Sealing fractures to increase underground storage security: Lessons learned from a multiscale multim
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Underground tunnel and void detection is a challenging geophysical problem, and many methods have been proposed. Seismic techniques are promising because of the large seismic velocity contrasts between the air-filled void and the surrounding sediment and concrete. We apply a joint seismic traveltime and waveform inversion method to image a buried tunnel with concrete walls and a void space inside. The joint inversion images the top of the concrete tunnel as a high-velocity anomaly and the void space as a low-velocity anomaly. The location of the velocity anomalies predicted by the method agrees with the known location of the tunnel. As a comparison, the stand-alone full waveform inversion is also applied to the data. The first-arrival traveltime tomography shows weak nonlinearity but fails to image the hidden low-velocity layer. Full waveform inversion is able to image complex near-surface structures, but fitting waveforms may not honor the traveltime fit, especially when the data contain noise. Synthetic and real data tests show that the joint inversion method retains the advantages of both traveltime inversion and full waveform inversion and overcomes their respective drawbacks at the same time. The field example shows the joint inversion provides a better reconstruction of the high-velocity feature representing the top of the concrete wall in terms of its magnitude and location.
This note reports the first double-differential measurements of charged-current $ν_µ$ scattering on argon leading to final states containing zero mesons and one or more protons. This event topology (hereafter abbreviated as CC0$πNp$) is the most common at the neutrino energies typically produced by the Fermilab Booster Neutrino Beam. A detailed understanding of neutrino-argon scattering in the CC0$πNp$ channel is therefore crucial for the success of the precision neutrino oscillation analyses planned for the Short-Baseline Neutrino (SBN) program. This remains true for the upcoming Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE), but the higher mean neutrino energy used there will ensure that more inelastic reaction modes, such as single pion production, will also play a major role. The analysis described in this note builds on a previous MicroBooNE study of the CC0$πNp$ channel which obtained the first single-differential cross-section measurements on an argon target. Since that foundational work, significant improvements have been made to MicroBooNE’s simulation software, event reconstruction algorithms, and procedure for calculating systematic uncertainties. When combined with a larger dataset (corresponding to a beam exposure of 6.79 × 10 20 protons-on-target versus 1.60 × 10 20 in Ref. [3]), these enhancements allow the important CC0$πNp$ channel to be studied in more detail. This note begins with a description of the data and simulation samples used as input to the analysis. Section 3 then defines the CC0$πNp$ signal event topology, and Section 4 describes a set of selection criteria designed to identify these events in MicroBooNE data. Binning schemes are then defined in Section 5 for two double-differential measurements of event rates. The first of these considers the momentum and scattering cosine of the outgoing muon, while the second reports the same observables for the leading proton, i.e., the final-state proton with the largest momentum. After a discussion of systematic uncertainties in Section 6, the note concludes by comparing the predictions of MicroBooNE Monte Carlo (MC) simulations to the measured double-differential distributions. These results will form the basis for a future extraction of flux-averaged double-differential CC0$πNp$ cross sections that will be immediately comparable to the theoretical predictions of multiple neutrino event generators. The selection described herein may also be used to study various other observables in CC0$πNp$ events, including those which are sensitive to correlations between leptonic and hadronic kinematics in the final state.
We develop a novel Time Projection Chamber (TPC) concept suitable for deployment in kilotonne-scale detectors, with a charge-readout system free from reconstruction ambiguities, and a robust TPC design that reduces high-voltage risks while increasing the coverage of the light-collection system and maximizing the active volume. This novel concept could be used as a far detector module in the Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE). For the charge-readout system, we used the charge-collection pixels and associated application-specific integrated circuits currently being developed for the liquid argon (LAr) component of the DUNE Near Detector design, ArgonCube. In addition, we divided the TPC into a number of shorter drift volumes, reducing the total voltage used to drift the ionization electrons, and minimizing the stored energy per TPC. Segmenting the TPC also contains scintillation light, allowing for precise trigger localization and a more expansive light-readout system. Furthermore, the design opens the possibility of replacing or upgrading components. These augmentations could substantially improve the reliability and the sensitivity, particularly for low-energy signals, in comparison to traditional monolithic LArTPCs with projective-wire charge readouts.
