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Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive of Ireland 2021

The Conti Ransomware Attack on the Health Service Executive (HSE) of Ireland 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed by the adversary. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The HSE provides public healthcare corporate services and operational services throughout Ireland, with critical functions including the acute national ambulance service, acute hospital service, and community healthcare service. On 14 May 2021, Conti ransomware encrypted 80 percent of the HSE’s Information Technology (IT) infrastructure across corporate, hospital, community, and electronic health record services. Conti is a ransomware-as-a-service operation that encrypts local files, uses double extortion against victims, and is facilitated by many intrusion tools. The attack forced the HSE to shut down its entire IT infrastructure to contain the ransomware, forcing employees to revert to pen and paper recordkeeping and leading to the cancellation of many appointments and procedures. The adversary also exfiltrated 700 GB of data, compromising the confidentiality of patients’ protected health information. Had the adversary targeted the COVID-19 cloud systems or operational technology assets, such as Internet of Medical Things medical devices or smart building management systems, the impact of the attack would almost certainly have been far more severe. Researchers and analysts identified 21 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 23 steps) likely utilized during the attack with a total of 1,185 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-one of the identified techniques used during the attack on the HSE were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 1,086 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 850 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 57 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021

The Remote Access Attack on Oldsmar Water Treatment Facility 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Oldsmar cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 5 February 2021, an adversary gained unauthorized remote access to Bruce T. Haddock Water Treatment Plant in Oldsmar, Florida, which provides treated water to 15,000 customers. The adversary accessed the facility’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) workstation and human machine interface (HMI) to change the chemical concentration of sodium hydroxide, commonly referred to as lye and used to regulate acidity levels, from 100 parts per million (PPM) to 11,100 PPM. The chemical was raised to lethal levels that if ingested could lead to serious soft tissue damage, burns, or even death. The facility, however, had redundancies and alarms in place to alert personnel of dangerous chemical levels, and facility officials stated it would have taken 24 to 36 hours for the chemical changes to affect the water supply. Researchers and analysts identified six unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 23 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Four of the identified techniques used during the Oldsmar cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 21 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 20 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the minutes preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Blackmatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021

The BlackMatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the New Cooperative cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The BlackMatter ransomware was first identified in July 2021 and is reported to have infected more than 50 corporations around the world. , The Iowa-based grain cooperative, New Cooperative, was impacted by the BlackMatter ransomware on or before 18 September 2021. The adversary likely resided on New Cooperative’s networks for 15 days prior to encrypting its network and demanding New Cooperative pay $5.9 million in ransom by 25 September to unlock systems and prevent 1 terabyte (TB) of sensitive data from being publicly released. It is not clear if New Cooperative paid the ransom. The full impact of the ransomware attack is not known; however, according to New Cooperative’s general manager, the attack caused the company’s automated processes to revert back to processes used in the 1970s. , As of 6 October, only 50 percent of New Cooperative’s operations were utilizing automated processes. The company took eight weeks to rebuild the entire network and information technology (IT) systems from the ground up, which puts the date of fully recovery around 13 November. Researchers and analysts identified 20 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 404 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Seventeen of the identified techniques used during the New Cooperative cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 360 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 284 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 15 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction, A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Operational Process for Trigger Identification and Comprehension (OPTIC)

The Operational Process for Trigger Identification and Comprehension (OPTIC) is a standalone, downloadable application designed to enhance the CyOTE (Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment) methodology and will be made available for free download to industry. OPTIC brings key CyOTE functionalities into focus. OPTIC aids OT professionals in analyzing and determining whether an observed anomaly may indicate possible malicious activity or merely a maintenance related irregularity.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Field Programmable Gate Array-Based Reactor Protection Systems and Potential for Inclusion of Secure Elements to Improve Cybersecurity

For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Field Programmable Gate Array-Based Reactor Protection Systems and Potential for Inclusion of Secure Elements to Improve Cybersecurity

For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Bayesian Attack Model (BAM) User Story

This document presents a user story for the Bayesian Attack Model (BAM) tool designed to aggregate and analyze cyber-attack observables for operational technology (OT) systems. BAM aims to empower cybersecurity analysts by providing a streamlined interface for collecting observable data from various sources, enabling real-time analysis of potential adversary activity. By enhancing the response capabilities of security teams, BAM facilitates risk-informed decision-making and improves organizational security posture. This user story outlines the key functionalities, user interactions, and requirements necessary to successfully integrate BAM with other security information and event management (SIEM) technology and cybersecurity operations centers (CSOCs).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014

