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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2018

Laser Tracker Utilization Methodology in Measuring Truth Trajectories for INS Testing on 6 Degree of Freedom Table at the Marshall Space Flight Center's Contact Dynamics Simulation Laboratory with Lessons Learned

When performing Inertial Navigation System (INS) testing at the Marshall Space Flight Center's (MSFC) Contact Dynamics Simulation Laboratory (CDSL) early in 2017, a Leica Geosystems AT901 Laser Tracker system (LLT) measured the twist & sway trajectories as generated by the 6 Degree Of Freedom (6DOF) Table in the CDSL. These LLT measured trajectories were used in the INS software model validation effort. Several challenges were identified and overcome during the preparation for the INS testing, as well as numerous lessons learned. These challenges included determining the position and attitude of the LLT with respect to an INS-shared coordinate frame using surveyed monument locations in the CDSL and the accompanying mathematical transformation, accurately measuring the spatial relationship between the INS and a 6DOF tracking probe due to lack of INS visibility from the LLT location, obtaining the data from the LLT during a test, determining how to process the results for comparison with INS data in time and frequency domains, and using a sensitivity analysis of the results to verify the quality of the results. While many of these challenges were identified and overcome before or during testing, a significant lesson on test set-up was not learned until later in the data analysis process. It was found that a combination of trajectory-dependent gimbal locking and environmental noise introduced non-negligible noise in the angular measurements of the LLT that spanned the evaluated frequency spectrum. The lessons learned in this experiment may be useful for others performing INS testing in similar testing facilities.

Leggett, Jared O.↗
NASA NTRS2018

International Space Station Passive Thermal Control System Top Ten Lessons-Learned

Final document not an Abstract attached. The International Space Station (ISS) has been on-orbit for nearly 20 years, and there have been numerous technical challenges along the way from design to assembly to on-orbit anomalies and repairs. The Passive Thermal Control System (PTCS) management team has been a key player in successfully dealing with these challenges. The PTCS team performs thermal analysis in support of design and verification, launch and assembly constraints, integration, sustaining engineering, failure response, and model validation. This analysis is a significant body of work and provides a unique opportunity to compile a wealth of real world engineering and analysis knowledge and the corresponding lessons-learned. The PTCS lessons encompass the full life cycle of flight hardware from design to on-orbit performance and sustaining engineering. These lessons can provide significant insight for new projects and programs. Key areas to be presented include thermal model fidelity, verification methods, analysis uncertainty, and operations support.

Iovine, John V.↗
NASA NTRS2018

International Space Station Passive Thermal Control System Top Ten Lessons-Learned

Final document not an Abstract attached. The International Space Station (ISS) has been on-orbit for nearly 20 years, and there have been numerous technical challenges along the way from design to assembly to on-orbit anomalies and repairs. The Passive Thermal Control System (PTCS) management team has been a key player in successfully dealing with these challenges. The PTCS team performs thermal analysis in support of design and verification, launch and assembly constraints, integration, sustaining engineering, failure response, and model validation. This analysis is a significant body of work and provides a unique opportunity to compile a wealth of real world engineering and analysis knowledge and the corresponding lessons-learned. The PTCS lessons encompass the full life cycle of flight hardware from design to on-orbit performance and sustaining engineering. These lessons can provide significant insight for new projects and programs. Key areas to be presented include thermal model fidelity, verification methods, analysis uncertainty, and operations support.

Iovine, John V.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Lessons Learned from Sonic Boom Flight Research Projects conducted by NASA Armstrong Flight Research Center

Over the course of four years, a team of aerospace engineers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Armstrong Flight Research Center completed four projects, each with the objective to research sonic boom signatures from a ground and building level perspective. The relatively compressed timeline of these projects resulted in the team amassing a large number of lessons learned. With each successive project, these lessons have been more relied upon and referenced. This report serves as a written record of the teams tribal knowledge capturing the relevant lessons learned and their importance for future projects.