The EGS Collab project, supported by the US Department of Energy, is performing intensively monitored rock stimulation and flow tests at the 10-m scale in an underground research laboratory to address challenges in implementing enhanced geothermal systems (EGS). Data and observations from the field tests are compared to simulations to understand processes and build confidence in numerical modeling of the processes. We have completed Experiment 1 (of 3), which examined hydraulic fracturing in a well-characterized underground fractured phyllite test bed at a depth of approximately 1.5 km at the Sanford Underground Research Facility (SURF) in Lead, South Dakota. Testbed characterization included fracture mapping, borehole acoustic and optical televiewers, full waveform sonic, conductivity, resistivity, temperature, campaign p- and s-wave investigations and electrical resistance tomography. Borehole geophysical techniques including passive seismic, continuous active source seismic monitoring, electrical resistance tomography, fiber-based distributed strain, distributed temperature, and distributed acoustic monitoring, were used to carefully monitor stimulation events and flow tests. More than a dozen stimulations and nearly one year of flow tests were performed. Quality data and detailed observations were collected and analyzed during stimulation and water flow tests using ambient temperature and chilled water. We achieved adaptive control of the tests using real-time monitoring and rapid dissemination of data and near-real-time simulation. More detailed numerical simulation was performed to answer key experimental design questions, forecast fracture propagation trajectories and extents, and analyze and evaluate results. Data are freely available from the Geothermal Data Repository. Experiment 2 examines the potential for hydraulic shearing in amphibolite at a depth of about 1.25 km at SURF. This site has a different set of stress and fracture conditions than Experiment 1. The Experiment 2 testbed consists of nine subhorizontal boreholes configured in two fans of two boreholes which surround the testbed and contain grouted-in electrical resistance tomography, seismic sensors, active seismic sources and distributed fiber sensors. A “five-spot” set of test wells that extends from a custom mined alcove includes an injection well and four production/monitoring wells. The testbed was characterized geophysically and hydrologically, and three stimulations have been performed using the Step-Rate Injection Method for Fracture In-Situ Properties (SIMFIP) tool to measure strains, and a new strain quantifying tool (downhole robotic strain analysis tool -DORSA) was deployed in a monitoring hole during stimulation. Real-time data were broadcast during stimulations to allow real-time response to arising issues.
The manufactured chemical pollutants, like 1,4 dioxane and PFAS (per- and polyfluroralkyl substances), found in the underground water and/or drinking water are challenging to be removed or biodegraded. Energetic electrons are capable of mediating and removing them. This paper utilizes FLUKA code to evaluate the beam-wastewater interaction effects with different energy, space and divergence distributions of the electron beam. With 8 MeV average energy, the electron beam exits from a 0.0127 cm thick titanium window, travels through a 4.3 cm distance air and a second 0.0127 cm thick stainless water container window with 2.43 cm radius, and finally is injected into the water area, where the volume of water is around 75 cubic cm. The distribution parameters of the electron beam are from the GPT (General Particle Tracer) simulations for UITF (Upgraded Injector Test Facility) in Jefferson lab. By varying the distributions, several measurements including the dose (or energy deposition) distribution, electron fluence, photon fluence are scored and compared. Taking the comparisons into consideration, this paper is aiming to find better electron beams for the wastewater irradiation.
The manufactured chemical pollutants, like 1,4 dioxane and PFAS (per- and polyfluroralkyl substances), found in the underground water and/or drinking water are challenging to be removed or biodegraded. Energetic electrons are capable of mediating and removing them. This paper utilizes FLUKA code to evaluate the beam-wastewater interaction effects with different energy, space and divergence distributions of the electron beam. With 8 MeV average energy, the electron beam exits from a 0.0127 cm thick titanium window, travels through a 4.3 cm distance air and a second 0.0127 cm thick stainless water container window with 2.43 cm radius, and finally is injected into the water area, where the volume of water is around 75 cubic cm. The distribution parameters of the electron beam are from the GPT (General Particle Tracer) simulations for UITF (Upgraded Injector Test Facility) in Jefferson lab. By varying the distributions, several measurements including the dose (or energy deposition) distribution, electron fluence, photon fluence are scored and compared. Taking the comparisons into consideration, this paper is aiming to find better electron beams for the wastewater irradiation.
