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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2014

Re-Engineering the ISS Payload Operations Control Center During Increased Utilization and Critical Onboard Events

With an increase in the utilization and hours of payload operations being executed onboard the International Space Station (ISS), upgrading the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) ISS Payload Control Area (PCA) was essential to gaining efficiencies and assurance of current and future payload health and science return. PCA houses the Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) responsible for the execution of all NASA payloads onboard the ISS. POIC Flight Controllers are responsible for the operation of voice, stowage, command, telemetry, video, power, thermal, and environmental control in support of ISS science experiments. The methodologies and execution of the PCA refurbishment were planned and performed within a four month period in order to assure uninterrupted operation of ISS payloads and minimal impacts to payload operations teams. To vacate the PCA, three additional HOSC control rooms were reconfigured to handle ISS realtime operations, Backup Control Center (BCC) to Mission Control in Houston, simulations, and testing functions. This involved coordination and cooperation from teams of ISS operations controllers, multiple engineering and design disciplines, management, and construction companies performing an array of activities simultaneously and in sync delivering a final product with no issues that impacted the schedule. For each console operator discipline, studies of Information Technology (IT) tools and equipment layouts, ergonomics, and lines of sight were performed. Infusing some of the latest IT into the project was an essential goal in ensuring future growth and success of the ISS payload science returns. Engineering evaluations led to a state of the art media wall implementation and more efficient ethernet cabling distribution providing the latest products and the best solution for the POIC. These engineering innovations led to cost savings for the project. Constraints involved in the management of the project included executing over 450 crew-hours of ISS real-time payload operations including a major onboard communications upgrade, SpaceX un-berth, a Soyuz launch, roll-out of ISS live video and interviews from the POIC, annual BCC certification and hurricane season, and ISS simulations and testing. Continuous ISS payload operations were possible during the PCA facility modifications with the reconfiguration of four control rooms and standup of two temporary control areas. Another major restriction to the project was an ongoing facility upgrade that included a NASA Headquarters mandated replacement of all electrical and mechanical systems and replacement of an external generator. These upgrades required a facility power outage during the PCA upgrades. The project also encompassed console layout designs and ordering, amenities selections and ordering, excessing of old equipment, moves, disposal of old IT equipment, camera installations, facility tour re-schedules, and contract justifications. These were just some of the tasks needed for a successful project.

Marsh, Angela L.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Re-Engineering the ISS Payload Operations Control Center During Increased Utilization and Critical Onboard Events

With an increase in utilization and hours of payload operations being executed onboard the International Space Station (ISS), upgrading the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) ISS Payload Control Area (PCA) was essential to gaining efficiencies and assurance of current and future payload health and science return. PCA houses the Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) responsible for the execution of all NASA payloads onboard the ISS. POIC Flight Controllers are responsible for the operation of voice, stowage, command, telemetry, video, power, thermal, and environmental control in support of ISS science experiments. The methodologies and execution of the PCA refurbishment were planned and performed within a four-month period in order to assure uninterrupted operation of ISS payloads and minimal impacts to payload operations teams. To vacate the PCA, three additional HOSC control rooms were reconfigured to handle ISS real-time operations, Backup Control Center (BCC) to Mission Control in Houston, simulations, and testing functions. This involved coordination and cooperation from teams of ISS operations controllers, multiple engineering and design disciplines, management, and construction companies performing an array of activities simultaneously and in sync delivering a final product with no issues that impacted the schedule. For each console operator discipline, studies of Information Technology (IT) tools and equipment layouts, ergonomics, and lines of sight were performed. Infusing some of the latest IT into the project was an essential goal in ensuring future growth and success of the ISS payload science returns. Engineering evaluations led to a state of the art Video Wall implementation and more efficient ethernet cabling distribution providing the latest products and the best solution for the POIC. These engineering innovations led to cost savings for the project. Constraints involved in the management of the project included executing over 450 crew-hours of ISS real-time payload operations including a major onboard communications upgrade, SpaceX un-berth, a Soyuz launch, roll-out of ISS live video and interviews from the POIC, annual BCC certification and hurricane season, and ISS simulations and testing. Continuous ISS payload operations were possible during the PCA facility modifications with the reconfiguration of four control rooms and standup of two temporary control areas. Another major restriction to the project was an ongoing facility upgrade that included a NASA Headquarters mandated replacement of all electrical and mechanical systems and replacement of an external generator. These upgrades required a facility power outage during the PCA upgrades. The project also encompassed console layout designs and ordering, amenities selections and ordering, excessing of old equipment, moves, disposal of old IT equipment, camera installations, facility tour re-schedules, and contract justifications. These were just some of the tasks needed for a successful project. This paper describes the logistics and lessons learned in upgrading a control center capability in the middle of complex real-time operations. Combining the efficiencies of controller interaction and new technology infusion were prime drivers for this upgrade to handle the increased utilization of science research on ISS. The success of this project could not jeopardize the current operations while these facility upgrades occurred.

