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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2019

Human Performance Contributions to Safety in Commercial Aviation

Every day in aviation, pilots, air traffic controllers, and other front-line personnel perform countless correct judgments and actions in a variety of operational environments. These judgments and actions are often the difference between an accident and a non-event. Ironically, data on these behaviors are rarely collected or analyzed. Data-driven decisions about safety management and design of safety-critical systems are limited by the available data, which influence how decision makers characterize problems and identify solutions. Large volumes of data are collected on the failures and errors that result in infrequent incidents and accidents, but in the absence of data on behaviors that result in routine successful outcomes, safety management and system design decisions are based on a small sample of nonrepresentative safety data. This assessment aimed to find and document “safety successes” made possible by human operators. With many Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) Programs and Projects focusing on increased automation and autonomy and decreased human involvement, failure to fully consider the human contributions to successful system performance in civil aviation represents a significant risk — a risk that has not been recognized to date. Without understanding how humans contribute to safety, any estimate of predicted safety of autonomous capabilities is incomplete and inherently suspect. Furthermore, understanding the ways in which humans contribute to safety can promote strategic interactions among safety technologies, functions, procedures and the people using them. Without this understanding, the full benefits of an integrated, optimized human/technology or autonomous system will not be realized. Historically, safety has been consistently defined in terms of the occurrence of accidents or recognized risks (i.e., in terms of things that go wrong). These adverse outcomes are explained by identifying their causes, and safety is restored by eliminating or mitigating these causes. An alternative to this approach is to focus on what goes right and identify how to replicate that process. Focusing on the rare cases of failures attributed to “human error” provides little information about why human performance routinely prevents adverse events. Hollnagel has proposed that things go right because people continuously adjust their work to match their operating conditions. These adjustments become increasingly important as systems continue to grow in complexity. Thus, the definition of safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” but “ensuring that things go right.” The basis for safety management requires developing an understanding of everyday activities. However, few mechanisms to monitor everyday work exist in the aviation domain, which limits opportunities to learn how designs function in reality. This concept of safety thinking and safety management is reflected in the emerging field of resilience engineering. According to Hollnagel, a system is resilient if it can sustain required operations under expected and unexpected conditions by adjusting its functioning prior to, during, or following changes, disturbances, and opportunities. To explore “positive” behaviors that contribute to resilient performance in commercial aviation, the assessment team examined a range of existing sources of data about pilot and air traffic control (ATC) tower controller performance, including subjective interviews with domain experts and objective aircraft flight data records. These data were used to identify strategies that support resilient performance, methods for exploring and refining those strategies in existing data, and proposed methods for capturing and analyzing new data.

Null, Cynthia H.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Environmental projects. Volume 3: Environmental compliance audit

The Goldstone Deep Space Communications Complex is part of NASA's Deep Space Network, one of the world's largest and most sensitive scientific telecommunications and radio navigation networks. Activities at Goldstone are carried out in support of six large parabolic dish antennas. In support of the national goal of the preservation of the environment and the protection of human health and safety, NASA, JPL and Goldstone have adopted a position that their operating installations shall maintain a high level of compliance with Federal, state, and local laws governing the management of hazardous substances, abestos, and underground storage tanks. A JPL version of a document prepared as an environmental audit of Goldstone operations is presented. Both general and specific items of noncompliance at Goldstone are identified and recommendations are provided for corrective actions.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2015

Risk of Performance and Behavioral Health Decrements Due to Inadequate Cooperation, Coordination, Communication, and Psychosocial Adaptation within a Team

