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At least 109 records · Page 6
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2015

CEA decommissioning and clean-up activities legacy waste management and lessons learned - 15506

The CEA has generated radioactive waste in both liquid and solid form for more than 50 years within the scope of its R and D, clean-up and dismantling programs. The vast majority of the waste produced is transferred to disposal centers in approved waste packages. Nonetheless, a large quantity of legacy waste still remains in ageing facilities in which the storage conditions are sometimes no longer satisfactory with respect to the safety requirements that are constantly evolving. As part of a broad clean-up and dismantling process focusing on these ageing facilities managed by the CEA, the top priority is to shut down nuclear activities on two symbolic sites: Grenoble and Fontenay-aux-Roses, which are both located in a dense urban environment. After about ten years of dismantling, the nuclear facilities on the Grenoble site are on their way to be completely decommissioned in the regulatory sense of the term. Furthermore, the radwaste issue on this site has raised no specific problems, though it did require developing innovative and sometimes costly waste outlets. The older Fontenay-aux-Roses site is where the first experimental research on minor actinide separation took place. The facilities on this site have reached a stage in dismantling which necessitates the recovery of irradiating legacy waste containing alpha, beta and gamma emitters. The transfer of this waste to interim storage centers more than 600 kilometers away is a decisive factor in reducing the site's nuclear source term and in ensuring the satisfactory progress of the dismantling operations. This paper details the issues raised by the recovery of legacy waste, which requires greater characterization to better understand its radiological and chemical status. This waste also requires better characterization to meet the storage requirements of new sites designed for storage periods exceeding 50 years prior to its final disposal in a deep geological repository. The issue of transporting waste on public roads is specifically covered, along with the strategy defined to securely transfer all legacy waste resulting from the CEA's very diverse R and D programs. Emphasis is placed on finding the right balance between collecting the necessary data on the waste to be transported, ensuring the reconditioning of this waste so it can be transported safely, and maintaining an efficient industrial-scale waste transfer process to limit the lead times and costs related to legacy waste recovery operations. (authors)

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NASA NTRS1983

Solid waste treatment processes for space station

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the state-of-the-art of solid waste(s) treatment processes applicable to a Space Station. From the review of available information a source term model for solid wastes was determined. An overall system is proposed to treat solid wastes under constraints of zero-gravity and zero-leakage. This study contains discussion of more promising potential treatment processes, including supercritical water oxidation, wet air (oxygen) oxidation, and chemical oxidation. A low pressure, batch-type treament process is recommended. Processes needed for pretreatment and post-treatment are hardware already developed for space operations. The overall solid waste management system should minimize transfer of wastes from their collection point to treatment vessel.

Marrero, T. R.↗
DOE OSTI2015

Optimization of municipal solid waste collection and transportation routes

Graphical abstract: Display Omitted - Highlights: • Profitable integrated solid waste management system. • Optimal municipal waste collection scheme between the sources and waste collection centres. • Optimal path calculation between waste collection centres and transfer stations. • Optimal waste routing between the transfer stations and processing plants. - Abstract: Optimization of municipal solid waste (MSW) collection and transportation through source separation becomes one of the major concerns in the MSW management system design, due to the fact that the existing MSW management systems suffer by the high collection and transportation cost. Generally, in a city different waste sources scatter throughout the city in heterogeneous way that increase waste collection and transportation cost in the waste management system. Therefore, a shortest waste collection and transportation strategy can effectively reduce waste collection and transportation cost. In this paper, we propose an optimal MSW collection and transportation scheme that focus on the problem of minimizing the length of each waste collection and transportation route. We first formulize the MSW collection and transportation problem into a mixed integer program. Moreover, we propose a heuristic solution for the waste collection and transportation problem that can provide an optimal way for waste collection and transportation. Extensive simulations and real testbed results show that the proposed solution can significantly improve the MSW performance. Results show that the proposed scheme is able to reduce more than 30% of the total waste collection path length.

