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At least 109 records · Page 6

Cyber Friendly Fire

Cyber friendly fire (FF) is a new concept that has been brought to the attention of Department of Defense (DoD) stakeholders through two workshops that were planned and conducted by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and research conducted for AFRL by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. With this previous work in mind, we offer a definition of cyber FF as intentional offensive or defensive cyber/electronic actions intended to protect cyber systems against enemy forces or to attack enemy cyber systems, which unintentionally harms the mission effectiveness of friendly or neutral forces. Just as with combat friendly fire, a fundamental need in avoiding cyber FF is to maintain situation awareness (SA). We suggest that cyber SA concerns knowledge of a system's topology (connectedness and relationships of the nodes in a system), and critical knowledge elements such as the characteristics and vulnerabilities of the components that comprise the system (and that populate the nodes), the nature of the activities or work performed, and the available defensive (and offensive) countermeasures that may be applied to thwart network attacks. A training implication is to raise awareness and understanding of these critical knowledge units; an approach to decision aids and/or visualizations is to focus on supporting these critical knowledge units. To study cyber FF, we developed an unclassified security test range comprising a combination of virtual and physical devices that present a closed network for testing, simulation, and evaluation. This network offers services found on a production network without the associated costs of a real production network. Containing enough detail to appear realistic, this virtual and physical environment can be customized to represent different configurations. For our purposes, the test range was configured to appear as an Internet-connected Managed Service Provider (MSP) offering specialized web applications to the general public. The network is essentially divided into a production component that hosts the web and network services, and a user component that hosts thirty employee workstations and other end devices. The organization's network is separated from the Internet by a Cisco ASA network security device that both firewalls and detects intrusions. Business sensitive information is stored in various servers. This includes data comprising thousands of internal documents, such as finance and technical designs, email messages for the organization's employees including the CEO, CFO, and CIO, the organization's source code, and Personally Identifiable client data. Release of any of this information to unauthorized parties would have a significant, detrimental impact on the organization's reputation, which would harm earnings. The valuable information stored in these servers pose obvious points of interest for an adversary. We constructed several scenarios around this environment to support studies in cyber SA and cyber FF that may be run in the test range. We describe mitigation strategies to combat cyber FF including both training concepts and suggestions for decision aids and visualization approaches. Finally, we discuss possible future research directions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Adaptive Hierarchical Cyber Attack Detection and Localization in Active Distribution Systems

Development of a cyber security strategy for the active distribution systems is challenging due to the inclusion of distributed renewable energy generations. Here this paper proposes an adaptive hierarchical cyber attack detection and localization framework for distributed active distribution systems via analyzing electrical waveforms. Cyber attack detection is based on a sequential deep learning model, via which even minor cyber attacks can be identified. The two-stage cyber attack localization algorithm first estimates the cyber attack sub-region, and then localize the specified cyber attack within the estimated subregion. We propose a modified spectral clustering-based network partitioning method for the hierarchical cyber attack ‘coarse’ localization. Next, to further narrow down the cyber attack location, a normalized impact score based on waveform statistical metrics is proposed to obtain a ‘fine’ cyber attack location by characterizing different waveform properties. Finally, compared with classical and state-of-art methods, a comprehensive quantitative evaluation with two case studies shows promising estimation results of the proposed framework.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cyber / Physical Security Vulnerability Assessment Integration

Abstract Both physical protection and cyber security domains offer solutions for the discovery of vulnerabilities through the use of various assessment processes and software tools. Each vulnerability assessment (VA) methodology provides the ability to identify and categorize vulnerabilities, and quantifies the risks within their own areas of expertise. Neither approach fully represents the true potential security risk to a site and/or a facility, nor comprehensively assesses the overall security posture. The technical approach to solving this problem was to identify methodologies and processes that blend the physical and cyber security assessments, and develop tools to accurately quantify the unaccounted for risk. SMEs from both the physical and the cyber security domains developed the blending methodologies, and cross trained each other on the various aspects of the physical and cyber security assessment processes. A local critical infrastructure entity volunteered to host a proof of concept physical/cyber security assessment, and the lessons learned have been leveraged by this effort. The four potential modes of attack an adversary can use in approaching a target are; Physical Only Attack, Cyber Only Attack, Physical Enabled Cyber Attack, and the Cyber Enabled Physical Attack. The Physical Only and the Cyber Only pathway analysis are two of the most widely analyzed attack modes. The pathway from an off-site location to the desired target location is dissected to ensure adversarial activity can be detected and neutralized by the protection strategy, prior to completion of a predefined task. This methodology typically explores a one way attack from the public space (or common area) inward towards the target. The Physical Enabled Cyber Attack and the Cyber Enabled Physical Attack are much more intricate. Both scenarios involve beginning in one domain to affect change in the other, then backing outward to take advantage of the reduced system effectiveness, before penetrating further into the defenses. The proper identification and assessment of the overlapping areas (and interaction between these areas) in the VA process is necessary to accurately assess the true risk.