A team is defined as: "two or more individuals who interact socially and adaptively, have shared or common goals, and hold meaningful task interdependences; it is hierarchically structured and has a limited life span; in it expertise and roles are distributed; and it is embedded within an organization/environmental context that influences and is influenced by ongoing processes and performance outcomes" (Salas, Stagl, Burke, & Goodwin, 2007, p. 189). From the NASA perspective, a team is commonly understood to be a collection of individuals that is assigned to support and achieve a particular mission. Thus, depending on context, this definition can encompass both the spaceflight crew and the individuals and teams in the larger multi-team system who are assigned to support that crew during a mission. The Team Risk outcomes of interest are predominantly performance related, with a secondary emphasis on long-term health; this is somewhat unique in the NASA HRP in that most Risk areas are medically related and primarily focused on long-term health consequences. In many operational environments (e.g., aviation), performance is assessed as the avoidance of errors. However, the research on performance errors is ambiguous. It implies that actions may be dichotomized into "correct" or "incorrect" responses, where incorrect responses or errors are always undesirable. Researchers have argued that this dichotomy is a harmful oversimplification, and it would be more productive to focus on the variability of human performance and how organizations can manage that variability (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006) (Category III1). Two problems occur when focusing on performance errors: 1) the errors are infrequent and, therefore, difficult to observe and record; and 2) the errors do not directly correspond to failure. Research reveals that humans are fairly adept at correcting or compensating for performance errors before such errors result in recognizable or recordable failures. Astronauts are notably adept high performers. Most failures are recorded only when multiple, small errors occur and humans are unable to recognize and correct or compensate for these errors in time to prevent a failure (Dismukes, Berman, Loukopoulos, 2007) (Category III). More commonly, observers record variability in levels of performance. Some teams commit no observable errors but fail to achieve performance objectives or perform only adequately, while other teams commit some errors but perform spectacularly. Successful performance, therefore, cannot be viewed as simply the absence of errors or the avoidance of failure Johnson Space Center (JSC) Joint Leadership Team, 2008). While failure is commonly attributed to making a major error, focusing solely on the elimination of error(s) does not significantly reduce the risk of failure. Failure may also occur when performance is simply insufficient or an effort is incapable of adjusting sufficiently to a contextual change (e.g., changing levels of autonomy).

Landon, Lauren Blackwell↗
NASA NTRS2014

Application of Fault Management Theory to the Quantitative Selection of a Launch Vehicle Abort Trigger Suite

The theory of System Health Management (SHM) and of its operational subset Fault Management (FM) states that FM is implemented as a "meta" control loop, known as an FM Control Loop (FMCL). The FMCL detects that all or part of a system is now failed, or in the future will fail (that is, cannot be controlled within acceptable limits to achieve its objectives), and takes a control action (a response) to return the system to a controllable state. In terms of control theory, the effectiveness of each FMCL is estimated based on its ability to correctly estimate the system state, and on the speed of its response to the current or impending failure effects. This paper describes how this theory has been successfully applied on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Launch System (SLS) Program to quantitatively estimate the effectiveness of proposed abort triggers so as to select the most effective suite to protect the astronauts from catastrophic failure of the SLS. The premise behind this process is to be able to quantitatively provide the value versus risk trade‐off for any given abort trigger, allowing decision makers to make more informed decisions. All current and planned crewed launch vehicles have some form of vehicle health management system integrated with an emergency launch abort system to ensure crew safety. While the design can vary, the underlying principle is the same: detect imminent catastrophic vehicle failure, initiate launch abort, and extract the crew to safety. Abort triggers are the detection mechanisms that identify that a catastrophic launch vehicle failure is occurring or is imminent and cause the initiation of a notification to the crew vehicle that the escape system must be activated. While ensuring that the abort triggers provide this function, designers must also ensure that the abort triggers do not signal that a catastrophic failure is imminent when in fact the launch vehicle can successfully achieve orbit. That is, the abort triggers must have low false negative rates to be sure that real crew‐threatening failures are detected, and also low false positive rates to ensure that the crew does not abort from non‐crew‐threatening launch vehicle behaviors. The analysis process described in this paper is a compilation of over six years of lessons learned and refinements from experiences developing abort triggers for NASA's Constellation Program (Ares I Project) and the SLS Program, as well as the simultaneous development of SHM/FM theory. The paper will describe the abort analysis concepts and process, developed in conjunction with SLS Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) to define a common set of mission phase, failure scenario, and Loss of Mission Environment (LOME) combinations upon which the SLS Loss of Mission (LOM) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models are built. This abort analysis also requires strong coordination with the Multi‐Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) and SLS Structures and Environments (STE) to formulate a series of abortability tables that encapsulate explosion dynamics over the ascent mission phase. The design and assessment of abort conditions and triggers to estimate their Loss of Crew (LOC) Benefits also requires in‐depth integration with other groups, including Avionics, Guidance, Navigation and Control(GN&C), the Crew Office, Mission Operations, and Ground Systems. The outputs of this analysis are a critical input to SLS S&MA's LOC PRA models. The process described here may well be the first full quantitative application of SHM/FM theory to the selection of a sensor suite for any aerospace system.