Erin R Waggoner↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned in Space Life Support System Testing

The earlier problems can be found and corrected, the easier and cheaper it is to fix them. Doing less testing saves cost and time but doing too little testing increases the risk of operational failures causing large costs and delays. Integrated test is necessary to determine if the subsystems work together and the overall architecture performs as intended. This report reviews the testing lessons learned from the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, a National Research Council report, and five reviews of International Space Station (ISS) lessons learned. The five reviews all mention two important points. First, that testing should be performed on the final integrated system, one as close as possible to the intended flight system. Second, “test as you fly,” while operating as planned in an environment as close as possible to the expected flight environment. Other lessons are the need for extensive preflight ground testing, the need to establish and defend an adequate budget, the problems using protoflight hardware on ISS, and the benefit of having ISS as a zero gravity test bed. The major ISS life support systems, carbon dioxide, water recycling, and oxygen recovery, were protoflight systems with little testing before launch to ISS. The failure rates these systems have been much greater than predicted and this has caused dissatisfaction with the protoflight approach. The more costly traditional approach is building qualification and test units in addition to flight units. The test units are used to test, analyze, and fix failure modes. Other work shows that there is an optimum cost-effective intuitive appeal of a human ecosystem in space.

Life support↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Lessons Learned in Space Life Support System Testing

The earlier problems can be found and corrected, the easier and cheaper it is to fix them. Doing less testing saves cost and time but doing too little testing increases the risk of operational failures causing large costs and delays. Integrated test is necessary to determine if the subsystems work together and the overall architecture performs as intended. This report reviews the testing lessons learned from the NASA Systems Engineering Handbook, a National Research Council report, and five reviews of International Space Station (ISS) lessons learned. The five reviews all mention two important points. First, that testing should be performed on the final integrated system, one as close as possible to the intended flight system. Second, “test as you fly,” while operating as planned in an environment as close as possible to the expected flight environment. Other lessons are the need for extensive preflight ground testing, the need to establish and defend an adequate budget, the problems using protoflight hardware on ISS, and the benefit of having ISS as a zero gravity test bed. The major ISS life support systems, carbon dioxide removal, water recycling, and oxygen recovery, were protoflight systems with little testing before launch to ISS. The failure rates of these systems have been much greater than predicted and this has caused dissatisfaction with the protoflight approach. The more costly traditional approach builds qualification and test units in addition to flight units. The test units are used to find, analyze, and fix failure modes. Other work shows that there is an optimum cost-effective amount of testing when redundant systems must have a specified reliability and confidence.

Harry W. Jones↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assimilating Lessons Learned – From URGE to NASA's Student Airborne Science Activation (SaSa) Project

In the first half of 2021, formal and informal pods at several universities and NASA Center affiliates participated in the Unlearning Racism in Geosciences (URGE) curriculum and deliverables. As a result, several members from different URGE pods are propagating and applying the URGE lessons learned to the new 5-year NASA Student Airborne Science Activation project (SaSa). Starting in the Summer of 2022, SaSa will provide an 8-week summer Earth Science research experience focused on attracting and retaining early undergraduate students from historically underrepresented groups from minority-serving institutions (MSIs). The multicenter and field-based research experience will provide the students access to and experience with NASA airborne resources. Additionally, integrating NASA material into the MSI curricula and providing student mentorship at both MSIs and NASA Centers will enhance students' exposure to Earth Science research. The objectives of URGE and SaSa are highly compatible with one another, and the project timing allows for the integration of URGE lessons early in the SaSa curriculum design phase. As of December 2021, the first SaSa summer program application will be open and the first SaSa semester at the host MSIs will be completed. This presentation will discuss the assimilation of URGE lessons learned from our respective pods into the first SaSa academic semester and into the preparations for the first SaSa summer cohort. We will welcome additional feedback from the broader URGE community in advance of SaSa's first summer session.

Kristina Pistone↗
NASA NTRS2021

Lessons Learned in Remote Participant Concurrent Engineering Concept Development Studies

Team-X was born from a need to perform rapid space mission design for principal investigator-led competed proposals in the mid-1990s. Throughout the last 25 years, Team-X at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory has expanded its application of the collaborative, concurrent study approach into every facet necessary to win competed proposals. The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 created an immediate and new constraint on these studies – the need to conduct them with remote participants, both on the client side requesting the study, but also on the provider side producing the study. This paper provides lessons learned from dozens of design studies run by Team-X at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory during the COVID-19 pandemic. These lessons span all aspects of the information infrastructure: the people, processes, procedures, methods, tools, and “facilities”. These lessons learned will have applicability post-pandemic, as they have shown how best to incorporate participants, both on the provider side, and on the client side, who cannot travel or otherwise be co-located during collaborative, concurrent study sessions.