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DOE OSTI2020

TWF Waste Container Receipt, Inspection and Transfer to Storage

This procedure provides instructions for the receipt, inspection, and transfer to storage of Transuranic (TRU) Waste Containers and Pipe Overpack Containers (POC) within the Transuranic Waste Facility (TWF) (Waste Storage Buildings [WSBs] and Characterization and Waste Storage Building [CWSB]). Performance of this procedure meets the requirements of AC 5.8.9, AC 5.8.13 2nd Bullet, SAC 5.9.1, SAC 5.9.3, SR 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.5, 4.2.1.6, 4.2.2.1, 4.2.2.2, 4.2.2.3, 4.2.2.4, 4.2.3.1, 4.2.3.2, 4.2.3.3, 4.3.4.1, 4.4.1.1, 4.4.1.2 and 4.4.1.3.

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DOE OSTI2012

EXPERIMENTAL METHODS TO ESTIMATE ACCUMULATED SOLIDS IN NUCLEAR WASTE TANKS

The Department of Energy has a large number of nuclear waste tanks. It is important to know if fissionable materials can concentrate when waste is transferred from staging tanks prior to feeding waste treatment plants. Specifically, there is a concern that large, dense particles, e.g., plutonium containing, could accumulate in poorly mixed regions of a blend tank heel for tanks that employ mixing jet pumps. At the request of the DOE Hanford Tank Operations Contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions, the Engineering Development Laboratory of the Savannah River National Laboratory performed a scouting study in a 1/22-scale model of a waste tank to investigate this concern and to develop measurement techniques that could be applied in a more extensive study at a larger scale. Simulated waste tank solids and supernatant were charged to the test tank and rotating liquid jets were used to remove most of the solids. Then the volume and shape of the residual solids and the spatial concentration profiles for the surrogate for plutonium were measured. This paper discusses the overall test results, which indicated heavy solids only accumulate during the first few transfer cycles, along with the techniques and equipment designed and employed in the test. Those techniques include: Magnetic particle separator to remove stainless steel solids, the plutonium surrogate from a flowing stream; Magnetic wand used to manually remove stainless steel solids from samples and the tank heel; Photographs were used to determine the volume and shape of the solids mounds by developing a composite of topographical areas; Laser rangefinders to determine the volume and shape of the solids mounds; Core sampler to determine the stainless steel solids distribution within the solids mounds; Computer driven positioner that placed the laser rangefinders and the core sampler over solids mounds that accumulated on the bottom of a scaled staging tank in locations where jet velocities were low. These devices and techniques were very effective to estimate the movement, location, and concentrations of the solids representing plutonium and are expected to perform well at a larger scale. The operation of the techniques and their measurement accuracies will be discussed as well as the overall results of the accumulated solids test.

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DOE OSTI2013

Experimental Methods to Estimate Accumulated Solids in Nuclear Waste Tanks - 13313

The Department of Energy has a large number of nuclear waste tanks. It is important to know if fissionable materials can concentrate when waste is transferred from staging tanks prior to feeding waste treatment plants. Specifically, there is a concern that large, dense particles, e.g., plutonium containing, could accumulate in poorly mixed regions of a blend tank heel for tanks that employ mixing jet pumps. At the request of the DOE Hanford Tank Operations Contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions, the Engineering Development Laboratory of the Savannah River National Laboratory performed a scouting study in a 1/22-scale model of a waste tank to investigate this concern and to develop measurement techniques that could be applied in a more extensive study at a larger scale. Simulated waste tank solids and supernatant were charged to the test tank and rotating liquid jets were used to remove most of the solids. Then the volume and shape of the residual solids and the spatial concentration profiles for the surrogate for plutonium were measured. This paper discusses the overall test results, which indicated heavy solids only accumulate during the first few transfer cycles, along with the techniques and equipment designed and employed in the test. Those techniques include: - Magnetic particle separator to remove stainless steel solids, the plutonium surrogate from a flowing stream. - Magnetic wand used to manually remove stainless steel solids from samples and the tank heel. - Photographs were used to determine the volume and shape of the solids mounds by developing a composite of topographical areas. - Laser range finders to determine the volume and shape of the solids mounds. - Core sampler to determine the stainless steel solids distribution within the solids mounds. - Computer driven positioner that placed the laser range finders and the core sampler over solids mounds that accumulated on the bottom of a scaled staging tank in locations where jet velocities were low. These devices and techniques were very effective to estimate the movement, location, and concentrations of the solids representing plutonium and are expected to perform well at a larger scale. The operation of the techniques and their measurement accuracies will be discussed as well as the overall results of the accumulated solids test. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2026