Lo, Yunnhon↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Accident Precursor Analysis Handbook, Version 1.0

Catastrophic accidents are usually preceded by precursory events that, although observable, are not recognized as harbingers of a tragedy until after the fact. In the nuclear industry, the Three Mile Island accident was preceded by at least two events portending the potential for severe consequences from an underappreciated causal mechanism. Anomalies whose failure mechanisms were integral to the losses of Space Transportation Systems (STS) Challenger and Columbia had been occurring within the STS fleet prior to those accidents. Both the Rogers Commission Report and the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report found that processes in place at the time did not respond to the prior anomalies in a way that shed light on their true risk implications. This includes the concern that, in the words of the NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), "no process addresses the need to update a hazard analysis when anomalies occur" At a broader level, the ASAP noted in 2007 that NASA "could better gauge the likelihood of losses by developing leading indicators, rather than continue to depend on lagging indicators". These observations suggest a need to revalidate prior assumptions and conclusions of existing safety (and reliability) analyses, as well as to consider the potential for previously unrecognized accident scenarios, when unexpected or otherwise undesired behaviors of the system are observed. This need is also discussed in NASA's system safety handbook, which advocates a view of safety assurance as driving a program to take steps that are necessary to establish and maintain a valid and credible argument for the safety of its missions. It is the premise of this handbook that making cases for safety more experience-based allows NASA to be better informed about the safety performance of its systems, and will ultimately help it to manage safety in a more effective manner. The APA process described in this handbook provides a systematic means of analyzing candidate accident precursors by evaluating anomaly occurrences for their system safety implications and, through both analytical and deliberative methods used to project to other circumstances, identifying those that portend more serious consequences to come if effective corrective action is not taken. APA builds upon existing safety analysis processes currently in practice within NASA, leveraging their results to provide an improved understanding of overall system risk. As such, APA represents an important dimension of safety evaluation; as operational experience is acquired, precursor information is generated such that it can be fed back into system safety analyses to risk-inform safety improvements. Importantly, APA utilizes anomaly data to predict risk whereas standard reliability and PRA approaches utilize failure data which often is limited and rare.

Groen, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2024

False Cape Data Collection Annex, Solid Waste Management Unit 113, Limited Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Investigation Report, Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI) Report summarizes groundwater investigation activities performed between July 2020 and October 2023 at the False Cape Data Collection Annex (FCDC) (Solid Waste Management Unit [SWMU] 113) located at Kennedy Space Center, Florida. The purpose of the RFI is to characterize the nature and extent of volatile organic compound (VOC)-contaminated groundwater at FCDC; evaluate the fate and transport of VOC contamination; collect sufficient data to evaluate potential future requirements for the site, such as corrective measures, long term monitoring, or No Further Action; and conduct a human health preliminary risk evaluation (PRE) based on the groundwater data.

