Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “package”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 109 records · Page 6

FIRST INTERIM STATUS REPORT: MODEL 9975 LIFE EXTENSION PACKAGE TESTING

Three 9975 packages have been instrumented and exposed to bounding storage conditions to help identify the extent to which laboratory test results for fiberboard, O-rings and other components apply within a full-scale package. To date, changes observed in the fiberboard overpack and Oring seals are generally consistent with the behavior of laboratory samples. The lead shield within each package has developed a corrosion layer of lead carbonate, consistent with other 9975 packages. However, the morphology of the corrosion layer is different within these packages, possibly as a result of the severity of the conditioning environments beyond normal service conditions. Conditioning of the second package, LE2, has been discontinued due to the degree of degradation of the fiberboard, and its components have received a final examination. Additional testing will be performed on samples removed from the fiberboard assembly to verify its final condition. The other two packages will continue in test. This is an interim status report for experiments carried out per Task Technical Plan WSRC-TR-2005-00014 [1], which is part of the comprehensive 9975 package surveillance program [2]. The primary goal of this task is to validate aging models currently under development based on lab scale testing of the fiberboard overpack and containment vessel O-rings. A secondary goal is to examine the behavior of the lead shielding under bounding conditions. This task provides an integrated assessment of the package response to environmental extremes, and demonstrates the extent to which data from small samples scale up to a full package. Three 9975 packages have been modified to provide instrumentation for monitoring package response and performance to environmental aging. Each package has a different environmental exposure history.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

FIRST INTERIM STATUS REPORT MODEL 9975 LIFE EXTENSION PACKAGE TESTING

Three 9975 packages have been instrumented and exposed to bounding storage conditions to help identify the extent to which laboratory test results for fiberboard, O-rings and other components apply within a full-scale package. To date, changes observed in the fiberboard overpack and O-ring seals are generally consistent with the behavior of laboratory samples. The lead shield within each package has developed a corrosion layer of lead carbonate, consistent with other 9975 packages. However, the morphology of the corrosion layer is different within these packages, possibly as a result of the severity of the conditioning environments beyond normal service conditions. Conditioning of the second package, LE2, has been discontinued due to the degree of degradation of the fiberboard, and its components have received a final examination. Additional testing will be performed on samples removed from the fiberboard assembly to verify its final condition. The other two packages will continue in test. This is an interim status report for experiments carried out per Task Technical Plan WSRC-TR-2005-00014 [1], which is part of the comprehensive 9975 package surveillance program [2]. The primary goal of this task is to validate aging models currently under development based on lab scale testing of the fiberboard overpack and containment vessel O-rings. A secondary goal is to examine the behavior of the lead shielding under bounding conditions. This task provides an integrated assessment of the package response to environmental extremes, and demonstrates the extent to which data from small samples scale up to a full package. Three 9975 packages have been modified to provide instrumentation for monitoring package response and performance to environmental aging. Each package has a different environmental exposure history.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Packaging Technologies for High Temperature Electronics and Sensors

This paper reviews ceramic substrates and thick-film metallization based packaging technologies in development for 500 C silicon carbide (SiC) electronics and sensors. Prototype high temperature ceramic chip-level packages and printed circuit boards (PCBs) based on ceramic substrates of aluminum oxide (Al2O3) and aluminum nitride (AlN) have been designed and fabricated. These ceramic substrate-based chip-level packages with gold (Au) thick-film metallization have been electrically characterized at temperatures up to 550 C. A 96% alumina based edge connector for a PCB level subsystem interconnection has also been demonstrated recently. The 96% alumina packaging system composed of chip-level packages and PCBs has been tested with high temperature SiC devices at 500 C for over 10,000 hours. In addition to tests in a laboratory environment, a SiC JFET with a packaging system composed of a 96% alumina chip-level package and an alumina printed circuit board mounted on a data acquisition circuit board was launched as a part of the MISSE-7 suite to the International Space Station via a Shuttle mission. This packaged SiC transistor was successfully tested in orbit for eighteen months. A spark-plug type sensor package designed for high temperature SiC capacitive pressure sensors was developed. This sensor package combines the high temperature interconnection system with a commercial high temperature high pressure stainless steel seal gland (electrical feed-through). Test results of a packaged high temperature capacitive pressure sensor at 500 C are also discussed. In addition to the pressure sensor package, efforts for packaging high temperature SiC diode-based gas chemical sensors are in process.

