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101 records · Page 6

Targeted Health Assessment for Wastes Contained at the Niagara Falls Storage Site to Guide Planning for Remedial Action Alternatives - 13428

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is evaluating potential remedial alternatives at the 191-acre Niagara Falls Storage Site (NFSS) in Lewiston, New York, under the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). The Manhattan Engineer District (MED) and Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) brought radioactive wastes to the site during the 1940's and 1950's, and the U.S. Department of Energy (US DOE) consolidated these wastes into a 10-acre interim waste containment structure (IWCS) in the southwest portion of the site during the 1980's. The USACE is evaluating remedial alternatives for radioactive waste contained within the IWCS at the NFSS under the Feasibility Study phase of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) process. A preliminary evaluation of the IWCS has been conducted to assess potential airborne releases associated with uncovered wastes, particularly during waste excavation, as well as direct exposures to uncovered wastes. Key technical issues for this assessment include: (1) limitations in waste characterization data; (2) representative receptors and exposure routes; (3) estimates of contaminant emissions at an early stage of the evaluation process; (4) consideration of candidate meteorological data and air dispersion modeling approaches; and (5) estimates of health effects from potential exposures to both radionuclides and chemicals that account for recent updates of exposure and toxicity factors. Results of this preliminary health risk assessment indicate if the wastes were uncovered and someone stayed at the IWCS for a number of days to weeks, substantial doses and serious health effects could be incurred. Current controls prevent such exposures, and the controls that would be applied to protect onsite workers during remedial action at the IWCS would also effectively protect the public nearby. This evaluation provides framing context for the upcoming development and detailed evaluation of remedial alternatives for the IWCS. (authors)

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In-Situ Radiological Surveys to Address Nuclear Criticality Safety Requirements During Remediation Activities at the Shallow Land Disposal Area, Armstrong County, Pennsylvania - 12268

Cabrera Services Inc. (CABRERA) is the remedial contractor for the Shallow Land Disposal Area (SLDA) Site in Armstrong County Pennsylvania, a United States (US) Army Corps of Engineers - Buffalo District (USACE) contract. The remediation is being completed under the USACE's Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) which was established to identify, investigate, and clean up or control sites previously used by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its predecessor, the Manhattan Engineer District (MED). As part of the management of the FUSRAP, the USACE is overseeing investigation and remediation of radiological contamination at the SLDA Site in accordance with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 US Code (USC), Section 9601 et. seq, as amended and, the National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 300.430(f) (2). The objective of this project is to clean up radioactive waste at SLDA. The radioactive waste contains special nuclear material (SNM), primarily U-235, in 10 burial trenches, Cabrera duties include processing, packaging and transporting the waste to an offsite disposal facility in accordance with the selected remedial alternative as defined in the Final Record of Decision (USACE, 2007). Of particular importance during the remediation is the need to address nuclear criticality safety (NCS) controls for the safe exhumation and management of waste containing fissile materials. The partnership between Cabrera Services, Inc. and Measutronics Corporation led to the development of a valuable survey tool and operating procedure that are essential components of the SLDA Criticality Safety and Material Control and Accountability programs. Using proven existing technologies in the design and manufacture of the Mobile Survey Cart, the continued deployment of the Cart will allow for an efficient and reliable methodology to allow for the safe exhumation of the Special Nuclear Material in existing SLDA trenches. (authors)

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Site closeout of the Linde FUSRAP Site, Tonawanda, New York - 15441

The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Buffalo District, with assistance from Argonne National Laboratory (Argonne), prepared a Site Closeout Report (SCOR) for the Linde Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) Site in accordance with Engineer Regulation (ER) 200-1-4 [1]. Under FUSRAP, USACE is authorized to investigate, and clean up or control sites contaminated as the result of actions by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its predecessor, the Manhattan Engineer District (MED), in support of the nation's early atomic energy and weapons program. The SCOR documents response actions conducted at the Linde FUSRAP Site between 1996 and 2013. These response actions include two non-time-critical removal actions and long-term remedies associated with the three operable units (OUs) at the site: 1) soils and structure surfaces (except Building 14), 2) Building 14, and 3) groundwater. The report summarizes the site history, previous investigations, selected remedies, remedial actions, waste disposal, community involvement, monitoring results, recycling, quality assurance/quality control practices, post-remediation dose assessment, remedial costs, and five year review requirements. (authors)

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TH-E-9A-01: Medical Physics 1.0 to 2.0, Session 4: Computed Tomography, Ultrasound and Nuclear Medicine