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Building 01-103, the Drill Bit Repair Building was originally recorded as SHPO Resource No. B18848 in 2020 during an architectural survey of the Area 1 Subdock (Collins et al. 2022). It was recommended individually eligible for listing in the NRHP under Criteria A and C and contributing to the significance of the Area 1 Subdock Historic District. The SHPO concurred with these determinations in a letter dated April 29, 2022 (Reed 2022). The Drill Bit Repair Building retains all seven aspects of integrity. The location, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association have not changed since its original construction. The design was modified slightly in 1996 with the addition of a removable and non-destructive chain-link fence. Nearby buildings 01-101 and 01-102 were removed (Collins and Menocal 2020) but the other buildings and storage yards remain. Therefore, the integrity of setting has been changed, but not to the degree that the building no longer conveys its significance (see Figures 4 and 5 for comparison). Building 01-103 was constructed in 1985 to coincide with the relocation of the Area 3 Subdock to Area 1. The design for the new Subdock provided a centralized cluster of buildings surrounded by two large storage yards. The buildings included administrative and engineering office space, warehouses, a radiograph building, and Building 01-103 as the drill bit maintenance and repair building, among others. The Drill Bit Repair Building was critical to the success of underground nuclear testing and is eligible under Criterion A for its contribution to broad patterns of history by maintaining specially designed equipment for underground nuclear testing at the NNSS. It is also eligible under Criterion C as it is the only recorded example of a facility built specifically for the maintenance of big-hole drill bits on the NNSS. As it retains both significance and integrity, it remains individually eligible under Criteria A and C. In addition to its individual significance, the Drill Bit Repair Building also contributes to the significance of the Area 1 Subdock Historic District as a representative of a big-hole drilling support facility necessary for underground nuclear testing. The building and the equipment therein were designed specifically for testing at the NNSS, where much of the early technology and methods for big-hole drilling were developed. Its removal will result in not only the demolition of a contributing element but also a change in the physical features of the district’s setting that contribute to its historic significance. The change in setting will diminish the district’s integrity. However, the district still contains numerous examples of other buildings constructed for the purpose of supporting big-hole drilling and remains eligible under Criteria A and C.
Conference presentation at Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage (CCUS) Conference 2024, Houston, Texas, March 11–13, 2024. We investigated the use of active seismoelectric monitoring (ASE) to determine its effectiveness in detecting CO 2 injected deep underground and as an additional monitoring option for carbon storage projects. The EERC performed an ASE survey in February of 2023 at Pennel oil field near Baker, Montana, as part of the U.S. Department of Energy-sponsored Williston Basin CO 2 Field Laboratory in conjunction with operating partner Denbury Inc. The field site is part of the Cedar Creek Anticline geologic structure, with CO 2 planned for injection into a stacked storage complex (SSC) in the Interlake Formation containing both a residual oil zone and a conventional reservoir. The objective was to test the ASE method’s ability to characterize baseline fluid distribution in both the near surface and the SSC prior to CO 2 injection.
