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At least 109 records · Page 6

Hazard and risk analysis framework for nuclear power plant–based integrated energy systems

Employing integrated energy systems (IESs) with nuclear power plants (NPPs) can improve NPP utilization by leveraging dedicated thermal and electric power delivery, but it may also increase operational safety risks. This paper presents a framework to identify and quantify hazards and risks for such IESs. The framework combines accidentology to review past industrial accidents with failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) to identify potential future incidents. Hydrogen explosion and toxic chemical release hazards are of particular concern. Explosion consequences are quantified using the Bauwens-Dorofeev (Bauwens) and trinitrotoluene equivalent mass (TNT-EM) methods, while chemical release consequences are computed using the Gaussian atmospheric dispersion method. Operational disturbances from direct electrical and thermal integration that may affect NPP safety are modeled using probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Hazards and risks are then evaluated for regulatory compliance. The framework is applied to IESs comprising pressurized or boiling water reactors supplying three levels of thermal and electrical power to industrial customers. Case studies include high-temperature steam electrolysis hydrogen plants of varying capacities and a synthetic fuel production plant. Sensitivity analysis examines piping component failures in the PRA model as a precursor to cost estimation for thermal extraction line design. Additionally, Fussel-Vessely (FV) and risk increase importance (RII) measures identify risk-informed design improvements for the thermal extraction system. FMEA highlights hazards such as loss of offsite power, prompt loss of electrical load, loss of thermal output, and immediate steam diversion, in addition to hydrogen explosions and toxic chemical releases. Both Bauwens and TNT-EM methods suggest maintaining several hundred meters of separation between the NPP and hydrogen facility to mitigate explosion risks. PRA results show a maximum initiating event frequency increase of 1.15% and an overall risk increase of 0.28%. Importance measure analysis identifies upstream pipe leak isolation components as critical. Evaluating the results against safety regulations, it is concluded that hazards and risks can be managed to comply with regulations through risk-informed thermal and electrical connection designs, component selection, maintenance programs, and safe separation distances between NPPs and integrated industrial facilities.

08 - HYDROGEN↗

Ionization potential and electron affinity for six common explosive compounds by DFT, MP2, and CBS-QB3

The vertical and adiabatic ionization potential (IP V and IP A ) and vertical electron affinity (EA V ) for six explosives (RDX, HMX, TNT, PETN, HMTD, and TATP) have been studied by ab initio computational methods. The IPV was calculated using MP2 and CBS-QB3 while the IP A was calculated with B3LYP, CAM-B3LYP, ω B97XD, B2PLYP, and MP2. RDX and TNT IP A ’s were also reported using CBS -QB3. Excluding results by CBS-QB3, B3LYP and B2PLYPD provided superior and more consistent results for calculating the IP. The EA V were calculated using the same methods however B3LYP performed the worst in this case with MP2 and B2PLYPD predicting values closest to those made by CBS-QB3, which was used a reference due to lacking experimental data. Basis set effects were evaluated using 6- 31+G(d,p), 6-311+G(d,p), and 6-311+(3df,2p) for both IP and EA. 6-31+G(d,p) gave satisfactory results for calculating both IP however 6-311+G(3df,2p) had improved results in calculating the EA. The four nitro containing compounds had exothermic reduction potentials while the peroxides were unfavorable. Additionally, it was seen that RDX, HMX, TATP and HMTD were unstable in their reduced forms. Results are aimed to assist detection and screening methods.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

The Production of Airblast From Solid Rocket Motor Fallbacks

A principal long-range hazard of solid rocket motor fall-backs is the airblast overpressure that breaks windows, and the overpressure-impulse that throws the broken glass. The basis for detailed analyses of airblast, including the effects of local terrain, wind, and temperature gradient, use the TNT equivalent weight as the starting point. A conservative estimate is that all the propellant weight is used to produce airblast, and that the propellant is 1.3 times as efficient as TNT, in accord with its energy density. Historic fall-backs of motors using Hazard Class 1.3 propellant, and some large-scale tests of those propellants, have resulted in air-blast inferences or measurements consistent with much less than full yield, even though the propellant was fully consumed. Other fall-backs and tests may be consistent with full yield.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