Determining the Efficiency of Nitrogen Blanketing to Mitigate Corrosion in Hanford’s Transfer Line System

The Hanford site stores large quantities of radioactive waste in underground, carbon-steel, double-shell tanks. The waste is transferred between the tanks using piping that consists of carbon-steel pipes and carbon-steel encasements. The transfer lines have shown extensive corrosion on both the interior of the casing and exterior of the carrier pipes. Nitrogen blanketing, used to displace the oxygen in the transfer lines, was hypothesized to reduce the corrosion of the transfer lines. Experimental studies were conducted to investigate the effect of oxygen concentration on the corrosion rate and the initiation of pitting on carbon steel. The results indicated that controlling the oxygen concentration to 0% effectively mitigates corrosion. However, at 5 vol% oxygen, a significant increase in the general corrosion rate and pitting corrosion is observed.

Atmospheric Corrosion↗
DOE OSTI2012

Comparison of Waste Feed Delivery Small Scale Mixing Demonstration Simulant to Hanford Waste

The Hanford double-shell tank (DST) system provides the staging location for waste that will be transferred to the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Specific WTP acceptance criteria for waste feed delivery describe the physical and chemical characteristics of the waste that must be met before the waste is transferred from the DSTs to the WTP. One of the more challenging requirements relates to the sampling and characterization of the undissolved solids (UDS) in a waste feed DST because the waste contains solid particles that settle and their concentration and relative proportion can change during the transfer of the waste in individual batches. A key uncertainty in the waste feed delivery system is the potential variation in UDS transferred in individual batches in comparison to an initial sample used for evaluating the acceptance criteria. To address this uncertainty, a number of small-scale mixing tests have been conducted as part of Washington River Protection Solutions' Small Scale Mixing Demonstration (SSMD) project to determine the performance of the DST mixing and sampling systems. A series of these tests have used a five-part simulant composed of particles of different size and density and designed to be equal or more challenging than AY-102 waste. This five-part simulant, however, has not been compared with the broad range of Hanford waste, and thus there is an additional uncertainty that this simulant may not be as challenging as the most difficult Hanford waste. The purpose of this study is to quantify how the current five-part simulant compares to all of the Hanford sludge waste, and to suggest alternate simulants that could be tested to reduce the uncertainty in applying the current testing results to potentially more challenging wastes.

Hanford Waste↗
DOE OSTI2013

Preliminary Scaling Estimate for Select Small Scale Mixing Demonstration Tests

The Hanford Site double-shell tank (DST) system provides the staging location for waste that will be transferred to the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Specific WTP acceptance criteria for waste feed delivery describe the physical and chemical characteristics of the waste that must be met before the waste is transferred from the DSTs to the WTP. One of the more challenging requirements relates to the sampling and characterization of the undissolved solids (UDS) in a waste feed DST because the waste contains solid particles that settle and their concentration and relative proportion can change during the transfer of the waste in individual batches. A key uncertainty in the waste feed delivery system is the potential variation in UDS transferred in individual batches in comparison to an initial sample used for evaluating the acceptance criteria. To address this uncertainty, a number of small-scale mixing tests have been conducted as part of Washington River Protection Solutions’ Small Scale Mixing Demonstration (SSMD) project to determine the performance of the DST mixing and sampling systems.

