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At least 109 records · Page 6

An Interior-Point Solver for Optimal Power Flow Problem Considering Distributed FACTS Devices

In this paper, we propose an AC optimal power flow (ACOPF) model considering distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices, in which the reactance of D-FACTS equipped lines are introduced as decision variables. This is motivated by increasing interests in using D-FACTS devices to address system operational and cyber-security concerns. First, D-FACTS devices can be incorporated in real-time operations for economic benefits such as managing power congestions and reducing system losses. Second, D-FACTS devices can be utilized by moving target defense (MTD), an emerging concept against cyber-attacks, to prevent attackers from knowing true system configurations. Therefore, system operators can use the proposed ACOPF model to achieve economic benefits and provide the setpoints of D-FACTS devices for MTD at the same time. In addition, we rigorously derive the gradient and Hessian matrices of the objective function and constraints, which are further used to build an interior-point solver of the proposed ACOPF. Numerical results on the IEEE 118-bus transmission system show the validity of the proposed ACOPF model as well as the efficacy of the interior-point solver in minimizing system losses and generation costs.

Liu, Bo↗

Cyber-Physical Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control for the Power Grid

Cyber security and resiliency of Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) applications is critically important to ensure secure, reliable, and economic operation of the bulk power system. WAMPAC relies heavily on the security of measurements and control commands transmitted over wide-area communication networks for real-time operational, protection, and control functions. Also, the current “N-1 security criteria” for grid operation is inadequate to address malicious cyber events and therefore it is important to fundamentally redesign WAMPAC and to enhance Energy Management System (EMS) applications to make them attack-resilient. In this paper, we propose an end-to-end defense-in-depth architecture for attack-resilient WAMPAC that addresses resilience at both the infrastructure layer and the application layers. Also, we propose an attack-resilient cyber-physical security framework that encompasses the entire security life cycle including risk assessment, attack prevention, attack detection, attack mitigation, and attack resilience. The overarching objective of this paper is to provide a broad scope that comprehensively describes most of the major research issues and potential solutions in the context of cyber-physical security of WAMPAC for the power grid.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Reliable and Secure Surveillance, Communications and Navigation (RSCAN) for Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) in Controlled Airspace

The aviation industry faces a rapidly-emerging need for integrating Unmanned Air Systems (UAS) into the national airspace (NAS). This trend will present challenging questions for the safe operation of UAS in controlled and uncontrolled airspaces based on new Communications, Navigation and Surveillance (CNS) technologies. For example, can wireless communications data links provide the necessary capacity for accommodating ever increasing numbers of UAS worldwide? Does the communications network provide ample Internet Protocol (IP) address space to allow Air Traffic Control (ATC) to securely address each UAS? Can navigation and surveillance approaches assure safe route planning and safe separation of vehicles even in crowded skies?Under NASA contract NNA16BD84C, Boeing is developing an integrated CNS architecture to enable UAS operations in the NAS. Revolutionary and advanced CNS alternatives are needed to support UAS operations at all altitudes and in all airspaces, including both controlled and uncontrolled. These CNS alternatives must be reliable, redundant, always available, cyber-secure, and affordable for all types of vehicles including small UAS to large transport category aircraft. Our approach considers CNS requirements that address the range of UAS missions where they will be most beneficial and cost-effective.A cybersecure future UAS CNS architecture is needed to support the NASA vision for an Unmanned Air Traffic Management (UTM) system in uncontrolled airspace and a cooperative operation of manned and unmanned aircraft in the controlled global Air Traffic Management (ATM) system. The architecture must, therefore, support always-available and cyber secure operations. This paper presents UAS CNS architecture concepts for large UAS operating in the ATM system in controlled airspace. Future companion works will consider small UAS operating in the UTM system in uncontrolled airspace.

