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The performance evaluation of the SA-207 launch vehicle for the Skylab 3 launch is presented. Flight problems are identified, the causes are determined, and recommendations are made for appropriate corrective action. Summaries of launch operations and spacecraft performance are included. The significant events, failures, and anomalies are tabulated.
An evaluation of the launch vehicle and lunar roving vehicle performance for the Apollo 17 flight is presented. The objective of the evaluation is to acquire, reduce, analyze, and report on flight data to the extent required to assure future mission success and vehicle reliability. Actual flight problems are identified, their causes are determined, and recommendations are made for corrective action. Summaries of launch operations and spacecraft performance are included. The significant events for all phases of the flight are analyzed.
A postflight analysis of the Apollo 16 mission is presented. The basic objective of the flight evaluation is to acquire, reduce, analyze, and report on flight data to the extent required to assure future mission success and vehicle reliability. Actual flight problems are identified, their causes are deet determined, and recommendations are made for corrective actions. Summaries of launch operations and spacecraft performance are included. Significant events for all phases of the flight are provide in tabular form.
A postflight analysis of the Apollo 14 flight is presented. The basic objective of the flight evaluation is to acquire, reduce, analyze, and report on flight data to the extent required to assure future mission success and vehicle reliability. Actual flight failures are identified, their causes are determined and corrective actions are recommended. Summaries of launch operations and spacecraft performance are included. The significant events for all phases of the flight are analyzed.
This report presents the history of a preflight contamination problem that occurred in the ATM C and D panel/EREP cooling system on the Skylab, the studies that were made to determine the cause of the problem, and corrective actions that were made prior to lift-off. The results of all the observations, analyses and laboratory testing indicated that the contamination came from one or more of the EREP tape recorder coldplates and was caused by some abnormal electrolytic action, either during bench testing or in the spacecraft. Studies indicate that no such electrolytic action is likely to occur under normal operating conditions.
A detailed evaluation is presented of the Skylab Apollo Telescope Mount experiments performance throughout the eight and one-half month Skylab Mission. Descriptions and the objectives of each instrument are included. The anomalies experienced, the causes, and corrective actions taken are discussed. Conclusions, based on evaluation of the performance of each instrument, are presented. Examples of the scientific data obtained, as well as a discussion of the quality and quantity of the data, are presented.
A control column and trottle flight director display system is synthesized for use during flight through severe turbulence. The column system is designed to minimize airspeed excursions without overdriving attitude. The throttle system is designed to augment the airspeed regulation and provide an indication of the trim thrust required for any desired flight path angle. Together they form an energy management system to provide harmonious display indications of current aircraft motions and required corrective action, minimize gust upset tendencies, minimize unsafe aircraft excursions, and maintain satisfactory ride qualities. A preliminary fixed-base piloted simulation verified the analysis and provided a shakedown for a more sophisticated moving-base simulation to be accomplished next. This preliminary simulation utilized a flight scenario concept combining piloting tasks, random turbulence, and discrete gusts to create a high but realistic pilot workload conducive to pilot error and potential upset. The turbulence director (energy management) system significantly reduced pilot workload and minimized unsafe aircraft excursions.
The function of the thermal/environmental control systems was to provide a comfortable thermal environment for the crew, to cool electronic components, to supply a controlled oxygen/nitrogen atmosphere, and to remove moisture, carbon dioxide, odors, and trace contaminants from the atmosphere. A separate refrigeration system was used to chill and freeze food and biomedical samples and to provide cold water for drinking. This paper describes system design and compares in-flight performance to preflight predictions. A discussion of in-flight anomalies and corrective actions is also included.
The earth resources experiment package consisted of six facility-type sensors, which were flown on the Skylab spacecraft to collect data for a large group of investigators. For satisfactory interpretation of their data, many of these investigators required knowledge of the actual realized sensor performance, which may have differed from ground-based test performance. Functional, geometric, and radiometric evaluations of each sensor were made by using flight data from selected ground scenes, the moon, and dark space. As a result of these evaluations made during the Skylab missions, several sensor operation anomalies were identified and the appropriate corrective action was taken.
Approximately 2 minutes 13 seconds after lift-off of the Apollo 6 mission, abrupt changes of strain, vibration, and acceleration measurements were indicated in the S-IVB, instrument unit, adapter, lunar module, and command and service modules; photographs showed objects coming from the area of the adapter. The adapter, however, continued to sustain the required loads with no impairment of the mission. The investigation was first focused upon the understanding of the coupled vibration modes and characteristics of the launch vehicle and spacecraft.' Extensive test programs were conducted. It was eventually concluded that the adapter failure was not caused by vibration. Extensive study of the airborne photography and other evidence indicated that a large area of the adapter had lost inner facesheet from the honeycomb sandwich panels. Loads and stresses resulting from vibration were determined to be insufficient to initiate such a failure. The investigation was then directed toward determining the range of pressures that could have been trapped in the Apollo 6 adapter sandwich panels, and toward determining the tolerance of the panels to withstand pressure with various degrees of flaws such as adhesive voids and facesheet dents. The degradation effects of moisture and heat exposure on the adhesive strength were also studied and tested. These tests and analyses led to the conclusion that pressure internal to the sandwich panels could have caused the failure, if a large flaw existed. The pressure buildup would have been caused by aerodynamic heating effects on air and moisture trapped in the panel. The probable cause of the failure was found in the original ultrasonic inspection scan record of the affected adapter panel. In the center of the region where the adapter failed, horizontally along the station 709 panel splice, the record contained two thick anomalous lines extending several feet. Without an X-ray record of this region, the significance of this particular scan record cannot be fully understood. However, since all other evidence had indicated that the adhesive had to be weakened in a rather large area to initiate the failure, the investigation was focused intently upon the station 709 splices of other adapters. Sufficient information was developed to verify that deficient assembly techniques have consistently resulted in abnormalities in the structure at this station. These abnormalities were identified in adapters 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16. Before the splice abnormalities were pinpointed, corrective action was taken to reduce pressure "buildup in the honeycomb panels and to reduce heat degrading effects on the adhesive. This was done by drilling vent holes in the inner facesheet and covering the outer facesheet with cork. The adapters having identified abnormalities in the station 709 splice are being repaired, and the contractor is investigating ways of avoiding these -abnormalities in panels yet to be bonded.
