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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2013

Preliminary Scaling Estimate for Select Small Scale Mixing Demonstration Tests

The Hanford Site double-shell tank (DST) system provides the staging location for waste that will be transferred to the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Specific WTP acceptance criteria for waste feed delivery describe the physical and chemical characteristics of the waste that must be met before the waste is transferred from the DSTs to the WTP. One of the more challenging requirements relates to the sampling and characterization of the undissolved solids (UDS) in a waste feed DST because the waste contains solid particles that settle and their concentration and relative proportion can change during the transfer of the waste in individual batches. A key uncertainty in the waste feed delivery system is the potential variation in UDS transferred in individual batches in comparison to an initial sample used for evaluating the acceptance criteria. To address this uncertainty, a number of small-scale mixing tests have been conducted as part of Washington River Protection Solutions’ Small Scale Mixing Demonstration (SSMD) project to determine the performance of the DST mixing and sampling systems.

Double-shell Tank↗
DOE OSTI2023

Evaluation of High Level Waste Sludge Processing Behavior

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Hanford Site has 177 underground storage tanks that contain wastes from past nuclear fuel reprocessing and waste-management operations. Over 20% of this waste is in the form of an insoluble sludge that will require slurry modification before its transfer to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Specific WTP acceptance criteria for waste feed delivery describe the physical and chemical characteristics of the waste that must be met before the waste is transferred to the WTP. One challenging requirement relates to the undissolved solids (UDS) composition in a waste feed because the waste contains solid particles that settle, and their concentration and relative proportion can change during the transfer of the waste in individual batches. A key uncertainty is the ability to transfer and mix wastes with large variations in UDS concentrations and resulting settling rates. To address this uncertainty, a number of small scale mixing and settling tests have been conducted to determine the mobilization performance of variable chemistry simulants. Comparison of the size and density of the particulate for each simulant to that of southeast area Hanford sludge was made using metrics for particle mobilization, suspension, settling, and pipeline transfer where dependance on particle size and density may be different, including: 1. Settling velocity, 2. Critical shear stress for erosion, 3. Just-suspended impeller speed, and 4. Pipeline critical transport velocity. Existing high-level waste sludge data has shown the effect that increasing Al concentration has on resulting settled solids. This differential settling of particles in the sludge has the possibility of resulting in solids segregation during feed preparation and uneven particle distribution during pipeline transportation or mixer jet pump operations. Understanding the predictive capabilities of HLW solids settling and transport as well as potential remedies for addressing disparate sludge behaviors can help provide technical guidance during HLW flowsheet planning.

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DOE OSTI2022

Hanford Site Composite Analysis: Comparison of One- and Three-Dimensional Simulation of Vadose Zone Transport and Transfer to Groundwater for Selected Waste Sites

The purpose of this document is to compare 1D and 3D technetium-99 (Tc-99) VZ transport and transfer rates to groundwater for five selected waste sites (two tanks, two cribs, and one trench) to demonstrate the need to consider 3D flow and transport mechanisms and commingling of contaminant plumes originating from adjacent waste sites. The waste sites selected for the comparison evaluation are the 241-A-105 Tank in the A Farms Area model, the 216-B-18 Crib and the 216-B-25 Trench in the BC Cribs and Trenches model, the 216-B-49 Crib in the B Complex model, and the 241-SX-115 Tank in the S Farms Area model. The selected waste sites all represent different disposal or leak conditions, with and without potential impacts due to release-fluid commingling, occurring at the Hanford Site Central Plateau.

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DOE OSTI2015

Waste minimization efforts at the H-Canyon nuclear materials processing facility located at the Savannah River Site - 15535

During the last decade, the H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site (SRS) has employed various means to minimize liquid waste generation and/or to segregate liquid waste that favors generation of low level vs high level wastes. The primary drivers were cost reduction and support of SRS liquid waste tank farm feed to the SRS's Defense Waste Processing Facility. Recent High Level Waste (HLW) volume restrictions (transfers of liquid waste from the H-Canyon to the SRS's Liquid Waste System) imposed on H-Canyon have renewed waste minimization efforts. For the next several years, H-Canyon is faced with a HLW transfer reduction of approximately 65% (reduced from approximately 300,000 gallons to 100,000 gallons). This comes at a time when H-Canyon (and a companion facility named HB-Line) are about to begin executing two high profile missions. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Environmental cleanup of the East Tennessee Technology Park - Year three - A status report - 15522