Ponchak, Denise S.↗

An Iterative Response-Surface-Based Approach for Chance-Constrained AC Optimal Power Flow Considering Dependent Uncertainty

A modern power system is characterized by a stochastic variation of the loads and an increasing penetration of renewable energy generation, which results in large uncertainties in its states. These uncertainties bring formidable challenges to the power system planning and operation process. To address these challenges, we propose a cost-effective, iterative response-surface-based approach for the chance-constrained AC optimal power-flow problem that aims to ensure the secure operation of the power systems considering dependent uncertainties. Starting from a stochastic-sampling-based framework, we first utilize the copula theory to simulate the dependence among multivariate uncertain inputs. Then, to reduce the prohibitive computational time required in the traditional Monte-Carlo method, we propose, instead of using the original complicated power-system model, to rely on a polynomial-chaos-based response surface. This response surface allows us to efficiently evaluate the time-consuming power-system model at arbitrary distributed sampled values with a negligible computational cost. This further enables us to efficiently conduct an online stochastic testing for the system states that not only screens out the statistical active constraints, but also assists in a better design of the tightened bounds without using any Gaussian or symmetric assumption. Finally, an iterative procedure is executed to fine-tune the optimal solution that better satisfies a predefined probability. The simulations conducted in multiple test systems demonstrate the excellent performance of the proposed method.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

The Design and Evaluation of Zero Trust Architecture for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure: EVs @ Scale Series on EV Charging Station Cybersecurity

Implementing a zero trust architecture can significantly bolster the security of electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. EV charging infrastructure includes numerous networked interfaces, each of which can present potential vulnerabilities. When these vulnerabilities are exploited, they can compromise the entire system, leading to severe operational and security risks. Zero trust is a security model that operates on the principle of "never trust, always verify," which helps manage the attack surface and limit the scope of any potential compromises. Fundamentally, this model ensures that no entity, whether inside or outside the network, is trusted by default. The design principles of zero trust include continuous verification, strict deny-by-default access controls, and micro-segmentation. Continuous verification ensures that every request is thoroughly checked, regardless of its origin. Strict access controls enforce the principle of least privilege, allowing users and devices only the minimum necessary access to perform their functions. Micro-segmentation involves dividing the network into smaller, isolated segments to prevent lateral movement in case of a breach. In the context of EV charging infrastructure, zero trust can be implemented through various strategies. For example, multi-factor authentication (MFA) can be required for engineers to access the management interfaces and control systems of charging stations. Real-time monitoring and analysis of network traffic can help detect and respond to anomalies. Systems that do not need to communicate with each other can be micro-segmented to enhance security. All communications should adhere to predefined policies to be permitted. Additionally, encrypting communications can protect sensitive information exchanged between chargers and management systems. This paper presents a zero trust architecture specifically designed for EV charging infrastructure. Implementing zero trust not only mitigates risks but also builds a resilient infrastructure capable of withstanding and quickly recovering from cyber threats. The architecture addresses six defined security objectives. A comprehensive test plan is developed to assess the architecture against these objectives, and the results of the evaluation are reported. This approach is essential for maintaining the reliability and integrity of EV charging services in an increasingly interconnected and vulnerable digital landscape. This is the first in a planned series of papers exploring the implementation of zero trust in EV charging infrastructure. Each paper will delve into different aspects and applications of zero trust, highlighting how various work processes and requirements can lead to distinct architectural designs. These architectures will be tailored to address specific security challenges and operational needs within the EV charging ecosystem, ensuring a robust and adaptable security framework.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Application of Cyber-Informed Engineering for Protecting BESS

This white paper synthesizes an array of crucial grid services provided by BESS technology, assesses its architecture and communications, and presents a case study for analysis against the principles introduced by Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). Furthermore, in walking through the analysis, this paper presents a framework to evaluate risks and solutions when considering BESS components. Asset owners and buyers could perform this analysis to assess their BESS product implementations, alternative inverter-based resources (IBR), and energy management systems (EMS). Battery systems fulfill various roles contingent on the unique market demands and the specific challenges presented by regional grid infrastructures. These roles also vary due to the differing utility models for ownership and operation, which are adapted to meet regional and local capabilities and requirements. Concerns have been raised regarding the potential for adversaries to exploit knowledge of battery operational patterns to orchestrate decisive attacks. However, the security of operational data for these systems may not be the primary vulnerability, as much of this information is already well-understood within the community. Applying a modest degree of subject matter expertise can often yield valuable predictions regarding how a battery will respond under certain conditions, such as grid emergencies, high or low-temperature days, Public Safety Power Shutoff (PSPS) events, and outages. The operational characteristics of batteries are well-documented, and their capabilities, including the risks associated with misoperation and the resulting consequences, are published and understood within the industry. CIE practices represent the next step in gaining functional assurance and providing an acceptable level of risk, regardless of whether a battery vendor can support a trusted and validated supply chain. While this issue has exacerbated supply chain challenges, it is not an isolated condition. This foreign supply route is the primary source of BESS for the U.S. market. Significant efforts are underway through the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL) to change that. Still, strategic short-term operational mitigations are needed to ensure the security of our operational technology (OT) systems, which are enhanced by instilling trust and are separate from vendors implementing CIE principles.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