Dudley, Stephanie R. B.↗
DOE OSTI2021

NRAP-open-IAM: A flexible open-source integrated-assessment-model for geologic carbon storage risk assessment and management

Large-scale implementation of geologic carbon storage (GCS) to help reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions requires stakeholder confidence that injected CO2 will remain contained and that potential subsurface environmental risks are acceptably small and manageable. The U.S. Department of Energy’s National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) has developed an open-source integrated assessment model (NRAP-Open-IAM) to help address questions about a potential GCS site’s ability to effectively contain injected CO 2 and protect groundwater and other overlying environmentally sensitive receptors. NRAP-Open-IAM allows a user to: (1) incorporate relevant site geologic and injection scenario data; (2) characterize important site features and events;(3) couple fast prediction models of various system components of the engineered geologic system; and (4) execute stochastic, dynamic simulation of whole GCS system performance, leakage risk assessment, and uncertainty quantification. NRAP-Open-IAM is available on GitLab (https://gitlab.com/NRAP/OpenIAM), and is accompanied by multiple application examples and detailed user and developer guides.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2002

Radiation Hardness Assurance for Space Systems

The space radiation environment can lead to extremely harsh operating conditions for on-board electronic box and systems. The characteristics of the radiation environment are highly dependent on the type of mission (date, duration and orbit). Radiation accelerates the aging of the electronic parts and material and can lead to a degradation of electrical performance; it can also create transient phenomena on parts. Such damage at the part level can induce damage or functional failure at electronic box, subsystem, and system levels. A rigorous methodology is needed to ensure that the radiation environment does not compromise the functionality and performance of the electronics during the system life. This methodology is called hardness assurance. It consists of those activities undertaken to ensure that the electronic piece parts placed in the space system perform to their design specifications after exposure to the space environment. It deals with system requirements, environmental definitions, part selection, part testing, shielding and radiation tolerant design. All these elements should play together in order to produce a system tolerant to.the radiation environment. An overview of the different steps of a space system hardness assurance program is given in section 2. In order to define the mission radiation specifications and compare these requirements to radiation test data, a detailed knowledge of the space environment and the corresponding electronic device failure mechanisms is required. The presentation by J. Mazur deals with the Earth space radiation environment as well as the internal environment of a spacecraft. The presentation by J. Schwank deals with ionization effects, and the presentation by T. Weatherford deals with Single particle Event Phenomena (SEP) in semiconductor devices and microcircuits. These three presentations provide more detailed background to complement the sections 3 and 4. Part selection and categorization are discussed in section 5. Section 6 presents the organization of the hardness assurance within a project. Section 7 discusses emerging radiation hardness assurance issues.

Poivey, Christian↗
NASA NTRS2016

Deformation of Cases in High Capacitance Value Wet Tantalum Capacitors under Environmental Stresses

Internal gas pressure in hermetic wet tantalum capacitors is created by air, electrolyte vapor, and gas generated by electrochemical reactions at the electrodes. This pressure increases substantially with temperature and time of operation due to excessive leakage currents. Deformation of the case occurs when the internal pressure exceeds pressure of the environments and can raise significantly when a part operates in space. Contrary to the cylinder case wet tantalum capacitors that have external sealing by welding and internal sealing provided by the Teflon bushing and crimping of the case, no reliable internal sealing exists in the button case capacitors. Single seal design capacitors are used for high capacitance value wet tantalum capacitors manufactured per DLA L&M drawings #04003, 04005, and 10011, and require additional analysis to assure their reliable application in space systems. In this work, leakage currents and case deformation of button case capacitors were measured during different environmental test conditions. Recommendations for derating, screening and qualification testing are given. This work is a continuation of a series of NEPP reports related to quality and reliability of wet tantalum capacitors.