Chen, Liang-Yu↗

Does the Perfect Waste Package Exist? Development of a Decisional Tool Addressing this Challenge - 17053

The definition of a safe, technically, economically and societally acceptable waste management strategy is highly dependent on the Waste Acceptance Criteria in each country and on the already available disposal routes. It is the reason why there is not a single solution but a combination of optimized solutions depending on the type of waste and on each country's considerations. In fact, when operating a nuclear plant or performing its decommissioning or legacy waste management, one has to consider a large waste diversity in term of natures, types, volumes and radioactivity spectra. All nuclear operators have to take-up the challenge of implementing solutions for conditioning its waste in packages suitable for transport short to long term interim storage and final disposal of it (or prepare for final disposal if the repository is not yet available). Operators have then to answer the following dilemma: either define a complete strategy packaging the waste for final disposal, or 'containerising' it temporarily, pending final disposal. The strategy is highly country dependent; in the first case, one has to take into account the available information and future orientations relative to acceptability of the packages in order to define a robust solution. The approach implemented in France requires a close dialogue between the Operators, the Safety Authority, the Administration and the stakeholders. Moreover it pushes forward whenever possible standardization, contributing to cost minimization. If the second approach has the advantage of leaving the options open, and reducing the initial investments, it inevitably requires future retrieval and re-packaging with potential evolutions/degradation of the initial waste form. It also induces the potential risk to produce additional secondary waste. As an additional drawback, it introduces uncertainties and unknowns related to the future waste management criteria and to the costs. The general idea is that, depending on context, a given route (i.e., treatment, conditioning, and transport), could be considered as efficient or not. Assessing a waste package is certainly highly context dependent. However it should be possible to recognize and to lead an evaluation based on a number of fixed criteria, whatever the context, to be addressed when assessing the development of a final waste package in connection to the overall management route. A waste package is always a combination of a waste container and a waste form and will have to be transported one day from the production site to the final repository or to off-site interim storage facilities. AREVA's approach consists in defining an evaluation grid based on a set of criteria which aim (i) to evaluate whether the different waste treatments, conditionings, transport and packages deserve to be considered within different national contexts, and (ii) to evaluate R and D actions to be performed for improving existing solutions or developing new ones. One of the key lessons to be drawn from AREVA's experience in developing waste packages is that the perfect waste doesn't exist even though the vitrified canister is probably the most efficient one. The performance of a package resulting from a compromise depends on context and is a strength combination between the waste container and the waste form. The approach is to evaluate a waste package development against different set of criteria and to draw optimization diagrams. In such diagram, a given waste package is assessed with respect to selected criteria such as waste form and waste container, stability, level of waste incorporation, integrity lifetime, secondary waste generation, transport, long term behavior, and economical effectiveness, etc. Addressing a waste form is a very key point. This evaluation grid and comparative approach will be presented through examples and comparison providing from AREVA feedback on waste package development related to complex waste management such as problematic waste or legacy waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Methodology for defining intermediate level waste package characteristics that ensure criticality safety in a geological disposal facility - 14599

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher activity radioactive wastes. These wastes include fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of the criticality safety of the wastes under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. The basis for ensuring criticality safety of intermediate level waste (ILW) packages is to specify controls on the fissile material content of individual packages through the application of deterministic criticality safety assessments (CSAs). The approach is defined and controlled through RWM's Disposability Assessment process, which aims to ensure that: criticality is prevented during waste package transport to a GDF; the risk of criticality is tolerable and as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) during GDF operations; and the likelihood and consequences of criticality arising from the evolution of waste packages after GDF closure are low. The most restrictive phase determines the package fissile material limit and, until now, in many cases the GDF post-closure phase has provided the most restrictive limit. Currently, the GDF post-closure limits are derived deterministically using highly stylised and conservative assumptions about fissile material accumulations occurring on very long timescales into the future. RWM, waste producers and regulators do not currently consider this approach to be yielding an appropriate balance of risk. Therefore, RWM is modifying the process for setting fissile material limits on ILW packages by making use of the outcomes of its recent research projects to establish the likelihood of post-closure criticality in a GDF and the consequences of hypothetical post-closure criticality events (presented in companion papers). This paper presents the revised methodology, which is based on the requirement that criticality in a GDF can be demonstrated to be of low and tolerable consequences with regard the performance of a GDF. A probabilistic 'low-likelihood package envelope' is proposed that establishes the packaging and disposal facility conditions under which post-closure criticality is considered to be of low likelihood and low consequence. The bounding conditions for establishing the extent of the package envelope have been evaluated through application of the methodologies and models developed in RWM's Likelihood of Criticality research project. It is expected that the vast majority of ILW packages would meet the package envelope requirements. The methodology also allows the use of other options, such as deterministic CSAs, for waste packages that fall outside the low-likelihood package envelope. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

