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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1993

Gender differences in endocrine responses to posture and 7 days of 6 deg head down bed rest

Endocrine regulation of fluids and electrolytes during seven days of 6 deg head down bed rest (HDBR) was compared in male (n = 8) and, for the first time, female (n = 8) volunteers. The subjects' responses to quiet standing for 2 hr before and after HDBR were also tested. In both sexes, diuresis and natriuresis were evident during the first 2-3 days of HDBR, resulting in a marked increase in the urinary Na/K ratio and significant Na retention on reambulation. After the first day of HDBR, plasma renin activity (PRA) was increased relative to aldosterone, plasma volume was decreased, and the renal response to aldosterone appeared to be appropriate. Circulating levels of arginine vasopressin (AVP), cortisol, and ACTH were unchanged during HDBR. Plasma testosterone decreased slightly on day 2 of HDBR in males. The ratio of AM ACTH to cortisol was lower in females than in males because ACTH was lower in females. Urinary cortisol increased and remained elevated throughout the HDBR in males only. There were no gender differences in the responses to 7 day HDBR, except those in the pituitary-adrenal system; those differences appeared unrelated to the postural change. The provocative cardiovascular test of quiet standing before and after bed rest revealed both sex differences and effects of HDBR. There were significant sex differences in cardiovascular responses to standing, before and after HDBR. Females had greater PRA and aldosterone responses to standing before bedrest and larger aldosterone responses to standing after HDBR than males. Cardiovascular responses to standing before and after bedrest differed markedly: arterial pressure and heart rates increased with standing before HDBR, by contrast, arterial pressure decreased, with greater increases in heart rates after HDBR. In both sexes, all hormonal responses to standing were greater after HDBR. The results show clearly that similar responses to standing as well as to HDBR occur in both sexes, but that females exhibit greater PRA and aldosterone responses than males.

Vernikos, J.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Voyager planetary radio astronomy studies

Analysis of nonthermal radio emission data obtained by the Planetary Radio Astronomy (PRA) spectrometers on the Voyager 1 and 2 spacecraft was performed. This PRA data provided unique insights into the radio emission characteristics of the outer planets because of PRA's unique spectral response below the terrestrial ionospheric plasma frequency and its unprecedented proximity to the source. Of those results which were documented or published, this final report surveys only the highlights and cites references for more complete discussions. Unpublished results for Uranus, Neptune, and theoretical Ionian current distributions are presented at greater length. The most important conclusion to be drawn from these observations is that banded spectral emission is common to the radio emission below 1-2 MHz observed from all four Jovian planets. In every case multiple spectral features evolve on time scales of seconds to minutes. To the extent these features drift in frequency, they appear never to cross one another. The Neptunian spectral features appear to drift little or not at all, their evolution consisting principally of waxing and waning. Since other evidence strongly suggests that most or all of this radio emission is occurring near the local magnetospheric electron cyclotron frequency, this implies that this emission preferentially occurs at certain continually changing planetary radii. It remains unknown why certain radii might be favored, unless radial electric field components or other means serve to differentiate radially the magnetospheric plasma density, particle energy vectors, or particle coherence. Calculation of the spatial distribution and intensity of the Io-generated magnetospheric currents are also presented; these currents may be limited principally by wave impedance and local field strengths.

Staelin, David H.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Overview of Probabilistic Risk Assessment at NASA: Past, Present and Future

PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment) adds the "probability" dimension to the traditional "deterministic" dimension of engineering and safety analyses. Although PRA, as a discipline, has been the evolutionary product of only the last couple of decades, much of the underlying methodology has been in use for a long time. In fact, the concept of probability for describing the likelihood that rare events happen is ancient and dates from Ancient Greece. Our vision is for NASA to achieve world-class state-of-the-art capability in performing and using PRA in technical and management decisions. Since NASA is a leader in many technical fields in which it is involved, we hope, before long, to see NASA become a leader in this field also.