The results of the Saturn 1B, SA-208 launch vehicle flight evaluation are presented. The performance of the launch vehicle is analyzed with special emphasis given to identifying the causes of flight problems. Recommendations for corrective action and summaries of launch operations and spacecraft performance are included.
A review of the concept, operational requirements, design, and development of the lunar module mission programer is presented, followed by a review of component and subsystem performance during design-feasibility, design-verification, and qualification tests performed in the laboratory. The system was further proved on the unmanned Apollo 5 mission. Several anomalies were detected, and satisfactory solutions were found. These problems are defined and examined, and the corrective action taken is discussed. Suggestions are given for procedural changes to be used if future guidance and control systems of this type are to be developed.
The system is described as a computer-based system designed to track the status of problems and corrective actions pertinent to space shuttle hardware. The input, processing, output, and performance requirements of the system are presented along with standard display formats and examples. Operational requirements, hardware, requirements, and test requirements are also included.
The identification of flight anomalies, the determination of their causes, and the approaches taken for corrective action are described. Interrelationships of the broad range of disciplines involved with the complex systems and the team concept employed to ensure timely and accurate resolution of anomalies are discussed. The documentation techniques and the techniques for management of anomaly resolution are included. Examples of specific anomalies are presented in the original form of their progressive documentation. Flight anomaly resolution functioned as a part of the real-time mission support and postflight testing, and results were included in the postflight documentation.
Progress is reported in the development of the space shuttle laboratory laser data relay link. The system transmittance of various surfaces was considered in order to examine the coating tradeoffs for the beryllium mirrors. The results of six coating combinations considered are summarized. It is recommended that silver coatings be used throughout the system. Design of the pre-expander and a preliminary alignment procedure implemented to align all optical elements to the reference mechanical axis (the rotational axis of the outer gimbal bearing located between the two Gregorian telescopes) are included. The local oscillator subsystem, consisting of the laser, Stark cell, Stark cell electronics, power supply, starting circuit, and conditioning optics were completed and installed in the optimechanical subsystem and operation against a 10.6 micrometer source was attempted. Preliminary measurements of the HgCdTe mixer showed that this critical element was inoperative and in subsequent tests the receiver front end electronics had also failed. Possible reasons for these failures and corrective action and steps to prevent future recurrence are discussed.
The purpose of the Functional Design Specification is to outline the design for the Problem Data System. The Problem Data System is a computer-based data management system designed to track the status of problems and corrective actions pertinent to space shuttle hardware.
Attention is given to the reliability controls in manned spacecraft programs, taking into account the project Mercury, the Gemini program, the Apollo program, the Skylab program, and the Apollo-Soyuz test project. Reliability controls used in these programs are related to reliability management, parts and materials control, failure mode and effects analysis, reliability quantitative analysis, problem reporting and corrective action control, test control, limited-life control, and milestone reviews. A summary is presented of the major reliability tasks and innovations being used on the Space Shuttle program. Examples of these innovations include improved management techniques and an early identification of specific certification tests.
The Atlas-Centaur AC-5 vehicle was launched from ETR Complex 36A on March 2., 1965 at 8:25.04 a.m. EST. Within about 1 second after launch the thrust of the Atlas booster engine decayed rapidly; the vehicle settled back on the launch pad and was quickly destroyed by fire and explosion. Considerable damage was sustained by the launch complex and its associated equipment. Loss of booster engine thrust was due to fuel depletion at the turbopump inlets, which is attributed to closure of the fuel prevalve or the staging valve. To preclude the recurrence of either of these fuel valving malfunctions, the following corrective action has been taken: The remote control actuator has been replaced by manual operation of the Atlas fuel prevalve; the internal passage dimensions in the staging valve have been increased to lessen the hydraulic load on the valve poppet. In addition to the Atlas fuel system malfunction, a failure in the power control circuitry of the Centaur guidance computer resulted in partial removal of power at umbilical ejection. To prevent such a guidance system failure on future flights some redundant circuitry has been eliminated and more rigorous checkout procedures have been adopted. No further anomalies were discovered in the telemetered data prior to the Atlas booster thrust decay. A prime objective of the AC-5 flight was to place a dynamic model of the Surveyor spacecraft in a simulated lunar transfer trajectory. An important facet of this problem is the demonstration of a launch-on-time capability in accordance with the proper Earth-moon relation. The window opening time was established at 8:25 a.m. EST; thus the actual launch occurred within 4 seconds of the planned time.