EDS V26 Containment Vessel Explosive Qualification Test Report

The objective of the test was to qualify the vessel for its intended use by subjecting it to a 1.25 times overtest. The criteria for success are that the measured strains do not exceed the calculated strains from the vessel analysis, there is no significant additional plastic strain on subsequent tests at the rated design load (shakedown), and there is no significant damage to the vessel and attached hardware that affect form, fit, or function. Testing of the V25 Vessel in 2011 established a precedent for testing V26 [2]. As with V25, two tests were performed to satisfy this objective. The first test used 9 pounds of Composition C-4 (11.25 lbs. TNT-equivalent), which is 125 percent of the design basis load. The second test used 7.2 pounds of Composition C-4 (9 lbs. TNT-equivalent) which is 100 percent of the design basis load. The first test provided the required overtest while the second test served to demonstrate shakedown and the absence of additional plastic deformation. Unlike the V25 vessel, which was mounted in a shipping cradle during testing, the V26 vessel was mounted on the EDS P2U3 trailer prior to testing. Visual inspections of the EDS vessel, surroundings, and diagnostics were completed before and after each test event. This visual inspection included analyzing the seals, fittings, and interior surfaces of the EDS vessel and documenting any abnormalities or damages. Photographs were used to visually document vessel conditions and findings before and after each test event.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Hydrogen Safety Training for Researchers

LLNL has been conducting hydrogen research for more than 50 years, starting with national security applications and continuing with hydrogen energy research. For many of these years, LLNL was designated as the pressure safety training facility for the whole DOE complex and other government institutions such as NASA. Many technicians and researchers visited LLNL to receive appropriate training on many aspects of pressure safety, including hydrogen technology, cryogenics, leak detection, and vacuum technology. The national security hydrogen and high-pressure research conducted at LLNL demanded unique testing facilities, and these were built with funding from DOE Defense Programs. These facilities include a high pressure laboratory equipped with 4 hydrogencompatible test cells, each rated for 80,000 psi, and 4 pounds of TNT equivalent stored energy. LLNL also has a high explosive test facility (Site 300) for high-energy experiments with many pounds of TNT equivalent and many kilograms of hydrogen. Experiments in Site 300 are typically conducted in outdoor firing tables and monitored from the safety of a bunker. The remote location of this facility protects employees and property from any hazard. These unique facilities and the expertise necessary to operate them are now being made available for hydrogen energy research through the development of training materials that may contribute to safe operation within the many institutions working for the hydrogen program.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Data Release Report for Source Physics Experiments 2 and 3 (SPE-2 and SPE-3) Nevada National Security Site

The second Source Physics Experiment shot (SPE-2) was conducted in Nevada on October 25, 2011, at 1900:00.011623 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). The explosive source was 997 kilograms (kg) trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent of sensitized heavy ammonium fuel oil (SHANFO) detonated at a depth of 45.7 meters (m). The third Source Physics Experiment shot (SPE-3) was conducted in Nevada on July 24, 2012, at 1800:00.44835 GMT. The explosive source was 905 kg TNT equivalent of SHANFO detonated at a depth of 45.8 m. Both shots were recorded by an extensive set of instrumentation that includes sensors both at near-field (less than 100 m) and far-field (100 m or greater) distances. The near-field instruments consisted of three-component accelerometers deployed in boreholes at 15, 46, and 55 m depths around the shot and a set of single-component vertical accelerometers on the surface. The far-field network was composed of a variety of seismic and acoustic sensors, including short-period geophones, broadband seismometers, three-component accelerometers, and rotational seismometers at distances of 100 m to 25 kilometers. This report coincides with the release of these data for analysts and organizations that are not participants in this program. This report describes the second and third Source Physics Experiment shots and the various types of near-field and far-field data that are available.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Data Release Report for Source Physics Experiments 2 and 3 (SPE-2 and SPE-3) Nevada National Security Site