PCP METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING DOSE RATES FOR SMALL GRAM QUANTITIES IN SHIPPING PACKAGINGS

The Small Gram Quantity (SGQ) concept is based on the understanding that small amounts of hazardous materials, in this case radioactive materials, are significantly less hazardous than large amounts of the same materials. This study describes a methodology designed to estimate an SGQ for several neutron and gamma emitting isotopes that can be shipped in a package compliant with 10 CFR Part 71 external radiation level limits regulations. These regulations require packaging for the shipment of radioactive materials perform, under both normal and accident conditions, the essential functions of material containment, subcriticality, and maintain external radiation levels within regulatory limits. 10 CFR 71.33(b)(1)(2)&(3) state radioactive and fissile materials must be identified and their maximum quantity, chemical and physical forms be included in an application. Furthermore, the U.S. Federal Regulations require application contain an evaluation demonstrating the package (i.e., the packaging and its contents) satisfies the external radiation standards for all packages (10 CFR 71.31(2), 71.35(a), & 71.47). By placing the contents in a He leak-tight containment vessel, and limiting the mass to ensure subcriticality, the first two essential functions are readily met. Some isotopes emit sufficiently strong photon radiation that small amounts of material can yield a large external dose rate. Quantifying of the dose rate for a proposed content is a challenging issue for the SGQ approach. It is essential to quantify external radiation levels from several common gamma and neutron sources that can be safely placed in a specific packaging, to ensure compliance with federal regulations. The Packaging Certification Program (PCP) Methodology for Determining Dose Rate for Small Gram Quantities in Shipping Packagings described in this report provides bounding mass limits for a set of proposed SGQ isotopes. Methodology calculations were performed to estimate external radiation levels for the 9977 shipping package using the MCNP radiation transport code to develop a set of response multipliers (Green's functions) for 'dose per particle' for each neutron and photon spectral group. The source spectrum for each isotope generated using the ORIGEN-S and RASTA computer codes was folded with the response multipliers to generate the dose rate per gram of each isotope in the 9977 shipping package and its associated shielded containers. The maximum amount of a single isotope that could be shipped within the regulatory limits contained in 10 CFR 71.47 for dose rate at the surface of the package is determined. If a package contains a mixture of isotopes, the acceptability for shipment can be determined by a sum of fractions approach. Furthermore, the results of this analysis can be easily extended to additional radioisotopes by simply evaluating the neutron and/or photon spectra of those isotopes and folding the spectral data with the Green's functions provided.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Packaging Technologies for 500 C SiC Electronics and Sensors: Challenges in Material Science and Technology

This paper presents ceramic substrates and thick-film metallization based packaging technologies in development for 500C silicon carbide (SiC) electronics and sensors. Prototype high temperature ceramic chip-level packages and printed circuit boards (PCBs) based on ceramic substrates of aluminum oxide (Al2O3) and aluminum nitride (AlN) have been designed and fabricated. These ceramic substrate-based chip-level packages with gold (Au) thick-film metallization have been electrically characterized at temperatures up to 550C. The 96 alumina packaging system composed of chip-level packages and PCBs has been successfully tested with high temperature SiC discrete transistor devices at 500C for over 10,000 hours. In addition to tests in a laboratory environment, a SiC junction field-effect-transistor (JFET) with a packaging system composed of a 96 alumina chip-level package and an alumina printed circuit board was tested on low earth orbit for eighteen months via a NASA International Space Station experiment. In addition to packaging systems for electronics, a spark-plug type sensor package based on this high temperature interconnection system for high temperature SiC capacitive pressure sensors was also developed and tested. In order to further significantly improve the performance of packaging system for higher packaging density, higher operation frequency, power rating, and even higher temperatures, some fundamental material challenges must be addressed. This presentation will discuss previous development and some of the challenges in material science (technology) to improve high temperature dielectrics for packaging applications.