An Overview of ANN Application in the Power Industry

The paper presents a survey on the development and experience with artificial neural net (ANN) applications for electric power systems, with emphasis on operational systems. The organization and constraints of electric utilities are reviewed, motivations for investigating ANN are identified, and a current assessment is given from the experience of 2400 projects using ANN for load forecasting, alarm processing, fault detection, component fault diagnosis, static and dynamic security analysis, system planning, and operation planning.

artificial neural networks ANN electric power syst↗

Cybersecurity Resiliency of Marine Renewable Energy Systems Part 2: Cybersecurity Best Practices and Risk Management

Marine renewable energy (MRE) is an emerging source of power for marine applications, marine devices, and coastal communities. This energy source relies on industrial control systems and IT to support operations and maintenance activities, which create a pathway for an adversary to gain unauthorized access to systems and data and disrupt operations. Incorporating cybersecurity risk prevention measures and mitigation capabilities from inception, development, operation, to decommissioning of the MRE system and components is paramount to the protection of energy generation and the security of network architecture and infrastructure. To improve the resilience of MRE systems as a predictable, affordable, and reliable source of energy, cybersecurity guidance was developed to enable operators to assess cybersecurity risks and implement security measures commensurate with the risk. This publication is the second of a two-part series, with Part 1 addressing a framework to determine cybersecurity risk by assessing the vulnerability of an MRE system to potential cyber threats and the consequences a cyberattack would have on the end user. This Part 2 publication describes an approach to select appropriate cybersecurity best practices commensurate with the MRE system's cybersecurity risk. The guidance includes 86 cybersecurity best practices, which are associated with 36 cybersecurity domains and grouped into nine categories. The best practices follow the core functions of the National Institute of Science and Technology Cybersecurity Framework (e.g., identify, detect, protect, respond, and and recover) and insights from both maritime and energy industry guidance documents to identify security measures effective in protecting information and operational technology assets prevalent in MRE systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

PIMS-Universal Payload Information Management

As the overall manager and integrator of International Space Station (ISS) science payloads and experiments, the Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) at Marshall Space Flight Center had a critical need to provide an information management system for exchange and management of ISS payload files as well as to coordinate ISS payload related operational changes. The POIC's information management system has a fundamental requirement to provide secure operational access not only to users physically located at the POIC, but also to provide collaborative access to remote experimenters and International Partners. The Payload Information Management System (PIMS) is a ground based electronic document configuration management and workflow system that was built to service that need. Functionally, PIMS provides the following document management related capabilities: 1. File access control, storage and retrieval from a central repository vault. 2. Collect supplemental data about files in the vault. 3. File exchange with a PMS GUI client, or any FTP connection. 4. Files placement into an FTP accessible dropbox for pickup by interfacing facilities, included files transmitted for spacecraft uplink. 5. Transmission of email messages to users notifying them of new version availability. 6. Polling of intermediate facility dropboxes for files that will automatically be processed by PIMS. 7. Provide an API that allows other POIC applications to access PIMS information. Functionally, PIMS provides the following Change Request processing capabilities: 1. Ability to create, view, manipulate, and query information about Operations Change Requests (OCRs). 2. Provides an adaptable workflow approval of OCRs with routing through developers, facility leads, POIC leads, reviewers, and implementers. Email messages can be sent to users either involving them in the workflow process or simply notifying them of OCR approval progress. All PIMS document management and OCR workflow controls are coordinated through and routed to individual user's "to do" list tasks. A user is given a task when it is their turn to perform some action relating to the approval of the Document or OCR. The user's available actions are restricted to only functions available for the assigned task. Certain actions, such as review or action implementation by non-PIMS users, can also be coordinated through automated emails.