During the final phase of a long-term project, a total of 80 TRU waste drums at ORNL have been retrieved from a below-grade storage vault in which they have remained untouched for about 25 years. The drums, which house material generated from past ORNL operations, are now stored and ready for eventual transfer to the Transuranic Waste Processing Center, located on Highway 95 in Oak Ridge. The Transuranic Waste Processing Center will process and ship the drums to WIPP in Carlsbad, New Mexico, for disposal. Workers lifted the drums one-by-one from the underground storage vault with a 110-ton crane over a one-week period in October 2017. Although the physical work was performed in one week, years of detailed planning preceded the fieldwork. A key obstacle needed to be overcome before the project could safely proceed. This obstacle involved the need to ensure controls were developed for the Deflagration to Detonation Transition (DDT) potential. DDT refers to a phenomenon in ignitable mixtures of a flammable gas and air (or oxygen) when a sudden transition takes place from a deflagration type of combustion to a detonation type of explosion. Basically, these drums, under certain circumstances, have a potential to detonate and overpressurize. Extensive analysis of the drums verified that detonation, while unlikely, was possible. Of the total 103 drums that were retrieved or moved in preparation for retrieval, 18 had DDT potential. Extensive security requirements were also necessary, due to the nature of the material, and this added another layer of complexity to the fieldwork. Prior to retrieving the drums from the underground storage vault, space needed to be made for them within the various above-grade facilities. Inventory and security requirements dictated what could be stored where, and the first step of the field work involved a number of drum movements in preparation for storage of the newly retrieved drums. This effort involved moving 21 drums already in the storage area to facilitate the addition of the newly retrieved ones. The retrieval project required a total of 107 critical lifts using the 110-ton crane, under 3 critical lift plans. The TRU waste storage facility is a Category 2 Nuclear Facility and is managed under an extensive Documented Safety Analysis. The TRU retrieval project was conducted in accordance with DOE Order 425.1D and included three Implementation Verification Reviews, two Management Assessments, one Readiness Assessment, and seven mock-ups in preparation for the field work. Despite being stored for 25 years, the drums were in good shape due to the integrity of the facilities where the drums were stored. Of the 80 drums that were retrieved, 12 were placed in special containers called 'overpacks' based on their content. The drums were removed safely and without incident, thanks to a lot of preparation and the efforts of a highly skilled team. Lessons learned through the DDT control development and the drum retrieval and overpacking process could be beneficial to others having to manage similar drums of TRU waste. (authors)
This addendum to the CR for CAU 98, Frenchman Flat, NNSS, Nevada (compiled in DOE/EMNV, 2019) defines the long-term monitoring approach after a five-year evaluation of water sampling results, water-level measurements, and trends in water-level measurements. The approach was developed by Navarro and discussed in the report Corrective Action Unit 98: Frenchman Flat Five-Year Evaluation Nevada National Security Site, Nevada (DOE/EMNV, 2022), which was approved by NDEP. Sections 4.0 and 5.0 of the CR were rewritten to reflect the approach discussed in the five-year evaluation. Appendix C contains well construction diagrams that have been updated since the original CR was published. Appendix D contains updated Use Restriction (UR) forms and maps. NDEP requested an addendum instead of a complete revision to the Frenchman Flat CR so the history of the CR would not be lost.
Primary cementing is the most important operation performed on a subterranean well. Cement, placed in the annulus between the casing and the formations, serves as a hydraulic seal preventing fluids and gas migrations, protecting steel casing from corrosion, and supporting the well structure. Poor cementing jobs can be directly responsible for wells not reaching their full capacity, casing corrosion, compromised well integrity and, in the worst-case scenarios, well collapse. Geothermal, thermal recovery, and carbon storage wells offer environments that are especially difficult for cements to survive while the required lifespan of these wells can be years. In these wells currently used cements cannot provide durable well integrity, and new solutions are necessary. The necessity of stabilizing the electric grid, increasing its flexibility, and providing energy on demand will further expand the market of durable cement solutions for applications in high-temperature underground reservoir thermal energy storage wells (HT RTES). The design challenges of special cement systems for such wells originate from chemistry limitations of currently used well cements, aggressive environments, temperature and repeated shock conditions associated with them, and very weak formations that are not uncommon in these wells. During the last 70 years the most common systems for thermal-well construction have been Ordinary Portland Cement (OPC) (absolute majority of the wells), silica-lime system, and high aluminum cement-containing formulations. The major issues of calcium-silicate hydrates, that form during the hydration of OPC resulting in hardened material, are their poor chemical resistance to acids due to the calcium interactions with acid anions followed by its eventual dissolution, even in mild acids, such as carbonic acid from CO 2 dissolution, and inadequate bonding to the steel causing serious casing corrosion problems (Sugama & Pyatina, 2019). Performance of OPC-based cement may be significantly improved with organic additives; however, those are limited by their temperature stability. An alternative to calcium-silicate cement was developed by BNL and commercialized by Halliburton as ThermaLock TM cement. Calcium-aluminate-phosphate-based chemistry of the material allowed overcoming acid-resistance problems of OPC, especially in CO 2 -rich geothermal environments. In 2012-2015, building upon this experience, BNL developed Thermal Shock Resistant Cement (TSRC) with the support of Geothermal Technology Office (GTO) of DOE. TSRC has high-temperature stable chemistry, superior properties of cement-metal casing bond and corrosion protection (4-times better than currently used OPC-based formulation), significantly outperforms common well-cements in thermal-shock tests, has self-healing properties, and like ThermaLock TM is CO 2 resistant incorporating carbonate ions into stable hydrates (Gill et al., 2012).