Medical Physics 2.0 is a bold vision for an existential transition of clinical imaging physics in face of the new realities of value-based and evidencebased medicine, comparative effectiveness, and meaningful use. It speaks to how clinical imaging physics can expand beyond traditional insular models of inspection and acceptance testing, oriented toward compliance, towards team-based models of operational engagement, prospective definition and assurance of effective use, and retrospective evaluation of clinical performance. Organized into four sessions of the AAPM, this particular session focuses on three specific modalities as outlined below. CT 2.0: CT has been undergoing a dramatic transition in the last few decades. While the changes in the technology merits discussions of their own, an important question is how clinical medical physicists are expected to effectively engage with the new realities of CT technology and practice. Consistent with the upcoming paradigm of Medical Physics 2.0, this CT presentation aims to provide definitions and demonstration of the components of the new clinical medical physics practice pertaining CT. The topics covered include physics metrics and analytics that aim to provide higher order clinicallyrelevant quantification of system performance as pertains to new (and not so new) technologies. That will include the new radiation and dose metrics (SSDE, organ dose, risk indices), image quality metrology (MTF/NPS/d’), task-based phantoms, and the effect of patient size. That will follow with a discussion of the testing implication of new CT hardware (detectors, tubes), acquisition methods (innovative helical geometries, AEC, wide beam CT, dual energy, inverse geometry, application specialties), and image processing and analysis (iterative reconstructions, quantitative CT, advanced renditions). The presentation will conclude with a discussion of clinical and operational aspects of Medical Physics 2.0 including training and communication, use optimization (dose and technique factors), automated analysis and data management (automated QC methods, protocol tracking, dose monitoring, issue tracking), and meaningful QC considerations. US 2.0: Ultrasound imaging is evolving at a rapid pace, adding new imaging functions and modes that continue to enhance its clinical utility and benefits to patients. The ultrasound talk will look ahead 10–15 years and consider how medical physicists can bring maximal value to the clinical ultrasound practices of the future. The roles of physics in accreditation and regulatory compliance, image quality and exam optimization, clinical innovation, and education of staff and trainees will all be considered. A detailed examination of expected technology evolution and impact on image quality metrics will be presented. Clinical implementation of comprehensive physics services will also be discussed. Nuclear Medicine 2.0: Although the basic science of nuclear imaging has remained relatively unchanged since its inception, advances in instrumentation continue to advance the field into new territories. With a great number of these advances occurring over the past decade, the role and testing strategies of clinical nuclear medicine physicists must evolve in parallel. The Nuclear Medicine 2.0 presentation is designed to highlight some of the recent advances from a clinical medical physicist perspective and provide ideas and motivation for designing better evaluation strategies. Topics include improvement of traditional physics metrics and analytics, testing implications of hybrid imaging and advanced detector technologies, and strategies for effective implementation into the clinic. Learning Objectives: Become familiar with new physics metrics and analytics in nuclear medicine, CT, and ultrasound. To become familiar with the major new developments of clinical physics support. To understand the physics testing implications of new technologies, hardware, software, and applications. Identify approaches for implementing comprehensive medical physics services in future imaging practices.

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Uranium Distribution Coefficient (Kd) Determination and Use in Assessing Transport, Fate, and Risk at Jefferson Proving Ground, I - 18593

Jefferson Proving Ground (JPG), located near Madison, Indiana is a 55,000-acre site with firing ranges for test firing of conventional munitions and depleted uranium penetrators. The penetrators were fired from three positions, but the majority (89 percent) was fired from a single location. Impacts from the penetrators along this firing line created an impact trench roughly 5 meters (m) to 8 m wide, 1,200 m long, and 1 m deep. Periodic surface sweeps were conducted to recover test fired penetrators, but roughly 73,500 kilograms (kg) of depleted uranium (DU) still remain at JPG. Co-located and intermingled with the penetrators are unexploded ordnance (UXO), making complete recovery and site restoration both risky and costly. Understanding the transport and fate of the depleted uranium at JPG was critical to assessing the potential radiological risks posed to human health and the environment from the penetrators and associated impacted soils on site. JPG is underlain by loess (wind-blown silt), glacial till, and carbonate bedrock, and transected by surface water (Big Creek, Middle Fork Creek, and smaller tributaries). The Army determined site-specific values of the uranium distribution coefficient (Kd) for each of the underlying units. The Army evaluated uranium transport and fate in column, groundwater, and surface water models. The Army used the Residual Radiation (RESRAD)- OFFSITE code to complete the uranium risk assessment for a period of 1,000 years. Results from the site-specific Kd tests are presented in this paper along with its use and results in assessing transport, fate, and potential risks associated with exposure to the penetrators remaining at JPG. The authors supported the decommissioning activities discussed in this paper under the direction of and with funding from the U.S. Army, specifically the U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM, Robert N. Cherry), U.S. Army Environmental Command (AEC, Joan F. Jackson), and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE, Andrew [Brooks] Evens). (authors)

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Integrating intrusive and nonintrusive characterization methods to achieve a conceptual site model for the SLDA FUSRAP site - 8265.