Tantalum Capacitors↗
NASA NTRS2005

Environmental Conditions for Space Flight Hardware: A Survey

Interest in generalization of the physical environment experienced by NASA hardware from the natural Earth environment (on the launch pad), man-made environment on Earth (storage acceptance an d qualification testing), the launch environment, and the space environment, is ed to find commonality among our hardware in an effort to reduce cost and complexity. NASA is entering a period of increase in its number of planetary missions and it is important to understand how our qualification requirements will evolve with and track these new environments. Environmental conditions are described for NASA projects in several ways for the different periods of the mission life cycle. At the beginning, the mission manager defines survivability requirements based on the mission length, orbit, launch date, launch vehicle, and other factors . such as the use of reactor engines. Margins are then applied to these values (temperature extremes, vibration extremes, radiation tolerances, etc,) and a new set of conditions is generalized for design requirements. Mission assurance documents will then assign an additional margin for reliability, and a third set of values is provided for during testing. A fourth set of environmental condition values may evolve intermittently from heritage hardware that has been tested to a level beyond the actual mission requirement. These various sets of environment figures can make it quite confusing and difficult to capture common hardware environmental requirements. Environmental requirement information can be found in a wide variety of places. The most obvious is with the individual projects. We can easily get answers to questions about temperature extremes being used and radiation tolerance goals, but it is more difficult to map the answers to the process that created these requirements: for design, for qualification, and for actual environment with no margin applied. Not everyone assigned to a NASA project may have that kind of insight, as many have only the environmental requirement numbers needed to do their jobs but do not necessarily have a programmatic-level understanding of how all of the environmental requirements fit together.

Plante, Jeannette↗
NASA NTRS1973

Zero-gravity cloud physics laboratory: Candidate experiments definition and preliminary concept studies

The candidate definition studies on the zero-g cloud physics laboratory are covered. This laboratory will be an independent self-contained shuttle sortie payload. Several critical technology areas have been identified and studied to assure proper consideration in terms of engineering requirements for the final design. Areas include chambers, gas and particle generators, environmental controls, motion controls, change controls, observational techniques, and composition controls. This unique laboratory will allow studies to be performed without mechanical, aerodynamics, electrical, or other type techniques to support the object under study. This report also covers the candidate experiment definitions, chambers and experiment classes, laboratory concepts and plans, special supporting studies, early flight opportunities and payload planning data for overall shuttle payload requirements assessments.

Eaton, L. R.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Effects of low Earth orbit environment on the Long Duration Exposure Facility thermal control coatings

One of the benefits of the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) was the opportunity to study the before and after effects of low earth orbit space environment on the spacecraft thermal control coatings. Since the LDEF's thermal control was totally passive by design, the selection of the external surface absorptivity to emissivity ratio (alpha/epsilon) and the ability for the coating to retain the alpha/epsilon over time was an important consideration in the thermal design of the LDEF. The primary surface coating chosen for the LDEF structure was clear chromic anodized aluminum with an average design alpha/epsilon of 0.32/0.16. External surface absorptivity (alpha) and emissivity (epsilon) were measured on all intercostals, longerons, tray mounting flanges, thermal control panels, and a limited number of experiment surface coatings after the experiment trays were removed from the LDEF structure. All surface alpha/epsilon measurements were made using portable hand held infrared and solar spectrum reflectometers. The absorptivity measurements were taken with a Devices and Services SSR-ER version 5.0 solar spectra reflectometer which has a stated uncertainty of +/- 0.01, and all normal emissivity measurements were made using the Gier Dunkle DB-100 infrared reflectometer also with a stated uncertainty of +/- 0.01. Both instruments were calibrated in the laboratory by LaRC instrumentation personnel before being used in the field at KSC. A combined total of 733 measurements were taken on the anodized aluminum hardware which included the structure (intercostals, longerons, and center ring), earth and space end thermal control panels, and experiment tray mounting flanges. The facility thermal control coatings measured in this survey cover 33 percent of the total exposed LDEF surface area. To correlate low earth orbit environmental effects on the anodized coatings, measurements were taken in both exposed and unexposed surfaces and compared to quality assurance (QA) measurements taken on the new surfaces at the time of hardware fabrication in 1978. The results of investigation are presented.