Stamatelatos, Michael G.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Charging Risks on the International Space Station

The International Space Station (ISS) operates in the F2 region of Earth's ionosphere, orbiting at altitudes ranging from 350 to 450 km at an inclination of 51.6 degrees. The relatively dense, cool F2 ionospheric plasma suppresses surface charging processes much of the time, and the flux of relativistic electrons is low enough to preclude deep dielectric charging processes. The most important spacecraft charging processes in the ISS orbital environment are: 1) ISS electrical power system interactions with the F2 plasma, 2) magnetic induction processes resulting from flight through the geomagnetic field and, 3) charging processes that result from interaction with auroral electrons at high latitude. Recently, the continuing review and evaluation of putative ISS charging hazards required by the ISS Program Office revealed that ISS charging could produce an electrical shock hazard to the ISS crew during extravehicular activity (EVA). ISS charging risks are being evaluated in an ongoing measurement and analysis campaign. The results of ISS charging measurements are combined with a recently developed model of ISS charging (the Plasma Interaction Model) and an exhaustive analysis of historical ionospheric variability data (ISS Ionospheric Specification) to evaluate ISS charging risks using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods. The PRA combines estimates of the frequency of occurrence and severity of the charging hazards with estimates of the reliability of various hazard controls systems, as required by NASA s safety and risk management programs, to enable design and selection of a hazard control approach that minimizes overall programmatic and personnel risk. The PRA provides a quantitative methodology for incorporating the results of the ISS charging measurement and analysis campaigns into the necessary hazard reports, EVA procedures, and ISS flight rules required for operating ISS in a safe and productive manner.

Koontz, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2005

Uncertainty Considerations for Ballistic Limit Equations

The overall risk for any spacecraft system is typically determined using a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). A PRA attempts to determine the overall risk associated with a particular mission by factoring in all known risks (and their corresponding uncertainties, if known) to the spacecraft during its mission. The threat to mission and human life posed by the mircro-meteoroid & orbital debris (MMOD) environment is one of the risks. NASA uses the BUMPER II program to provide point estimate predictions of MMOD risk for the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station. However, BUMPER II does not provide uncertainty bounds or confidence intervals for its predictions. With so many uncertainties believed to be present in the models used within BUMPER II, providing uncertainty bounds with BUMPER II results would appear to be essential to properly evaluating its predictions of MMOD risk. The uncertainties in BUMPER II come primarily from three areas: damage prediction/ballistic limit equations, environment models, and failure criteria definitions. In order to quantify the overall uncertainty bounds on MMOD risk predictions, the uncertainties in these three areas must be identified. In this paper, possible approaches through which uncertainty bounds can be developed for the various damage prediction and ballistic limit equations encoded within the shuttle and station versions of BUMPER II are presented and discussed. We begin the paper with a review of the current approaches used by NASA to perform a PRA for the Space Shuttle and the International Space Station, followed by a review of the results of a recent sensitivity analysis performed by NASA using the shuttle version of the BUMPER II code. Following a discussion of the various equations that are encoded in BUMPER II, we propose several possible approaches for establishing uncertainty bounds for the equations within BUMPER II. We conclude with an evaluation of these approaches and present a recommendation regarding which of them would be the most appropriate to follow.

Schonberg, W. P.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Simulation Assisted Risk Assessment: Blast Overpressure Modeling

A probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) approach has been developed and applied to the risk analysis of capsule abort during ascent. The PRA is used to assist in the identification of modeling and simulation applications that can significantly impact the understanding of crew risk during this potentially dangerous maneuver. The PRA approach is also being used to identify the appropriate level of fidelity for the modeling of those critical failure modes. The Apollo launch escape system (LES) was chosen as a test problem for application of this approach. Failure modes that have been modeled and/or simulated to date include explosive overpressure-based failure, explosive fragment-based failure, land landing failures (range limits exceeded either near launch or Mode III trajectories ending on the African continent), capsule-booster re-contact during separation, and failure due to plume-induced instability. These failure modes have been investigated using analysis tools in a variety of technical disciplines at various levels of fidelity. The current paper focuses on the development and application of a blast overpressure model for the prediction of structural failure due to overpressure, including the application of high-fidelity analysis to predict near-field and headwinds effects.

Lawrence, Scott L.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Risk-Informed Safety Assurance and Probabilistic Assessment of Mission-Critical Software-Intensive Systems

This report validates and documents the detailed features and practical application of the framework for software intensive digital systems risk assessment and risk-informed safety assurance presented in the NASA PRA Procedures Guide for Managers and Practitioner. This framework, called herein the "Context-based Software Risk Model" (CSRM), enables the assessment of the contribution of software and software-intensive digital systems to overall system risk, in a manner which is entirely compatible and integrated with the format of a "standard" Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), as currently documented and applied for NASA missions and applications. The CSRM also provides a risk-informed path and criteria for conducting organized and systematic digital system and software testing so that, within this risk-informed paradigm, the achievement of a quantitatively defined level of safety and mission success assurance may be targeted and demonstrated. The framework is based on the concept of context-dependent software risk scenarios and on the modeling of such scenarios via the use of traditional PRA techniques - i.e., event trees and fault trees - in combination with more advanced modeling devices such as the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) or other dynamic logic-modeling representations. The scenarios can be synthesized and quantified in a conditional logic and probabilistic formulation. The application of the CSRM method documented in this report refers to the MiniAERCam system designed and developed by the NASA Johnson Space Center.