On August 1, 2011, URS - CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) began its five-year, $1.4 billion cleanup of the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), the former Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, located on the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Oak Ridge Reservation (Reservation) in Tennessee. Under the contract, the base period scope of work to be completed by 2016 includes demolition of both the K-25 and K-31 gaseous diffusion buildings and all demolition waste dispositioned, initiation of demolition on the remaining K-27 gaseous diffusion building, safe storage of transuranic (TRU) waste for eventual transfer to the Transuranic Waste Processing Center, previously designated -No-Path-To-Disposition Waste- dispositioned to the extent possible, and completion of design and engineering of a mercury treatment system to be installed at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12). UCOR will have also managed DOE Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM)-owned facilities at ETTP, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and Y-12 in a safe and cost-effective manner. Since assuming responsibilities as the ETTP and Oak Ridge Reservation cleanup contractor, UCOR has completed its life-cycle Performance Measurement Baseline; received its Earned Value Management System (EVMS) certification; completed the deactivation and demolition (D and D) of the 44-acre K-25 gaseous diffusion building; removed and disposed of a contaminated underground storage tank (Tank W-1A) at ORNL; dispositioned mercury-contaminated storage tanks at Y-12; completed closure of the Toxic Substances Control Act Incinerator; disposed of more than 158,000 cubic yards of cleanup waste while managing the on-site Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF); and conducted operations, surveillance, and maintenance activities at 180 DOE EM facilities at ETTP, ORNL, and Y-12 in a safe and cost-effective manner. In 2014, UCOR completed the removal and disposal of all of the K-25 demolition debris; completed the removal of asbestos-laden transite siding on the K-31 gaseous diffusion building and began demolition of that 17-acre building; advanced the characterization and deactivation of the K-27 gaseous diffusion building, readying the building for the start of demolition in 2015; advanced the design and engineering of a Mercury Treatment Facility to be located at Y-12; continued the cost-effective and safe disposition of all cleanup wastes; and readied ETTP for Voluntary Protection Program Star Status Assessment in 2015. Project performance as of December 31, 2014, continued to be excellent: - Cost Performance Index - 1.12 - Schedule Performance Index - 1.02 At the same time, since safety is the foundation of all cleanup work, UCOR's safety record goes hand-in-hand with its excellent project performance. Through calendar year 2014, UCOR's recordable injury rate was 1.04 occurrences per 200,000 work hours, and the lost workday case rate was 0.52. This performance continues to be due, in large part, to the people and processes URS and CH2M HILL, the parent companies of UCOR, brought to the project. Key enablers included: - Selected and deployed experienced staff in key leadership positions throughout the organization, continually re-energizing the organization with new leaders - Implemented previously successful safety programs and initiatives from other DOE sites, such as DOE's Voluntary Protection Program - Brought fresh thinking and innovation to tackling tough project issues, such as the deactivation of the Technetium-99-contaminated areas of K-27, applying lessons learned from the D and D of K-25; and implementing a -waste factory- approach to cleanup - Maintained continuing alignment between UCOR's contract with DOE and its Performance Measurement Baseline - rapidly addressing contract changes when they arose - Maintained a readiness both from a process as well as experienced personnel perspective to support DOE OREM in performing other significant Oak Ridge Reservation cleanup activities. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

Development and Qualification of Advancements in Submersible Transfer Pump Performance and Life, and Implications for Advancing and Supporting Processing Options - 13343

From the 1950's through the 1990's, relatively inexpensive, 'off-the-shelf' type, vertical turbine pumps (VTP) were used to transfer Hanford waste. The technology of those pumps was rooted primarily in the mining and agricultural (irrigation) industries. HNF-3218, Double Shell Tank (DST) Transfer Pump History and Reliability Report, 1998, provides a summary of Hanford DST pump history to that date. Such pumps operated in the Hanford radioactive waste environment for an average of only 400 hours before failure. However, at that time, operating life was not a driving criteria within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, as the failure of transfer pumps represented a relatively low replacement and disposal cost. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issuance of the 'Debris Rule' in 1992, which mandated that mixed radioactive waste contaminated equipment be decontaminated to a 'low level waste' category prior to burial, elevated the significance of transfer pump reliability and decontamination capability as life-cycle cost criteria. Minimizing the frequency of transfer pump failures and design for decontamination became significantly important and served to drive the need toward specific, designed for application pumps to meet this challenge. To this end, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) and the supplier, Curtiss-Wright EMD (EMD), have recently collaborated on an intense program to further transfer pump technology and performance. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Andra's strategy and approach for operational safety of French underground facility Cigeo - 15127