Sampair, Thomas R.↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Assurance Challenges of Advanced Packaging Technologies for Electronics

Advances in microelectronic parts performance are driving towards finer feature sizes, three-dimensional geometries and ever-increasing number of transistor equivalents that are resulting in increased die sizes and interconnection (I/O) counts. The resultant packaging necessary to provide assemble-ability, environmental protection, testability and interconnection to the circuit board for the active die creates major challenges, particularly for space applications, Traditionally, NASA has used hermetically packaged microcircuits whenever available but the new demands make hermetic packaging less and less practical at the same time as more and more expensive, Some part types of great interest to NASA designers are currently only available in non-hermetic packaging. It is a far more complex quality and reliability assurance challenge to gain confidence in the long-term survivability and effectiveness of nonhermetic packages than for hermetic ones. Although they may provide more rugged environmental protection than the familiar Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuits (PEMs), the non-hermetic Ceramic Column Grid Array (CCGA) packages that are the focus of this presentation present a unique combination of challenges to assessing their suitability for spaceflight use. The presentation will discuss the bases for these challenges, some examples of the techniques proposed to mitigate them and a proposed approach to a US MIL specification Class for non-hermetic microcircuits suitable for space application, Class Y, to be incorporated into M. IL-PRF-38535. It has recently emerged that some major packaging suppliers are offering hermetic area array packages that may offer alternatives to the nonhermetic CCGA styles but have also got their own inspectability and testability issues which will be briefly discussed in the presentation,

Sampson, Michael J.↗
DOE OSTI2020

Underground Test Area (UGTA) Sampling Plan for Corrective Action Units 101 and 102: Central and Western Pahute Mesa, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

The purpose of this groundwater sampling plan (referred to herein as “the Plan”) is to describe the approach for collecting and analyzing groundwater samples to meet the objectives of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program’s Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity. The Plan is focused on the Central and Western Pahute Mesa corrective action units (CAUs 101 and 102). The remaining UGTA CAUs are in the final stage of the UGTA strategy (Closure Report [CR] stage), and monitoring requirements for these CAUs are described in their respective CRs. The Plan supersedes the Nevada National Security Site Integrated Groundwater Sampling Plan and its ensuing Record of Technical Change (ROTC) (DOE/EMNV, 2019b). The Plan is designed to ensure compliance with the UGTA Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) and its ensuing ROTC (DOE/EMNV, 2018), and the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (1996, as amended). The Plan is implemented by the Environmental Program Services (EPS) contractor. Implementation of the Plan provides data to complete corrective actions prescribed by the FFACO to protect the public from groundwater contaminated by historical underground nuclear testing. The Plan’s scope comprises sample collection and analysis requirements for assessing the extent of groundwater contamination from underground nuclear testing. Sampling wells located in the communities surrounding the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is performed by other organizations (e.g., management and operating [M&O] contractor) and is therefore not included within the Plan. The results of the community sampling are presented in the annual NNSS environmental reports.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

In-Situ Applied Coatings for Mitigating Gas Hydrate Deposition in Deepwater Operations (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

The Project objectives of this work were focused on the need to develop, investigate, and validate for field and commercial deployment robust pipeline surface treatments to prevent / minimize hydrate and other flow assurance solids deposition in subsea oil flowlines. A robust pipeline treatment that can prevent hydrate and wax/asphaltene adhesion/deposition will be a major fundamental breakthrough in hydrate and flow assurance science and engineering, and to critical Deepwater field operations. The project addressed the current major outstanding issue of mitigating gas hydrate and other solids deposition in different pipeline conditions, a major outstanding issue that has not been solved to-date, despite previous attempts/studies. The major goal of this project was to develop and investigate for deployment robust pipeline coatings to mitigate gas hydrate deposition in Deepwater oil flowlines, which will be critical in offshore leak and spill prevention. As oil and gas production wells mature, the water content and oil composition can change and increase the risk of gas hydrate, wax, and asphaltene deposition and blockages in flowlines, with the cost of complete inhibition becoming prohibitive. The ability to mitigate flow assurance risks in maturing flowlines can extend the life of the field, significantly reduce operational costs from inhibitor injection and prevent potential safety hazards to personnel and equipment and can prevent potential environmental hazards leading to catastrophic hydrocarbon emissions. This research allows for a novel, cost-effective method of mitigating gas hydrate and other pipeline solids deposition/blockages in flowlines, extending the life of the field while being minimally disruptive to normal flowline operation. The omniphobic surface treatment developed in this work can significantly improve the economics of energy transport by providing flow assurance and limiting catastrophic blowouts.

