Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “lessons”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1997

Lessons Learned from the Clementine Mission

According to BMDO, the Clementine mission achieved many of its technology objectives during its flight to the Moon in early 1994 but, because of a software error, was unable to test the autonomous tracking of a cold target. The preliminary analyses of the returned lunar data suggest that valuable scientific measurements were made on several important topics but that COMPLEX's highest-priority objectives for lunar science were not achieved. This is not surprising given that the rationale for Clementine was technological rather than scientific. COMPLEX lists below a few of the lessons that may be learned from Clementine. Although the Clementine mission was not conceived as a NASA science mission exactly like those planned for the Discovery program, many operational aspects of the two are similar. It is therefore worthwhile to understand the strengths and faults of the Clementine approach. Some elements of the Clementine operation that led to the mission's success include the following: (1) The mission's achievements were the responsibility of a single organization and its manager, which made that organization and that individual accountable for the final outcome; (2) The sponsor adopted a hands-off approach and set a minimum number of reviews (three); (3) The sponsor accepted a reasonable amount of risk and allowed the project team to make the trade-offs necessary to minimize the mission's risks while still accomplishing all its primary objectives; and (4) The development schedule was brief and the agreed-on funding (and funding profile) was adhered to. Among the operational shortcomings of Clementine were the following: (1) An overly ambitious schedule and a slightly lean budget (meaning insufficient time for software development and testing, and leading ultimately to human exhaustion); and (2) No support for data calibration, reduction, and analysis. The principal lesson to be learned in this category is that any benefits from the constructive application of higher risk for lower cost and faster schedule will be lost if the schedule does not allow adequate time for the development of all essential systems or makes no allowance for human frailties. Another lesson to be drawn is that despite its limitations, if judged strictly as a science mission, Clementine attested that significant scientific information can be gathered during a technology-demonstration mission. In the current era of limited funds, when science missions will be infrequent, the opportunity to fly scientific instruments aboard missions whose objectives might be other than science must be seized and, indeed, encouraged. During such opportunities it would be inexcusable to do second-class science. Thus the scientific community must be actively involved in such projects from their initiation.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1998

NASA/Mir Phase 1: A Lesson Learned in Long Duration Mission Planning and Operations

The NASA/Mir Phase I Program is a precursor to the assembly and operations of the International Space Station (ISS). The Phase I Program covers a four-year period and encompasses over ten shuttle flights to the Mir, culminating with the flight of STS-91 in June 1998. The Mir-Orbiting Station (Mir-OS) provides an excellent environment, both onboard and on the ground, for learning and studying the characteristics associated with crew-tended operations on long duration missions. By the end of the Phase I program, NASA astronauts will have accumulated over two years of continuous operations experience working and living onboard the Mir-OS. Ground controllers, working in Russia and at remote sites in the United States, will have gained valuable experience in the generation, maintenance, and coordination of the information and products required to support the long duration crew members onboard the Mir-OS. The experience gained by the crew and ground support personnel in the area of long duration mission operations has resulted in a number of factors that need to be considered in the definition and implementation of the processes and products for the ISS. While there are many areas in which experience has been gained, this paper focuses on the lessons learned regarding the level of detail and flexibility of crew timelines. Provided in this paper is an overview of the characteristics associated with long duration mission timeline development and execution, a summary of applicable lessons learned identified and documented through participation in the NASA/Mir Phase I Program, a detailed discussion of "Gross Timelines" as implementation which addresses the lessons learned. Also discussed are the challenges that must be overcome in getting the ISS program to recognize, evaluate, and learn from the crew and ground controller experience gained through participation in the NASA/Mir Phase I Program.

Hagopian, Jeff↗
NASA NTRS2000

Development of X-33/X-34 Aerothermodynamic Data Bases: Lessons Learned and Future Enhancements