Vulnerability Analysis, Risk Analysis, Cyber Secur↗

International Cyber Incident Repository System: Information Sharing on a Global Scale

According to the 2016 Internet Security Threat Report, the largest number of cyber attacks were recorded last year (2015), reaching a total of 430 million incidents throughout the world. As the number of cyber incidents increases, the need for information and intelligence sharing increases, as well. This fairly large increase in cyber incidents is driving the need for an international cyber incident data reporting system. The goal of the cyber incident reporting system is to make available shared and collected information about cyber events among participating international parties. In its 2014 report, Insurance Industry Working Session Readout Report-Insurance for CyberRelated Critical Infrastructure Loss: Key Issues, on the outcomes of a working session on cyber insurance, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security observed that “many participants cited the need for a secure method through which organizations could pool and share cyber incident information” and noted that one underwriter emphasized the importance of internationally harmonized data taxonomies. This cyber incident data reporting system could benefit all nations that take part in reporting incidents to provide a more common operating picture. In addition, this reporting system could allow for trending and anticipated attacks and could potentially benefit participating members by enabling them to get in front of potential attacks. The purpose of this paper is to identify options for consideration for such a system in fostering cooperative cyber defense.

Joyce, Amanda L.↗

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Adapting Traditional Hazards Analysis Methods to Address Cyber Risks

Traditional hazards analysis (HA) methods, originally developed to address physical and operational risks, often fall short when it comes to identifying and mitigating cyber threats. These cyber threats pose unique and evolving risks to critical infrastructure and industrial control systems (ICS). This report explores the integration of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles into existing HA methods to enhance their ability to address cyber-induced risks. CIE provides organizations with a practical, cost-effective approach to closing the gap between traditional HA methods and the need for cyber risk mitigation. By leveraging existing safety processes and controls, CIE allows users to examine and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities without overhauling existing HA methods. This report identifies areas where HA and CIE naturally align and where their approaches diverge. It emphasizes how CIE principles can be used to adapt HA methods, broadening their scope to include cyber risks and enabling the mitigation of cyber- induced impacts alongside traditional hazards and failure scenarios. This report examines how CIE can be applied across various HA methods—such as Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP), Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA), Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems (HAZCADS), and Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). It provides strategies for integrating CIE to strengthen the identification, assessment, and mitigation of cyber-induced risks. The findings offer a structured entry point for organizations to embed CIE concepts into hazards and safety analyses, as well as broader engineering processes, ultimately supporting the design and operation of a more resilient infrastructure.

