS. However, most of the radioactive waste was characterized, profiled, approved and managed under the WCS permitted radioactive waste exemption process authorized and implemented by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) and the Radioactive Materials Division. This allows LLRW and LLMW to be shipped as regulated waste and then upon receipt at WCS through satisfying the relevant waste acceptance criteria the waste is exempted and placed into the WCS RCRA permitted cell. An additional 35 shipments (544 metric ton) of contaminated hazardous waste water were transported to U.S. Ecology in Robstown, TX for treatment/disposal. An additional 36 shipments (500 metric tons) of non-hazardous wastewater was sent to Republic Waste Services' facility in Fresno, TX. The disposal of these materials required close coordination with State of Texas regulators. During decommissioning, the project team recycled approximately 270 metric tons (600,000 pounds) of lead and steel. As part of the dismantlement in Brownsville, TX the team recycled approximately 5,000 metric tons (11 million pounds) of ferrous and non-ferrous material, limiting our disposal requirements to about 180 metric tons (400,000 pounds) of material (<4% from entire shipbreaking activity). Although the primary hazard being mitigated by this project was radiological, recycling was always a priority for the project. The team strived to achieve sustainability goals as we implemented this one of a kind project. Scrap metal recycling has a large positive impact on the environment and can also favorably impact project disposal costs. Steel is among the most recycled material in the world. Nearly 40% of the world's steel production is made from scrap. Recycling steel also requires 75% less energy than producing it from raw materials. By using recycled steel rather than virgin materials, 2.33 kg of carbon emissions are eliminated per kg of steel [1]. The project recycled more than 4,500 metric tons (10 million pounds) of steel, which eliminated about 10,400 metric tons (23 million pounds) of CO{sub 2}. By implementing a recycling initiative for the Sturgis project, the team was able to realize cost avoidance for disposal of scrap, cost savings from the metals recycled, plus the project provided benefits to the environment through our recycling efforts. Once the dismantlement was complete, the team prepared a detailed decommissioning closure report, which allowed for the termination of the Army Reactor Decommissioning Permit. While it not only reduced any potential long-term environmental liability, this project to decommission and dismantle a floating nuclear power plant is truly unprecedented - it is a prime example of the USACE mission which is: 'Engineering solutions for the Nation's toughest challenges'. This unique, one of a kind, historical power plant was never designed to be taken apart, and the available information about its construction was lacking in many details. The hazards that required mitigation dictated a painstaking and deliberate process in order to avoid any release to the environment and the community, and to protect the health and safety of the workers involved while keeping the waste hierarchy's three R's - reduce, reuse and recycle at the forefront. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2025

Conceptual Model Testing Related to SDU 6 Drainwell Observations

From its inception in the early 1950s through the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the Savannah River Site (SRS) produced nuclear materials for national defense in five reactors. Additionally, irradiated reactor fuel and target tubes were dissolved in nitric acid to recover plutonium and uranium using the PUREX (Plutonium Uranium Reduction EXtraction) process. Liquid waste from these chemical separations processes was then stored onsite in 51 underground tanks. Eight waste storage tanks have been operationally closed (i.e. cleaned and grouted) and the remaining tanks hold a mixture of liquids, insoluble solids, and precipitated salts (SRMC-LWP-2022-00001), the latter generated by evaporating water from the liquid waste. Waste is currently being retrieved from tanks and separated into 1) high-radioactivity, low-volume, and 2) low-radioactivity, high-volume components, principally through the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) (SRMC-LWP-2023-00001). The former waste stream is vitrified in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), stored onsite, and destined for offsite disposal in a deep geologic repository. The latter stream is mixed with dry cementitious materials in the Saltstone Production Facility (SPF) and the wet slurry placed in onsite Saltstone Disposal Units (SDUs) within the Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF), where it hardens into a cement waste form termed saltstone. A low-infiltration surface cover system will be placed over the SDF at closure, where SDUs will then be in the subsurface post-closure (SRR-CWDA-2019-00001).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Modeling and Analysis of the Transport and Disposal of Beryllium Moderator Blocks and Greater than Class C (GTCC) Waste