A synoptic of programmatic and technical lessons learned in the development of aerothermodynamic data bases for the X-33 and X-34 programs is presented in general terms and from the perspective of the NASA Langley Research Center Aerothermodynamics Branch. The format used is that of the "aerothermodynamic chain," the links of which are personnel, facilities, models/test articles, instrumentation, test techniques, and computational fluid dynamics (CFD). Because the aerodynamic data bases upon which the X-33 and X-34 vehicles will fly are almost exclusively from wind tunnel testing, as opposed to CFD, the primary focus of the lessons learned is on ground-based testing. The period corresponding to the development of X-33 and X-34 aerothermodynamic data bases was challenging, since a number of other such programs (e.g., X-38, X-43) competed for resources at a time of downsizing of personnel, facilities, etc., outsourcing, and role changes as NASA Centers served as subcontractors to industry. The impact of this changing environment is embedded in the lessons learned. From a technical perspective, the relatively long times to design and fabricate metallic force and moment models, delays in delivery of models, and a lack of quality assurance to determine the fidelity of model outer mold lines (OML) prior to wind tunnel testing had a major negative impact on the programs. On the positive side, the application of phosphor thermography to obtain global, quantitative heating distributions on rapidly fabricated ceramic models revolutionized the aerothermodynamic optimization of vehicle OMLs, control surfaces, etc. Vehicle designers were provided with aeroheating information prior to, or in conjunction with, aerodynamic information early in the program, thereby allowing trades to be made with both sets of input; in the past only aerodynamic data were available as input. Programmatically, failure to include transonic aerodynamic wind tunnel tests early in the assessment phase led to delays in the optimization phase, as OMLs required modification to provide adequate transonic aerodynamic performance without sacrificing subsonic and hypersonic performance. Funding schedules for industry, based on technical milestones, also presented challenges to aerothermodynamics seeking optimum flying characteristics across the subsonic to hypersonic speed regimes and minimum aeroheating. This paper is concluded with a brief discussion of enhancements in ground-based testing/CFD capabilities necessary to partially/fully satisfy future requirements.

Miller, C. G.↗
NASA NTRS1999

Unpressurized Logistics Carriers for the International Space Station: Lessons Learned

The International Space Station has been in development since 1984, and has recently begun on orbit assembly. Most of the hardware for the Space Station has been manufactured and the rest is well along in design. The major sets of hardware that are still to be developed for Space Station are the pallets and interfacing hardware for resupply of unpressurized spares and scientific payloads. Over the last ten years, there have been numerous starts, stops, difficulties and challenges encountered in this effort. The Space Station program is now entering the beginning of orbital operations. The Program is only now addressing plans to design and build the carriers that will be needed to carry the unpressurized cargo for the Space Station lifetime. Unpressurized carrier development has been stalled due to a broad range of problems that occurred over the years. These problems were not in any single area, but encompassed budgetary, programmatic, and technical difficulties. Some lessons of hindsight can be applied to developing carriers for the Space Station. Space Station teams are now attempting to incorporate the knowledge gained into the current development efforts for external carriers. In some cases, the impacts of these lessons are unrecoverable for Space Station, but can and should be applied to future programs. This paper examines the progress and problems to date with unpressurized carrier development identifies the lessons to be learned, and charts the course for finally accomplishing the delivery of these critical hardware sets.

Robbins, William W., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2001

NASA's Lessons Learned and Technical Standards: A Logical Marriage

Lessons Learned have been the basis for our accomplishments throughout the ages. They have been passed down from father to son, mother to daughter, teacher to pupil, and older to younger worker. Lessons Learned have also been the basis for NASA's accomplishments for more than forty years. Both government and industry have long recognized the need to systematically document and utilize the knowledge gained from past experiences in order to avoid the repetition of failures and mishaps. Lessons Learned have formed the foundation for discoveries, inventions, improvements, textbooks, and Technical Standards.

Gill, Paul↗
NASA NTRS2002

Lessons Learned In Developing Multiple Distributed Planning Systems for the International Space Station

The planning processes for the International Space Station (ISS) Program are quite complex. Detailed mission planning for ISS on-orbit operations is a distributed function. Pieces of the on-orbit plan are developed by multiple planning organizations, located around the world, based on their respective expertise and responsibilities. The "pieces" are then integrated to yield the final detailed plan that will be executed onboard the ISS. Previous space programs have not distributed the planning and scheduling functions to this extent. Major ISS planning organizations are currently located in the United States (at both the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) and NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)), in Russia, in Europe, and in Japan. Software systems have been developed by each of these planning organizations to support their assigned planning and scheduling functions. Although there is some cooperative development and sharing of key software components, each planning system has been tailored to meet the unique requirements and operational environment of the facility in which it operates. However, all the systems must operate in a coordinated fashion in order to effectively and efficiently produce a single integrated plan of ISS operations, in accordance with the established planning processes. This paper addresses lessons learned during the development of these multiple distributed planning systems, from the perspective of the developer of one of the software systems. The lessons focus on the coordination required to allow the multiple systems to operate together, rather than on the problems associated with the development of any particular system. Included in the paper is a discussion of typical problems faced during the development and coordination process, such as incompatible development schedules, difficulties in defining system interfaces, technical coordination and funding for shared tools, continually evolving planning concepts/requirements, programmatic and budget issues, and external influences. Techniques that mitigated some of these problems will also be addressed, along with recommendations for any future programs involving the development of multiple planning and scheduling systems. Many of these lessons learned are not unique to the area of planning and scheduling systems, so may be applied to other distributed ground systems that must operate in concert to successfully support space mission operations.