According to the French Act on radioactive waste of 28 June 2006, Andra shall design a reversible repository. In response to this demand, Andra is developing the industrial project namely 'Cigeo', a reversible geological disposal facility for HLW and ILW located in Meuse/Haute-Marne. The previous safety cases of 2005, 2009 and 2012 give a sound basis to assess Cigeo's safety both for the operational and post-closure periods. Regarding operational safety, in this new stage of the project, the challenging issues for the preparation of the safety case are the following: - To adapt the various regulatory frameworks (nuclear and non-nuclear) to the underground facility - To design the underground facility and handling equipment's to reduce at first risks in the underground facility as such radioactive particles release, gas explosion, fire and co-activity and limit their consequence. - To establish waste acceptance criteria to be fulfilled by waste producers in line with operational safety and design options. The objective of the paper is to present the experience of Andra in operation safety of the underground facility of Cigeo. Operational safety for Cigeo is assessed as much as possible according to the existing French regulations and guidance for nuclear facilities. Indeed, compared to existing nuclear facilities, a geological repository is a specific case due to the existence of underground facilities with particularities such as: - ventilation management in a large scale underground facility, - fire risk management. As an input for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation, Andra defined a fire guidance and a specific reference safety guidance, based on the adaptation of the French nuclear regulatory texts for and when feasible to mines and tunnels regulatory texts and on its own experience gained through safety operational reports since 2005 and their reviews by the Safety Authority. - underground co-activity of nuclear operation with construction works. According to the common 'defense-in depth' principle for nuclear facilities, these guidelines for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation consider the successive levels of defense of: - Preventing the risk and its spreading by design and construction; - Detecting incidents and early fighting by design and operation dispositions (detection and control systems, survey procedure); - Controlling incidents and limiting of their consequences by safeguarding systems, specific procedures. At that stage, design options for Cigeo constitute an adequate response to the operational safety functions and requirements: - Two levels of containment are set up: the first one is ensured by the waste package, the second one is ensured from the surface facility to the disposal vaults by the transfer cask during the transfer of waste packages in the disposal vaults by the disposal vault itself and a nuclear ventilation with HEPA filter; - Favorable options for fire risk prevention and mitigation: transport system minimizing heat load (cable car for the transfer from the surface, electric transfer engines), twin access tunnels to ease fire-fighting and evacuation...; - Permanent complete physical separation of nuclear zone and construction zone (including ventilation systems). In practice, operation safety assessment of Cigeo, designed following the aforesaid reference safety guidelines, follows a common risk analysis (internal aggressions such as auxiliary losses, chemical and toxic risks, fall or collision, fire, human factors and external aggressions such as earthquake, air traffic, flooding) with the following steps: - Identification of the major risks and the design basis scenarios that have to be considered for dimensioning of the installations and the safety devices; - On the basis of these different situations, those who will have to be quantified are identified; one or more representative and envelop situations are chosen in order to evaluate robustness of the installation. Quantitative evaluation of these situations permits to: - identify the consequences on man, environment and installation, and in particular to gain confidence in the maintaining of the safety functions; - identify or define the technic and/or organisational dispositions classified as 'important elements for protection' (IEP); - Situations beyond dimensioning permit to verify the robustness of the installation. They permit, on one hand to identify possible complementary material or organisational dispositions; on the other hand, to define the 'hard core' i.e. structures, systems and components that permit to maintain the confinement function of radioactive substance. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2012