Radioactive waste is stored in underground, carbon-steel double-shell tanks at the Department of Energy Hanford site.1,2,3 The underground transfer lines are used to transfer the waste between the tanks and other assets at the Hanford tank farm facilities. The transfer lines constructed before 1990 are pipe-in-pipe design with most of the lines having carbon steel carrier pipe and carbon steel encasements. The lines constructed after 1990 have a stainless-steel carrier with a carbon steel encasement. The carrier lines, which are in contact with the waste, provide a critical confinement function, while the encasements provide secondary containment to reduce the risk of a release and contamination to the environment. In 2022, a visual inspection of the annulus between the encasement and the carrier for one of the pre-1990 transfer lines revealed standing liquid in contact with the carrier pipe. Additionally, a significant build-up of corrosion products on the exterior of the carrier pipe and the interior of the encasement pipe was observed. To assess the extent of condition, borescope inspections were performed in the encasement space of additional transfer lines in the facility to provide a baseline. The inspection revealed that of the lines inspected, 29 had either moisture present or evidence that moisture had been present in the past (e.g., waterline corrosion where the pipe had been exposed to standing water). Additional inspections indicated several instances of pitting corrosion on the interior of the encasement and exterior the carrier transfer lines. An image of the carrier pipe with several pits is presented in Figure 1(a) and the profiled image of the transfer line section along with the pit depths are presented Figure 1(b). As seen in the figure, the deepest pit was 73 mils on the pipe section. These lines were designated as “do-not-use” until further compensatory actions are implemented to return the lines to service.
Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are monitored to determine whether the URs remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Monitoring data will be used in the future, once multiple years of data are available, to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. Six wells were sampled for water-quality monitoring in 2019. Contaminants of concern were detected only in the two source/plume wells already known to contain contamination as a result of a radionuclide migration experiment. Tritium concentrations in both of these wells, RNM-2S and UE-5n, remain above the Safe Drinking Water Act maximum contaminant level of 20,000 picocuries per liter but declined in 2019 as compared to measurements in 2018. All other contaminants of concern are below the minimum detection level plus analytical error. The water-level monitoring network includes 16 wells. Depth to water measured in 2019 is generally consistent with recent measurements for all wells. Many wells continue to exhibit a long-term downward trend in water level, though changes from 2018 to 2019 are minimal. The sharp 2016 decline in water level in Well ER-5-3-2 remains unexplained, with the lower level persisting through 2019. Rising water-level trends continue to be observed in Well ER-5-3 deep piezometer and former water supply Well WW-5A. Water supply Well WW-5B experienced a rise in water level as a result of an absence of pumping in the first part of the year (due to a mechanical problem), whereas water levels declined in WW-4 and WW-4A in response to greater pumping in 2019. Institutional control monitoring confirmed the URs are recorded in U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Air Force land management systems, and that no activities within Frenchman Flat basin are occurring that could potentially affect the contaminant boundaries. Survey of groundwater resources in basins surrounding Frenchman Flat similarly identify no current or pending development that would indicate the need to increase monitoring activities or would otherwise cause concern for the closure decision. The URs continue to prevent exposure of the public, workers, and the environment to contaminants of concern by preventing use of potentially contaminated groundwater.