Nash, Alfred↗
NASA NTRS2021

Spacecraft Line-Of-Sight Jitter Management and Mitigation Lessons Learned And Engineering Best Practices

Predicting, managing, controlling, and testing spacecraft line-of-sight (LoS) jitter caused by micro-vibrations due to on-board internal disturbance sources is a formidable multidisciplinary engineering task. It is especially challenging for those missions hosting high-performance (e.g., nano-radian/milli-arcsecond class), vibration-sensitive optical sensor payloads with stringent pointing stability requirements. The Nation Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA) are planning technically aggressive spaceflight missions that include ultra-high-performance optical payloads with delicate, highly vibration-sensitive scientific and observational instruments. The guidance, navigation, and control community of practice will need to leverage collective experiences and document their best practices and lessons learned to address future micro-vibration challenges. To identify lessons learned and best practices the NASA Engineering & Safety Center sponsored a 2-day Spacecraft LoS Jitter Workshop in late 2019. The workshop’s goal was to provide a multidisciplinary forum to elicit deeper understanding of the issues related to addressing the spacecraft LoS jitter/micro-vibration problem. The primary objective was to identify, document, and share lessons learned, best practices, and preferred options for jitter-related analysis and test activities. Representatives from NASA, ESA, along with NASA’s industrial partners, independent consultant subject matter experts, and members of academia participated in the workshop. This paper will describe the motivation for the workshop and summarize the identified findings and recommendations.

Swanson, Davin K.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Power Quality Lessons Learned

Power Quality is a physical description of the electrical characteristics that allow the system to function properly without significant loss of performance or life. This physical description includes steady state voltage limits, transient voltage limits in normal/abnormal conditions, ripple voltage, stability, fault conditions, and more. All which are vital for improving reliability, ensuring stable operation, defining proper fault recovery, and ensuring a ‘plug and play’ approach to design and integration. Typically, a specification for Power Quality is created based on expected system performance or an existing standard, such as the International Space Power System Interoperability Standards (ISPSIS). One example of such a specification is the Gateway Power Quality Specification. It defines the requirements and characteristics of the 120 Volt direct current electrical power system for the Gateway Electrical Power System (EPS) and the Gateway Electrical Power Consuming Equipment (EPCE). This specification also maintains a separate requirement verification section that defines test methods for requirement verification. The test methods include analysis, test, inspection, and demonstration. These test methodologies and requirements are used to ensure that the loads operate when connected to the specified power quality and performance as defined by this specification. The challenge with developing a specification is that desired system characteristics are not always fully matured before the specification is needed and many performance requirements may be application specific. This drives the need to utilize lessons learned through extensive analysis and testing as well as historical knowledge to finalize requirements. Some example requirements where this is important are Small and Large Signal Stability, Ripple Voltage, Inrush/Surge Currents, and Fault Containment. Lessons learned are also important in the testing, analysis, and verification to ensure consistent and accurate results to verify performance. This presentation will cover the lessons learned for power quality relative to ripple, inrush/surge, fault containment, testing/verification, and more.

Power Quality↗
NASA NTRS2024

Lessons Learned in Designing A Proposed Ultraviolet Sterilization System for Space

This paper presents a number of lessons learned while designing a proposed sterilization system for Mars Sample Return. This sterilization system is needed to inactivate any potentially hazardous Mars material on the exterior surface of the vessel containing sealed sample tubes filled with Mars rock cores, regolith and atmosphere. These returned samples would provide information on the geologic history of Mars, the evolution of its climate and the potential for ancient life. Mars Sample Return is categorized at Planetary Protection Category V Restricted Earth Return, so it is required to protect the Earth–Moon system from the biological impact of returning samples from Mars to Earth. This article reviews lessons learned in the development of a particular engineering implementation to support the protection of the Earth–Moon biosphere: the use of in situ ultraviolet LED illumination. The details of the biological efficacy of this approach or the policy-related impacts are outside of the scope of this manuscript. The lessons learned presented here include establishing design requirements for the system, the selection of a light source, optical design options, contamination control and approaches to thermal and power management.