02 PETROLEUM↗
DOE OSTI2020

Assessment Report 76376 Assess the Quality of Center 00600 Completed Assessments for FY2018

Department 00635, Performance Assurance, assessments reveal risks and opportunities for improvement Labs-wide. This assessment was conducted to identify opportunities for improving the Department 00635 Assessment Program. This evaluation was conducted to identify opportunities for improving the Center 00600 assessment process by reviewing the quality of assessments completed by Environment Safety and Health (ES&H) personnel in fiscal year (FY) 2018. Approximately 20 percent of the Center 00600 assessments completed in FY18 were reviewed. One assessment was selected from each Center 00600 department contingent on availability in the Assurance Information System (AIS).

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS1989

Protoflight photovoltaic power module system-level tests in the space power facility

Work Package Four, which includes the NASA-Lewis and Rocketdyne, has selected an approach for the Space Station Freedom Photovoltaic (PV) Power Module flight certification that combines system level qualification and acceptance testing in the thermal vacuum environment: The protoflight vehicle approach. This approach maximizes ground test verification to assure system level performance and to minimize risk of on-orbit failures. The preliminary plans for system level thermal vacuum environmental testing of the protoflight PV Power Module in the NASA-Lewis Space Power Facility (SPF), are addressed. Details of the facility modifications to refurbish SPF, after 13 years of downtime, are briefly discussed. The results of an evaluation of the effectiveness of system level environmental testing in screening out incipient part and workmanship defects and unique failure modes are discussed. Preliminary test objectives, test hardware configurations, test support equipment, and operations are presented.

Rivera, Juan C.↗
NASA NTRS1989

Protoflight photovoltaic power module system-level tests in the Space Power Facility

Work Package Four, which includes the NASA-Lewis and Rocketdyne, has selected an approach for the Space Station Freedom Photovoltaic (PV) Power Module flight certification that combines system level qualification and acceptance testing in the thermal vacuum environment: the 'protoflight' vehicle approach. This approach maximizes ground test verification to assure system level performance and to minimize risk of on-orbit failures. The preliminary plans for system level thermal vacuum environmental testing of the protoflight PV Power Module in the NASA-Lewis Space Power Facility (SPF) are addressed. Details of the facility modifications to refurbish SPF, after 13 years of downtime, are briefly discussed. The results of an evaluation of the effectiveness of system level environmental testing in screening out incipient part and workmanship defects and unique failure modes are discussed. Preliminary test objectives, test hardware configurations, test support equipment, and operations, are presented.

Rivera, Juan C.↗
NASA NTRS2004

An Approach to V&V of Embedded Adaptive Systems

Rigorous Verification and Validation (V&V) techniques are essential for high assurance systems. Lately, the performance of some of these systems is enhanced by embedded adaptive components in order to cope with environmental changes. Although the ability of adapting is appealing, it actually poses a problem in terms of V&V. Since uncertainties induced by environmental changes have a significant impact on system behavior, the applicability of conventional V&V techniques is limited. In safety-critical applications such as flight control system, the mechanisms of change must be observed, diagnosed, accommodated and well understood prior to deployment. In this paper, we propose a non-conventional V&V approach suitable for online adaptive systems. We apply our approach to an intelligent flight control system that employs a particular type of Neural Networks (NN) as the adaptive learning paradigm. Presented methodology consists of a novelty detection technique and online stability monitoring tools. The novelty detection technique is based on Support Vector Data Description that detects novel (abnormal) data patterns. The Online Stability Monitoring tools based on Lyapunov's Stability Theory detect unstable learning behavior in neural networks. Cases studies based on a high fidelity simulator of NASA's Intelligent Flight Control System demonstrate a successful application of the presented V&V methodology. ,