Radioactive waste in the United states is categorized based on its source, radioactivity, and security risk. The categorization method employed by the Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC) for low-level radioactive waste is not currently applied to any waste generated by the Department of Energy (DOE) or disposed of in DOE facilities. As a result, there is a large volume of DOE-generated waste with characteristics similar to the NRC’s “Greater than Class C” (GTCC) waste category which presently do not have a path for long-term disposal. Much of this waste cannot undergo the standard commercial disposition process due to it being categorized as Transuranic (TRU) waste under DOE guidelines, due to elevated concentrations of key fission products. Possible solutions to this dilemma are explored in the Environmental Impact Statement for the “Disposal of Greater-Than-Class-C Low Level Radioactive Wave” (EIS-0375). This paper analyzes several EIS possible paths for disposal for this “orphaned” waste. One example that highlights this categorization issue is the spent beryllium cladding that has been extracted from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) throughout its operational lifetime. These beryllium blocks surround the reactor’s main chambers and components and serve as neutron moderators. This paper will use this particular waste form to analyze the economic and technological viability of transporting and storing this material under the storage and transportation criteria of the Waste isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which was deemed the most feasible disposition path according to the EIS. The example of this waste form used in this paper that highlights this categorization issue is the spent beryllium cladding extracted from Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). These beryllium blocks surround the reactor’s components and serve as neutron moderators, and thus have accumulated high concentration of high-activity transuranic isotopes. This paper analyzed the viability of transporting and storing this material under the storage and transportation criteria of the five primary disposition paths covered in EIS-0375. An array of calculations was carried out to assess the viability of the various disposition paths for the beryllium shipments as well as other waste shipments that fall within the GTCC category. Modeling with MCNP 6.2 was conducted to determine whether the beryllium blocks could be safely stored and transported within a 72-B cask; the standard shipping container for remote-handled, transuranic waste, while also meeting regulatory limits at various disposition paths. A cost analysis of the transportation and long-term disposal paths mentioned in the EIS was also carried out using available data and information from similar waste shipments. Lastly, a geochemical analysis of the various geological repository discussed in the EIS was also carried out using the Geochemists Workbench Release 14. Long-term disposal of the beryllium blocks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) proved to be the most cost-effective long-term disposition option of the ones considered in the EIS. A dose rate calculation at both contact and remote-handling distances indicate that the analyzed beryllium shipments should not exceed the exposure limits at any of the considered locations. Greater-than-class-C waste has been left in a regulatory state of limbo for years, resulting in backlogs of inventory across several research sites in the United States. Due to its high activity and presence of transuranic isotopes, it is imperative to ensure that it remains inaccessible and sequestered both in its short-term interim as well as a long-term geologic time scale. The information and assessments done in the paper could potentially serve as a reference for any future shipments of this waste form at the WIPP facility as well as other disposition paths that may be considered in the future.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2025

Thermal properties and Thermodynamic Equilibrium Modeling of Cementitious Waste Forms

INTRODUCTION Cementitious matrices are used in the US DOE complex and worldwide to solidify aqueous radioactive, hazardous, mixed salt solutions, and sludges to meet low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal requirements. Blended formulations are used for most waste form mix designs. Substitution of pozzolans for Class F fly ash has the potential to alter the processing properties and stabilization properties of the resulting waste forms because they add chemical and mineralogical complexity to the final material. The Savannah River Site saltstone waste form was selected as the test case material. CemGEMS software was chosen as the model for predicting hydrated cementitious phases assemblages and phase evolution. Isothermal calorimetry was used as the method for evaluating processing and properties of fresh, uncured waste forms. The test cases consisted of reference case saltstone, and five natural pozzolan substituted saltstone mixes.