42 - ENGINEERING↗

Towards A Theory of Autonomous Reconstitution of Compromised Cyber-Systems

The ability to maintain mission-critical operations in cyber-systems in the face of disruptions is critical. Faults in cyber systems can come from accidental sources (e.g., natural failure of a component) or deliberate sources (e.g., an intelligent adversary). Natural and intentional manipulation of data, computing, or coordination are the most impactful ways that an attacker can prevent an infrastructure from realizing its mission goals. Under these conditions, the ability to reconstitute critical infrastructure becomes important. Specifically, the question is: Given an intelligent adversary, how can cyber systems respond to keep critical infrastructure operational? In cyber systems, the distributed nature of the system poses serious difficulties in maintaining operations, in part due to the fact that a centralized command and control apparatus is unlikely to provide a robust framework for resilience. Resilience in cyber-systems, in general, has several components, and requires the ability to anticipate and withstand attacks or faults, as well as recover from faults and evolve the system to improve future resilience. The recovery effort (and any subsequent evolution) may require significant reconfiguration of the system (at all levels – hardware, software, services, permissions, etc.) if the system is to be made resilient to further attack or faults. This is especially important in the case of ongoing attacks, where reconfiguration decisions must be taken with care to avoid further compromising the system while maintaining continuity of operations. Collectively, we will label this recovery and evolution process as “reconstitution”. Currently, reconstitution is performed manually, generally after-the-fact, and usually consists of either standing up redundant systems, check-points (rolling back the configuration to a “clean” state), or re-creating the system using “gold-standard” copies. For enterprise systems, such reconstitution may be performed either directly on hardware, or using virtual machines. A significant challenge within this context is the ability to verify that the reconstitution is performed in a manner that renders the cyber-system resilient to ongoing and future attacks or faults. Fundamentally, the need is to determine optimal configuration of the cyber system when a fault is determined to be present. While existing theories for fault tolerance (for example, Byzantine fault tolerance) can guarantee resilience under certain conditions, in practice, these theories can break down in the face of an intelligent adversary. Further, it is difficult, in a dynamically evolving environment, to determine whether the necessary conditions for resilience have been met, resulting in difficulties in achieving resilient operation. In addition, existing theories do not sufficiently take into account the cost for attack and defense (the adversary is generally assumed to have infinite resources and time), hierarchy of importance (all network resources are assumed to be equally important), and the dynamic nature of some attacks (i.e., as the attack evolves, can resilience be maintained?). Alternative approaches to resilience based on a centralized command and control structure suffer from a single-point-failure. This paper presents preliminary research towards concepts for effective autonomous reconstitution of compromised cyber systems. We describe a mathematical framework as a first step towards a theoretical basis for autonomous reconstitution in dynamic cyber-system environments. We then propose formulating autonomous reconstitution as an optimization problem and describe some of the challenges associated with this formulation. This is followed by a brief discussion on potential solutions to these challenges.

asymmetric resilience↗

Modeling Cyber Conflicts Using an Extended Petri Net Formalism

When threatened by automated attacks, critical systems that require human-controlled responses have difficulty making optimal responses and adapting protections in real- time and may therefore be overwhelmed. Consequently, experts have called for the development of automatic real-time reaction capabilities. However, a technical gap exists in the modeling and analysis of cyber conflicts to automatically understand the repercussions of responses. There is a need for modeling cyber assets that accounts for concurrent behavior, incomplete information, and payoff functions. Furthermore, we address this need by extending the Petri net formalism to allow real-time cyber conflicts to be modeled in a way that is expressive and concise. This formalism includes transitions controlled by players as well as firing rates attached to transitions. This allows us to model both player actions and factors that are beyond the control of players in real-time. We show that our formalism is able to represent situational aware- ness, concurrent actions, incomplete information and objective functions. These factors make it well-suited to modeling cyber conflicts in a way that allows for useful analysis. MITRE has compiled the Common Attack Pattern Enumera- tion and Classification (CAPEC), an extensive list of cyber attacks at various levels of abstraction. CAPEC includes factors such as attack prerequisites, possible countermeasures, and attack goals. These elements are vital to understanding cyber attacks and to generating the corresponding real-time responses. We demonstrate that the formalism can be used to extract precise models of cyber attacks from CAPEC. Several case studies show that our Petri net formalism is more expressive than other models, such as attack graphs, for modeling cyber conflicts and that it is amenable to exploring cyber strategies.

cyber security↗

Probabilistic risk evaluation of cyber-attacks on a nuclear power plant safety - 205.5

By adopting digital technology in nuclear power plants (NPPs), the cyber-attack has been introduced as one of the newest dangerous threats. It is required to develop efficient defense strategies against possible cyber-attacks on NPPs. However, it is difficult to expect when, where, and how the cyber-attacks will occur because they are intended attacks. Therefore, the risk of cyber-attacks on NPP is getting more and more important. Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), which is one of the most widely used methods in NPPs to assess the risk, is introduced. However, it is difficult to evaluate the risk of NPPs by cyber-attacks from only the existing PRA method. In this research, a new PSA method, which is based on existing PRA, is used for evaluating of cyber-attacks on NPP. In addition, the case studies were performed for the feasibility study using nuclear power plant PRA model. Through this study, the risk assessment of the cyber-attacks on the NPP is tried by using a previous PRA model. Also, several scenarios are assumed to proceed the risk assessment. The risk-assessment should be performed in future work containing more specific cyber-attack scenarios, and if possible, the risk assessment model should be developed. Finally, the risk of cyber-attacks on NPPs could be evaluated quantitatively. Also, the defense strategies could be deducted by a risk assessment based on the risk assessment results which is based on the proposed method. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Discrete game-theoretic analysis of defense in correlated cyber-physical systems