Elmore, Ralph↗

Report on the deployment of the National Geothermal Data System 2.0

This reports includes a video description of recent upgrades and changes to the National Geothermal Data System (geothermaldata.org) and a text report of its relevant security upgrades. Improvements include a new operating system, implementation of HTTPS, implementation of a standard firewall, PostgreSQL upgrades, an ESRI ArcGIS server, new registration policies, and a non-public API.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

Cyber Threat Assessment of Uplink and Commanding System for Mission Operation

Most of today's Mission Operations Systems (MOS) rely on Ground Data System (GDS) segment to mitigate cyber security risks. Unfortunately, IT security design is done separately from the design of GDS' mission operational capabilities. This incoherent practice leaves many security vulnerabilities in the system without any notice. This paper describes a new way to system engineering MOS, to include cyber threat risk assessments throughout the MOS development cycle, without this, it is impossible to design a dependable and reliable MOS to meet today's rapid changing cyber threat environment.

ground data↗

Universal Payload Information Management

As the overall manager and integrator of International Space Station (ISS) science payloads, the Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) at Marshall Space Flight Center has a critical need to provide an information management system for exchange and control of ISS payload files as well as to coordinate ISS payload related operational changes. The POIC's information management system has a fundamental requirement to provide secure operational access not only to users physically located at the POIC, but also to remote experimenters and International Partners physically located in different parts of the world. The Payload Information Management System (PIMS) is a ground-based electronic document configuration management and collaborative workflow system that was built to service the POIC's information management needs. This paper discusses the application components that comprise the PIMS system, the challenges that influenced its design and architecture, and the selected technologies it employs. This paper will also touch on the advantages of the architecture, details of the user interface, and lessons learned along the way to a successful deployment. With PIMS, a sophisticated software solution has been built that is not only universally accessible for POIC customer s information management needs, but also universally adaptable in implementation and application as a generalized information management system.

Elmore, Ralph B.↗

Knowledge management: Role of the the Radiation Safety Information Computational Center (RSICC)

The Radiation Safety Information Computational Center (RSICC) at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is an information analysis center that collects, archives, evaluates, synthesizes and distributes information, data and codes that are used in various nuclear technology applications. RSICC retains more than 2,000 software packages that have been provided by code developers from various federal and international agencies. RSICC’s customers (scientists, engineers, and students from around the world) obtain access to such computing codes (source and/or executable versions) and processed nuclear data files to promote on-going research, to ensure nuclear and radiological safety, and to advance nuclear technology. The role of such information analysis centers is critical for supporting and sustaining nuclear education and training programs both domestically and internationally, as the majority of RSICC’s customers are students attending U.S. universities. Additionally, RSICC operates a secure CLOUD computing system to provide access to sensitive export-controlled modeling and simulation (M&S) tools that support both domestic and international activities. This presentation will provide a general review of RSICC’s activities, services, and systems that support knowledge management and education and training in the nuclear field.

Valentine, Timothy↗

CRITICAL FUNCTION ASSURANCE: Understanding Critical Function and Critical Function Delivery is Foundational for Meaningful ICS Security Improvement and Policy Efforts

Modern life is enabled by a complex and interdependent web of critical functions, including energy, communications, transportation, food, and water. Automation has significantly reduced or replaced human interactions in the delivery of these functions, resulting in a web of goods and services that are made available 24/7 only through unique and intentional deployments of microprocessors, software, and firmware technologies. The prospect of cyber-enabled sabotage of these processes disrupts traditional risk determination models. Critical Function Assurance (CFA) is a foundational approach to identifying, prioritizing, and mitigating the risk that is inherent in the delivery of critical functions that depend on digital technology. It provides rapid focus to what matters most and illuminates elements and areas of risk that otherwise are often overlooked. This focus enables effective application of available security resources and optimizes security strategy and policy efforts. This paper introduces CFA to decision makers and risk executives (including CEOs, COOs, CFOs, and CISOs) whose organizations support and deliver the critical functions that underpin national defense, societal health and safety, and a vibrant economy.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Hands-On, Heads-Up: Blending Cyber T&E with Data Science-Driven Training in Jupyter Notebooks

In an era of increasingly sophisticated threats to critical infrastructure, cybersecurity professionals must be more than just aware; they must be immersed, agile, and equipped to operate in environments where failure is not an option. Nowhere is this truer than in the nuclear sector, where cyber-physical systems, regulatory scrutiny, and insider threat potential demand a new generation of hands-on, technically fluent defenders. This paper presents a unified training approach that integrates Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation (T&E) with data science techniques using Jupyter Notebooks as the interactive lab environment. The program centers on a modular, scenario-driven curriculum designed to build not just knowledge but practical capability in the assessment and defense of radiation detection systems, firmware interfaces, and operational security postures.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Optimal Operation for Resilient and Economic Modes in an Islanded Alaskan Grid: Preprint