The Main Storage Yard was originally recorded as SHPO Resource No. S2772 in 2020 during an architectural survey of the Area 1 Subdock (Collins et al. 2022). It was recommended individually eligible for listing in the NRHP under Criteria A and C and as contributing to the significance of the potential Area 1 Subdock Historic District. The SHPO concurred with these determinations in a letter dated April 29, 2022 (Reed). The Main Storage Yard retains all seven aspects of integrity. The location, design, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association have not changed since the original construction. Since the purpose of the yard is to maintain storage equipment that is actively being used, the design and feeling will change each time equipment is moved. Such actions reinforce the integrity of design and feeling. Buildings 01-101 and 01-102 were removed (Collins and Menocal 2020), but the other buildings and storage yard remain. Therefore, the setting has been changed, but not to the degree that the Main Storage Yard no longer conveys its significance (see Figures 4 and 5 for comparison). The Main Storage Yard was designed to facilitate the relocation of the Area 3 Subdock to Area 1 in 1985. The design for the overall Subdock provided a centralized cluster of buildings surrounded by two large storage yards. While the North Storage Yard largely serves as overflow storage, the Main Storage Yard holds the majority of drill rigs and drilling equipment needed to support big hole drilling. The Main Storage Yard and its contents were essential elements of the nuclear testing drilling program on the NNSS thus making it eligible for the NRHP under Criterion A for its contribution to broad patterns of history by storing specially designed equipment for underground nuclear testing at the NNSS. It is also eligible under Criterion C as it is an engineered landscape that now serves as an open-air repository of drilling technology and nuclear testing. In addition to its individual significance, the Main Storage Yard also contributes to the significance of the Area 1 Subdock Historic District as it showcases a variety of big-hole drilling equipment, support facilities, and warehouses that were specially designed for nuclear testing at the NNSS. Despite the demolition of two contributing elements to date, the district still contains numerous examples of other facilities with the purpose of supporting big-hole drilling; therefore, the district still remains eligible under Criteria A and C.
Hydrogen energy storage can be used to achieve goals of national energy security, renewable energy integration, and grid resilience. Adapting underground natural gas storage facility (UNGSF) infrastructure for underground hydrogen storage (UHS) is one method of storing large quantities of hydrogen that has already largely been proven to work for natural gas. There are currently some underground salt caverns in the United States that are being used for hydrogen storage by commercial entities, but it is still a fairly new concept in that it has not been widely deployed nor has it been done with other geologic formations like depleted hydrocarbon reservoirs. Assessments of UHS systems can help identify and evaluate risks to people both working within the facility and residing nearby. This report provides example risk assessment methodologies and analyses for generic wellhead and processing facility configurations, specifically in the context of the risks of unintentional hydrogen releases into the air. Assessment of the hydrogen containment in the subsurface is also critically important for a safety assessment for a UHS facility, but those geomechanical assessments are not included in this report.
The method developed and presented here improves our nuclear explosion monitoring capability by providing a new independent and transportable method to determine the explosive yields of seismically recorded events associated with foreign weapons development. Here we report new independent absolute yield and depth of burial estimates of the North Korean nuclear tests which are commensurate with previously determined source parameters. The key advantage of this method over other methods which estimate absolute explosive yields is that this method does not require any a priori calibration, and can be immediately applied to any region of interest. This method uses the source information obtained from the spectral ratios of envelopes of measured seismic coda waves to invert for model-derived yield and depth of burial. The only requirements of this method are that the region of interest must contain several (> 3) seismic sources which have been well recorded (SNR > 2) by a set of shared stations. For regions with only a few events (~ 3) and/or extremely band-limited observations for which the depth of burial is unknown, an earthquake with a known magnitude may be required to obtain an accurate and robust yield estimate.