Bustamante, Michael E. [Savannah River National La↗

DOE OSTI2020

Using Robotic Manipulators for Radioactive Waste Inspection - 20090

The global nuclear industry has a growing volume of nuclear waste which needs to be scanned, sorted according to its activity and material type, then processed into the correct waste packages for long term storage and disposal. It is vital that there is a detailed understanding of the waste inventory stored in long term waste containers, as knowledge of their contents could predict or prevent any adverse effects in storage. The numerous 'scan and sort' tables which are currently used at many different facilities around the world to sort waste into their correct containers are human operated and require very slow gamma scanning procedures combined with educated guesswork to manually sort the waste. This often leads to excessive conservatisms, with placement of lower activity wastes in higher activity containers, which in turn costs significantly more to store. In the United Kingdom it costs UK Pounds 46 k per cubic meter to store intermediate level waste compared to just UK Pound 2.9 k per cubic meter to store low level waste according to a 2008 Department of Energy and Climate Change report in the UK. A proposed solution to this problem, is the use of a robotic manipulator to automatically inspect the 'scan and sort table' in order to produce an accurate 3D model of the table's waste contents and attach an overlaid radiation map. The radiation map contains spectrometry data and can in consequence be used to distinguish and locate specific radioisotopes. The 3D model should be as accurate as possible in order to allow for a second robot arm with an attached gripper to grasp the objects and place them into their designated long-term storage container. Various scanning procedures are explored in this study including basic raster scanning, adaptive raster scanning and point sampling. The optimal solution will in practice be defined by the required application and activity level of the wastes being inspected. The results presented in this study indicate that it is possible to produce a centimeter accurate 3D model of a mixed assortment of components on a nuclear waste 'scan and sort' table. In addition, it was shown that the waste objects emitting radiation could be accurately identified and located, with an overlaid radiation map. This study is applicable across the nuclear waste management sector. Many of the ideas and concepts developed in this study are applicable in other decommissioning settings for example, dismantling of legacy gloveboxes or routine inspection of nuclear waste packages in storage. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

DECOVALEX-2019 (Task B Final Report)

The DECOVALEX Project is an on-going international research collaboration, established in 1992, to advance the understanding and modeling of coupled Thermal (T), Hydrological (H), Mechanical (M) and Chemical (C) processes in geological in geological systems. DECOVALEX was initially motivated by the recognition that prediction of these coupled effects is an essential part of the performance and safety assessment of geologic disposal systems for radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel. This document is the final report of Task B which was proposed and coordinated by the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (ENSI) and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL), presenting the technical definitions of the problems studied, approaches applied, achievements made and outstanding issues for future research. Task B focused mainly on modelling of fault activation experiments (FS experiment) recently performed at the Mont Terri underground research laboratory, Switzerland. The FS experiment explores the coupling between fault reactivation in a clay host rock and the potential-enhanced fluid displacement through a previously low-permeability formation. Based on this experiment, the DECOVALEX-2019 Task B addresses how the change in permeability induced by the fault activation and the resulting fluid flow within the fault can be simulated including the dependence on its mechanical behavior. This will support the understanding of the processes during fault activation itself and it can help to determine consequences for contaminant transport due to potentially created permeable flow paths in otherwise low permeability argillaceous rocks.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2020

A Systematic Evidence Based Performance Approach to Regulation of Nuclear Sites in England and Wales - 20058