Planetary Protection↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Collection, Usage, and Preliminary Examination of the Apollo Sample Suite: Lessons for Artemis

Apollo Sample Collection and Usage: From 1969 to 1972 there were six Apollo missions to the surface of the Moon during which the astronauts collected 382 kg of rock and regolith (~2200 samples). The samples collected fall into these general categories: rocks (~66% by mass), rake samples (~4%), bulk regolith (~24%), and specialty regolith (deep drill cores, drive tubes, sealed bulk regolith) samples (~6%). In each category there are a variety of different subtypes available for study, e.g., among the bulk regolith samples there are also skim, trench, and (partially) shaded regolith samples each sampling unique types or depths of regolith. This variety of subsamples has enabled a multitude of different studies over the past 55 years (>3400 individual requests). We are still averaging ~50 unique requests and have allocated >500 individual Apollo samples annually for the past 10 years (2020 excepted). Looking at the 4,675 non-ANGSA (Apollo Next Generation Sample Analysis) samples allocated over the past 10 years, the proportions of allocated samples do not precisely align with the abundance (by mass) of those samples withing the collection: Rock (69.4 %); Rake (10.8 %); Bulk Regolith (15.5 %); Drive Tube (3.3 %); Core/Specialty (1.0 %). Apollo Preliminary Examination (PE): The PE process differs significantly for the various sample types enumerated above; we focus on regolith and rock samples here. During the Apollo mission era, the PE process evolved over the course of the missions; below is what was done for the Apollo 17 mission. For regolith samples, the PE process was: (1) documented bags containing regolith are opened, photographed, and described; (2) large rocks are removed and treated separately; (3) 25% to 33% of the bulk soil is scooped out, weighed, and stored in reserve; (4) the remaining sample is sieved to produce the size fractions <1, 1- 2, 2-4, and 4-10 mm, all of which are weighed. For rock samples, the process is: (1) removing rocks from the container(s) it came back from the Moon in; (2) rematching any materials that spalled off the rock to their original location; (3) numbering, weighing, and basic photographic documentation; (4) dusting with a gentle N2 gas jet; (5) Orthogonal photography; (6) detailed description of the textures and features of the rock; (7) rock modelling and measurement; (8) stereophotography; (9) determination of the orientation of the rock on the lunar surface. Drive tubes and deep drill cores were not characterized during PE beyond an initial weight and a sketch of the interior tube materials derived from 2D medical X-ray images. Catalogs: The ongoing utility of the Apollo samples is enabled by the robust cataloguing process for the samples [3-5], which allows the scientific community to accurately request samples uniquely suited to their proposed studies. A common misconception, however, is the amount of detail that goes into the initial catalog (e.g., [6]) for a collection from the preliminary examination (PE) period, versus what goes into the catalogs that come later in the life cycle of the samples from that mission (e.g., [7]). The only required data for a PE catalog is a weight, a basic photograph, and a description of the nature of the sample. Artemis PE: Over the past few years, the ongoing ANGSA project studied previously unopened Apollo 17 double drive tube samples 73001/2 [1], and a PE of the drive tubes was done. The PE took the existing core dissection process (developed during PE of Apollo cores in the 1970s, 1980s), and modernized it [7]. The main lesson from the ANGSA PE relative to future missions was that the physical work done during PE of lunar samples has not changed much over the past 5 decades. The use of “modern” technology during PE (e.g., XCT; multispectral analyses) resulted in an enhanced initial understanding of the 73001 and 73002 drive tubes, but greatly increased the time required. The lessons learned from recent astromaterial PEs (e.g., ANGSA and OREx) are important to consider when planning for Artemis, but the unique nature of the Artemis Campaign means many lessons learned from these mission will not be applicable. Given the time constraints (6 months) and likely number of samples that will be returned by Artemis (>200), the Artemis PE catalog will necessarily look much more like [4] than [6].