Power System is a complex system, with an objective to provide power to the customers. The objective is driven by a complex consideration of the secure, economic and resilient operation of the system. With the growing occurrence of extreme events emphasis has been shifted towards making the grid more resilient. However, an economic operation is still a priority for the utilities as well as its customers. Many utilities especially small isolated micro-grids do not emphasize much on an economic and resilient operation, but more on reliability. In this research we focus on striking a balance between economic and resilientoperation, ensuring reliability.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Keyless Infrastructure Security Solution (KISS) (Technology Landscape Analysis Report)

The following landscape analysis explores blockchain or distributed ledger technologies application to securing electricity infrastructure. The exploration of how distributed ledger technologies can be used to increase the trustworthiness and integrity of the grid’s edge is imperative to the economic, security and well-being of all modern societies that rely on electricity. Blockchain technology’s ability to secure, track and optimize complex data transactions provides an exciting value proposition to securing and optimizing the U.S. power grid. An energy delivery system (EDS) operating at the grid’s edge requires unprecedented levels of security and trustworthiness to verify integrity of data and manage complex transactive and distributed Energy Resources (DERs) exchanges. Moreover, grid-edge devices lack visibility, control and security to conduct real-time energy transactions with the required security, speed and scale. The U.S. power grid is a complex system of systems that requires secure, reliable and trustworthy EDSs. Grid modernization has increased the speed and size of data sets exchanged on these systems (Gordes and Mylrea 2014). Exasperating the challenge is these systems are increasingly distributed creating new data fidelity and interoperability challenges for grid operators struggling to balance and incorporate DERs. Blockchain technology provides an atomically verifiable cryptographic signature to help increase the trustworthiness of EDSs at the grid’s edge. This feature is especially important at distribution level since EDSs and field devices have increasing operational and security requirements that are often diametrically opposed. For example, as data, speed and analytic requirements increase, security and functionality requirements increase. Further, as the grid’s edge incorporate DERs and transacts in real time, availability is prioritized over the integrity and confidentially of that data. Blockchain presents the prospect of solving some of these complex challenges related to grid security and modernization. However, there are more questions about blockchain applicability than answers. There are number of theoretical blockchain applications to the energy sector, but few energy utilities have actually applied, implemented or even experimented with the underlying distributed ledger technology and consensus algorithms that enable blockchain to exchange data more efficiently and securely.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

UAS Radiological Sensing – Nevada National Security Site

In the aftermath of a hazardous incident, there is limited information and almost no means to access the area safely. There is a need to quickly obtain accurate information regarding the extent and severity of the incident. One way to quickly assess the environment is by flying over the dangerous area with unmanned aerial systems followed by remotely operated ground vehicles. The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) provides a repeatable environment to simulate operations for dangerous and dirty situations. An unmanned aircraft system (UAS) has the advantages of fast deployment and low-altitude flying, which enhances sensitivity and wide-area coverage, eliminates radiation exposure health safety restrictions, and gives the ability to access highly hazardous or radioactive areas, etc. A UAS can be configured with the nuclear detecting sensor optimized to measure the radiation associated with the event. A multi-UAS has advantages over a single UAS, especially in time-critical tasks such as detecting nuclear radiation. UAS may be helpful in plume definition, ground deposition, moving source, and static or moving spills. Assessing any situation that is dangerous, in hazardous areas (dirty), needs to be repeated (dull), or unreachable (deep), is a candidate for an unmanned system. In addition, the NNSS is in a unique location to conduct isolated, secured, and controlled high-risk experiments. We attract international customers along with domestic agencies due to the unique environmental conditions that have evolved over the past 65 years. The NNSS employs a talented group of operational scientists and engineers with a long history of applied research in radiation/nuclear science. We often collaborate with other national laboratories and universities in addressing unique problems. The NNSS has conducted UAS missions for over 25 years and has established a UAS program to address the difficult challenges in using unmanned systems for national security missions.

42 ENGINEERING↗