The Environment Agency for England has developed a systematic evidence-based approach to pursue our strategic environmental objectives for the regulation of nuclear sites. We use an annual evidence review process to ensure effective and efficient targeting of limited resources to achieve those objectives. Over the last 8 years, we have been developing and refining this approach to ensure risk-based and value driven regulation. The approach comprises nuclear site and nuclear sector review processes known as Site Environment Review (SER) and Nuclear Environment Review (NER). This approach complements our regulation of nuclear site permit holders under the Environmental Permitting Regulations (EPR). We deliver our regulation of nuclear sites in England and Wales alongside the Office for Nuclear Regulation. The SER process involves the lead regulator for each nuclear site assessing the permit holder's environmental performance across 14 themes, set within the context of the site's main activities and associated waste disposals. Our themes include environmental leadership, resources and climate change, radioactive waste management, facility management and decommissioning, groundwater, and environmental radiological protection. We use evidence from site inspections and working within our subject matter groups to grade current and predicted future environmental performance. We are particularly interested in sustainability and the application of Best Available Techniques (BAT) to prevent the creation, and minimise the disposal, of radioactive wastes. We use risk analysis (strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities) to examine performance against our strategic environmental objectives, which are set out, in our 5-year Nuclear Delivery Plan (NDP). The output supports the targeting of our resources at each nuclear site. We consult the relevant permit holders on the SER priorities and use their feedback to refine our plans. We expect all permit holders to take account of our priorities when considering their own programmes of work, objectives and plans. The NER process brings together what we learn and achieve through regulation across the sector. It provides input to planning priorities, supported by qualitative and semi-quantitative evidence. It covers the 28 nuclear sites in England and Wales and spans the same 14 environmental themes. During the process we collate, compile and summarise evidence from the SERs and other sources such as inspection reports and evidence from our other nuclear work programmes. The output is the NER annual report. This provides a snapshot of the status of the nuclear sector and gives insights to enable us to regulate more efficiently and effectively. It also takes account of cross-cutting issues and risks such as changes in international standards, domestic policy, regulatory framework, domestic standards and guidance, learning from experience such as incidents, events and good practice, and innovation, research and development. It provides graphics that illustrate the grading of environmental performance for the nuclear sector across the fourteen environmental themes. This analysis allows benchmarking of nuclear site's environmental performance and the visualisation provides a convenient comparison of performance across themes, sites, and over time. We use this intelligence to inform our investment in training and development of our staff, and our cross-cutting engagement on strategic issues with government, the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) and other corporate organisations. Adopting this approach can provide benefits with organisational reputation, stakeholder participation and ensuring value from the public investment. This paper describes the history of the SER/NER process, a selection of outputs from the process and ideas for improvement. The paper will be of interest to other regulators and organisations across the world that are interested in supporting continuous improvement. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Low Level Radon Concentration and Radon Daughter Dose Monitoring in an Arid-zone Waste Store - 20081

Radioactive waste containing predominantly soil and rubble from the clean-up of a former uranium and thorium minerals processing research facility is currently stored at the Woomera Test Range in South Australia awaiting final disposal. Prior to commencing any manipulation of the nearly 10,000 waste drums (205 L or 55 gallon each), radon concentration monitoring and radon daughter dosimetry has been undertaken to (i) gain understanding of the temporal and spatial variation of radon and its daughters within the storage facility, which could provide insights into the radiological source term and (ii) confirm that radiological risks to workers are below the guideline values. A time series of nearly 12 months of detailed observations shows low level radon concentrations with annual average values that are slightly above the average radon concentrations in Australian homes. Peak values in summer are about three times higher than the annual average based on the CRM measurements. Both radon concentrations and annual effective dose are well below the regulatory limits. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

On Temperature Limits for the Outer Surface of a Container in a Disposal Facility - 20313

The temperature in a disposal facility for high-level radioactive waste (HLRW) is an issue for safety. When the recommencement of the search for and selection of a site for a disposal facility for HLRW in Germany was stipulated by the Site Selection Act (StandAG 2017) in 2017, a precautionary temperature limit of 100 deg. C on the outer surface of the containers with high-level radioactive waste in the disposal facility section was set. This precautionary temperature limit shall be applied in preliminary safety analyses provided that the 'maximum physically possible temperatures' in the respective host rocks have not yet been determined due to pending research. Therefore, this issue is addressed and discussed in this paper, contributing to 'pending research' by a review of the literature. This paper briefly discusses a few examples of thermohydraulic, mechanical, chemical and biological processes in a disposal facility, because temperature limits are derived based on safety impacts regarding THMCB-processes. The temperature-dependent processes have been extracted from databases for features, events and processes (FEP-databases). Furthermore, it is discussed if the feasibility to retrieve and recover HLRW is hampered at high temperatures. A design temperature concerning single components of a disposal facility for the preservation of their features can be derived when a safety concept is established. However, the interactions of all relevant processes in a disposal concept must be considered to determine a specific temperature limit for the outer surface of the containers. Therefore, applicable temperature limits may vary for particular safety and disposal concepts in the following host rocks: rock salt, clay stone and crystalline rock. Technical solutions for retrieval and design options for recovery seem to be viable up to temperatures of 200 deg. C with different, sometimes severe, downsides according to expert judgement. Temperature limits regarding the outer surface of the containers can be derived specifically for each safety concept and design of the disposal facility in a host rock. General temperature limits without reference to specific safety concepts or the particular design of the disposal facility may narrow down the possibilities for optimisation of the disposal facility and could adversely affect the site selection process in finding the best suitable site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Vapor-Liquid Partitioning of Methylmercury Compounds: Fundamental Data to Support the Savannah River Site Liquid Waste System: Henry's Law, Solubility and Vapor Pressure Determination for Representative Methylmercury Compounds