A cyber-physical system (CPS) is composed of a discrete number of cyber and physical components and subject to internal failures and external disruptions. The functionality of CPS therefore is determined not only by cyber and physical components but the adversary’s attacker strategy. We characterize the effect of cyber-physical interdependency on the CPS survival probability using a product-form function with cyber and physical exponential correlation coefficients. We model simultaneous and sequential discrete games between the provider and attacker on a CPS infrastructure to analyze its survivability and reinforcement strategy at Nash equilibrium. Our results show that the cyber and physical correlation coefficients can significantly affect CPS survival probability. In general, the provider’s cyber- (or physical-) reinforcement level increases as the cyber- (or physical-) attack level increases. In each of cyber and physical domains, the reinforcement level first increases then decreases in its own correlation coefficient, probability of successful component attacks, and maximum level of available resources, but decreases in the correlation coefficient of the other domain. We apply this game-theoretic analysis to a cloud computing infrastructure, and show that its residual capacity is relatively high when the attacker has no information about the distribution of servers. Finally, a high level of survival probability does not necessarily lead to high utility.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Data-driven cyber attack detection and mitigation for decentralized wide-area protection and control in smart grids

Modern power systems have already evolved into complicated cyber physical systems (CPS), often referred to as smart grids, due to the continuous expansion of the electrical infrastructure, the augmentation of the number of heterogeneous system components and players, and the consequential application of a diversity of information and telecommunication technologies to facilitate the Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) of the day-to-day power system operation. Because of the reliance on cyber technologies, WAMPAC, among other critical functions, is prone to various malicious cyber attacks. Successful cyber attacks, especially those sabotage the operation of Bulk Electric System (BES), can cause great financial losses and social panics. Application of conventional IT security solutions is indispensable, but it often turns out to be insufficient to mitigate sophisticated attacks that deploy zero-day vulnerabilities or social engineering tactics. To further improve the resilience of the operation of smart grids when facing cyber attacks, it is desirable to make the WAMPAC functions per se capable of detecting various anomalies automatically, carrying out adaptive activity adjustments in time and thus staying unimpaired even under attack. Most of the existing research efforts attempt to achieve this by adding novel functional modules, such as model-based anomaly detectors, to the legacy centralized WAMPAC functions. In contrast, this dissertation investigates the application of data-driven algorithms in cyber attack detection and mitigation within a decentralized architecture aiming at improving the situational awareness and self-adaptiveness of WAMPAC. First part of the research focuses on the decentralization of System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS) with Multi-Agent System (MAS), within which the data-driven anomaly detection and optimal adaptive load shedding are further explored. An algorithm named as Support Vector Machine embedded Layered Decision Tree (SVMLDT) is proposed for the anomaly detection, which provides satisfactory detection accuracy as well as decision-making interpretability. The adaptive load shedding is carried out by every agent individually with dynamic programming. The load shedding relies on the load profile propagation among peer agents and the attack adaptiveness is accomplished by maintaining the historical mean of load shedding proportion. Load shedding only takes place after the consensus pertaining to the anomaly detection is achieved among all interconnected agents and it serves the purpose of mitigating certain cyber attacks. The attack resilience of the decentralized SIPS is evaluated using IEEE 39 bus model. It is shown that, unlike the traditional centralized SIPS, the proposed solution is able to carry out the remedial actions under most Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The second part investigates the clustering based anomalous behavior detection and peer-assisted mitigation for power system generation control. To reduce the dimensionality of the data, three metrics are designed to interpret the behavior conformity of generator within the same balancing area. Semi-supervised K-means clustering and a density sensitive clustering algorithm based on Hierarchical DBSCAN (HDBSCAN) are both applied in clustering in the 3D feature space. Aiming to mitigate the cyber attacks targeting the generation control commands, a peer-assisted strategy is proposed. When the control commands from control center is detected as anomalous, i.e. either missing or the payload of which have been manipulated, the generating unit utilizes the peer data to infer and estimate a new generation adjustment value as replacement. Linear regression is utilized to obtain the relation of control values received by different generating units, Moving Target Defense (MTD) is adopted during the peer selection and 1-dimensional clustering is performed with the inferred control values, which are followed by the final control value estimation. The mitigation strategy proposed requires that generating units can communicate with each other in a peer-to-peer manner. Evaluation results suggest the efficacy of the proposed solution in counteracting data availability and data integrity attacks targeting the generation controls. However, the strategy stays effective only if less than half of the generating units are compromised and it is not able to mitigate cyber attacks targeting the measurements involved in the generation control.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Suggestion of a Framework to Evaluate the Extent of Cyber Security Enhancements in NPP