dielectric properties↗

Electrical and Dielectric Characterizations of HTCC Electronic Packages for High Temperature Harsh Environment Applications

A prototype high temperature co-fired ceramic (HTCC) alumina packaging system composed of a 32-I/Os package and a compatible circuit board was previously developed and demonstrated for long term operation in 500 °C environments. The electrical / dielectric parasitic parameters of that chip level package were characterized and reported. This co-fired packaging system with platinum (Pt) conductor has successfully facilitated tests of silicon carbide (SiC) analog and digital integrated circuits (ICs) developed at NASA GRC at 500°C for up to 10,000 hours in ambient oven environment and 60 earth days in Venus surface environment with simulated temperature, pressure, and chemical constituents. Based on these previous results, this paper introduces new designs of Pt-HTCC packages with 16, 24, and 44 I/Os for packaging a new generation SiC ICs with 8, 24, 56, 62, and 72 I/Os to be tested in high temperature harsh environments. The package with 44 I/Os is specifically designed for the new SiC ICs with 56, 62, and 72-I/Os and electrical connection needs, the power pads of this package are consolidated, and an array of I/O pads distributed on separated vertical levels (inside the package) is used to control the overall package dimensions and mitigate the parasitic effects at high temperatures. This paper will present the detailed design of these chip-level packages and results of electrical and dielectric characterization of these newly fabricated chip-level Pt-HTCC packages.

High temperature↗

Electrical and Dielectric Characterizations of HTCC Electronic Packages for High Temperature Harsh Environment Applications

A prototype high temperature co-fired ceramic (HTCC) alumina packaging system composed of a 32-I/Os package and a compatible circuit board was previously developed and demonstrated for long term operation in 500 °C environments. The electrical / dielectric parasitic parameters of that chip level package were characterized and reported. This co-fired packaging system with platinum (Pt) conductor has successfully facilitated tests of silicon carbide (SiC) analog and digital integrated circuits (ICs) developed at NASA GRC at 500°C for up to 10,000 hours in ambient oven environment and 60 earth days in Venus surface environment with simulated temperature, pressure, and chemical constituents. Based on these previous results, this paper introduces new designs of Pt-HTCC packages with 16, 24, and 44 I/Os for packaging a new generation SiC ICs with 8, 24, 56, 62, and 72 I/Os to be tested in high temperature harsh environments. The package with 44 I/Os is specifically designed for the new SiC ICs with 56, 62, and 72-I/Os and electrical connection needs, the power pads of this package are consolidated, and an array of I/O pads distributed on separated vertical levels (inside the package) is used to control the overall package dimensions and mitigate the parasitic effects at high temperatures. This paper will present the detailed design of these chip-level packages and results of electrical and dielectric characterization of these newly fabricated chip-level Pt-HTCC packages.

High temperature↗

Productivity Techniques and Quality Aspects in the Criticality Safety Evaluation of Y-12 Type-B Fissile Material Packages

The inventory of certified Type-B fissile material packages consists of ten performance-based packages for offsite transportation purposes, serving transportation programs at the Y-12 National Security Complex. The containment vessels range from 5 to 19 in. in diameter and from 17 to 58 in. in height. The drum assembly external to the containment vessel ranges from 18 to 34 in. in diameter and from 26 to 71 in. in height. The weight of the packaging (drum assembly and containment vessel) ranges from 239 to 1550 lb. The older DT-nn series of Cellotex-based packages are being phased-out and replaced by a new generation of Kaolite-based ('Y-12 patented insulation') packages capable of withstanding the dynamic crush test 10 CFR 71.73(c)(2). Three replacement packages are in various stages of development; two are in use. The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) 6M specification package, which does not conform to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements for Type-B packages, is no longer authorized for service on public roads. The ES-3100 shipping package is an example of a Kaolite-based Type-B fissile material package developed as a replacement package for the DOT 6M. With expanded utility, the ES-3100 is designed and licensed for transporting highly enriched uranium and plutonium materials on public roads. The ES-3100 provides added capability for air transport of up to 7-kg quantities of uranium material. This paper presents the productivity techniques and quality aspects in the criticality safety evaluation of Y-12 packages using the ES-3100 as an example.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE-EM-45 PACKAGING OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COURSE