J Gross↗
DOE OSTI2025

Lessons Learned from MARVEL Initial Fabrication and Testing

The Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) project is intended to be amongst the first U.S. advanced reactor demonstrations in four decades. By virtue of being sponsored directly by the U.S. Department of Energy, the reactor is intended to benefit the broader nuclear community by exercising design processes, safety reviews, and supply chains. This project is intent on publicly documenting key lessons learned along the way toward demonstration. Building on a 2024 report that focused on lessons learned from the design and project management phase, this 2025 edition focuses on findings from the MARVEL guard vessel fabrication and primary coolant apparatus test (PCAT) testing.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2026

MARVEL Lessons Learned – 2026 Edition Fabrication, Fuel Procurement, Quality Assurance, and Safety Basis

The Microreactor Applications Research Validation and Evaluation (MARVEL) project is intended to be among the first U.S. advanced reactor demonstrations in four decades. By virtue of being sponsored directly by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the reactor is expected to benefit the broader nuclear community by exercising design processes, safety reviews, and supply chains. This project is committed to publicly documenting key lessons learned along the way toward demonstration. Building on a 2025 report that focused on lessons learned from guard vessel fabrication and Primary Coolant Apparatus Test (PCAT) testing (Abou-Jaoude et al. 2025), this 2026 edition captures findings spanning structural fabrication, quality assurance (QA), reactivity control system (RCS) assembly, fuel fabrication and shipment, safety basis development, balance-of-plant design, and overall reactor design.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗
NASA NTRS2006

Heritage Adoption Lessons Learned, Active Mirror Telescope Cover Deployment and Latch Mechanism

The Active Mirror Telescope (AMT) task adopted the Cover Deployment and Latch Mechanism (CDLM) design as used on the Galaxy Evolution Explorer (GALEX) project. The three separate mechanisms that comprise the CDLM will be discussed in this paper in addition to a focus on heritage adoption lessons learned and specific examples. These lessons learned will be valuable to any project considering the use of heritage designs.

heritage adoption↗
NASA NTRS2005

Lessons Learned Implementing Multi-Mission Sequencing Software

This paper will describe the software and its uses to provide context for its criticality. The different approaches that have been taken to implement the software in a multi-mission format will be outlined. The advantages and disadvantages as well as the lessons learned during development and maintenance of these different architectures will be discussed, Finally. the use of multi-mission software in operations and the lessons learned from using it will be discussed.This paper will provide valuable information to organizations exploring the use of multi-mission software. regardless of whether the change is to minimize spacecraft ground software development time or cost reduction. Similarly. the paper will provide insight into some of the steps that can be taken during software development and operational use that will minimize difficulty later.

software↗
NASA NTRS2014

MAVEN Information Security Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance (GRC): Lessons Learned

As the first interplanetary mission managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) had three IT security goals for its ground system: COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION. In a multiorganizational environment in which government, industry and academia work together in support of the ground system and mission operations, information security governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) becomes a challenge as each component of the ground system has and follows its own set of IT security requirements. These requirements are not necessarily the same or even similar to each other's, making the auditing of the ground system security a challenging feat. A combination of standards-based information security management based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF), due diligence by the Mission's leadership, and effective collaboration among all elements of the ground system enabled MAVEN to successfully meet NASA's requirements for IT security, and therefore meet Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) mandate on the Agency. Throughout the implementation of GRC on MAVEN during the early stages of the mission development, the Project faced many challenges some of which have been identified in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to document these challenges, and provide a brief analysis of the lessons MAVEN learned. The historical information documented herein, derived from an internal pre-launch lessons learned analysis, can be used by current and future missions and organizations implementing and auditing GRC.

FISMA↗
NASA NTRS2011

Human Factors Throughout the Life Cycle: Lessons Learned from the Shuttle Program

With the ending of the Space Shuttle Program, it is critical that we not forget the Human Factors lessons we have learned over the years. At every phase of the life cycle, from manufacturing, processing and integrating vehicle and payload, to launch, flight operations, mission control and landing, hundreds of teams have worked together to achieve mission success in one of the most complex, high-risk socio-technical enterprises ever designed. Just as there was great diversity in the types of operations performed at every stage, there was a myriad of human factors that could further complicate these human systems. A single mishap or close call could point to issues at the individual level (perceptual or workload limitations, training, fatigue, human error susceptibilities), the task level (design of tools, procedures and aspects of the workplace), as well as the organizational level (appropriate resources, safety policies, information access and communication channels). While we have often had to learn through human mistakes and technological failures, we have also begun to understand how to design human systems in which individuals can excel, where tasks and procedures are not only safe but efficient, and how organizations can foster a proactive approach to managing risk and supporting human enterprises. Panelists will talk about their experiences as they relate human factors to a particular phase of the shuttle life cycle. They will conclude with a framework for tying together human factors lessons-learned into system-level risk management strategies.

human factors↗