The second Source Physics Experiment shot (SPE-2) was conducted in Nevada on October 25, 2011, at 1900:00.011623 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). The explosive source was 997 kilograms (kg) trinitrotoluene (TNT) equivalent of sensitized heavy ammonium fuel oil (SHANFO) detonated at a depth of 45.7 meters (m). The third Source Physics Experiment shot (SPE-3) was conducted in Nevada on July 24, 2012, at 1800:00.44835 GMT. The explosive source was 905 kg TNT equivalent of SHANFO detonated at a depth of 45.8 m. Both shots were recorded by an extensive set of instrumentation that includes sensors both at near-field (less than 100 m) and far-field (100 m or greater) distances. The near-field instruments consisted of three-component accelerometers deployed in boreholes at 15, 46, and 55 m depths around the shot and a set of single-component vertical accelerometers on the surface. The far-field network was composed of a variety of seismic and acoustic sensors, including short-period geophones, broadband seismometers, three-component accelerometers, and rotational seismometers at distances of 100 m to 25 kilometers. This report coincides with the release of these data for analysts and organizations that are not participants in this program. This report describes the second and third Source Physics Experiment shots and the various types of near-field and farfield data that are available.This revised document includes reports on baseline shift corrections for the SPE-2 and SPE-3 shots that were missing from the original January 2015 version.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

V27 Test Report.

The V27 containment vessel was procured by the US Army Recovered Chemical Material Directorate ( RCMD ) as a replacement vessel for use on the P2 Explosive Destruction Systems. It is the third EDS vessel to be fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the Code Case, is nine (9) pounds TNT - equivalent for up to 637 detonations . This report documents the results of explosive tests that were done on the vessel at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque New Mexico to qualify the vessel for explosive use . The primary qualification test consisted of si x 1.5 pound charges of Composition C - 4 (equivalent to 11.25 pounds TNT) distributed around the vessel in accordance with the User Design Specification. Four subsequent tests using less explosive evaluated the effects of slight variations in orientation of the charges . All vessel acceptance criteria were met.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Data Release Report Source Physics Experiments 5 and 6 (SPE-5 and SPE-6), Nevada National Security Site

The fifth Source Physics Experiment test (SPE-5) was conducted in Nevada on April 26, 2016, at 20:49:00 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). The explosive source was 4,288.7 kilograms (kg) of polymer-bonded explosive (PBXN) –110, equivalent to 5,035 kg of trinitrotoluene (TNT) detonated at a depth of 76.5 meters (m). The sixth Source Physics Experiment test (SPE-6) was conducted in Nevada on October 12, 2016 at 18:36:00 UTC. The explosive source was 1,982.2 kg of PBXC-141, equivalent to 2,240.2 kg of TNT detonated at the depth of 31.4 m. Both tests were recorded by an extensive set of instrumentation that includes sensors both at near-field (less than 100 m) and far-field (100 m or greater) distances. The near-field instruments consisted of three-component accelerometers installed at various depths ranging from 4 to 99 m below ground surface in boreholes positioned around the shot, and a set of single-component vertical accelerometers on the surface. The far-field network was composed of a variety of seismic and acoustic sensors, including short-period geophones, broadband seismometers, and three-component accelerometers at distances of 100 m to 400 kilometers. In addition, both explosions were recorded in a temporary array of 996 geophones arranged in a densely spaced grid pattern (“large N”). This report coincides with the release of these data for analysts and organizations that are not participants in this program. This report describes the fifth and sixth Source Physics Experiment tests and the various types of near-field and far-field data that are available.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

V28 Test Report

The V28 containment vessel was procured by the US Army Recovered Chemical Material Directorate (RCMD) as a replacement vessel for use on the P2 Explosive Destruction Systems. It is the fourth EDS vessel to be fabricated under Code Case 2564 of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, which provides rules for the design of impulsively loaded vessels. The explosive rating for the vessel, based on the Code Case, is nine (9) pounds TNT- equivalent for up to 637 detonations. This report documents the results of explosive tests that were done on the vessel at Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque New Mexico to qualify the vessel for explosive use. The primary qualification test consisted of six, 1.5 pounds charges of Composition C-4 (equivalent to 11.25 pounds TNT) distributed around the vessel in accordance with the User Design Specification. This test was repeated due to a lack of proper clamp settings. Two additional tests using less explosive were performed, one identical in configuration to a test performed in the V27 qualification series as a baseline for comparison, and one where the separation distance of the charges was increased to extend the V27 analysis of distributed load effects on the P2 vessel. All vessel acceptance criteria were met.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Beirut Explosion Yield and Mushroom Cloud Height - Effects of the Source Environment