Double-shell Tank↗
DOE OSTI2023

Evaluation of High Level Waste Sludge Processing Behavior

The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Hanford Site has 177 underground storage tanks that contain wastes from past nuclear fuel reprocessing and waste-management operations. Over 20% of this waste is in the form of an insoluble sludge that will require slurry modification before its transfer to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Specific WTP acceptance criteria for waste feed delivery describe the physical and chemical characteristics of the waste that must be met before the waste is transferred to the WTP. One challenging requirement relates to the undissolved solids (UDS) composition in a waste feed because the waste contains solid particles that settle, and their concentration and relative proportion can change during the transfer of the waste in individual batches. A key uncertainty is the ability to transfer and mix wastes with large variations in UDS concentrations and resulting settling rates. To address this uncertainty, a number of small scale mixing and settling tests have been conducted to determine the mobilization performance of variable chemistry simulants. Comparison of the size and density of the particulate for each simulant to that of southeast area Hanford sludge was made using metrics for particle mobilization, suspension, settling, and pipeline transfer where dependance on particle size and density may be different, including: 1. Settling velocity, 2. Critical shear stress for erosion, 3. Just-suspended impeller speed, and 4. Pipeline critical transport velocity. Existing high-level waste sludge data has shown the effect that increasing Al concentration has on resulting settled solids. This differential settling of particles in the sludge has the possibility of resulting in solids segregation during feed preparation and uneven particle distribution during pipeline transportation or mixer jet pump operations. Understanding the predictive capabilities of HLW solids settling and transport as well as potential remedies for addressing disparate sludge behaviors can help provide technical guidance during HLW flowsheet planning.

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DOE OSTI2022

Hanford Site Composite Analysis: Comparison of One- and Three-Dimensional Simulation of Vadose Zone Transport and Transfer to Groundwater for Selected Waste Sites

The purpose of this document is to compare 1D and 3D technetium-99 (Tc-99) VZ transport and transfer rates to groundwater for five selected waste sites (two tanks, two cribs, and one trench) to demonstrate the need to consider 3D flow and transport mechanisms and commingling of contaminant plumes originating from adjacent waste sites. The waste sites selected for the comparison evaluation are the 241-A-105 Tank in the A Farms Area model, the 216-B-18 Crib and the 216-B-25 Trench in the BC Cribs and Trenches model, the 216-B-49 Crib in the B Complex model, and the 241-SX-115 Tank in the S Farms Area model. The selected waste sites all represent different disposal or leak conditions, with and without potential impacts due to release-fluid commingling, occurring at the Hanford Site Central Plateau.

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DOE OSTI2015

Waste minimization efforts at the H-Canyon nuclear materials processing facility located at the Savannah River Site - 15535

During the last decade, the H-Canyon at the Savannah River Site (SRS) has employed various means to minimize liquid waste generation and/or to segregate liquid waste that favors generation of low level vs high level wastes. The primary drivers were cost reduction and support of SRS liquid waste tank farm feed to the SRS's Defense Waste Processing Facility. Recent High Level Waste (HLW) volume restrictions (transfers of liquid waste from the H-Canyon to the SRS's Liquid Waste System) imposed on H-Canyon have renewed waste minimization efforts. For the next several years, H-Canyon is faced with a HLW transfer reduction of approximately 65% (reduced from approximately 300,000 gallons to 100,000 gallons). This comes at a time when H-Canyon (and a companion facility named HB-Line) are about to begin executing two high profile missions. (authors)

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NASA NTRS2010

Database for Safety-Oriented Tracking of Chemicals

SafetyChem is a computer program that maintains a relational database for tracking chemicals and associated hazards at Johnson Space Center (JSC) by use of a Web-based graphical user interface. The SafetyChem database is accessible to authorized users via a JSC intranet. All new chemicals pass through a safety office, where information on hazards, required personal protective equipment (PPE), fire-protection warnings, and target organ effects (TOEs) is extracted from material safety data sheets (MSDSs) and recorded in the database. The database facilitates real-time management of inventory with attention to such issues as stability, shelf life, reduction of waste through transfer of unused chemicals to laboratories that need them, quantification of chemical wastes, and identification of chemicals for which disposal is required. Upon searching the database for a chemical, the user receives information on physical properties of the chemical, hazard warnings, required PPE, a link to the MSDS, and references to the applicable International Standards Organization (ISO) 9000 standard work instructions and the applicable job hazard analysis. Also, to reduce the labor hours needed to comply with reporting requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the data can be directly exported into the JSC hazardous- materials database.