Hanford Technology Development (Tank Farms) - 12509

The mission of the Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (ORP) is to safely retrieve and treat the 56 million gallons of Hanford's tank waste and close the Tank Farms to protect the Columbia River. The millions of gallons of tank waste are a byproduct of decades of plutonium production. After irradiated fuel rods were taken from the nuclear reactors to the processing facilities at Hanford they were exposed to a series of chemicals designed to dissolve away the rod, which enabled workers to retrieve the plutonium. Once those chemicals were exposed to the fuel rods they became radioactive and extremely hot. They also couldn't be used in this process more than once. Because the chemicals are caustic and extremely hazardous to humans and the environment, underground storage tanks were built to hold these chemicals until a more permanent solution could be found. One key part of the ongoing work at Hanford is retrieving waste from the single-shell tanks, some of which have leaked in the past, and transferring that waste to the double-shell tanks - none of which have ever leaked. The 56 million gallons of radioactive tank waste is stored in 177 underground tanks, 149 of which are single-shell tanks built between 1943 and 1964. The tanks sit approximately 250 feet above the water table. Hanford's single-shell tanks are decades past their 20-year design life. In the past, up to 67 of the single-shell tanks are known or suspected to have leaked as much as one million gallons of waste to the surrounding soil. Starting in the late 1950's, waste leaks from dozens of the single-shell tanks were detected or suspected. Most of the waste is in the soil around the tanks, but some of this waste is thought to have reached groundwater. The Vadose Zone Project was established to understand the radioactive and chemical contamination in the soil beneath the tanks as the result of leaks and discharges from past plutonium-production operations. The vadose zone is the area of soil between the ground surface and the water table 200-to-300 feet below. The project tracks and monitors contamination in the soil. Technologies are being developed and deployed to detect and monitor contaminants. Interim surface barriers, which are barriers put over the single-shell tanks, prevent rain and snow from soaking into the ground and spreading contamination. The impermeable barrier placed over T Farm, which was the site of the largest tank waste leak in Hanford's history, is 60,000 square feet and sloped to drain moisture outside the tank farm. The barrier over TY Farm is constructed of asphalt and drains moisture to a nearby evaporation basin. Our discussion of technology will address the incredible challenge of removing waste from Hanford's single-shell tanks. Under the terms of the Tri-Party Agreement, ORP is required to remove 99 percent of the tank waste, or until the limits of technology have been reached. All pumpable liquids have been removed from the single-shell tanks, and work now focuses on removing the non-pumpable liquids. Waste retrieval was completed from the first single-shell tank in late 2003. Since then, another six single-shell tanks have been retrieved to regulatory standards. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Current status of solid waste management in small island developing states: A review

Highlights: • Waste management is a matter of great concern for small island developing states. • On average, waste generation rate in these islands amounts to 1.29 kg/capita/day. • Illegal dumping and landfilling prevail in most small island developing states. • Sustainable waste management practices, previously absent, are now emerging. • However, many challenges still hinder the implementation of these practices. - Abstract: This article reviews the current status of waste management in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the challenges that are faced in solid waste management. The waste generation rates of SIDS were compared within the three geographic regions namely Caribbean SIDS, Pacific SIDS and Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China (AIMS) SIDS and with countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). Only Pacific SIDS had a waste generation rate less than 1 kg/capita/day. The waste generation rates for the three SIDS regions averaged 1.29 kg/capita/day while that for OECD countries was at a mean value of 1.35 kg/capita/day. The waste compositions in the different SIDS regions were almost similar owing to comparable consumption patterns while these differed to a large extent with wastes generated in OECD countries. In SIDS, the major fraction of MSW comprised of organics (44%) followed by recyclables namely paper, plastics, glass and metals (total: 43%). In contrast, MSW in OECD countries consisted mainly of recyclables (43%) followed by organics (37%). This article also reviewed the other functional elements of the waste management systems in SIDS. Several shortcomings were noted in the process of waste collection, transfer and transport namely the fact of having outdated collection vehicles and narrow roads which are inaccessible. Among the waste management practices in SIDS, waste disposal via landfilling, illegal dumping and backyard burning were favoured most of the time at the expense of sustainable waste treatment technologies such as composting, anaerobic digestion and recycling.

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DOE OSTI2024

Retrieval of Tank Waste from Storage

This book will provide an overview of the key elements in remediating complex waste sites using the Hanford Site as a case study. In this chapter, the existing infrastructure to store and transfer Hanford wastes, a short history of operations in Hanford Tank Farms, the SST retrieval needs and subsequent DST waste handling operations for retrieval, treatment, and closure are discussed. Waste retrieval operational examples are summarized.