False Cape Data Collection Annex↗
NASA NTRS1993

NASA trend analysis procedures

This publication is primarily intended for use by NASA personnel engaged in managing or implementing trend analysis programs. 'Trend analysis' refers to the observation of current activity in the context of the past in order to infer the expected level of future activity. NASA trend analysis was divided into 5 categories: problem, performance, supportability, programmatic, and reliability. Problem trend analysis uncovers multiple occurrences of historical hardware or software problems or failures in order to focus future corrective action. Performance trend analysis observes changing levels of real-time or historical flight vehicle performance parameters such as temperatures, pressures, and flow rates as compared to specification or 'safe' limits. Supportability trend analysis assesses the adequacy of the spaceflight logistics system; example indicators are repair-turn-around time and parts stockage levels. Programmatic trend analysis uses quantitative indicators to evaluate the 'health' of NASA programs of all types. Finally, reliability trend analysis attempts to evaluate the growth of system reliability based on a decreasing rate of occurrence of hardware problems over time. Procedures for conducting all five types of trend analysis are provided in this publication, prepared through the joint efforts of the NASA Trend Analysis Working Group.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2022

2021 Corrective Measures Implementation and Interim Measures Annual Status Report: Summary of Biosparge System Operation and Maintenance, and Interim Groundwater Monitoring Mobile Launch Platform Rehabilitation Sites / Vehicle Assembly Building Area (SWMU 056) Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This report presents a summary of the Corrective Measures Implementation (CMI) and Interim Measure (IM) implementation activities that occurred from January 2021 through December 2021 at the Mobile Launch Platform Rehabilitation Sites (MLP)/Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) Area, Solid Waste Management Unit 056 (SWMU 056), located at the John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida. The following summaries briefly describe areas within SWMU 056 identified by historical site investigation activities where groundwater monitoring and remedial actions have been implemented to date.

Randall K. Sillan↗
NASA NTRS2024

2022 Through April 2023 Corrective Measures Implementation and Interim Measures Annual Status Report: Summary of Biosparge System Operation and Maintenance, Interim Measures and Monitoring Mobile Launch Platform Rehabilitation Sites / Vehicle Assembly Building Area (Swmu 056) Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This report presents a summary of the Corrective Measures Implementation (CMI) and Interim Measure (IM) implementation activities that occurred from January 2022 through April 2023 at the Mobile Launch Platform Rehabilitation Sites (MLP)/Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) Area, Solid Waste Management Unit 056 (SWMU 056), located at the John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida. The following summaries briefly describe areas within SWMU 056 identified by historical site investigation activities where groundwater monitoring and remedial actions have been implemented to date.

VOCs↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Adaptative Site Management for a 115 Acre Chlorinated Solvent Plume with Two Separate Source Areas at Kennedy Space Center, Florida

Background/Objectives. During Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI) activities, Geosyntec delineated a chlorinated volatile organic compound (CVOC) plume at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) area located at KSC, Florida. The RFI activities identified an approximate 115-acre dissolved plume (primarily vinyl chloride) and a trichloroethene (TCE) source area in an active aerospace complex that is surrounded by sensitive wetland/waterbodies. Due to the size of the impacted area, the Corrective Measure Design included a multi-component strategy: (i) address the source area via bioremediation; (ii) protect sensitive wetlands from impacted groundwater discharge via biosparging; and (iii) Long Term Monitoring (LTM) of the remaining dissolved plume. After the Corrective Measures implementation (CMI), NASA and Geosyntec worked with Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) to implement an adaptive site management for the complex, 115-acre site outside of the traditional RCRA process. The adaptive site management approach relied on performing supplemental assessments and implementing Interim Measures (IMs) to further assess and implement remedies over time while working within site and budget constraints, with an overall goal of achieving enough mass reduction to transition the entire site to LTM and eventually achieve site closure. Approach/Activities. After the biosparge barrier was operational and bioremediation within the source area (referred to as Hot Spot 1) achieved the Corrective Action Objective (CAO), supplemental assessment of the area between Hot Spot 1 and the biosparge barrier was performed. The conceptual site model was updated using the supplemental assessment results and an air sparge system IM was designed to treat an approximate 1.2 acre area (referred to as Hot Spot 2). After installation of the air sparge system, supplemental assessment within the remainder of the 115-acre dissolved plume was performed and a second TCE source area was identified. The TCE source area and associated areas with elevated CVOC concentrations (referred to as Hot Spot 3) were delineated and a bioremediation IM was implemented. Also, the downgradient impacts from Hot Spot 3 were adjacent to a sensitive waterbody, and negotiations with the FDEP allowed the area to be monitored using LTM. Results/Lessons Learned. The performance of supplemental assessment activities and implementation of remedial alternatives as IMs allowed NASA to successfully address groundwater impacts over time, while working within the FDEP regulatory framework. The implementation of the CMI and multiple IMs has achieved the following goals: (i) the biosparge barrier has mitigated the potential discharge of impacted groundwater to an adjacent wetland; (ii) enhanced bioremediation within Hot Spot 1 achieved the CAO within 2 years and transitioned the area into LTM; (iii) operation of an air sparge system within Hot Spot 2 removed TCE as a constituent of concern and contributed to a reduction (approximately 43%) in the impacted groundwater area outside the air sparge treatment area (plume collapse); and (iv) bioremediation within Hot Spot 3 removed approximately 80% of the CVOC mass and contributed to a reduction (approximately 47%) in the impacted groundwater area outside the bioremediation IM treatment area. Overall, the adaptive approach is protecting the sensitive water bodies surrounding the complex site and reducing the area of impacted groundwater, which is moving the entire site towards LTM.

