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A New Era of Nuclear Criticality Experiments: The First 10 Years of Flattop Operations at NCERC

The Flattop critical assembly was built and operated from 1958 through 2004 at the Pajarito Site (Technical Area-18), home to the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility. Flattop was disassembled in 2005 and refurbished over the course of 3 years. In 2008, Flattop was installed in the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) located in the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada National Security Site. Startup of Flattop with a uranium core occurred in 2011. This paper details the first 10 years of Flattop operations at NCERC (2011–present).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A New Era of Nuclear Criticality Experiments: The First 10 Years of Godiva IV Operations at NCERC

The work presented in this paper focuses on the first 10 years (2011–2020) of Godiva IV operations at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC). Godiva IV is a fast burst critical assembly constructed of approximately 65 kg of highly enriched uranium fuel alloyed with 1.5% molybdenum for strength. Godiva is one of the last such critical assemblies in the United States and can be used for studies of super-prompt-critical behavior as well as irradiations and demonstrations. An overview of the startup of Godiva IV at NCERC is given followed by a summary of the experiments performed utilizing Godiva IV over the first 10 years of operation at NCERC.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A New Era of Nuclear Criticality Experiments: The First 10 Years of Comet Operations at NCERC

Comet is a general-purpose, heavy-duty, vertical-lift assembly designed for flexibility in conducting a variety of critical experiments. It is currently located at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) in Nevada. In the past, Comet resided at Technical Area-18 in Los Alamos, New Mexico, as part of the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF). The Comet assembly was relocated to NCERC in 2008 and became fully operational in June of 2011. The first critical experiment performed on Comet at NCERC was a verification of one of the previous configurations of the Zeus experiment series. Over the next 10 years, many additional experiments followed including other Zeus configurations as well as completely new designs. This paper discusses the Comet vertical-lift assembly, the transition from LACEF to NCERC, and a selection of experiments that have been performed on Comet during its first 10 years of operation at NCERC.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Nuclear Criticality Experiments Research Center Futures: A Report of a Workshop held September 6-9, 2022, Los Alamos, NM, November, 2022

Experiments and training with critical assemblies and fissionable material (at or near the critical state) that explore reactivity phenomena are central to a number of national security challenges. From fission energy to nuclear weapons to a broad suite of scientific challenges, it is clear that additional capacity and capability are needed. The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) marked 10 years of operations in 2021. This anniversary was an opportune time to celebrate our successes and progress, and to evaluate the remaining and emergent challenges. Against this backdrop, a workshop of approximately 140 national and international leaders in nuclear research was convened in Los Alamos, New Mexico to explore “NCERC Futures.” Therefore, the present workshop focused specifically on needed capabilities and tools to meet the research challenges in eight topical mission areas served by NCERC. As each Topical Group summarized their discussions in the out brief, it was recognized that key challenges could be met through enabling infrastructure investments and new critical assemblies. Enabling infrastructure includes staffing, additional space/buildings, developing an agile bounding safety basis, the ability to keep pace with technological advances in detectors and data acquisition systems (allowing use of those with Bluetooth™ and similar technologies), an expanded set of materials options (especially plutonium), a “Plug and Play” design and implementation mindset, and a facility that enabled free-field measurements. The new critical assemblies that were identified as having the most impact were a bare plutonium (Pu) Critical Assembly, a Horizontal Split Table (HST), a Super Comet, and a Uranium Solution Burst Assembly. NECRC is a unique, one-of-a-kind facility in the United States. If all the improvements were to be made, NCERC would enable the United States and its partners to address many important research questions related to criticality. These include but are not limited to: (1) Covering the entire neutron energy spectrum for both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and Pu in configurations for virtually all conceivable applications; (2) Performing multi-physics solution experiments and irradiations with a Uranium Solution Burst Assembly, which more closely resembles actual criticality accidents; (3) Conducting free-field experiments to make basic fission physics measurements and much cleaner benchmarks with various experimental observables; and (4) Providing more training classes and more experiments annually at greater cost efficiency enabled by additional buildings and machines and an agile, bounding, risk-balanced Safety Basis. In the end, workshop attendees enthusiastically concluded that NCERC Futures are bright and the workshop helped to identify a roadmap of capability gaps that need to be addressed. This report documents the results of those efforts.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Design of Nuclear Criticality Safety Framework for Hands-on Construction of Fast Systems Over Ranges of Multiplication