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Liquid Waste System (LWS) contains approximately 66 tons of mercury within the liquids, salts, and sludges that are currently being processed into final wasteforms for disposal. Mercury concentrations within the system exceed those typically experienced in environmental or industrial systems; thus, management of mercury compounds continues to be a priority for SRS. In the LWS, waste is vitrified into a borosilicate glass wasteform that contains most of the radioactivity, while the lower activity solutions are dispositioned in a low-level grout wasteform, or “saltstone”. The alkaline, high ionic strength caustic wastes are pumped, evaporated, and otherwise managed throughout the LWS and Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) as they are stored and prepared for conversion to the final wasteforms. Because of the complexity of this system, a key component of effective mercury management in the LWS requires analysis of mercury in various physical phases. The high concentration of mercury within the SRS LWS has the potential to generate vapor-phase contamination. Elemental mercury (Hg 0 ), dimethylmercury ((CH 3 ) 2 Hg), and methylmercury (CH 3 Hg + ) are among species known or suspected to contribute to the flux of mercury from liquid to vapor phase (Iverfeldt and Lindquist, 1982). Chemical speciation affects not only mercury behavior in LWS operations but may also affect the performance of mercury treatment and removal technologies in the LWS.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Study on the Strategy for Final Disposal and Reuse of Decontamination Wastes after the Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident - 20426

After the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, a large area of East Japan was contaminated by radio-Cs. To discuss the final disposal of the contaminated wastes off-site and the required development of related technologies, it is important to understand the volume and radiation concentration of the wastes after various treatments. For a scientific investigation purpose, a research committee has been formed by the Society for the Remediation of Radioactive Contamination in the Environment, which is independent from the Ministry of Environment. This committee's work is focused on discussing various scenarios for the final disposal considering a mass balance evaluation of the entire process, economic evaluations, and stakeholder consultation for final consensus. The current discussions of this committee are herein reported. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Treatment of Problematic Reactive Metal Wastes Using GeoMelt ICV - WM2020 Conference Paper