Fountain, Matthew S.↗
DOE OSTI2025

Determining Drying Conditions to Mitigate Hanford Transfer Line Corrosion

Radioactive waste is stored in underground, carbon-steel double-shell tanks at the Department of Energy Hanford site.1,2,3 The underground transfer lines are used to transfer the waste between the tanks and other assets at the Hanford tank farm facilities. The transfer lines constructed before 1990 are pipe-in-pipe design with most of the lines having carbon steel carrier pipe and carbon steel encasements. The lines constructed after 1990 have a stainless-steel carrier with a carbon steel encasement. The carrier lines, which are in contact with the waste, provide a critical confinement function, while the encasements provide secondary containment to reduce the risk of a release and contamination to the environment. In 2022, a visual inspection of the annulus between the encasement and the carrier for one of the pre-1990 transfer lines revealed standing liquid in contact with the carrier pipe. Additionally, a significant build-up of corrosion products on the exterior of the carrier pipe and the interior of the encasement pipe was observed. To assess the extent of condition, borescope inspections were performed in the encasement space of additional transfer lines in the facility to provide a baseline. The inspection revealed that of the lines inspected, 29 had either moisture present or evidence that moisture had been present in the past (e.g., waterline corrosion where the pipe had been exposed to standing water). Additional inspections indicated several instances of pitting corrosion on the interior of the encasement and exterior the carrier transfer lines. An image of the carrier pipe with several pits is presented in Figure 1(a) and the profiled image of the transfer line section along with the pit depths are presented Figure 1(b). As seen in the figure, the deepest pit was 73 mils on the pipe section. These lines were designated as “do-not-use” until further compensatory actions are implemented to return the lines to service.

Shukla, Pavan K. [Savannah River National Laborato↗
DOE OSTI2012

Design Improvements and Analysis of Innovative High-Level Waste Pipeline Unplugging Technologies - 12171

Transferring high-level waste (HLW) between storage tanks or to treatment facilities is a common practice performed at the Department of Energy (DoE) sites. Changes in the chemical and/or physical properties of the HLW slurry during the transfer process may lead to the formation of blockages inside the pipelines resulting in schedule delays and increased costs. To improve DoE's capabilities in the event of a pipeline plugging incident, FIU has continued to develop two novel unplugging technologies: an asynchronous pulsing system and a peristaltic crawler. The asynchronous pulsing system uses a hydraulic pulse generator to create pressure disturbances at two opposite inlet locations of the pipeline to dislodge blockages by attacking the plug from both sides remotely. The peristaltic crawler is a pneumatic/hydraulic operated crawler that propels itself by a sequence of pressurization/depressurization of cavities (inner tubes). The crawler includes a frontal attachment that has a hydraulically powered unplugging tool. In this paper, details of the asynchronous pulsing system's ability to unplug a pipeline on a small-scale test-bed and results from the experimental testing of the second generation peristaltic crawler are provided. The paper concludes with future improvements for the third generation crawler and a recommended path forward for the asynchronous pulsing testing. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2012

Simulant Development for Hanford Double-Shell Tank Mixing and Waste Feed Delivery Testing

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of River Projection manages the River Protection Project, which has the mission to retrieve and treat the Hanford tank waste for disposal and close the tank farms (Certa et al. 2011). Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) is responsible for a primary objective of this mission which is to retrieve and transfer tank waste to the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). A mixing and sampling program with four separate demonstrations is currently being conducted to support this objective and also to support activities in a plan for addressing safety concerns identified by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board related to the ability of the WTP to mix, sample, and transfer fast settling particles. Previous studies have documented the objectives, criteria, and selection of non-radioactive simulants for these four demonstrations. The identified simulants include Newtonian suspending liquids with densities and viscosities that span the range expected in waste feed tanks. The identified simulants also include non-Newtonian slurries with Bingham yield stress values that span a range that is expected to bound the Bingham yield stress in the feed delivery tanks. The previous studies identified candidate materials for the Newtonian and non-Newtonian suspending fluids, but did not provide specific recipes for obtaining the target properties and information was not available to evaluate the compatibility of the fluids and particles or the potential for salt precipitation at lower temperatures. The purpose of this study is to prepare small batches of simulants in advance of the demonstrations to determine specific simulant recipes, to evaluate the compatibility of the liquids and particles, and to determine if the simulants are stable for the potential range of test temperatures. The objective of the testing, which is focused primarily on the Newtonian and non-Newtonian fluids, is to determine the composition of simulant materials that give the desired density and viscosity or rheological parameters.