Digital I and C systems have been developed and installed in nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, due to installation of digital I and C systems, cyber security concerns have been emerged. One of the major problems is that nuclear industry is in very early stage in dealing with cyber security issues. It is because that cyber security has received less attention compared to other safety problems. In addition, late adoption of digital I and C systems has resulted in lower level of cyber security advancements in nuclear industry than ones in other industries. With this regards, recently, international standard organizations, regulatory institutes, and research institutes have performed a number of studies addressing these cyber security issues in nuclear industries. In order to provide useful information about cyber security issues including cyber security enhancements, this paper suggests a framework to evaluate how much cyber security is improved when a specific cyber security enhancement is applied in NPPs. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cyber Friendly Fire: Research Challenges for Security Informatics

This paper addresses cognitive implications and research needs surrounding the problem of cyber friendly fire (FF). We define cyber FF as intentional offensive or defensive cyber/electronic actions intended to protect cyber systems against enemy forces or to attack enemy cyber systems, which unintention-ally harms the mission effectiveness of friendly or neutral forces. Just as with combat friendly fire, maintaining situation awareness (SA) is paramount to avoiding cyber FF incidents. Cyber SA concerns knowledge of a system’s topology (connectedness and relationships of the nodes in a system), and critical knowledge elements such as the characteristics and vulnerabilities of the components that comprise the system and its nodes, the nature of the activities or work performed, and the available defensive and offensive countermeasures that may be applied to thwart network attacks. Mitigation strategies to combat cyber FF— including both training concepts and suggestions for decision aids and visualization approaches—are discussed.

cyber friendly fire↗

Spatio-Temporal Deep Graph Network for Event Detection, Localization, and Classification in Cyber-Physical Electric Distribution System

This work proposes a deep graph learning framework to identify, locate, and classify power, cyber, and cyber power events at the distribution system level. The proposed algorithm jointly exploits spatial, temporal, and node-level cyber and physical data features. The developed graph neural network, together with a deep autoencoder, utilizes physical measurements from distribution level phasor measurement units and cyber data from communication network logs. The spatial structure of the synchrophasor measurements and network is incorporated through a weighted adjacency matrix. The temporal structure is incorporated by defining a spatial operation in the gated recurrent unit. This spatio-temporal learning element resides inside a power event detection, localization, and classification module that provides the degree of confidence for an event label. To accurately pinpoint the location of an event to the nearest bus equipped with a measurement unit, a combination of squared error and proximity score is utilized. Also included is a cyber event detection module that employs heteroskedasticity to analyze the significance of various cyber features during different types of attacks. Finally, a dual-bit cyber-power decision table determines the nature of the event. The proposed method is validated on two distribution systems modeled in OPAL-RT/Hypersim with limited phasor measurement units for different possible physical and cyber events. Further analyses include comparison with other state-of-the-art methods and validation in the presence of measurement noise. As a result, our method outperforms existing approaches and achieves an average detection accuracy of 97.97%, F1-score of 96.88%, precision of 96.53%, and recall of 98.57%.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber–Physical System Security of Distribution Systems