Decommissioning of sodium-cooled reactors and fast reactor technologies has generated a number of reactive metal waste configurations that are problematic to treat and typically lack cost effective treatment methods and disposition options. As a result, Veolia Nuclear Solutions, under contract with Idaho National Laboratory (owned by the U.S. Department of Energy and managed and operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC) demonstrated its GeoMelt® In-Container Vitrification (ICV)™ technology to safely convert sodium metal to a non-reactive vitrified oxide form. The demonstration project, supported by glass formulation and crucible testing, consisted of a series of ICV™ melts that processed elemental sodium into stable non-reactive glass. INL is currently implementing GeoMelt® technology as a means to safely and reliably convert radioactive reactive metal residues that contaminate sodium cooled reactor components into waste forms that comply with existing disposition pathways. Reactive metal wastes require treatment in order to remove the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) reactivity and ignitability characteristics to comply with land disposal restrictions. GeoMelt®, which is an alternative to other potential treatment approaches, provides a robust approach that chemically converts the reactive metals to an inert oxide while also immobilizing radionuclides in a vitrified waste form with durability equal to or better than vitrified nuclear fuel reprocessing wastes (very robust and inert waste forms). Most other treatment approaches generate hydrogen gas which is problematic. In 2016, Veolia Nuclear Solutions first demonstrated the effectiveness of the GeoMelt® ICV™ process in deactivating reactive sodium metal. Crucible, bench-scale, and engineering-scale demonstrations were conducted on several surrogate waste configurations with various ratios of sodium metal and glass-formers. Each ratio and configuration demonstrated complete deactivation of the surrogate sodium metal. Follow-on work in 2017 demonstrated the deactivation of reactive sodium by GeoMelt® ICV™ at a higher waste loading relative to previously demonstrated work performed in 2016; the higher waste loading optimized glass chemistry while enhancing the economical full-scale treatment of reactive metals. Additionally, follow-on demonstration testing in 2018 and 2019 focused on more complex shapes and other reactive-metals (mocked up Experimental Breeder Reactor II [EBR-II] subassembly, sodium filled heat exchanger, and a can containing sodium potassium alloy) which were all performed at engineering-scale. Since 2018, a 10-metric ton full-scale GeoMelt unit (GeoMelt® Richland) was designed, installed, and commissioned at Perma-Fix Northwest in Richland, Washington for the treatment of reactive metal wastes. As of September 2019, over 900 55-gallon drums containing a total of around 3,500 lb of sodium with low levels of radioactivity have been treated at GeoMelt ® Richland, with resulting glass monoliths disposed at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). A full-scale radiological demonstration melt on an actual EBR-II subassembly has also been performed using the full-scale melter in 2019. The GeoMelt® technology is a proven radioactive waste treatment technology capable of immobilizing radioactive wastes, including bulk rubble such as drums and other steel vessels usually without pretreatment. Utilizing the GeoMelt® technology to treat reactive metals eliminates pretreatment steps resulting from having to separate the reactive metal from steel containers or jackets as GeoMelt® can easily operate at temperatures sufficient to melt the steel and expose the reactive metal for treatment. Eliminating handling steps of reactive metals is a significant safety advantage since reactive metals are pyrophoric. The results generated as a part of the 2018-2019 demonstration program are presented in the paper.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2024

Numerical modeling of Joule heated ceramic melter

Computational fluid dynamics and heat transfer models of waste glass melters are being developed to support the vitrification campaign at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) as part of the United States nuclear waste stewardship and environmental protection programs. The WTP mission aims to achieve the stable and durable processing of vitrified waste in the safest, most efficient, and economical manner possible. Hanford’s tank waste is far more complex and varied than the waste treated by other vitrification facilities and both startup and long-term operational challenges are likely to be even greater than prior experience has shown. There are thousands of different waste compositions, which makes processing the waste a complex and challenging task. Models of test melters, pilot-scale, and full-scale melters have been developed to provide understanding and insight into the various physical and chemical phenomena occurring during vitrification. So the results of these modeling activities will be used to support the WTP operations to process legacy nuclear waste into a stable form for disposal.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Influences on Subsurface Plutonium and Americium Migration

Plutonium (Pu) has been released to the environment worldwide, including approximately 1.85 × 1015 Bq (200 kg) of Pu from process waste solutions to unconfined soil structures at the Hanford Site in Washington State. The subsurface mobility of Pu is influenced by complex interactions with sediments, groundwater, and any co-contaminants within the waste stream. Previous investigations at Hanford have shown that Pu exists as discrete PuO 2 particles forming before or after disposal, as secondary solid phases formed from waste interactions with sediments as adsorbed/incorporated species, and/or as dissolved species. In this research, new evidence is presented for the existence of PuO 2 , PuO 2 -Bi 2 O 3 composites, and particles from burnt Pu metal in near-surface sediments where Pu-laden acidic process waste was disposed to sediments. Pu and americium (Am) L3 X-ray absorption spectroscopy and density functional theory suggest that, in larger, more crystalline PuO 2 particles, Am formed from radioactive decay is retained in the Pu IV O 2 structure as Am IV . The Pu and Am that were disposed of in an acidic waste stream have since migrated deeper into the subsurface with detection to at least 37 meters below ground surface. In contrast, Pu deposited near the ground surface from neutral pH waste is found to be homogeneously distributed and relatively immobile. Groundwater extractions performed on contaminated sediments indicate that both Pu and Am are recalcitrant, with Am being fractionally less extractable than Pu on a molar basis. These results suggest that the more mobile fraction of Am has migrated from the near-surface and may be present in the deeper sediments as a different phase than Pu. From these results, it is suggested that Pu and Am deposited from acidic wastes were initially mobile and became significantly less mobile as wastes were neutralized within the soil profile.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