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DOE OSTI2021

Advancements of On-Line Monitoring and Real-Time Characterization of Actual Low-Level Hanford Tank-Waste Samples

Waste and process stream characterization is essential to the safe, efficient, and cost-effective processing of Hanford Site materials. The demand for materials characterization including chemical, radionuclide, and physical attributes during waste management, transfer, and staging operations in the Hanford tank farms is expected to significantly increase as the U.S. Department of Energy River Protection Project progresses toward Hanford waste treatment and immobilization. Our past work has applied Raman on-line monitoring and chemometric modeling to the supernate of Hanford tank 241-AP-105 and has demonstrated the quantitative measurement of nine analytes within this waste. To demonstrate broader applicability, this method has now been expanded to waste from two additional Hanford tanks, AW-102 and AP-107, and the offgas condensate from lab-scale melter runs of actual-tank waste feeds. To enhance the performance of the Raman method, instruments with various excitation wavelengths were compared, since it is known that the Raman response is enhanced by shorter wavelength excitation. The laser excitations for the three systems tested were 404 nm, 532 nm, and 671 nm. In addition to laser wavelength selection, the laser power, measurement integration times, and signal averaging techniques were also investigated to determine their effect on detection limits for oxy-anion analytes within tank wastes. These advancements in Raman capability are compared with past standards and will be presented.

Bryan, Samuel A.↗
DOE OSTI2013

Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Waste Feed Qualification Program Development Approach - 13114

The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) is a nuclear waste treatment facility being designed and constructed for the U.S. Department of Energy by Bechtel National, Inc. and subcontractor URS Corporation (under contract DE-AC27-01RV14136 [1]) to process and vitrify radioactive waste that is currently stored in underground tanks at the Hanford Site. A wide range of planning is in progress to prepare for safe start-up, commissioning, and operation. The waste feed qualification program is being developed to protect the WTP design, safety basis, and technical basis by assuring acceptance requirements can be met before the transfer of waste. The WTP Project has partnered with Savannah River National Laboratory to develop the waste feed qualification program. The results of waste feed qualification activities will be implemented using a batch processing methodology, and will establish an acceptable range of operator controllable parameters needed to treat the staged waste. Waste feed qualification program development is being implemented in three separate phases. Phase 1 required identification of analytical methods and gaps. This activity has been completed, and provides the foundation for a technically defensible approach for waste feed qualification. Phase 2 of the program development is in progress. The activities in this phase include the closure of analytical methodology gaps identified during Phase 1, design and fabrication of laboratory-scale test apparatus, and determination of the waste feed qualification sample volume. Phase 3 will demonstrate waste feed qualification testing in support of Cold Commissioning. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Application of On-Line Monitoring and Real-Time Characterization of Low Level Waste Samples from Hanford Tanks

Waste and treatment stream characterization is an essential part of safe, efficient, and cost-effective processing of Hanford materials. The demand for materials characterization, including chemical, radionuclide, and physical attributes during waste management, transfer, and staging operations in the Hanford tank farms, is expected to significantly increase as the U.S. Department of Energy Office of River Protection (ORP) progresses toward Hanford waste treatment and immobilization. The application of on-line monitoring can greatly improve operation timeframes and reduce costs by providing real-time data and supporting the reduction of necessary grab sample collection. Recently, our team applied Raman online monitoring and chemometric modeling to the supernate of Hanford tank 241-AP-105, and demonstrated the quantitative measurement of nine analytes within this waste. Application of this method has been expanded to additional Hanford tank wastes, AW-102 and AP-107. The performance of the process monitoring instruments and the accuracy of the chemometric models will be assessed. On-line monitoring results will be compared to anion results determined from the current standard, ion-chromatographic and inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry methods. Comparisons of both determined values and uncertainties of results will be presented. Results will be shared with personnel working on flowsheet interfaces for the Direct-Feed Low Activity Waste mission at Hanford.

Lines, Amanda M.↗