Liu, Yan↗
DOE OSTI1975

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 2, March-April 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 127 Quality Assurance in the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants by Sidney A. Bernsen, 141 1974 ANS Topical Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety by M. H. Fontana; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 150 GBR-4 Protection Systems: Failures and Their Consequences by Peter Burgsmüller, J. J. Dekais, Albert Krähe, Raffaello Pignatelli, and Gottfried Vieider, 162 Standby Emergency Power Systems. Part 2—The Later Plants by E. W. Hagen; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 180 Radiotoxic Hazard Measure for Buried Solid Radioactive Waste by J. Hamstra, 190 The Thirteenth AEC Air-Cleaning Conference by D. W. Moeller, D. W. Underhill, and M. W. First, 203 Book Review: Nuclear Criticality Safety; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 204 Environmental Radiation Effects of Nuclear Facilities in New York State by M. S. Terpilak and B. L. Jorgensen, 222 Book Review: Thermal Ecology; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 223 Set-Point Drift in Nuclear Power-Plant Safety-Related Instrumentation Adapted by the Nuclear Safety Staff, 224 Diesel-Generator Operating Experience at Nuclear Power Plants, 227 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Jan. 1, 1975, 232 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in November and December 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto, 235 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 243 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 251 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 266 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B Cottrell, 268 Proposed Rule Changes as of Jan. 1, 1975; MISCELLANY: 149 Course in Italy on High-Energy Radiation Dosimetry and Protection (Announcement), 250 Course at Northwestern on Safety of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Announcement), 266 Symposium of the Combined Effects on the Environment of Radioactive, Chemical, and Thermal Releases from the Nuclear Industry (Announcement), 271 Short Course on Engineering for Extreme Winds and Tornadoes (Announcement), 272 Three 1-Week Courses at MIT on Nuclear Power-Reactor Safety (Announcement), 272 Harvard University Short Courses (Announcement).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Dynamic Assurance of Autonomous Systems through Ground Control Software

Assurance cases are being increasingly acknowledged as a way to build trust in complex systems with autonomous capabilities [1]. An assurance case is a comprehensive, defensible, and valid justification that a system will function as intended for the specific mission and operating environment. Such justifications for systems with autonomous capabilities are often based on various probabilistic quantifications [2]. Due to the dynamic nature of the environmental conditions in which these systems operate, as well as the changing nature of the autonomous systems themselves, these probabilistic quantifications cannot be simply estimated once during design time. Rather, they need to be continually evaluated during systems operations to ensure that the assurance case justifications are valid. We refer to the assurance case that combines both the static and dynamic elements as a Dynamic Assurance Case (DAC). Such complex systems with autonomous capabilities are often deployed with a Ground Control Software (GCS) component to enable remote operation. Whether the system is composed of a single unit or a fleet of units, deployed distributed or in remote environments, GCS acts as a window into the behavior of the deployed system. It receives telemetry from the system, issues commands to the system and provides various functionalities to visualize the system performance. We propose a dynamic assurance framework where the GCS acts as a relay between the autonomous system and its DAC. GCS can be used to measure both unit-specific as well as system-wide probabilistic quantifications using the incoming telemetry. We embed these quantifications throughout the DAC as variables that can be updated by external sources. We use the GCS to periodically update these variables, which allows us to continually evaluate the formally defined assurance case justifications. We demonstrate our dynamic assurance framework in the NASA Ames project Troupe1 that aims at developing a fleet of rovers capable of au- tonomously mapping their environment. The rovers work cooperatively, each collecting data for different parts of the environment. Each rover runs an identical core Flight System (cFS) [4] application. Troupe1 uses OpenC3 Cosmos [5] as the ground system, and AdvoCATE [3] to capture the system DAC. We show how we can measure both rover-specific and system-wide quantifications in Cosmos using its Ruby scripting editor and pass them into the DAC modelled in AdvoCATE. Then, we show how these incoming variables can be embedded in different parts of the DAC and how effects of their updates can be observed

Irfan Sljivo↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Dynamic Assurance of Autonomous Systems through Ground Control Software∗

Assurance cases are being increasingly acknowledged as a way to build trust in complex systems with autonomous capabilities [1]. An assurance case is a comprehensive, defensible, and valid justification that a system will function as intended for the specific mission and operating environment. Such justifications for systems with autonomous capabilities are often based on various probabilistic quantifications [2]. Due to the dynamic nature of the environmental conditions in which these systems operate, as well as the changing nature of the autonomous systems themselves, these probabilistic quantifications cannot be simply estimated once during design time. Rather, they need to be continually evaluated during systems operations to ensure that the assurance case justifications are valid. We refer to the assurance case that combines both the static and dynamic elements as a Dynamic Assurance Case (DAC).

dynamic assurance case↗