DOE OSTI2020

Treatment of Problematic Reactive Metal Wastes Using the GeoMelt{sup R} In-Container Vitrification (ICV{sup TM}) Process - 20326

Decommissioning of sodium-cooled reactors and fast reactor technologies has generated a number of reactive metal waste configurations that are problematic to treat and typically lack cost effective treatment methods and disposition options. As a result, Veolia Nuclear Solutions, under contract with Idaho National Laboratory (owned by the U.S. Department of Energy and managed and operated by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC) demonstrated its GeoMelt{sup R} In-Container Vitrification (ICV){sup TM} technology to safely convert sodium metal to a non-reactive vitrified oxide form. The demonstration project, supported by glass formulation and crucible testing, consisted of a series of ICV{sup TM} melts that processed elemental sodium into stable non-reactive glass. INL is currently implementing GeoMelt{sup R} technology as a means to safely and reliably convert radioactive reactive metal residues that contaminate sodium cooled reactor components into waste forms that comply with existing disposition pathways. Reactive metal wastes require treatment in order to remove the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) reactivity and ignitability characteristics to comply with land disposal restrictions. GeoMelt{sup R}, which is an alternative to other potential treatment approaches, provides a robust approach that chemically converts the reactive metals to an inert oxide while also immobilizing radionuclides in a vitrified waste form with durability equal to or better than vitrified nuclear fuel reprocessing wastes (very robust and inert waste forms). Most other treatment approaches generate hydrogen gas which is problematic. In 2016, Veolia Nuclear Solutions first demonstrated the effectiveness of the GeoMelt{sup R} ICV{sup TM} process in deactivating reactive sodium metal. Crucible, bench-scale, and engineering-scale demonstrations were conducted on several surrogate waste configurations with various ratios of sodium metal and glass formers. Each ratio and configuration demonstrated complete deactivation of the surrogate sodium metal. Follow-on work in 2017 demonstrated the deactivation of reactive sodium by GeoMelt{sup R} ICV{sup TM} at a higher waste loading relative to previously demonstrated work performed in 2016; the higher waste loading optimized glass chemistry while enhancing the economical full-scale treatment of reactive metals. Additionally, follow-on demonstration testing in 2018 and 2019 focused on more complex shapes and other reactive-metals (mocked up Experimental Breeder Reactor II [EBR-II] subassembly, sodium filled heat exchanger, and a can containing sodium potassium alloy) which were all performed at engineering scale. Veolia Nuclear Solutions designed, installed, and commissioned in September 2018, at Perma-Fix Northwest in Richland Washington, a 10-metric ton full-scale GeoMelt unit (GeoMelt{sup R} Richland) for the treatment of reactive metal wastes. As of September 2019, over 900 55-gallon drums containing a total of around 3,500 lb of sodium with low levels of radioactivity have been treated at GeoMelt{sup R} Richland, with resulting glass monoliths disposed at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). A full-scale radiological demonstration melt on an actual EBR-II subassembly has also been performed using the full-scale melter in 2019. The GeoMelt{sup R} technology is a proven radioactive waste treatment technology capable of immobilizing radioactive wastes, including bulk rubble such as drums and other steel vessels usually without pretreatment. Utilizing the GeoMelt{sup R} technology to treat reactive metals eliminates pretreatment steps resulting from having to separate the reactive metal from steel containers or jackets as GeoMelt{sup R} can easily operate at temperatures sufficient to melt the steel and expose the reactive metal for treatment. Eliminating handling steps of reactive metals is a significant safety advantage since reactive metals are pyrophoric. The results generated as a part of the 2018-2019 demonstration program are presented in the paper. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Oil and Natural Gas Development near and beneath Uranium Tailings Cells and Other Remediated Sites - 20358