Since 1945, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has performed critical experiments, primarily at the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF) at Technical Area 18 (TA-18). Since 2011, these experiments have been conducted by the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC), operated by LANL, at the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) in the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). These experiments utilize various types of Special Nuclear Material (SNM). Some of these experiments utilize what is referred to as the Rocky Flat Shells, which are called such as they came from the Rocky Flats Plant. These concentric hemi-shells are made of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), which is 93 w/o 235U. Fig. 1. Subset of the Rocky Flat Shells LANL is designing a new subcritical hands-on experiment with the goal of achieving a neutron multiplication in the range of 50 to 200, which correlates to Keff values of 0.98 to 0.995. ANSI/ANS-1 is the standard for Conduct of Critical Experiments which governs critical operations at NCERC. Section 3.9 of ANSI/ANS-1 states that when manipulating a critical assembly by hand, the predicted k eff of a known configuration should not exceed 0.95 (a neutron multiplication of 20). This presents a challenge, as this system would have a higher multiplication than 20 and the assembly would have to remain subcritical in normal and credible accident scenarios. To ensure the safety of such an assembly, the different normal and abnormal conditions that could alter the criticality 1 MCNP® and Monte Carlo N-Particle® are registered trademarks owned by Triad National Security, LLC, manager and operator of Los Alamos National Laboratory. Any third party use of such registered marks should be properly of the system must be considered and analyzed. If such a condition is deemed to be credible, it will be further investigated using the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code. If the results of these simulations show that a k eff larger than one could be possible, modifications to the assembly will be made until such an event is deemed no longer possible.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Pebble Tanker Model for Nuclear Criticality Safety Needs

This report documents a study performed to investigate the requirements for criticality safety benchmark experiments for high-assay, low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel in transportation applications. In this work, an exploratory application model, the “Pebble Tanker,” was developed to represent TRISO fuel in a transportation scenario for an analysis of the validation basis in industrial quantities. An aspect of the criticality validation process involves assessing the “similarity” between application and experimental benchmark systems through an integral index parameter evaluation. Here, this includes propagating nuclear data uncertainties and calculating a correlation coefficient (hereinafter referred to as “c k ”) to evaluate the similarity of benchmark experiments compared with the application Pebble Tanker model. Finding sufficient critical benchmark experiments allows for the evaluation of bias and bias uncertainty, thus determining the upper subcritical limit (USL) of the transportation package. A target k eff of ~0.94 was used in this work to establish appropriate modeling conditions, reflecting a reasonable estimate for a USL. Two container models were investigated: one with the Hermes-type pebble and one with the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)–type pebble. The models were simplified, considering only fuel, containment structure, and either water or air. This allows a focus on the underlying physics of applications involving TRISO fuel pebbles using the Pebble Tanker model. A crucial consideration is the transport package's ability to safely hold pebbles while flooded, maintaining subcritical conditions. Tools available in the SCALE 6.3.1 suite—the CSAS6-Shift, TSUNAMI-3D-Shift, and TSUNAMI-IP sequences—were employed for neutronics and sensitivity and uncertainty (S/U) analysis of the Pebble Tanker. Findings demonstrated sufficient available critical experiment benchmarks to perform a validation of the Pebble Tanker in the most reactive state, i.e., when the Tanker is flooded.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