Maxwell, Theresa G.↗
NASA NTRS2003

MC-1 Engine Valves, Lessons Learned

Many lessons were learned during the development of the valves for the MC-1 engine. The purpose of this report is to focus on a variety of issues related to the engine valves and convey the lessons learned. This paper will not delve into detailed technical analysis of the components. None of the lessons learned are new or surprising, but simply reinforce the importance of addressing the details of the design early, at the component level. The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), Huntsville, Alabama developed the MC-1 engine, a LOX / FW-1, 60,000 pound thrust engine. This engine was developed under the Low Cost Boost Technology office at MSFC and proved to be a very successful project for the MSFC Propulsion team and the various subcontractors working the development of the engine and its components.

Laszar, John↗
NASA NTRS2002

Lessons Learned in Developing Multiple Distributed Planning Systems for the International Space Station

The planning processes for the International Space Station (ISS) Program are quite complex. Detailed mission planning for ISS on-orbit operations is a distributed function. Pieces of the on-orbit plan are developed by multiple planning organizations, located around the world, based on their respective expertise and responsibilities. The pieces are then integrated to yield the final detailed plan that will be executed onboard the ISS. Previous space programs have not distributed the planning and scheduling functions to this extent. Major ISS planning organizations are currently located in the United States (at both the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) and NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)), in Russia, in Europe, and in Japan. Software systems have been developed by each of these planning organizations to support their assigned planning and scheduling functions. Although there is some cooperative development and sharing of key software components, each planning system has been tailored to meet the unique requirements and operational environment of the facility in which it operates. However, all the systems must operate in a coordinated fashion in order to effectively and efficiently produce a single integrated plan of ISS operations, in accordance with the established planning processes. This paper addresses lessons learned during the development of these multiple distributed planning systems, from the perspective of the developer of one of the software systems. The lessons focus on the coordination required to allow the multiple systems to operate together, rather than on the problems associated with the development of any particular system. Included in the paper is a discussion of typical problems faced during the development and coordination process, such as incompatible development schedules, difficulties in defining system interfaces, technical coordination and funding for shared tools, continually evolving planning concepts/requirements, programmatic and budget issues, and external influences. Techniques that mitigated some of these problems will also be addressed, along with recommendations for any future programs involving the development of multiple planning and scheduling systems. Many of these lessons learned are not unique to the area of planning and scheduling systems, so may be applied to other distributed ground systems that must operate in concert to successfully support space mission operations.

Maxwell, Theresa G.↗
NASA NTRS2003

Engineering Lessons Learned and Technical Standards Integration: Capturing Key Technologies for Future Space Missions

Capturing engineering lessons learned derived from past experiences and new technologies, then integrating them with technical standards, provides a viable process for enhancing engineering capabilities. The development of future space missions will require ready access, not only to the latest technical standards, but also to lessons learned derived from past experiences and new technologies. The integration of this information such that it is readily accessible by engineering and programmatic personnel is a key aspect of enabling technology. This paper addresses the development of a new and innovative Lessons Learned/Best Practices/Applications Notes--Standards Integration System, including experiences with its initial implementation as a pilot effort within the NASA Technical Standards Program. Included are metrics on the Program, feedbacks from users, future plans, and key issues that are being addressed to expand the System's utility. The objective is the enhancement of engineering capabilities on all aspects of systems development applicable to the success of future space missions.

Mellen, Daniele P.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Lessons Learned (3 Years of H2O2 Propulsion System Testing Efforts at NASA's John C. Stennis Space Center)

John C. Stennis Space Center continues to support the Propulsion community in an effort to validate High-Test Peroxide as an alternative to existing/future oxidizers. This continued volume of peroxide test/handling activity at Stennis Space Center (SSC) provides numerous opportunities for the SSC team to build upon previously documented 'lessons learned'. SSC shall continue to strive to document their experience and findings as H2O2 issues surface. This paper is intended to capture all significant peroxide issues that we have learned over the last three years. This data (lessons learned) has been formulated from practical handling, usage, storage, operations, and initial development/design of our systems/facility viewpoint. The paper is intended to be an information type tool and limited in technical rational; therefore, presenting the peroxide community with some issues to think about as the continued interest in peroxide evolves and more facilities/hardware are built. These lessons learned are intended to assist industry in mitigating problems and identifying potential pitfalls when dealing with the requirements for handling high-test peroxide.