Savannah River National Laboratory - Savannah River Packaging Technology (SRNL-SRPT) delivered the inaugural offering of the Packaging Operations and Maintenance Course for DOE-EM-45's Packaging Certification Program (PCP) at the University of South Carolina Aiken on September 1 and 2, 2009. Twenty-nine students registered, attended, and completed this training. The DOE-EM-45 Packaging Certification Program (PCP) sponsored the presentation of a new training course, Packaging Maintenance and Operations, on September 1-2, 2009 at the University of South Carolina Aiken (USC-Aiken) campus in Aiken, SC. The premier offering of the course was developed and presented by the Savannah River National Laboratory, and attended by twenty-nine students across the DOE, NNSA and private industry. This training informed package users of the requirements associated with handling shipping containers at a facility (user) level and provided a basic overview of the requirements typically outlined in Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Chapters 1, 7, and 8. The course taught packaging personnel about the regulatory nature of SARPs to help reduce associated and often costly packaging errors. Some of the topics covered were package contents, loading, unloading, storage, torque requirements, maintaining records, how to handle abnormal conditions, lessons learned, leakage testing (including demonstration), and replacement parts. The target audience for this course was facility operations personnel, facility maintenance personnel, and field quality assurance personnel who are directly involved in the handling of shipping containers. The training also aimed at writers of SARP Chapters 1, 7, and 8, package designers, and anyone else involved in radioactive material packaging and transportation safety. Student feedback and critiques of the training were very positive. SRNL will offer the course again at USC Aiken in September 2010.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Limiting Surface Density Method Adapted to Large Arrays of Heterogeneous Shipping Packages with Nonlinear Responses

The classic Limiting Surface Density (LSD) method is an empirical calculation technique for analyzing and setting mass limits for fissile items in storage arrays. LSD is a desirable method because it can reduce or eliminate the need for lengthy detailed Monte Carlo models of storage arrays. The original (or classic) method was developed based on idealized arrays of bare spherical metal items in air-spaced cubic units in a water-reflected cubic array. In this case, the geometric and material-based surface densities were acceptably correlated by linear functions. Later updates to the method were made to allow for concrete reflection rather than water, cylindrical masses rather than spheres, different material forms, and noncubic arrays. However, in the intervening four decades since those updates, little work has been done to update the method, especially for use with contemporary highly heterogeneous shipping packages that are noncubic and stored in noncubic arrays. In this work, the LSD method is reevaluated for application to highly heterogeneous shipping packages for fissile material. The package modeled is the 9975 shipping package, currently the primary package used to store fissile material at Savannah River Site’s K-Area Complex. The package is neither cubic nor rectangular but resembles nested cylinders of stainless steel, lead, aluminum, and Celotex. The fissile content is assumed to be a cylinder of plutonium metal. The packages may be arranged in arrays with both an equal number of packages per side (package cubic) and an unequal number of packages per side (noncubic). The cubic arrangements are used to derive the 9975-specific material and geometry constants for the classic linear form LSD method. The linear form of the LSD, with noncubic array adjustment, is applied and evaluated against computational models for these packages to determine the critical unit fissile mass. Sensitivity equations are derived from the classic method, and these are also used to make projections of the critical unit fissile mass. It was discovered that the heterogeneous packages have a nonlinear surface density versus critical mass relationship compared to the acceptably linear response of bare spherical fissile masses. Methodology is developed to address the nonlinear response. In so doing, the solution to the nonlinear LSD method becomes decoupled from the critical mass of a single unit, adding to its flexibility. The ability of the method to predict changes in neutron multiplication due to perturbations in a parameter is examined to provide a basis for analyzing upset conditions. In conclusion, a full rederivation of the classic LSD method from diffusion theory is also included as this was found to be lacking in the available literature.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Assessment of Existing Transportation Packages for Use with HALEU