The Cyber Attack on Thyssenkrupp Blast Furnace 2014 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the Thyssenkrupp Steel Mill cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. In December 2014, the German Government’s Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) released a report detailing a cyber attack on a German steel mill that occurred earlier that year, though exact dates and details of the attack were not revealed. While the report did not specify the name of the company, multiple sources identified the victim as one of Europe’s largest steel manufacturers, Thyssenkrupp AG. Further, Thyssenkrupp announced on 16 May of that year that Europe’s largest blast furnace, “Schwelgern 2,” located at its facility in Duisburg, Germany, would be offline for several weeks for repairs and upgrades, suggesting Schwelgern 2 was likely the target of the attack. The attack began in early 2014, when adversaries infiltrated the victim steel mill’s Information Technology (IT) network via a spearphishing campaign, then worked their way into the Operational Technology (OT) environment, where they executed software that caused denial of service, denial of control, and eventually a loss of control. This led to the blast furnace shutting down without proper safety procedures, resulting in catastrophic physical damage. No lives were lost in the incident, but ThyssenKrupp suffered $4 million in damage to the blast furnace and an additional $6 million in lost revenue. The adversaries required specialized knowledge and expertise in steel production, which enabled them to compromise a variety of internal systems and components across both IT and OT networks. The attack also demonstrated detailed knowledge of the industrial control systems (ICS) and production processes being used. This combination resulted in one of the earliest known publicly reported cybersecurity incidents resulting in physical damage to ICS equipment. Researchers and analysts identified 19 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 20 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 454 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the Thyssenkrupp cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 369 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 316 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 120 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide: Version 1.0 [Slides]

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system's lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements - but does not replace - the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system's engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber-Informed Engineering Implementation Guide

This Implementation Guide describes the principles of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) and outlines questions that engineering teams should consider during each phase of a system’s lifecycle to effectively employ these principles. It describes what it means to engineer systems in a cyber-informed way, rather than offering a comprehensive, step-by-step process or procedure for CIE implementation. This guide complements—but does not replace—the application of cybersecurity standards or practices currently in place within an organization. Engineers and technicians that design critical energy infrastructure installations can use this Implementation Guide to integrate the 12 principles of CIE into each phase of the engineering lifecycle, from concept to retirement. The guide is aimed at system or design engineers, rather than software engineers or operational cybersecurity practitioners. The engineers who design, build, operate, and maintain the physical infrastructure are best positioned to leverage a system’s engineering design to diminish the severity of cyber attacks or digital technology failures. CIE expands cybersecurity decisions into the engineering space, not by asking engineers to become cyber experts, but by calling on engineers to apply engineering tools and make engineering decisions that improve cybersecurity outcomes. CIE examines the engineering consequences that a sophisticated cyber attacker could achieve and drives engineering changes that may provide deterministic mitigations to limit or eliminate those consequences.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cybersecurity and Optimization in Smart “Autonomous” Buildings

Significant resources have been invested in making buildings “smart” by digitizing, networking and automating key systems and operations. Smart autonomous buildings create new energy efficiency, economic and environmental opportunities. But as buildings become increasingly networked to the Internet, they can also become more vulnerable to various cyber threats. Automated and Internet-connected buildings systems, equipment, controls, and sensors can significantly increase cyber and physical vulnerabilities that threaten the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical systems in organizations. Securing smart autonomous buildings presents a national security and economic challenge to the nation. Ignoring this challenge threatens business continuity and the availability of critical infrastructures that are enabled by smart buildings. In this chapter, the authors address challenges and explore new opportunities in securing smart buildings that are enhanced by machine learning, cognitive sensing, artificial intelligence (AI) and smart-energy technologies. The chapter begins by identifying cyber-threats and challenges to smart autonomous buildings. Then it provides recommendations on how AI enabled solutions can help smart buildings and facilities better protect, detect and respond to cyber-physical threats and vulnerabilities. Next, the chapter will provide case studies that examine how combining AI with innovative smart-energy technologies can increase both cybersecurity and energy efficiency savings in buildings. The chapter will conclude by proposing recommendations for future cybersecurity and energy optimization research for examining AI enabled smart-energy technology.