Taylor, Gary O.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Propulsion Ground Testing with High Test Peroxide: Lessons Learned

Propulsion Ground Testing with High Test Peroxide (85 to 98% concentration) began at the NASA John C. Stennis Space Center in calendar year 1998, when the E3 Test Facility was modified to accomodate hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) in order to suport the research and development testing of the USAF Upper Stage Flight Experiment rocket engine. Since that time, efforts have continued to provide actual and planned test services to various customers, both U.S. Government and Commercial, in the ground test of many test articles, ranging from gas generators, to catalyst beds, to turbomachinery, to main injectors, to combustion chambers, to integrated rocket engines, to integrated stages. Along this path, and over the past 4 years, there has been both the rediscovery of previously learned lessons, through literature search, archive review, and personal interviews, as well as the learning of many new lessons as new areas are explored and new endeavors are tried. This paper will summarize those lessons learned in an effort to broaden the knowledge base as High Test Peroxide is considered more widely for use in rocket propulsion applications.

Bruce, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2004

From Bridges and Rockets, Lessons for Software Systems

Although differences exist between building software systems and building physical structures such as bridges and rockets, enough similarities exist that software engineers can learn lessons from failures in traditional engineering disciplines. This paper draws lessons from two well-known failures the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in 1940 and the destruction of the space shuttle Challenger in 1986 and applies these lessons to software system development. The following specific applications are made: (1) the verification and validation of a software system should not be based on a single method, or a single style of methods; (2) the tendency to embrace the latest fad should be overcome; and (3) the introduction of software control into safety-critical systems should be done cautiously.

Holloway, C. Michael↗
NASA NTRS2006

Importance Of Quality Control in Reducing System Risk, a Lesson Learned From The Shuttle and a Recommendation for Future Launch Vehicles

This paper presents lessons learned from the Space Shuttle return to flight experience and the importance of these lessons learned in the development of new the NASA Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV). Specifically, the paper discusses the relationship between process control and system risk, and the importance of process control in improving space vehicle flight safety. It uses the External Tank (ET) Thermal Protection System (TPS) experience and lessons learned from the redesign and process enhancement activities performed in preparation for Return to Flight after the Columbia accident. The paper also, discusses in some details, the Probabilistic engineering physics based risk assessment performed by the Shuttle program to evaluate the impact of TPS failure on system risk and the application of the methodology to the CLV.

Safie, Fayssal M.↗
NASA NTRS2006

NASA Crew and Cargo Launch Vehicle Development Approach Builds on Lessons Learned from Past and Present Missions

A viewgraph presentation of NASA crew and cargo launch vehicle development building upon lessons learned from past and present missions is shown. The topics include: 1) U.S. Vision for Space Exploration; 2) NASA's Exploration Road Map; 3) The Moon-The First Step to Mars and Beyond; 4) Building on a Foundation of Proven Technologies; 5) Constellation Launch Vehicle Elements; 6) 1.5 Launch Earth Orbit/Lunar Orbit Rendezvous; 7) The Journey Continues; 8) Design Philosophy for Mission Success; 9) Lessons Learned: Implementation Tenets; and 10) Lessons Learned: Early Integration with the Operators.

Dumbacher, Dan↗
NASA NTRS2006

Habitability and Human Factors: Lessons Learned in Long Duration Space Flight

This study documents the investigation of qualitative habitability and human factors feedback provided by scientists, engineers, and crewmembers on lessons learned from the ISS Program. A thorough review and understanding of this data is critical in charting NASA's future path in space exploration. NASA has been involved in ensuring that the needs of crewmembers to live and work safely and effectively in space have been met throughout the ISS Program. Human factors and habitability data has been collected from every U.S. crewmember that has resided on the ISS. The knowledge gained from both the developers and inhabitants of the ISS have provided a significant resource of information for NASA and will be used in future space exploration. The recurring issues have been tracked and documented; the top 5 most critical issues have been identified from this data. The top 5 identified problems were: excessive onsrbit stowage; environment; communication; procedures; and inadequate design of systems and equipment. Lessons learned from these issues will be used to aid in future improvements and developments to the space program. Full analysis of the habitability and human factors data has led to the following recommendations. It is critical for human factors to be involved early in the design of space vehicles and hardware. Human factors requirements need to be readdressed and redefined given the knowledge gained during previous ISS and long-duration space flight programs. These requirements must be integrated into vehicle and hardware technical documentation and consistently enforced. Lastly, space vehicles and hardware must be designed with primary focus on the user/operator to successfully complete missions and maintain a safe working environment. Implementation of these lessons learned will significantly improve NASA's likelihood of success in future space endeavors.