Commercial light water reactor operators and fuel vendors in the United States are pursuing changes to fuel that include increased 235 U enrichment. Economic studies generally anticipate maximum near-term fuel assembly designs with up to 8 wt.% 235 U. Many next-generation nuclear reactor designs require high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) (19.75 wt.% > 235 U > 5 wt.%) fuel. One necessary element for the commercial-scale use of HALEU is the ability to safely transport large quantities of enriched fuel material in multiple forms. However, there is uncertainty as to whether subcriticality requirements can be satisfied with existing package designs and whether existing critical benchmark experiment data are sufficient to support criticality safety code validation for HALEU transportation applications. This study assesses the potential to use currently licensed transportation packages for the transportation of increased enrichment unirradiated U fuel forms. The assessment uses selected package designs that represent the five categories of fuel form-boiling water reactor pins and assemblies, pressurized water reactor pins and assemblies, UF 6 , U-metal and tristructural isotropic (TRISO) particles, and UO 2 pellets or powder-and focuses on demonstrating subcriticality and identifying benchmark critical experiments appropriate for use in criticality computer code validation. Key quantities of interest that relate to subcriticality are limiting conditions (e.g., optimum moderation), package or package array k eff , package capacity, and package transportation array size. The SCALE TSUNAMI-3D and TSUNAMI Indices and Parameters codes are used for sensitivity and uncertainty calculations and for identification of candidate critical benchmark experiments for code validation. The primary metric for identifying candidate benchmarks is the similarity coefficient, c k . For each fuel form category, a representative package is evaluated. Results provided for each package evaluation include enrichment and packaging limits (e.g., maximum transportation array size as a function of enrichment) and benchmark critical experiment similarity coefficients. Results indicate that there are viable means for increasing enrichments into the HALEU range across the spectrum of fuel forms with differing increase amounts available for different packages. Sources of subcriticality margin to offset increased enrichment reactivity include reduced transportation array size, reduced fissile mass, burnable absorber credit, and safety analysis margin harvesting. For all packages except the DN-30, numerous critical benchmark experiment candidates for validation were identified.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

EXAMINATION OF SHIPPING PACKAGES 9975-01818, 9975-01903 AND 9975-02287

Three 9975 shipping packages were examined to investigate the non-conforming condition of an axial air gap greater than 1 inch. This condition typically indicates the presence of excess moisture in the fiberboard overpack, and may be accompanied by degradation in the fiberboard properties. The package with the largest axial air gap (9975-01818, with an air gap of 1.437 inches) was found to contain significant excess moisture, and the lower fiberboard assembly was covered with mold and was significantly degraded in strength. This condition is very similar to that observed previously in package 9975-01819. Both packages (-1818 and -1819) appear to contain a similar amount of excess moisture, which was previously estimated for 9975-01819 as {approx}2.5 liters. The condition of 9975-01818 was also evidenced by several rust spots along the bottom chime of the drum, although no significant rust was noted on the closure bolts. Packages 9975-01903 and 9975-02287 were also examined. The axial air gap in these two packages was less than in 9975-01818, but still exceeded 1 inch. These two packages contained elevated moisture levels, although not significantly higher than seen in other 'typical' packages. The fiberboard in these two packages was of sound integrity, and appeared generally consistent with undegraded material. A few small patches of mold on and near the bottom of the fiberboard in 9975-01903 appeared dormant. No mold was observed on package 9975-02287. The SPA will provide recommendations on possible follow-up activities with these three packages. This might include a demonstration in SRNL of whether removal of the caplugs from similar packages would facilitate removal of excess moisture. Future efforts should also include an assessment of using the 1 inch axial gap criterion as a valid indicator of fiberboard degradation.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Transportation Package Seal Performance in Beyond Design Basis Thermal Exposures - 12472