Stump, Jacob↗
DOE OSTI2015

Environmental cleanup of the East Tennessee Technology Park - Year three - A status report - 15522

On August 1, 2011, URS - CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) began its five-year, $1.4 billion cleanup of the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), the former Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, located on the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Oak Ridge Reservation (Reservation) in Tennessee. Under the contract, the base period scope of work to be completed by 2016 includes demolition of both the K-25 and K-31 gaseous diffusion buildings and all demolition waste dispositioned, initiation of demolition on the remaining K-27 gaseous diffusion building, safe storage of transuranic (TRU) waste for eventual transfer to the Transuranic Waste Processing Center, previously designated -No-Path-To-Disposition Waste- dispositioned to the extent possible, and completion of design and engineering of a mercury treatment system to be installed at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12). UCOR will have also managed DOE Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM)-owned facilities at ETTP, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and Y-12 in a safe and cost-effective manner. Since assuming responsibilities as the ETTP and Oak Ridge Reservation cleanup contractor, UCOR has completed its life-cycle Performance Measurement Baseline; received its Earned Value Management System (EVMS) certification; completed the deactivation and demolition (D and D) of the 44-acre K-25 gaseous diffusion building; removed and disposed of a contaminated underground storage tank (Tank W-1A) at ORNL; dispositioned mercury-contaminated storage tanks at Y-12; completed closure of the Toxic Substances Control Act Incinerator; disposed of more than 158,000 cubic yards of cleanup waste while managing the on-site Environmental Management Waste Management Facility (EMWMF); and conducted operations, surveillance, and maintenance activities at 180 DOE EM facilities at ETTP, ORNL, and Y-12 in a safe and cost-effective manner. In 2014, UCOR completed the removal and disposal of all of the K-25 demolition debris; completed the removal of asbestos-laden transite siding on the K-31 gaseous diffusion building and began demolition of that 17-acre building; advanced the characterization and deactivation of the K-27 gaseous diffusion building, readying the building for the start of demolition in 2015; advanced the design and engineering of a Mercury Treatment Facility to be located at Y-12; continued the cost-effective and safe disposition of all cleanup wastes; and readied ETTP for Voluntary Protection Program Star Status Assessment in 2015. Project performance as of December 31, 2014, continued to be excellent: - Cost Performance Index - 1.12 - Schedule Performance Index - 1.02 At the same time, since safety is the foundation of all cleanup work, UCOR's safety record goes hand-in-hand with its excellent project performance. Through calendar year 2014, UCOR's recordable injury rate was 1.04 occurrences per 200,000 work hours, and the lost workday case rate was 0.52. This performance continues to be due, in large part, to the people and processes URS and CH2M HILL, the parent companies of UCOR, brought to the project. Key enablers included: - Selected and deployed experienced staff in key leadership positions throughout the organization, continually re-energizing the organization with new leaders - Implemented previously successful safety programs and initiatives from other DOE sites, such as DOE's Voluntary Protection Program - Brought fresh thinking and innovation to tackling tough project issues, such as the deactivation of the Technetium-99-contaminated areas of K-27, applying lessons learned from the D and D of K-25; and implementing a -waste factory- approach to cleanup - Maintained continuing alignment between UCOR's contract with DOE and its Performance Measurement Baseline - rapidly addressing contract changes when they arose - Maintained a readiness both from a process as well as experienced personnel perspective to support DOE OREM in performing other significant Oak Ridge Reservation cleanup activities. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

Development and Qualification of Advancements in Submersible Transfer Pump Performance and Life, and Implications for Advancing and Supporting Processing Options - 13343