SCALE 6.2.4 Validation: Nuclear Criticality Safety

The computational bias of criticality safety computer codes must be established through the validation of the codes to critical experiments. A large collection of suitable experiments has been vetted by the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) and made available in the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (ICSBEP Handbook). More than 600 cases from this handbook have been prepared and reviewed within the Verified, Archived Library of Inputs and Data (VALID), which is maintained by the Reactor and Nuclear Systems Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The performance of the KENO V.a and KENO-VI Monte Carlo codes within the SCALE 6.2.4 code system is assessed using the VALID models of benchmark experiments. A range of nuclear cross section libraries based on Evaluated Nuclear Data File (ENDF)/B-VII.1 in both multigroup (MG) and continuous energy (CE) formats is considered. The critical experiments available to validate the KENO V.a code cover 15 broad categories of systems. These systems use a range of fissile materials, including a range of uranium enrichments, various plutonium isotopic vectors, and some mixed uranium/plutonium oxides. The physical forms of the fissile material also vary and are represented as metal, solutions, or arrays of rods or plates in a water moderator. The neutron energy spectra of the systems also vary and cover fast, intermediate, mixed, and thermal spectra. Over 550 of the total cases use the KENO V.a code for the four nuclear data libraries considered in this report.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety in Practice [Slides]

The agenda for the presentation includes the following topics: Requirements; How is criticality safety practiced; criticality safety evaluations; fissionable material operation review; and, procedures.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

PNNL Measurement Results for the 2018 FlatTop Criticality Nuclear Accident Dosimetry Exercise at the Nevada National Security Site (IER-253)

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) participated in the FlatTop exercise IER-253 at the National Nuclear Security Site (NNSS) during the week of May 21, 2018. This report summarizes the measurements of the personal nuclear accident dosimeters (PNAD). Additionally, portable survey instrument readings and measurements of the simulated biological samples are included. The FlatTop exercise (IER-253) tested only PNADs and did not include fixed nuclear accident dosimeters (FNAD). Previous PNAD results obtained in 2016 at the Godiva-IV exercise IER-148 were summarized in PNNL Measurement Results for the 2016 Criticality Accident Dosimetry Exercise at the Nevada National Security Site IER-148 (PNNL-26497). The results clearly indicated that the previous dose conversions were a historical legacy of the Hanford Site and corresponded closer to kerma dose (or first collision dose, and not to Hp(10) dose). The technical basis for PNAD dose was based on the Godiva-IV exercise and documented in A New Dose Calculation Methodology for New PNAD and FNAD Designs at PNNL (PNNL-27023). The configuration of the PNAD was described in these two documents. The FlatTop exercise was the first time PNNL tested this new dose calculation methodology. Results were generally favorable with some results conservatively over reported that fell above the performance criteria. The reported gamma dose results fell non-conservatively low because only the default parameters obtained from the Godiva-IV exercise were used, and because the OSL gamma dosimeter has an energy dependency. The results from the simulated biological samples were also favorable, and in several cases conservatively over reported.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

The Nuclear Criticality Slide Rule [Slides]

Familiarity with the Criticality Slide Rule and its: • Background • Technical Bases • Use in estimating magnitudes of fission yield and dose rates from accidents. Awareness of an important tool for Criticality Safety Engineers who might be called upon to develop emergency exercises or support the Technical Support Room at the SRS Emergency Operations Center.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Margin and Handbook Data: Concepts and Applications [Slides]

At the end of this briefing, personnel should be able to: • Define concepts associated with criticality safety margin • Provide and understand practical applications that illustrate safety margin concepts • Describe how safety margin is addressed in criticality safety evaluations • Improve documentation and communication of safety margin • Connect these concepts to related statements in the ANS-8 Standards • Find numerous applications for handbook data.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Human Factors and Nuclear Criticality Safety Accidents [Slides]

The agenda for the presentation is as follows: Human Factors; Accident Review (Tokai Mura, Siberian Chemical Combine); Procedures; Accident Review (Los Alamos Waste Recovery); Environmental Distractions; Accident Review (Idaho Fuel Reprocessing); and, Equipment Reliability.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

SCALE 6.3 Validation: Nuclear Criticality Safety

The KENO codes have been used extensively around the world since their initial development in the 1960s. Therefore, a large number and wide range of validation reports have been generated for KENO by a variety of organizations. This section provides a synopsis of recent validation reports generated at ORNL, along with a brief list of some older validation reports generated in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Some of the oldest reports are not attributed directly to ORNL, as the Y-12 Plant (currently the Y-12 National Security Complex), the K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant (now the East Tennessee Technology Park), and the X-10 Site (ORNL) were operated as a single entity.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