Guarro, Sergio B.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Assessment and Control of Spacecraft Charging Risks on the International Space Station

Electrical interactions between the F2 region ionospheric plasma and the 160V photovoltaic (PV) electrical power system on the International Space Station (ISS) can produce floating potentials (FP) on the ISS conducting structure of greater magnitude than are usually observed on spacecraft in low-Earth orbit. Flight through the geomagnetic field also causes magnetic induction charging of ISS conducting structure. Charging processes resulting from interaction of ISS with auroral electrons may also contribute to charging albeit rarely. The magnitude and frequency of occurrence of possibly hazardous charging events depends on the ISS assembly stage (six more 160V PV arrays will be added to ISS), ISS flight configuration, ISS position (latitude and longitude), and the natural variability in the ionospheric flight environment. At present, ISS is equipped with two plasma contactors designed to control ISS FP to within 40 volts of the ambient F2 plasma. The negative-polarity grounding scheme utilized in the ISS 160V power system leads, naturally, to negative values of ISS FP. A negative ISS structural FP leads to application of electrostatic fields across the dielectrics that separate conducting structure from the ambient F2 plasma, thereby enabling dielectric breakdown and arcing. Degradation of some thermal control coatings and noise in electrical systems can result. Continued review and evaluation of the putative charging hazards, as required by the ISS Program Office, revealed that ISS charging could produce a risk of electric shock to the ISS crew during extra vehicular activity. ISS charging risks are being evaluated in ongoing ISS charging measurements and analysis campaigns. The results of ISS charging measurements are combined with a recently developed detailed model of the ISS charging process and an extensive analysis of historical ionospheric variability data, to assess ISS charging risks using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods. The PRA analysis (estimated frequency of occurrence and severity of the charging hazards) are then used to select the hazard control strategy that provides the best overall safety and mission success environment for ISS and the ISS crew. This paper presents: 1) a summary of ISS spacecraft charging analysis, measurements, observations made to date, 2) plans for future ISS spacecraft charging measurement campaigns, and 3) a detailed discussion of the PRA strategy used to assess ISS spacecraft charging risks and select charging hazard control strategies

Koontz, Steve↗
NASA NTRS2010

Structural Health Monitoring Analysis for the Orbiter Wing Leading Edge

This viewgraph presentation reviews Structural Health Monitoring Analysis for the Orbiter Wing Leading Edge. The Wing Leading Edge Impact Detection System (WLE IDS) and the Impact Analysis Process are also described to monitor WLE debris threats. The contents include: 1) Risk Management via SHM; 2) Hardware Overview; 3) Instrumentation; 4) Sensor Configuration; 5) Debris Hazard Monitoring; 6) Ascent Response Summary; 7) Response Signal; 8) Distribution of Flight Indications; 9) Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA); 10) Model Correlation; 11) Impact Tests; 12) Wing Leading Edge Modeling; 13) Ascent Debris PRA Results; and 14) MM/OD PRA Results.

Yap, Keng C.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Applications of the International Space Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment Model

Recently the International Space Station (ISS) has incorporated more Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs) in the decision making process for significant issues. Future PRAs will have major impact to ISS and future spacecraft development and operations. These PRAs will have their foundation in the current complete ISS PRA model and the current PRA trade studies that are being analyzed as requested by ISS Program stakeholders. ISS PRAs have recently helped in the decision making process for determining reliability requirements for future NASA spacecraft and commercial spacecraft, making crew rescue decisions, as well as making operational requirements for ISS orbital orientation, planning Extravehicular activities (EVAs) and robotic operations. This paper will describe some applications of the ISS PRA model and how they impacted the final decision. This paper will discuss future analysis topics such as life extension, requirements of new commercial vehicles visiting ISS.

Grant, Warren↗
NASA NTRS2014

Exit Presentation Fall 2013

Our current International Space Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment (ISS PRA) model assumes all collisions between a visiting vehicle (VV) and the ISS result in worst case loss of the ISS crew and the vehicle (LOCV). Drawing results from the Mir-Progress collision, we know this assumption is inaccurate because that collision did not lead to LOCV. Therefore the PRA team is conducting a study to determine the likelihood of LOCV when a collision occurs between a VV and the ISS. Kinetic energy is calculated and converted to pounds of TNT for the moving VVs when they collide with the ISS. Different scenarios are evaluated to obtain collision related data such as translational kinetic energy and rotational kinetic energy. These calculated data are integrated into the results from the expert elicitation performed on the Mir- Progress collision. As a result of this study, the PRA model will now calculate the probability of a VV collision with ISS, the probability that collision will result in Loss of Soyuz Crew (LOC) or Loss of ISS Crew and Vehicle (LOCV).