Rebecca C Daprato↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Usability of an Updated Version of the Supplemental Data Service Provider-Consolidated Dashboard for Supporting Uncrewed Aircraft System Traffic Management

The Supplemental Data Service Provider-Consolidated Dashboard (SDSP-CD) is a preflight planning user interface (UI) that serves to aid operators when drafting routes for small uncrewed aircraft systems (sUASs). The primary function of the SDSP-CD is to identify hazards that an sUAS may encounter along a proposed flight path and assess the severity of these risks. A usability study was conducted on an updated version of the SDSP-CD to determine if the most recent iterations made to the system improved objective performance and subjective user experience. There are two main components of the SDSP-CD interface: (1) the dashboard and (2) the interactive map. The dashboard provides users with hazard and vehicle limitations for each sUAS in their fleet while the map contains a graphical representation of each vehicle’s route, hazard details, and geographic information. A series of preflight risk-assessment questions and tasks were developed to examine how participants interact with the updated version of the SDSP-CD. Additionally, a new service that measures vertiport congestion was developed and included as one of the services that was tested. In the present study, participants were trained to use the SDSP-CD and then completed two simulated scenarios during which they performed a variety of tasks, responded to questions, and completed surveys. The two scenarios developed for the present study were the Package Delivery and Hurricane Preparation scenarios. The Package Delivery scenario involved a fleet of four sUASs delivering low-stakes items (e.g., lunches and snacks) to people in a fictitious city. The Hurricane Preparation scenario involved a fleet of 11 sUASs delivering a range of supplies (from medicine to boardgames) to employees stranded at an office park due to road closures caused by an impending hurricane. Participants assumed the role of a fleet manager during both scenarios and were responsible for managing the sUASs in their fleet. Questions included those with objectively correct responses, open-ended strategy responses, and subjective user experience feedback. It was found that participants were largely successful at using the SDSP-CD interface to answer questions with objectively correct responses. Additionally, participants were able to use reasoning and logic based on the information available in the SDSP-CD to determine the cause of various risks and what actions they would consider taking. Finally, although participants reported that there were elements of the UI that could be improved, overall feedback pertaining to user experience suggested that the SDSP-CD concept is viable.

usability testing↗
NASA NTRS2001

RFI to CMS: An Approach to Regulatory Acceptance of Site Remediation Technologies