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) technical report, NUREG/CR-6886, 'Spent Fuel Transportation Package Response to the Baltimore Tunnel Fire Scenario', describes, in detail, an evaluation of the potential for a theoretical release of radioactive material from three different spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transportation packages, had they been exposed to the Baltimore tunnel fire that occurred in July of 2001. This evaluation determined the temperatures of various components of the packages, including the seals, using temperatures resulting from models of the Baltimore tunnel fire (as boundary conditions) and finite element models of the SNF packages. For two of the packages evaluated, the analyses indicated that the seals used would have exceeded their continuous-use rated service temperatures, meaning the release of radioactive material could not be ruled out with available information; However, for both of the packages evaluated, the analysis determined, by a bounding calculation, that the maximum potential release was well below the regulatory requirements for releases from a SNF package during the hypothetical accident condition (HAC) sequence of events in 10CFR Part 71. The NRC is investigating the performance of seals in SNF transportation packages exposed to fires that could exceed the HAC fire described in 10CFR Part 71, such as the Baltimore Tunnel Fire that occurred in 2001. The performance of package seals is important for determining the potential release of radioactive material from a package during a beyond-design-basis accident. The seals have lower temperature limits than other package components and are the containment barrier between the environment and the cask contents. The NRC Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research contracted the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to conduct small-scale thermal testing to obtain experimental data of the performance of seals during extreme temperature exposures. The experimental testing consisted of several small-scale pressure vessels fabricated with a modified ASME flange design and tested metallic and elastomeric seals, similar to those that might be used on an actual SNF transportation package. The vessels were heated in an electrical oven to temperatures as high as 800 deg. C (1472 deg. F), exceeding the rated temperatures of the seals in question. This paper will provide a summary of the testing conducted and present test results and conclusions. Fifteen metallic and elastomeric seal performance tests including two shakedowns were performed under beyond-design-basis thermal exposure conditions; twelve tests used metallic seals, two used ethylene-propylene seals, and one used a Teflon seal. Of the five repeat metallic-seal tests (Tests No.2, 3, 4, 8, and 9), leakage (decreasing vessel pressure) was observed in three of the tests (Tests No.3, 4, and 8) during the 9 h 800 deg. C (1472 deg. F) exposure. The times when the leakage occurred (the vessel pressure started to decrease) varied in the three tests performed. The two shakedown tests were conducted using a 30 min and 4 h exposure to 800 deg. C (1472 deg. F), respectively, and the seal appeared to hold vessel pressure. No leakage (unchanged vessel pressure within the pressure measurement uncertainty) was also observed in the two metallic seal tests that used 100 deg. C incremental heating from 427 deg. C (800 deg. F) to 627 deg. C (1160 deg. F) and from 427 deg. C (800 deg. F) to 727 deg. C (1340 deg. F), respectively, with at least 9 h exposure to each temperature increment. Three repeat metallic seal tests were also conducted at the seal maximum operating temperature of 427 deg. C (800 deg. F) for 9 h. The seal maintained vessel pressure within the measurement of the pressure transducer in all three tests. No leakage was observed in one ethylene-propylene seal tested at 300 deg. C (572 deg. F) for more than 20 hours; however, leakage was found in another ethylene-propylene seal tested at 450 deg. C (842 deg. F) for more than 20 hours (Test No.15). Leakage was also observed in the test (Test No.12) that used a TFE seal subject to 300 deg. C (572 deg. F) exposure. In these fifteen tests the temperature and time exposure variables were changed to map the performance of the metallic and polymeric seals at elevated temperatures beyond the rated operating temperatures. Both the metallic and polymeric seals were able to hold pressure even after leaks were detected and no catastrophic seal failure (i.e., a rapid release of pressure to atmospheric) occurred. Further testing on the polymeric seals would need to be performed to confirm the results in these tests.(authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION OF SHIPPING PACKAGE 9975-02028

Destructive and non-destructive examinations have been performed on specified components of shipping package 9975-02028. For those attributes that were also measured during the field surveillance, no significant changes were observed. Four conditions were identified that do not meet inspection criteria. These conditions are subject to additional investigation and disposition by the Surveillance Program Authority. The conditions include: (1) The lead shield was covered with a white corrosion layer; (2) The lead shield height exceeds drawing requirements; (3) Mold was observed on the lower fiberboard subassembly; and (4) Fiberboard thermal conductivity in the axial direction exceeded the specified range. The Surveillance Program Authority was notified of these conditions and will document the disposition by surveillance report. All other observations and test results met identified criteria, or were collected for information and trending purposes. The Savannah River Site (SRS) stores packages containing plutonium (Pu) materials in the K-Area Complex (KAC). The Pu materials are packaged per the DOE 3013 Standard and stored within Model 9975 shipping packages in KAC. The KAC facility DSA (Document Safety Analysis) credits the Model 9975 package to perform several safety functions, including criticality prevention, impact resistance, containment, and fire resistance to ensure the plutonium materials remain in a safe configuration during normal and accident conditions. The Model 9975 package is expected to perform its safety function for at least 12 years from initial packaging. The DSA recognizes the degradation potential for the materials of package construction over time in the KAC storage environment and requires an assessment of materials performance to validate the assumptions of the analysis and ultimately predict service life. As part of the comprehensive Model 9975 package surveillance program, destructive examination of package 9975-02028 was performed following field surveillance in accordance with Reference. Field surveillance of the Model 9975 package in KAC included nondestructive examination of the drum, fiberboard, lead shield and containment vessels. Results of the field surveillance are provided in Attachment 1.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Codisposal Waste Package Loading Options for DOE SNF and HLW PPT