I use crater dimensions to estimate the yield of the August 4th, 2020 Beirut explosion to be equivalent to approximately 1.4 kilotons of TNT with a lower bound of about 0.7 kilotons. Based on the amount of ammonium nitrate reported to have been stored at the Beirut harbor, I assume an upper bound for the yield of 2.75 kilotons. However, it is highly likely that the yield was less than 2.75 kilotons, since reported values for TNT equivalence of ammonium nitrate are typically much less than one hundred percent. The crater-size based yield estimates are based on crater radius estimates from satellite imagery and empirical curves and data for scaled crater radius from past chemical and nuclear explosions. I present evidence that suggests that the relatively large crater radius is due to a high degree of coupling of shock wave energy to the surrounding medium and a reduction of the effective stress because of a high level of saturation of the geologic media beneath the explosion. I provide yield estimates based on seismic body-wave magnitude and crater depth as corroborating evidence. I compare preliminary estimates for the maximum debris cloud height, based on cell phone videos/images, with predicted maximum heights for this yield range from empirical formulas and numerical cloud-rise models. Based on a preliminary analysis of cell phone footage, the observed maximum cloud height appears to be approximately 1600 m. This is much lower than that predicted using standard empirical formulas and buoyant cloud rise models. I present results from a modified buoyant cloud rise model that more accurately predicts the maximum cloud height by allowing for the inclusion of a fixed amount of air and/or water into the fireball at the start of cloud rise. The amount of mass that needs to be added at the start, to reproduce the observed maximum cloud height, is relatively small compared to the total mass entrained during cloud rise. A much greater amount of dry air or debris is required, relative to water, for an equivalent reduction in maximum cloud height. The ammonium nitrate is one possible source for water in the fireball since it was being stored in a very humid environment and ammonium nitrate is known to be hygroscopic. The ground beneath the explosion, especially if it were saturated, and the nearby harbor could also have been sources for water or debris in the fireball.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Maritime Interdiction Operations Small Craft Detection

The Naval Postgraduate School has been conducting Tactical Network Topology (TNT) Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) experiments with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) since early in 2005. In this work, we are investigating cutting edge technology to evaluate use of networks, advanced sensors and collaborative technology for globally-supported maritime interdiction operations. Some examples of our research include communications in harsh environments, between moving ships at sea; small boat drive-by radiation detection; network-centric collaboration with global partners; situational awareness; prototype sensors & biometric instruments. Since 2006, we have studied the concept of using a small vessel with fixed radiation sensors to do initial searches for illicit radioactive materials. In our work, we continue to evaluate concepts of operation for small boat monitoring. For example, in San Francisco Bay we established a simulated choke point using two RHIBs. Each RHIB had a large sodium iodide radiation sensor on board, mounted on the side nearest to the passing potential target boats. Once detections were made, notification over the network prompted a chase RHIB also equipped with a radiation sensor to further investigate the potential target. We have also used an unmanned surface vessel (USV) carrying a radiation sensor to perform the initial discovery. The USV was controlled remotely and to drive by boats in different configurations. The potential target vessels were arranged in a line, as a choke point and randomly spaced in the water. Search plans were problematic when weather, waves and drift complicated the ability to stay in one place. A further challenge is to both detect and identify the radioactive materials during the drive-by. Our radiation detection system, ARAM, Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor, is able to detect, alarm and quickly identify plausible radionuclides in real time. We have performed a number of experiments to better understand parameters of vessel speed, time, shielding, and distance in this complex three-dimensional space. At the NMIOTC in September 2009, we employed a dual detector portal followed by a chase. In this event, the challenge was to maintain communications after a lapse. When the chase went past the line-of sight reach of the Tactical Operational Center's (TOC) antenna, with interference from a fortress island in Suda Bay, Wave Relay extended the network for continued observation. Sodium iodide radiation detectors were mounted on two Hellenic Navy SEAL fast boats. After making the detection one of the portal boats maintained line-of sight while the other pursued the target vessel. Network access via Wave Relay antennas was maintained until the conclusion of the chase scenario. Progress has been made in the detection of radioactive materials in the maritime environment. The progression of the TNT MIO experiments has demonstrated the potential of the hardware to solve the problems encountered in this physically challenging environment. There continue to be interesting opportunities for research and development. These experiments provide a variety of platforms and motivated participants to perform real-world testing as solutions are made available.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Numerical Analysis of Blast Effects and Mitigation in the Far-Field from Small Explosions