Lockheed Martin made a smooth transition from RCRA Facility Investigation (RFI) at the National Aeronautics and Space Administrations'(NASA) Michoud Assembly Facility (MA-F) to its Corrective Measures Study (CMS) phase within the RCRA Corrective Action Process. We located trichloroethylene (TCE) contamination that resulted from the manufacture of the Apollo Program Saturn V rocket and the Space Shuttle External Tank, began the cleanup, and identified appropriate technologies for final remedies. This was accomplished by establishing a close working relationship with the state environmental regulatory agency through each step of the process, and resulted in receiving approvals for each of those steps. The agency has designated Lockheed Martin's management of the TCE-contamination at the MAF site as a model for other manufacturing sites in a similar situation. In February 1984, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) issued a compliance order to begin the clean up of groundwater contaminated with TCE. In April 1984 Lockheed Martin began operating a groundwater recovery well to capture the TCE plume. The well not only removes contaminants, but also sustains an inward groundwater hydraulic gradient so that the potential offsite migration of the TCE plume is greatly diminished. This effort was successful, and for the agency to give orders and for a regulated industry to follow them is standard procedure, but this is a passive approach to solving environmental problems. The goal of the company thereafter was to take a leadership, proactive role and guide the MAF contamination clean up to its best conclusion at minimum time and lowest cost to NASA. To accomplish this goal, we have established a positive working relationship with LDEQ, involving them interactively in the implementation of advanced remedial activities at MAF as outlined in the following paragraphs.

Rowland, Martin A.↗
NASA NTRS1996

Advanced Intelligent System Application to Load Forecasting and Control for Hybrid Electric Bus

The primary motivation for this research emanates from providing a decision support system to the electric bus operators in the municipal and urban localities which will guide the operators to maintain an optimal compromise among the noise level, pollution level, fuel usage etc. This study is backed up by our previous studies on study of battery characteristics, permanent magnet DC motor studies and electric traction motor size studies completed in the first year. The operator of the Hybrid Electric Car must determine optimal power management schedule to meet a given load demand for different weather and road conditions. The decision support system for the bus operator comprises three sub-tasks viz. forecast of the electrical load for the route to be traversed divided into specified time periods (few minutes); deriving an optimal 'plan' or 'preschedule' based on the load forecast for the entire time-horizon (i.e., for all time periods) ahead of time; and finally employing corrective control action to monitor and modify the optimal plan in real-time. A fully connected artificial neural network (ANN) model is developed for forecasting the kW requirement for hybrid electric bus based on inputs like climatic conditions, passenger load, road inclination, etc. The ANN model is trained using back-propagation algorithm employing improved optimization techniques like projected Lagrangian technique. The pre-scheduler is based on a Goal-Programming (GP) optimization model with noise, pollution and fuel usage as the three objectives. GP has the capability of analyzing the trade-off among the conflicting objectives and arriving at the optimal activity levels, e.g., throttle settings. The corrective control action or the third sub-task is formulated as an optimal control model with inputs from the real-time data base as well as the GP model to minimize the error (or deviation) from the optimal plan. These three activities linked with the ANN forecaster proving the output to the GP model which in turn produces the pre-schedule of the optimal control model. Some preliminary results based on a hypothetical test case will be presented for the load forecasting module. The computer codes for the three modules will be made available fe adoption by bus operating agencies. Sample results will be provided using these models. The software will be a useful tool for supporting the control systems for the Electric Bus project of NASA.

Momoh, James↗
NASA NTRS2006

Comprehensive Environmental Informatics System (CEIS) Integrating Crew and Vehicle Environmental Health

Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) systems have been pursued as highly integrated systems that include smart sensors, diagnostic and prognostics software for assessments of real-time and life-cycle vehicle health information. Inclusive to such a system is the requirement to monitor the environmental health within the vehicle and the occupants of the vehicle. In this regard an enterprise approach to informatics is used to develop a methodology entitled, Comprehensive Environmental Informatics System (CEIS). The hardware and software technologies integrated into this system will be embedded in the vehicle subsystems, and maintenance operations, to provide both real-time and life-cycle health information of the environment within the vehicle cabin and of its occupants. This comprehensive information database will enable informed decision making and logistics management. One key element of the CEIS is interoperability for data acquisition and archive between environment and human system monitoring. With comprehensive components the data acquired in this system will use model based reasoning systems for subsystem and system level managers, advanced on-board and ground-based mission and maintenance planners to assess system functionality. Knowledge databases of the vehicle health state will be continuously updated and reported for critical failure modes, and routinely updated and reported for life cycle condition trending. Sufficient intelligence, including evidence-based engineering practices which are analogous to evidencebased medicine practices, will be included in the CEIS to result in more rapid recognition of off-nominal operation to enable quicker corrective actions. This will result from better information (rather than just data) for improved crew/operator situational awareness, which will produce significant vehicle and crew safety improvements, as well as increasing the chance for mission success, future mission planning as well as training. Other benefits include improved reliability, increase safety in operations and cost of operations. The cost benefits stem from significantly reduced processing and operations manpower, predictive maintenance for systems and subjects. The improvements in vehicle functionality and cost will result from increased prognostic and diagnostic capability due to the detailed total human exploration system health knowledge from CEIS. A collateral benefit is that there will be closer observations of the vehicle occupants as wrist watch sized devices are worn for continuous health monitoring. Additional database acquisition will stem from activities in countermeasure practices to ensure peak performance capability by occupants of the vehicle. The CEIS will provide data from advanced sensing technologies and informatics modeling which will be useful in problem troubleshooting, and improving NASA s awareness of systems during operation.

Nall, Mark E.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Thematic mapper - An overview of spectral band registration

The Thematic Mapper (TM) is a high-resolution radiometer designed for earth resources classification and mapping. The TM employs multispectral scanning in a near polar orbit to sweep a 185-km swath. Data are obtained through a combination of spacecraft motion and the sweeping action of the scan mirror. These data are transmitted either directly to ground stations around the world or through a relay to the central data processing facility at White Sands, NM. Seven spectral passbands are employed, and applications include coastal water mapping, soil vegetation differentiation, biomass surveys, water body delineation, vegetation moisture measurement, plant heat stress management, and hydrothermal mapping. Attention is given to the scan mirror assembly, scan nonlinearities, the characterization and compensation of scan profiles, experimental performance, and a procedure for midscan correction.

Freudenstein, W. H.↗
NASA NTRS2017

A Fuzzy Logic Approach for Separation Assurance and Collision Avoidance for Unmanned Aerial Systems

In the coming years, operations in low altitude airspace will vastly increase as the capabilities and applications of small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) continue to multiply. Therefore, solutions to managing sUAS in highly congested airspace must be explored. In this study, a Fuzzy Logic based approach was used to help mitigate the risk of collisions between aircraft using separation assurance and collision avoidance techniques. The system was evaluated for its effectiveness to mitigate the risk of mid-air collisions between aircraft. This system utilizes only current state information and can resolve potential conflicts without knowledge of intruder intent. The avoidance logic was verified using formal methods and shown to select the correct action in all instances. Additionally, the Fuzzy Logic Controllers were shown to always turn the vehicles in the correct direction. Numerical testing demonstrated that the avoidance system was able to prevent a mid-air collision between two sUAS in all tested cases. Simulations were also performed in a three-dimensional environment with a heterogenous fleet of sUAS performing a variety of realistic missions. Simulations showed that the system was 99.98 effective at preventing mid-air collisions when separation assurance was disabled (unmitigated case) and 100 effective when enabled (mitigated case).