From the 1950's through the 1990's, relatively inexpensive, 'off-the-shelf' type, vertical turbine pumps (VTP) were used to transfer Hanford waste. The technology of those pumps was rooted primarily in the mining and agricultural (irrigation) industries. HNF-3218, Double Shell Tank (DST) Transfer Pump History and Reliability Report, 1998, provides a summary of Hanford DST pump history to that date. Such pumps operated in the Hanford radioactive waste environment for an average of only 400 hours before failure. However, at that time, operating life was not a driving criteria within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, as the failure of transfer pumps represented a relatively low replacement and disposal cost. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issuance of the 'Debris Rule' in 1992, which mandated that mixed radioactive waste contaminated equipment be decontaminated to a 'low level waste' category prior to burial, elevated the significance of transfer pump reliability and decontamination capability as life-cycle cost criteria. Minimizing the frequency of transfer pump failures and design for decontamination became significantly important and served to drive the need toward specific, designed for application pumps to meet this challenge. To this end, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) and the supplier, Curtiss-Wright EMD (EMD), have recently collaborated on an intense program to further transfer pump technology and performance. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2015

Andra's strategy and approach for operational safety of French underground facility Cigeo - 15127

According to the French Act on radioactive waste of 28 June 2006, Andra shall design a reversible repository. In response to this demand, Andra is developing the industrial project namely 'Cigeo', a reversible geological disposal facility for HLW and ILW located in Meuse/Haute-Marne. The previous safety cases of 2005, 2009 and 2012 give a sound basis to assess Cigeo's safety both for the operational and post-closure periods. Regarding operational safety, in this new stage of the project, the challenging issues for the preparation of the safety case are the following: - To adapt the various regulatory frameworks (nuclear and non-nuclear) to the underground facility - To design the underground facility and handling equipment's to reduce at first risks in the underground facility as such radioactive particles release, gas explosion, fire and co-activity and limit their consequence. - To establish waste acceptance criteria to be fulfilled by waste producers in line with operational safety and design options. The objective of the paper is to present the experience of Andra in operation safety of the underground facility of Cigeo. Operational safety for Cigeo is assessed as much as possible according to the existing French regulations and guidance for nuclear facilities. Indeed, compared to existing nuclear facilities, a geological repository is a specific case due to the existence of underground facilities with particularities such as: - ventilation management in a large scale underground facility, - fire risk management. As an input for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation, Andra defined a fire guidance and a specific reference safety guidance, based on the adaptation of the French nuclear regulatory texts for and when feasible to mines and tunnels regulatory texts and on its own experience gained through safety operational reports since 2005 and their reviews by the Safety Authority. - underground co-activity of nuclear operation with construction works. According to the common 'defense-in depth' principle for nuclear facilities, these guidelines for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation consider the successive levels of defense of: - Preventing the risk and its spreading by design and construction; - Detecting incidents and early fighting by design and operation dispositions (detection and control systems, survey procedure); - Controlling incidents and limiting of their consequences by safeguarding systems, specific procedures. At that stage, design options for Cigeo constitute an adequate response to the operational safety functions and requirements: - Two levels of containment are set up: the first one is ensured by the waste package, the second one is ensured from the surface facility to the disposal vaults by the transfer cask during the transfer of waste packages in the disposal vaults by the disposal vault itself and a nuclear ventilation with HEPA filter; - Favorable options for fire risk prevention and mitigation: transport system minimizing heat load (cable car for the transfer from the surface, electric transfer engines), twin access tunnels to ease fire-fighting and evacuation...; - Permanent complete physical separation of nuclear zone and construction zone (including ventilation systems). In practice, operation safety assessment of Cigeo, designed following the aforesaid reference safety guidelines, follows a common risk analysis (internal aggressions such as auxiliary losses, chemical and toxic risks, fall or collision, fire, human factors and external aggressions such as earthquake, air traffic, flooding) with the following steps: - Identification of the major risks and the design basis scenarios that have to be considered for dimensioning of the installations and the safety devices; - On the basis of these different situations, those who will have to be quantified are identified; one or more representative and envelop situations are chosen in order to evaluate robustness of the installation. Quantitative evaluation of these situations permits to: - identify the consequences on man, environment and installation, and in particular to gain confidence in the maintaining of the safety functions; - identify or define the technic and/or organisational dispositions classified as 'important elements for protection' (IEP); - Situations beyond dimensioning permit to verify the robustness of the installation. They permit, on one hand to identify possible complementary material or organisational dispositions; on the other hand, to define the 'hard core' i.e. structures, systems and components that permit to maintain the confinement function of radioactive substance. (authors)

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