Baggerman, Susan D.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Lessons Learned and Flight Results from the F15 Intelligent Flight Control System Project

A viewgraph presentation on the lessons learned and flight results from the F15 Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) project is shown. The topics include: 1) F-15 IFCS Project Goals; 2) Motivation; 3) IFCS Approach; 4) NASA F-15 #837 Aircraft Description; 5) Flight Envelope; 6) Limited Authority System; 7) NN Floating Limiter; 8) Flight Experiment; 9) Adaptation Goals; 10) Handling Qualities Performance Metric; 11) Project Phases; 12) Indirect Adaptive Control Architecture; 13) Indirect Adaptive Experience and Lessons Learned; 14) Gen II Direct Adaptive Control Architecture; 15) Current Status; 16) Effect of Canard Multiplier; 17) Simulated Canard Failure Stab Open Loop; 18) Canard Multiplier Effect Closed Loop Freq. Resp.; 19) Simulated Canard Failure Stab Open Loop with Adaptation; 20) Canard Multiplier Effect Closed Loop with Adaptation; 21) Gen 2 NN Wts from Simulation; 22) Direct Adaptive Experience and Lessons Learned; and 23) Conclusions

Bosworth, John↗
NASA NTRS2008

Lessons Learned from Recent Failure and Incident Investigations of Composite Structures

During the past few decades, NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) has supported several large-scale failure and incident investigations and numerous requests for engineering consultations. Although various extenuating circumstances contributed to each of these incidents, in all cases, the failure resulted from accumulation and/or propagation of damage that reduced the load carrying capability of the structure to a level below that which was needed to sustain structural loads. A brief overview of various failure and incident investigations supported by LaRC, including some of the computational and experimental methodologies that have been applied, is presented. An important outcome of many of these failure and incident investigations is the development of an improved understanding of not only the state-of-the-art in experimental and analytical methods but also the state-of-the-art in the design and manufacturing processes that may contribute to such failures. In order to provide insight into such large-scale investigations, a series of lessons learned were captured. Awareness of these lessons learned is highly beneficial to engineers involved in similar investigations. Therefore, it is prudent that the lessons learned are disseminated such that they can be built upon in other investigations and in ensuing research and development activities.

Ransom, J. B.↗
NASA NTRS2009

An Overview of MODIS Calibration and Characterization and Lessons Learned

The Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) is a key instrument for NASA's EOS missions. Two nearly identical copies have flown on the Terra and Aqua spacecraft for more than 9 years and 6 years since their launch in December 1999 and May 2002, respectively. MODIS observations and associated data products have been widely used by the science community and users worldwide for studies of Earth's system of land, oceans, and atmosphere. MODIS was developed based on the desire of the science community to extend and enhance heritage sensors' data records. It was designed with enhancements made over its heritage sensors in terms of its spectral, spatial, and radiometric characteristics. It is a cross-track scanning radiometer, that uses a two-sided scan mirror, collecting data in 36 spectral bands covering spectral regions of visible (VIS), near-infrared (NIR), short-wave infrared (SWIR), mid-wave infrared (MWIR), and long-wave infrared (LWIR). The VIS, NIR, and SWIR bands (bands 1-19 and 26), which make measurements of daytime surface reflected radiances, are referred to as the reflective solar bands (RSB). The MWIR and LWIR bands (20-25 and 27-36), which measure both the daytime and nighttime scene emissive radiances, are thus referred to as the thermal emissive bands (TEB). In this paper, we provide an overview of MODIS instrument calibration and characterization methodologies, activities, and results from pre-launch to post launch, with emphasis on the lessons learned from its design to on-orbit operation. Currently, both instruments are operated normally and all the on-orbit calibration activities are performed on a regular basis with some at slightly reduced frequencies. The TEB responses have been extremely stable with less than 0.3% change per year. For the RSB, the changes are wavelength and scan angle dependent with the largest changes in the VIS spectral bands. As both Terra and Aqua MODIS continue to operate beyond their prime missions, constant effort is still needed to maintain instrument and calibration and data product quality. This paper shows that the lessons from Terra MODIS design, test, and operation, have greatly benefitted Aqua MODIS. Because of this, Aqua MODIS overall performance is better than Terra MODIS. It is not surprising that lessons from MODIS calibration and characterization, from methodologies to on-orbit implementation, have also provided valuable information for the design and development of future earth observing missions/sensors, such as VHRS on the NPP and NPOESS, ABI on GOES-R, OLI on LDCM, and the reflective solar sensor on CLARREO.

Xiong, Xiaxiong↗