Requirements for explosive safety are often given in terms of a “K-Factor”, correlating incident blast effects with the distance and TNT equivalent weight of an explosion. Traditionally, this is conducted using empirical correlations to experimental measurements (e.g., the Kingery–Bulmash equations). In the far-field, empirical verification of incident overpressure and impulse magnitudes can be difficult; extrapolations from data give expected values at reasonable standoff distances that sometimes are too small to measure on available equipment but are larger than some regulations require. The present paper describes the results of numerical hydrocode analysis to verify the expected incident overpressure and impulse from small hemispherical ground charges of TNT at these relatively large distances. Furthermore, the dynamic effect of incident blast waves on lightweight, modular mitigation barriers is studied to gauge their effectiveness at providing safety standard compliance.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

The equivalent depth of burst for impact cratering

The concept of modeling an impact cratering event with an explosive event with the explosive buried at some equivalent depth of burst (d.o.b.) is discussed. Various and different ways to define this equivalent d.o.b. are identified. Recent experimental results for a dense quartz sand are used to determine the equivalent d.o.b. for various conditions of charge type, event size, and impact conditions. The results show a decrease in equivalent d.o.b. with increasing energy for fixed impact velocity and a decrease in equivalent d.o.b. with increasing velocity for fixed energy. The values for an iron projectile are on the order of 2-3 projectile radii for energy equal to one ton of TNT, decreasing to about 1.5 radii at a megaton of TNT. The dependence on projectile and target mass density matches that included in common jet-penetration formulas for projectile densities greater than target densities and for the higher energies.

Holsapple, K. A.↗

CFD Applications in Support of the Space Shuttle Risk Assessment

The paper describes a numerical study of a potential accident scenario of the space shuttle, operating at the same flight conditions as flight 51L, the Challenger accident. The interest in performing this simulation is derived by evidence that indicates that the event itself did not exert large enough blast loading on the shuttle to break it apart. Rather, the quasi-steady aerodynamic loading on the damaged, unbalance vehicle caused the break-up. Despite the enormous explosive potential of the shuttle total fuel load (both liquid and solid), the post accident explosives working group estimated the maximum energy involvement to be equivalent to about five hundreds of pounds of TNT. This understanding motivated the simulation described here. To err on the conservative side, we modeled the event as an explosion, and used the maximum energy estimate. We modeled the transient detonation of a 500 lbs spherical charge of TNT, placed at the main engine, and the resulting blast wave propagation about the complete stack. Tracking of peak pressures and impulses at hundreds of locations on the vehicle surface indicate that the blast load was insufficient to break the vehicle, hence demonstrating likely crew survivability through such an event.

Baum, Joseph D.↗

The Contemporary Hazard of Cometary Impacts

Cosmic impacts pose a continuing hazard of loss of human life and property. Significant contemporary risk is associated with projectiles in the energy range from about 10 megatons of TNT up to the size of the K/T impactor. The lower threshold for damage is defined by the atmosphere of the Earth, which effectively shields us From smaller projectiles. Up to energies of about a gigaton of TNT, the effects are local or regional for impacts on the land, or coastal for ocean impacts, which can generate large tsunamis. A greater risk is associated with still larger impacts, which are capable of causing global ecological catastrophe, possibly leading to mass mortality From starvation and epidemics. If such a impact took place anywhere on Earth during our lifetimes, we would each be in danger, independent of where the projectile struck. Statistical estimates indicate that each human on this planet runs a risk of roughly 1 in 20,000 of dying from this cause. Prudence suggests that we should be concerned about such impacts and seek ways of avoiding them or mitigating their consequences. The primary objective of any program to deal with this hazard is to determine whether or not such a near-term impact is likely. The best approach for the asteroidal component is a comprehensive telescopic survey, which can discover all Earth-crossing asteroids larger than 1 km in diameter and provide decades of warning in which to plan ways to deflect or destroy a threatening object. Long-period comets, however, pose a much greater challenge, since they cannot be discovered long in advance of a possible impact, their orbits are harder to predict, and they are significantly more difficult to deflect or destroy.