DOE LM is responsible for maintaining remedies at more than 50 remediated sites that require active long-term surveillance and maintenance (LTS and M). Institutional controls (ICs) were established to limit human and environmental exposures to residual contamination by controlling land use, restricting access to potential hazards, and making the public aware of potential dangers from the residual contamination. ICs for each site were developed based on current and foreseeable conditions; however, these controls should evolve to mitigate potential human health and other environmental risks from unanticipated changes in activities or site conditions. Activities conducted beyond the DOE long-term care boundaries by non-DOE parties may impact the effectiveness of ICs or even the long-term stability of disposal cells and groundwater remedies. Several sites that LM manages or that will transfer to LM for LTS and M are in active oil and gas production basins. The sites are associated with uranium ore milling or nuclear test sites and have been remediated or are in the process of remediation and have no ongoing DOE mission. Particularly since 2005, hydraulic fracturing ('fracking') combined with directional drilling has dramatically increased oil and natural gas (oil/gas) production in the United States, now making it the number one hydrocarbon-producing country. Fracking has allowed production from shale and other rocks of low natural permeability that were historically not considered viable oil/gas resources. Also, because wellbores can now be drilled as many as 5 kilometers or more horizontally, hydrocarbons can be recovered from zones without having access to the surface above them. Drilling activity near Rulison, Colorado, the location of an underground nuclear detonation managed by LM, has raised public concerns that remnant radioactivity in the detonation zone could migrate to producing wells and enter the natural gas distribution system. At sites like the Falls City, Texas, Disposal site, transitioned to LM with a split estate, increased production in the region has resulted in wellbores beneath the long-term care boundary of the site. While the DOE license for Falls City was approved by the NRC in 1997 without the acquisition of the subsurface rights, NRC has raised concerns on whether this activity impacts the integrity of the cell and/or groundwater remedies. In Wyoming, LM is anticipating receiving the license for the Bear Creek site and manages the Spook site, both locations of uranium mill tailings disposal cells. These Wyoming sites are in an active region of major oil and gas development. This change in surrounding land use will require LM to work collaboratively with NRC to address these concerns. At several DOE sites radioactive waste, and often intermixed nonradioactive constituents, is permanently isolated in engineered disposal cells. At other sites, residual contamination can be present in groundwater, blast cavities, and infinite amounts within soil. Areas targeted for oil and gas development at the Texas and Wyoming sites range from depths of 2440 to 3350 meters (8000-11000 feet) below ground surface. When most site remedies were designed, oil and gas development was not considered to be an issue within the site boundary. With the more recent uses of directional drilling, fracking, and associated wastewater injections, the evaluative criteria for incoming sites and ICs for managing long-term protectiveness and regulatory compliance are changing. Although DOE surface ownership was previously thought to be a robust IC to prevent surface and subsurface development, particularly at disposal sites, that may no longer be the case. Whereas the subsurface development at Texas and Wyoming sites is currently occurring at thousands of meters beneath the surface, shallower and direct onsite development would be more of a concern for LM. The energy introduced when a well is hydraulically fractured causes microseismic events (magnitude -2 to 1.0) as the fractures propagate but does not directly cause seismic events (earthquakes) of sufficient magnitude to damage surface structures. Additionally, the extent of the hydraulic fractures is limited to the targeted depths, which are far below the surface. However, earthquakes of sufficient magnitude to damage surface structures have been attributed to the injection of wastewater into disposal wells. States that have experienced these effects have enacted regulations that limit the rate and pressures that wastewater can be injected into disposal wells. Items LM may consider are the need for monitoring the volume of water injected into nearby disposal wells and possibly installing seismic stations at sites most susceptible to damage. While the need to demonstrate that no impact from oil and gas extraction activities on a site groundwater remedy or disposal cells will vary from site to site, LM is assessing risk criteria for this activity. Though LM has not experienced an issue yet at a uranium tailings disposal site, it cannot assume that there will be none, and must address NRC concerns. LM is building on past experiences at other sites and beginning to form new processes with the hope that these concepts can be applied for other future sites. (authors)

04 OIL SHALES AND TAR SANDS↗