Yang, Qi Rong↗
NASA NTRS2015

Dynamic Modeling of Ascent Abort Scenarios for Crewed Launches

For the last 30 years, the United States' human space program has been focused on low Earth orbit exploration and operations with the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs. After over 40 years, the U.S. is again working to return humans beyond Earth orbit. To do so, NASA is developing a new launch vehicle and spacecraft to provide this capability. The launch vehicle is referred to as the Space Launch System (SLS) and the spacecraft is called Orion. The new launch system is being developed with an abort system that will enable the crew to escape launch failures that would otherwise be catastrophic as well as probabilistic design requirements set for probability of loss of crew (LOC) and loss of mission (LOM). In order to optimize the risk associated with designing this new launch system, as well as verifying the associated requirements, NASA has developed a comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of the integrated ascent phase of the mission that includes the launch vehicle, spacecraft and ground launch facilities. Given the dynamic nature of rocket launches and the potential for things to go wrong, developing a PRA to assess the risk can be a very challenging effort. Prior to launch and after the crew has boarded the spacecraft, the risk exposure time can be on the order of three hours. During this time, events may initiate from either the spacecraft, the launch vehicle, or the ground systems, thus requiring an emergency egress from the spacecraft to a safe ground location or a pad abort via the spacecraft's launch abort system. Following launch, again either the spacecraft or the launch vehicle can initiate the need for the crew to abort the mission and return home. Obviously, there are thousands of scenarios whose outcome depends on when the abort is initiated during ascent and how the abort is performed. This includes modeling the risk associated with explosions and benign system failures that require aborting a spacecraft under very dynamic conditions, particularly in the lower atmosphere, and returning the crew home safely. This paper will provide an overview of the PRA model that has been developed of this new launch system, including some of the challenges that are associated with this effort.

Bigler, Mark↗
NASA NTRS2011

Reliability Analysis and Standardization of Spacecraft Command Generation Processes

center dot In order to reduce commanding errors that are caused by humans, we create an approach and corresponding artifacts for standardizing the command generation process and conducting risk management during the design and assurance of such processes. center dot The literature review conducted during the standardization process revealed that very few atomic level human activities are associated with even a broad set of missions. center dot Applicable human reliability metrics for performing these atomic level tasks are available. center dot The process for building a "Periodic Table" of Command and Control Functions as well as Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models is demonstrated. center dot The PRA models are executed using data from human reliability data banks. center dot The Periodic Table is related to the PRA models via Fault Links.

human errors.↗
NASA NTRS2016

Estimating Orion Heat Shield Failure Due To Ablator Cracking During The EFT-1 Mission

The Orion EFT-1 heatshield suffered from two major certification challenges: First, the mechanical properties used in design were not evident in the flight hardware and second, the flight article itself cracked during fabrication. The combination of these events motivated the Orion Program to pursue an engineering-level Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) as part of heatshield certification rationale. The PRA provided loss of Mission (LOM) likelihoods considering the probability of a crack occurring during the mission and the likelihood of subsequent structure over-temperature. The methods and input data for the PRA are presented along with a discussion of the test data used to anchor the results. The Orion program accepted an EFT-1 Loss of Vehicle (LOV) risk of 1-in-160,000 due to in-mission Avcoat cracking based on the results of this analysis. Conservatisms in the result, along with future considerations for Exploration Missions (EM) are also addressed.

Avcoat↗
NASA NTRS2018

Synthesizing a New Launch Vehicle Failure Probability Based on Historical Flight Data

New launch vehicles have historically had significantly higher failure rates in early flights than what has been predicted using Probabilistic Risk Assessment - PRA. This is because PRAs typically model a mature vehicle where a significant portion of the early failure probability contributors have been eliminated due to testing and improvements after actual field operation. To capture a more accurate early flight failure probability estimate, this paper develops a method that estimates ascent failure probability starting with the first flight based on historical launch vehicle records. With new launch vehicles being developed, such as the Space Launch System - SLS, a PRA model must be extended to cover early flight failure probability contributions that are either not covered in the mature-vehicle PRA or are underestimated. These failure probability contributions include design errors, quality control deficiencies, installation errors, and environmental impacts. There are also failure dependencies due to systemic errors that still exist due to limited entire-system testing.