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that is currently in, or will in the future come into, its possession. DOE must continue to safely store that SNF, transport it to an interim storage site or a repository, and dispose of it. These fuels come from a wide range of reactor types with various cladding materials and enrichments. Many of these reactors, now decommissioned, had unique design features, such as core configuration, fuel element and assembly geometry, moderator and coolant materials, operational characteristics, and neutron spatial and spectral properties, resulting in a large diversity of reactor and fuel designs. Because of the wide variety and conditions of SNF, a robust DOE Standard Canister was proposed that would confine radionuclides and preclude moderator. The DOE Standard Canister had four variations: 3.05-meter (10-foot) or 4.57-meter (15-foot) length, and 45.7-cm (18-inch) or 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter. For ultimate disposal in the Yucca Mountain Repository, these canisters were to be grouped with 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter high level waste (HLW) canisters in a 2.13-meter (84-inch) diameter co-disposal waste package. The smaller 45.7-cm (18-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister could be placed in the middle of five HLW canisters. The larger 61.0-cm (24-inch) diameter DOE Standard Canister would take the place of one of the five HLW canisters on the outer ring in the co-disposal waste package. No DOE Standard Canisters have been loaded. A preliminary evaluation has estimated the number of elements of a fuel type that can fit into the different sizes of the DOE Standard Canister, but no definitive loading configuration has been selected. Changing the loading configuration could impact the number of loadable DOE Standard Canisters and the number of co-disposal waste packages needed for eventual disposition. This paper conveys the ranges of DOE Standard Canisters and HLW canisters that may be produced under certain conditions. It also examines the differences in the estimated number of co-disposal waste packages produced for eventual disposal when using different loading strategies in the DOE Standard Canister for Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), Peach Bottom, and High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) SNF. Changing the loading configurations of ATR, Peach Bottom, and HFIR SNF slightly impacted the number of co-disposal waste packages that may be needed for ultimate disposal. The change in loading configuration was more impactful when a different canister was used, as opposed to varying the number of elements that could fit inside the same size canister. In one case, a reduction of co-disposal waste packages could be achieved by allowing mixing of short HLW canisters with long DOE Standard Canisters. The main conclusion from this analysis is that the ratio between HLW canisters and DOE Standard Canisters will drive the total number of co-disposal waste packages. If too many HLW canisters (i.e., more than five times the number of 18-inch DOE standard canisters) or DOE Standard Canisters are produced, some co-disposal waste packages may not have all positions filled. A co-disposal waste package may be filled with all HLW with no DOE Standard Canister, or a co-disposal waste package could be filled with a single DOE Standard Canister. A ratio that does not closely align to optimum could allow for the design of waste packages that hold just HLW canisters or just DOE SNF canisters.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Lessons Learned in the Design and Use of IP1 / IP2 Flexible Packaging - 13621

For many years in the USA, Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLW), contaminated soils and construction debris, have been transported, interim stored, and disposed of, using IP1 / IP2 metal containers. The performance of these containers has been more than adequate, with few safety occurrences. The containers are used under the regulatory oversight of the US Department of Transportation (DOT), 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). In the late 90's the introduction of flexible packaging for the transport, storage, and disposal of low level contaminated soils and construction debris was introduced. The development of flexible packaging came out of a need for a more cost effective package, for the large volumes of waste generated by the decommissioning of many of the US Department of Energy (DOE) legacy sites across the US. Flexible packaging had to be designed to handle a wide array of waste streams, including soil, gravel, construction debris, and fine particulate dust migration. The design also had to meet all of the IP1 requirements under 49CFR 173.410, and be robust enough to pass the IP2 testing 49 CFR 173.465 required for many LLW shipments. Tens of thousands of flexible packages have been safely deployed and used across the US nuclear industry as well as for hazardous non-radioactive applications, with no recorded release of radioactive materials. To ensure that flexible packages are designed properly, the manufacturer must use lessons learned over the years, and the tests performed to provide evidence that these packages are suitable for transporting low level radioactive wastes. The design and testing of flexible packaging for LLW, VLLW and other hazardous waste streams must be as strict and stringent as the design and testing of metal containers. The design should take into consideration the materials being loaded into the package, and should incorporate the right materials, and manufacturing methods, to provide a quality, safe product. Flexible packaging can be shown to meet the criteria for safe and fit for purpose packaging, by meeting the US DOT regulations, and the IAEA Standards for IP-1 and IP-2 including leak tightness. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