The US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is addressing radiological contamination following Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) requirements at the Shallow Land Disposal Area (SLDA) site, which is a radiologically contaminated property that is part of the Formerly utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). The SLDA is an 18-hectare (44-acre) site in Parks township, Armstrong County, Pennsylvania, about 37 kilometers (23 miles) east-northeast of Pittsburgh. According to historical record, radioactive wastes were disposed of at the SLDA in a series of trenches by the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Company (NUMEC) in the 1960s. The wastes originated from the nearby Apollo nuclear fuel fabrication facility, which began operations under NUMEC in the late 1950s and fabricated enriched uranium into naval reactor fuel elements. It is believed that the waste materials were buried in a series of pits constructed adjacent to one another in accordance with an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) regulation that has since been rescinded. A CERCLA remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) process was completed for the SLDA site, and the results of the human health risk assessment indicated that the radiologically contaminated wastes could pose a risk to human health in the future. There are no historical records that provide the exact location of these pits. However, based on geophysical survey results conducted in the 1980s, these pits were defined by geophysical anomalies and were depicted on historical site drawings as trenches. At the SLDA site, a combination of investigative methods and tools was used in the RI/FS and site characterization activities. The SLDA site provides an excellent example of how historical documents and data, historical aerial photo analysis, physical sampling, and nonintrusive geophysical and gamma walkover surveys were used in combination to reduce the uncertainty in the location of the trenches. The data and information from these sources were used to refine the conceptual site model, complete the RI/FS, and support the ongoing remedial design and action, which will achieve site closure acceptable to all stakeholders.

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Million Worker Study

Radiation health issues have been an important aspect of DOE's Worker Safety and Health programs. The goal is to ensure that workers are adequately protected from the various radiological hazards associated with DOE sites and operations. Since the early 1940’s DOE has supported the conduct of epidemiologic studies of practically every DOE (AEC) facility and collected these data, now managed by the Oak Ridge Associated Universities (ORAU), in remarkable detail. In the early 2000s, the Office of Health, Safety and Security authorized access to specific DOE worker datasets. Shortly thereafter, the DOE Office of Science provided funds for a pilot study that confirmed the feasibility of the Million Worker Study (MWS), and then additional resources were provided (with other agencies) to extend the follow-up of many populations, not just DOE workers, but also atomic veterans, industrial radiographers, nuclear power plant workers and medical radiation workers (the Million Persons Study (MPS)). This proposal was a continuation of support provided by DOE, specifically to extend the follow-up of the worker populations at the Mallinckrodt Chemical Works (MCW) and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The work addresses DOE’s interest in clarifying the health risks of their workers as well as contributing knowledge on radiation risks that is relevant today with regard to compensation schemes. The findings are also important for the US public in light of the increased population exposure to medical imaging, environmental circumstances such as hydraulic fracturing, increased exposures during high altitude flights, and with regard to nuclear accidents such as Fukushima and possible terrorist events. Furthermore, it is important to consider reducing the uncertainty in current risk estimates by developing risk coefficients based on healthy American workers who are more representative of U.S. workers and the general public than 1945 Japanese survivors of the atomic bombs living in a war-torn country which experienced deprivation, malnourishment, and increased rates of infections and other diseases. But more importantly, it is important to learn whether radiation exposures received gradually over time (e.g., years) are more or less effective in causing health effects, cancer in particular, than if the radiation dose is received all at once in a fraction of a second as experienced by the Japanese atomic bomb survivors. Finally, the ability to evaluate and combine large populations with intakes of radionuclides such as uranium, radium, plutonium, americium and polonium will provide new quantitative knowledge on human health effects that hitherto has not been possible. This cost-efficient study has built on the investments made and foundations laid by investigators and government agencies, including DOE, over the past 30-40 years, which have established early worker cohorts that can now provide answers to questions on the lifetime human health risks associated with low-level radiation exposures. Collaborating institutions included: International Epidemiology Institute, Oak Ridge Associated Universities, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Landauer, Inc., and Vanderbilt University. Follow-up of these two populations and the integration of them with the many other cohorts (now a total of 31) in the MPS continues under a separate DOE grant (DE-AU0000046).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Integrating Intrusive and Non-intrusive Characterization Methods To Achieve A Conceptual Site Model For The SLDA FUSRAP