Verification & Validation of a Fuzzy Logic Control↗
NASA NTRS2007

Fault Detection and Correction for the Solar Dynamics Observatory Attitude Control System

The Solar Dynamics Observatory is an Explorer-class mission that will launch in early 2009. The spacecraft will operate in a geosynchronous orbit, sending data 24 hours a day to a devoted ground station in White Sands, New Mexico. It will carry a suite of instruments designed to observe the Sun in multiple wavelengths at unprecedented resolution. The Atmospheric Imaging Assembly includes four telescopes with focal plane CCDs that can image the full solar disk in four different visible wavelengths. The Extreme-ultraviolet Variability Experiment will collect time-correlated data on the activity of the Sun's corona. The Helioseismic and Magnetic Imager will enable study of pressure waves moving through the body of the Sun. The attitude control system on Solar Dynamics Observatory is responsible for four main phases of activity. The physical safety of the spacecraft after separation must be guaranteed. Fine attitude determination and control must be sufficient for instrument calibration maneuvers. The mission science mode requires 2-arcsecond control according to error signals provided by guide telescopes on the Atmospheric Imaging Assembly, one of the three instruments to be carried. Lastly, accurate execution of linear and angular momentum changes to the spacecraft must be provided for momentum management and orbit maintenance. In th~sp aper, single-fault tolerant fault detection and correction of the Solar Dynamics Observatory attitude control system is described. The attitude control hardware suite for the mission is catalogued, with special attention to redundancy at the hardware level. Four reaction wheels are used where any three are satisfactory. Four pairs of redundant thrusters are employed for orbit change maneuvers and momentum management. Three two-axis gyroscopes provide full redundancy for rate sensing. A digital Sun sensor and two autonomous star trackers provide two-out-of-three redundancy for fine attitude determination. The use of software to maximize chances of recovery from any hardware or software fault is detailed. A generic fault detection and correction software structure is used, allowing additions, deletions, and adjustments to fault detection and correction rules. This software structure is fed by in-line fault tests that are also able to take appropriate actions to avoid corruption of the data stream.

Starin, Scott R.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Trends in Human Spaceflight: Failure Tolerance, High Reliability and Correlated Failure History

In a half century of human spaceflight, NASA has continuously refined agency safety and reliability requirements in response to mission demands, critical failures, and technology development. Early spacecraft, including Mercury, Gemini and Apollo vehicles, were highly reliant on dissimilar redundancy and demonstrated test margins. Later programs, such as the reusable Space Transportation System (STS) and International Space Station (ISS), introduced probabilistic studies and isolated two-failure tolerance to improve robustness at the expense of added complexity. More recently, the Orion Multi-Program Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program adopted universal single-failure tolerance with two categorical exceptions; Zero-Failure Tolerant (0FT) and Design for Minimum Risk (DFMR) hardware. Failure tolerance variances are defined and managed in accordance with agency human-rating requirements, and require concurrence from program Technical Authorities (TA) as well as the MPCV Safety and Mission Assurance Safety and Engineering Review Panel (MSERP). To understand and reaffirm standards applied to Apollo, Space Shuttle and Orion vehicles, Orion and Deep Space Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) representatives conducted accelerated research to compare unique safety and reliability criteria against ground and flight anomalies, based on information contained in post-mission reports and the Problem Reporting and Corrective Action (PRACA) database. In some cases, high-profile failures and narrow escapes have reinforced decisions to maintain or adapt safety requirements. In others, empirical trends have highlighted the need for vigilance and innovative safety guidelines. Given the inability to achieve absolute compliance with evolving safety and reliability requirements, the team conducted a targeted review of DFMR and 0FT propulsion elements within the framework of changing system design, inspection, materials and process developments to formulate conclusions on technological maturity, failure density, and net changes in safety risk. Based on the aggregate performance of high-reliability and failure-tolerant systems, the authors have attempted to establish best practices and guidelines to inform future program decisions. On a somewhat cautionary note, this study is not intended to direct a universal set of requirements for future missions based on prior lessons learned. Spacecraft safety is a multi-variable problem, and attempts to mitigate past failures will not guarantee future success. However, this assessment offers a retrospective review of policy changes, implementation and effectiveness. In the future, NASA, European Space Agency (ESA) and industry partners may benefit from a more robust correlation between requirements and performance, as space-faring nations work toward more challenging, complex and long-duration commercial and deep-space ventures.

Green, Carrie↗