The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) for control and monitoring of power systems is a layer on top of the physical power system infrastructure. The cyber system and physical power system components form a tightly coupled Cyber–Physical System (CPS). Sources of vulnerabilities arise from the computing and communication systems of the cyber–power grid. Cyber intrusions targeting the power grid are serious threats to the reliability of electricity supply that is critical to society and the economy. In a typical Information Technology environment, numerous attack scenarios have shown how unauthorized users can access and manipulate protected information from a network domain. The need for cyber security has led to industry standards that power grids must meet to ensure that the monitoring, operation, and control functions are not disrupted by cyber intrusions. Cyber security technologies such as encryption and authentication have been deployed on the CPS. Intrusion or anomaly detection and mitigation tools developed for power grids are emerging. Furthermore, this survey paper provides the basic concepts of cyber vulnerabilities of distribution systems and CPS security. The important ICT subjects for distribution systems covered in this paper include Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition, Distributed Energy Resources, including renewable energy and smart meters.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Cyber security evaluation of II&C technologies

The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is a research and development program sponsored by the Department of Energy, which is conducted in close collaboration with industry to provide the technical foundations for licensing and managing the long-term, safe and economical operation of current nuclear power plants The LWRS Program serves to help the US nuclear industry adopt new technologies and engineering solutions that facilitate the continued safe operation of the plants and extension of the current operating licenses. Within the LWRS Program, the Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control (II&C) Systems Technologies Pathway conducts targeted research and development (R&D) to address aging and reliability concerns with the legacy instrumentation and control and related information systems of the U.S. operating light water reactor (LWR) fleet. The II&C Pathway is conducted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Cyber security is a common concern among nuclear utilities and other nuclear industry stakeholders regarding the digital technologies that are being developed under this program. This concern extends to the point of calling into question whether these types of technologies could ever be deployed in nuclear plants given the possibility that the information in them can be compromised and the technologies themselves can potentially be exploited to serve as attack vectors for adversaries. To this end, a cyber security evaluation has been conducted of these technologies to determine whether they constitute a threat beyond what the nuclear plants already manage within their regulatory-required cyber security programs. Specifically, the evaluation is based on NEI 08-09, which is the industry’s template for cyber security programs and evaluations, accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as responsive to the requirements of the nuclear power plant cyber security regulation found in 10 CFR 73.54. The evaluation was conducted by a cyber security team with expertise in nuclear utility cyber security programs and experience in conducting these evaluations. The evaluation has determined that, for the most part, cyber security will not be a limiting factor in the application of these technologies to nuclear power plant applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cyber Threat Dictionary Using MITRE ATT&CK Matrix and NIST Cybersecurity Framework Mapping

Cyber-attack and defense frameworks offer numerous ways to protect systems and networks from threats. However, only a few of these numerous attack and defense frameworks provide countermeasures by linking multiple frameworks. Due to the lack of attack-defense mapped frameworks, a number of cyber security practitioners are often puzzled how to cope with cyber-attacks when it occurs. The objective of this paper is to present a tool called the “Cyber Threat Dictionary” to solve the problem . Cyber Threat Dictionary offers approaches and practical solutions to the threats by mapping MITRE ATT&CK Matrix to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. By providing immediate solutions to cyber security practitioners, Cyber Threat Dictionary enables effective responses against cyber-attacks.

MITRE ATT&CK MATRIX, NIST Cybersecurity Framework,↗

Risk informed cyber security for nuclear power plants - 342

Nuclear power plants are increasingly adding digital components for plant operation, safety, and security. These digital components fill a gap with legacy equipment where replacement components no longer exist. They also benefit operation of the plant by increasing efficiency in power generation, monitoring of equipment and plant parameters, as well as aiding operator control. However, the addition of digital components and systems also adds cyber risks with previously unanalyzed failure modes and attack vectors are introduced with these new systems. These risks are difficult to identify, analyze, and mitigate due to the increasingly complex nature of the digital components and the integration of these components with additional plant processes and communication networks. The research presented in this paper develops a new method that addresses the cyber risk to inform appropriate levels of protection. EPRI and Sandia are working under a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement to develop an effective method of evaluating the cyber risk in production nuclear power facilities. The Cyber Hazards Analysis Risk Methodology (CHARM) focuses on ensuring adequate controls are in place for appropriate cyber protection of the plant from radiological release or generation risk. Existing plant hazards analyses (e.g., PRA, FTA) do not account for software deficiencies or adversarial intent. This method leverages existing plant analyses and MIT's Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) to create cyber informed fault trees. These new fault trees will provide the basis for comprehensive cyber risk analysis and help ensure potential gaps in cyber security controls are identified and corrected. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