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is addressing radiological contamination following Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) requirements at the Shallow Land Disposal Area (SLDA) site, which is a radiologically contaminated property that is part of the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP). The SLDA is an 18-hectare (44- acre) site in Parks Township, Armstrong County, Pennsylvania, about 37 kilometers (23 miles) east-northeast of Pittsburgh. According to historical record, radioactive wastes were disposed of at the SLDA in a series of trenches by the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Company (NUMEC) in the 1960's. The wastes originated from the nearby Apollo nuclear fuel fabrication facility, which began operations under NUMEC in the late 1950's and fabricated enriched uranium into naval reactor fuel elements. It is believed that the waste materials were buried in a series of pits constructed adjacent to one another in accordance with an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) regulation that has since been rescinded. A CERCLA remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) process was completed for the SLDA site, and the results of the human health risk assessment indicated that the radiologically contaminated wastes could pose a risk to human health in the future. There are no historical records that provide the exact location of these pits. However, based on geophysical survey results conducted in the 1980's, these pits were defined by geophysical anomalies and were depicted on historical site drawings as trenches. At the SLDA site, a combination of investigative methods and tools was used in the RI/FS and site characterization activities. The SLDA site provides an excellent example of how historical documents and data, historical aerial photo analysis, physical sampling, and non-intrusive geophysical and gamma walkover surveys were used in combination to reduce the uncertainty in the location of the trenches. The data and information from these sources were used to refine the conceptual site model, complete the RI/FS, and support the ongoing remedial design and action, which will achieve site closure acceptable to all stakeholders. (authors)

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Decommissioning Status and Preliminary Engineering Planning for Chinshan NPP in Taiwan - 19114

The Chinshan Nuclear Power Plant, which consists of two BWR units and was owned by Taiwan Power Company (TPC), has an electrical output of 636 MWe for each unit. Unit No. 1 and Unit No. 2 were licensed till December 2018 and July 2019, respectively. According to regulations of decommissioning in Taiwan, decontamination and dismantling of a NPP should be completed within 25 years. Therefore, TPC had started compiling the decommissioning plans (DP, 17 chapters) with INER, national engineering companies and international consultants since 2012. The DP of Chinshan NPP has been approved by the regulator, Atomic Energy Council (AEC), in the end of June, 2017. There are 17 chapters in the decommissioning plans, which deal with all aspects of safety-related considerations during the decommissioning period, such as spent fuel management, waste management, personnel/workers planning, schedules/working items, environmental management and monitoring. Those items are discussed in detail in this paper in accordance with the approved DP. The implementation of decommissioning will be started while the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is still under approval by EPA, which is expected to be completed in the end of 2018 or the mid of 2019. Once the decommissioning be started, all dismantling, decontamination, management teams, and preparation would be kicked off simultaneously in a very short period of time. In this paper, the planning assumptions, strategies from INER and TPC, management of radioactive waste, conversion of Turbine Building and detailed description of turbine-generator set are discussed. For the Turbine Building dismantling, inventories of equipment, cutting technology determination, storage logistics, container options and radwaste treatment and reduction would be important factors to be evaluated in the beginning. Afterwards, WBS (work breakdown structure) would be determined and be the basis for working bids, construction of a new storage warehouse, an incinerator and a super high pressure compactor. This preliminary engineering planning would be applied in the decommissioning of Chinshan NPP for the first time and be duplicated in Kuosheng NPP and Maanshan NPP in Taiwan as well. (authors)

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Demolitions of the Savannah River Site's concentrator and finishing facilities