Cross, Robert B.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Comparative Analysis of Static and Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment

Implementation of risk-informed design allows the design team to thoroughly explore the risks of a system while iterating the operations concept, design, and requirements until the system meets mission objects and is achievable within constraints. To arrive at a space system design that is likely to meet all constraints placed upon mass, cost, performance and risk, the system requirements must be understood and traded against each other as early as the conceptual design phase. Depending on the project phase and the goals of the risk analysis, various PRA methodologies could be used to produce quantitative risk estimates to enable such a process. In order to better understand the applicability, advantages, and limitations of various PRA methodologies, a comparative analysis of three bottom-up, component-based PRA approaches was performed. The three methods examined are a traditional static fault tree, a fault tree hybrid, and a dynamic Monte Carlo simulation. Each approach was used to assess a generic reaction control system (RCS) thruster pod and mission. The methods are assessed in terms of the process of modeling a system, the actionable information produced for the design team, and the overall fidelity of the quantitative risk evaluation generated. The paper also discusses the applicability of each methodology to the different phases of system development.

Probablistic↗
NASA NTRS2020

Using Bayesian Estimation to Quantify the Risks of Spaceflight

Complex PRA is the best method and current gold standard, as it allows us to reflect changes (improvements) in individual spacecraft system risks over time. Yet, Bayesian methods – using simple inputs – allowed us to get estimates that are in line with high-complexity PRA. Here Bayesian estimation acts as a “gut check” on PRA (supposing a “reasonable” prior is used). Frequentist calculations can overestimate P(failure), especially when total number of trials are few (e.g., after Challenger). In general, Bayesian probability estimation can be used in any risk assessment situation to integrate what we think we know ahead of time with what we observe over time.

Reynolds, Robert J.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Challenger tragedy was caused by an Apollo mistake, terminating risk analysis

NASA’s view of risk changed between early Apollo and the Space Shuttle. Risk was a known serious problem at the beginning of Apollo and the risk estimates were disturbingly high. To avoid public concern, risk analysis was discontinued. Risk analysis was avoided in Shuttle, leading to an unnecessarily risky design. The immediate cause of the Challenger tragedy was the mistaken decision to launch in cold weather. The fundamental cause was the high risk of the Shuttle design. Before Challenger, management thought and testified that the probability of an accident was 1 in 100,000. After Challenger, Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) found a roughly 1 in 100 chance of a Shuttle failure. The recent Orion design uses the safer Apollo approach, with a hardened capsule, launch abort escape, and the crew placed above the rocket tanks and engines. During Apollo it was estimated that, “assuming all elements from propulsion to rendezvous and life support were done as well or better than ever before, that 30 astronauts would be lost before 3 were returned safely to the Earth.” The chance of astronaut survival was only 10%. After the Apollo 1 tragedy, the awareness of risk led to an intense focus on achieving safety. “The only possible explanation for the astonishing success – no losses in space and on time – was that every participant at every level in every area far exceeded the norm of human capabilities.” During Apollo, a NASA PRA found that the chance of success was “less than 5 percent.” The NASA Administrator felt that “the numbers could do irreparable harm,” and discontinued numerical risk assessment. This led to decreasing understanding of risk. The head of Apollo reliability and safety decided, “Statistics don’t count for anything,” and that risk is reduced by “attention taken in design.” The great and initially unexpected success of Apollo appeared to validate the neglect of PRA. Continuing to neglect the mathematical estimation of risk led Shuttle into a high risk design that produced tragic results. The initial design of the Shuttle emphasized increasing capability and reducing cost without analysis or even mention of risk. A retired NASA official stated, “some NASA people began to confuse desire with reality. … One result was to assess risk in terms of what was thought acceptable without regard for verifying the assessment. … Note that under such circumstances real risk management is shut out.” Not computing risk led to removing launch abort, removing crew escape, selecting less reliable Solid Rocket Boosters, placing the crew compartment next to the rocket boosters, and accepting more stressed shielding tile designs. Accepting these specific risks directly caused the shuttle disasters. The Challenger tragedy is frequently taught as a case of management failure. The focus is on the Challenger launch decision hours before, which is a dramatic example of bad management. However, the true cause of the Challenger disaster occurred decades earlier in the Apollo era. When the easily predictable failures occurred, failure investigations focused on how they might have been avoided. The Shuttle was cancelled after the space station was completed because of its high risk. The ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies was the choice by the Apollo-era NASA administrator to avoid a negative public reaction to realistic risk analysis.

Harry W. Jones↗