Morrison, David↗

Computing Q-D Relationships for Storage of Rocket Fuels

The Quantity Distance Measurement Tool is a GIS BASEP computer program that aids safety engineers by calculating quantity-distance (Q-D) relationships for vessels that contain explosive chemicals used in testing rocket engines. (Q-D relationships are standard relationships between specified quantities of specified explosive materials and minimum distances by which they must be separated from persons, objects, and other explosives to obtain specified types and degrees of protection.) The program uses customized geographic-information-system (GIS) software and calculates Q-D relationships in accordance with NASA's Safety Standard For Explosives, Propellants, and Pyrotechnics. Displays generated by the program enable the identification of hazards, showing the relationships of propellant-storage-vessel safety buffers to inhabited facilities and public roads. Current Q-D information is calculated and maintained in graphical form for all vessels that contain propellants or other chemicals, the explosiveness of which is expressed in TNT equivalents [amounts of trinitrotoluene (TNT) having equivalent explosive effects]. The program is useful in the acquisition, siting, construction, and/or modification of storage vessels and other facilities in the development of an improved test-facility safety program.

Jester, Keith↗

Source physics experiments at the Nevada Test Site.

The U. S. capability to monitor foreign underground nuclear test activities relies heavily on measurement of explosion phenomena, including characteristic seismic, infrasound, radionuclide, and acoustic signals. Despite recent advances in each of these fields, empirical, rather than physics-based, approaches are used to predict and explain observations. Seismologists rely on prior knowledge of the variations of teleseismic and regional seismic parameters such as p- and s-wave arrivals from simple one-dimensional models for the teleseismic case to somewhat more complicated enhanced two-dimensional models for the regional case. Likewise, radionuclide experts rely on empirical results from a handful of limited experiments to determine the radiological source terms present at the surface after an underground test. To make the next step in the advancement of the science of monitoring we need to transform these fields to enable predictive, physics-based modeling and analysis. The Nevada Test Site Source Physics Experiments (N-SPE) provide a unique opportunity to gather precise data from well-designed experiments to improve physics-based modeling capability. In the seismic experiments, data collection will include time domain reflectometry to measure explosive performance and yield, free-field accelerometers, extensive seismic arrays, and infrasound and acoustic measurements. The improved modeling capability that we will develop using this data should enable important advances in our ability to monitor worldwide for nuclear testing. The first of a series of source physics experiments will be conducted in the granite of Climax Stock at the NTS, near the locations of the HARD HAT and PILE DRIVER nuclear tests. This site not only provides a fairly homogeneous and well-documented geology, but also an opportunity to improve our understanding of how fractures, joints, and faults affect seismic wave generation and propagation. The Climax Stock experiments will consist of a 220 lb (TNT equivalent) calibration shot and a 2200 lb (TNT equivalent) over-buried shot conducted in the same emplacement hole. An identical 2200 lb shot at the same location will follow to investigate the effects of pre-conditioning. These experiments also provide an opportunity to advance capabilities for near-field monitoring, and on-site inspections (OSIs) of suspected testing sites. In particular, geologic, physical, and cultural signatures of underground testing can be evaluated using the N-SPE activities as case studies. Furthermore, experiments to measure the migration of radioactive noble gases to the surface from underground explosions will enable development of higher fidelity radiological source term models that can predict migration through a variety of geologic conditions. Because the detection of short-lived radionuclides is essential to determining if an explosion was nuclear or conventional, a better understanding of the gaseous and particulate radionuclide source terms that reach the surface from underground testing is critical to development of OSI capability.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