Mylrea, Michael E.↗

Master Services Agreement - Flexible Feeder/Distribution System Support: Cooperative Research and Development (Final Report)

PGE will engage NREL on a broad range of projects related to the integration of distributed energy resources (DERs) into the utility's operations. This portfolio of work could include projects focused on DER adoption models, advanced distribution management system (ADMS) and distributed energy management system (DERMS) design, DER dispatch strategy development, and DER valuation framework development. Additional topics could include long-term energy planning, renewable energy, energy efficiency and demand-side management. As well as technology evaluations and design guidance for building retrofits and new construction projects, energy and energy infrastructure planning, policies, and markets (and their analysis), energy storage, energy security and resilience (including energy system-related cybersecurity), transportation and mobility, technology integration analysis. Additionally, other assistance as requested by PGE consistent with NREL’s expertise.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Developing an AI-Powered Zero-Trust Cybersecurity Framework for Malware Prevention in Nuclear Power Plants

This study presents the development of an AI-powered Zero-Trust cybersecurity framework for malware prevention in nuclear power plants. The framework aims to enhance the security of critical systems within nuclear power plants by adopting the principles of Zero-Trust and leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. By assuming no implicit trust in any user or device and continuously authenticating and authorizing access, the framework ensures a robust defense against malware attacks. The integration of AI allows for the detection and prevention of malware through behavioral analytics, endpoint protection, network segmentation, and continuous monitoring. The paper discusses the key considerations, steps, and technologies involved in developing this framework, emphasizing the importance of regular updates, training, compliance, and auditing. The proposed framework serves as a comprehensive approach to safeguarding nuclear power plants from sophisticated malware threats and protecting the integrity and safety of critical infrastructure.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Precursor Analysis Report: SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003

The SQL Slammer Worm Infection of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant 2003 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about Davis-Besse’s 2003 cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. On 25 January 2003, the SQL Slammer worm infected more than 90% of vulnerable hosts and crashed the internet in 10 to 15 minutes, making it one of the fastest spreading worms in history. SQL Slammer is a fileless, memory-resident worm that remotely exploits a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability on local hosts to intensively scan and rapidly self-propagate across the internet. The worm infected approximately 300,000 unpatched hosts running Microsoft Structured Query Language (SQL) Server 2000 or Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) 2000 with SQL Server Resolution Service. The SQL Slammer worm indirectly infected FirstEnergy’s Davis-Besse nuclear power plant by first infecting a consultant’s company network server and then propagating through an external misconfigured connection into Davis-Besse’s site network. The infection caused major network congestion, slow performance, data overloads, and the inability of local hosts to communicate with each other, which eventually caused a loss of availability and a loss of view when the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Plant Process Computer (PPC) crashed. At the time of the infection, the plant was already offline, the digital monitoring systems had redundant analog backups, and the plant control and safety functions were not affected, so there were no concerns of a safety breach. However, this incident resulted in many lessons learned and spawned important discussions about cybersecurity’s role in nuclear safety and electric power reliability regulation, policy, and guidance. Researchers and analysts identified 10 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 640 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Eight of the identified techniques used during Davis-Besse cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 596 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 428 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 331 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗

Fossil Power Plant Cyber Security Life-Cycle Risk Reduction: A Practical Framework for Implementation

Market conditions are forcing fossil electricity generation facility owners and operators to implement advanced digital technologies. These technologies enable efficiencies, operational flexibility, operations and maintenance efficiencies, and adapting to a transitioning workforce. These digital technologies, however, can increase the cybersecurity attack surface. The purpose of this research was to develop a holistic cybersecurity risk reduction framework for fossil generation facilities. The framework begins with assessing how cyber risk changes across facility life cycles, including plant, system, vendor, and business life cycles. The next phase performs consequence analysis to prioritize high consequence events. Focusing on high consequence events allows owners to use a graded, risk-informed approach to prioritize cybersecurity efforts. The final phase identifies the digital asset attack surface in sensors and instrumentation and control equipment. After the vulnerabilities are identified, the owner selects mitigating cybersecurity control measures (or countermeasures) based on the risk analysis from the previous phases. This report describes the current industry cybersecurity best practices in fossil generation that are based on the first principles for cybersecurity engineering. The report is divided into five sections that describe the implementation of the risk reduction framework and present identified research, methodological, and technology gaps that were identified through this course of research and development.

20 FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS↗