The Savannah River Site (SRS) has produced Special Nuclear Materials (SNMs) starting in the early 1950's to the mid 1970's for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and from the mid 1970's to the present for the Department of Energy (DOE). In that time, over 1,000 facilities have been built in the sixteen operational areas of the eight hundred square kilometer site. Over the years, many of the facilities have been dispositioned by the DOE as inactive. In FY-03, DOE identified two hundred and forty-seven (inactive or soon to be inactive) facilities that required demolition. Demolition work was scheduled to start in FY-04 and be completed in the first quarter of FY-07. Two-hundred and thirty-nine of these facilities have been demolished employing Routine demolition techniques. This presentation reviews and discusses two of the eight Non-Routine demolitions Facilities, 420-D 'The Concentrator Facility', and 421-D 'The Finishing Facility'. Facilities 420-D and 421-D were toppled by attaching rigging from the structural steel building frame to bulldozers and toppling the facilities over. The greatest advantage of this method is that it employs equipment that is on hand at SRS, saving time on locating and leasing offsite equipment as well as operator training. In addition, although the toppled structure does not land in the original facilities footprint, it does land in a contained area that is easily barricaded to prevent access during the operation. There are several disadvantages. First, there must be adequate area for the structure to topple into. Also if the wire rope size required to topple the structure is larger than two in., the ropes become extremely difficult to work with. Lastly, the yield strength of steel members is guaranteed by the manufacturer as a minimum strength, so its ultimate strength is unknown. This requires extremely conservative specifications sizing the bulldozers and any rigging equipment employed. Two hundred and forty-seven facilities have been successfully demolished at SRS utilizing five different demolition techniques. The routine method employed on the vast majority of facilities has been extremely successful and should be applied whenever possible. Because of their height, the 420-D and 421-D facilities required developing a new (to SRS) demolition method. This technique of toppling the structures with a bulldozer and implementing additional safety measures provided a successful, safe, and cost efficient demolition method. This method should be employed in the future on any steel or wood framed structures that are over forty ft. high that have ample space around them.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Formerly Used Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) W. R. Grace Building 23 Remedial Action-Challenges and Successes - 12247

Monazite sand processing was conducted at the W. R. Grace Curtis Bay Facility (Baltimore, Maryland) from mid-May 1956 through the spring of 1957 under license to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), for the extraction of source material in the form of thorium, as well as rare earth elements. The processing was conducted in the southwest quadrant of a ca. 100 year old, five-story, building (Building 23) in the active manufacturing portion of the facility. Building components and equipment in the southwest quadrant of Building 23 exhibited residual radiological activity remaining from the monazite sand processing. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) conducted a remedial investigation (RI) and feasibility study (FS) and prepared a Record of Decision (ROD) to address residual radioactivity on building components and equipment in the southwest quadrant of Building 23. The remedy selected for the southwest quadrant of Building 23, which was documented in the ROD (dated May 2005), was identified as 'Alternative 2: Decontamination With Removal to Industrial Use Levels'. The selected remedy provided for either decontaminating or removing areas of radioactivity to meet the RGs. Demonstration of compliance with the selected ARAR was performed using the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM) and other appropriate guidance, as well as appropriate dose modeling codes where necessary. USACE-Baltimore District along with its private industry partner worked together under the terms of a 2008 Settlement Agreement to implement the remedial action (RA) for the southwest quadrant of Building 23. The RA was conducted in two phases: Phase 1 was completed to improve the building condition for support of subsequent remedial action and decrease scope uncertainty of the remedial action, and Phase 2 included decontamination and removal activities to meet the RGs and demonstration of compliance with the selected ARAR. Challenges encountered during the RA include: coordination with stakeholders, coordination between multiple RA contractors, addressing unique structural challenges for Building 23, nonradiological hazards associated with the RA, weather issues, and complex final status survey (FSS) coordination. The challenges during the Phase 1 RA were handled successfully. The challenges for the Phase 2 RA, which is anticipated to be complete by late-summer of 2012, have been handled successfully so far. By fall of 2012, USACE is expecting to finalize a robust RA Closure Report, including the Final Status Survey Report, which summarizes the RA activities and documents compliance with the ROD. During the ongoing RA at Building 23, there have been and still are many challenges both technically and from a project management perspective, due in part to the nature and extent of impact at the site (residual radioactivity within an active processing building), dual oversight by the property owner and USACE, and site-specific challenges associated with a complex RA and multiple contractors. Currently, USACE and its industry partner are overseeing the completion of RA field activities. RA closure documentation for the remediation of Building 23 to address residual contamination in building materials will be reviewed/approved by USACE and its industry partner upon completion of the field activities. USACE and its industry partner are working well together, through the Settlement Agreement, to conduct a cost-efficient and effective remedial action to address the legacy issues at Building 23. This cooperative effort has set a firm foundation for achieving a successful RA at the RWDA using a 'forward think' approach, and it is a case study for other sites where an industry partner is involved. The collaborative effort led to implementation of an RA which is acceptable to the site owner, the regulators, and the public, thus allowing USACE to move this project forward successfully in the FUSRAP program. (authors)

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