Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “TERRORIST”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 109 records · Page 6

MCS+: An Efficient Algorithm for Crawling the Community Structure in Multiplex Networks

In this article, we consider the problem of crawling a multiplex network to identify the community structure of a layer-of-interest. A multiplex network is one where there are multiple types of relationships between the nodes. In many multiplex networks, some layers might be easier to explore (in terms of time, money etc.). We propose MCS+, an algorithm that can use the information from the easier to explore layers to help in the exploration of a layer-of-interest that is expensive to explore. We consider the goal of exploration to be generating a sample that is representative of the communities in the complete layer-of-interest. This work has practical applications in areas such as exploration of dark (e.g., criminal) networks, online social networks, biological networks, and so on. For example, in a terrorist network, relationships such as phone records, e-mail records, and so on are easier to collect; in contrast, data on the face-to-face communications are much harder to collect, but also potentially more valuable. We perform extensive experimental evaluations on real-world networks, and we observe that MCS+ consistently outperforms the best baseline—the similarity of the sample that MCS+ generates to the real network is up to three times that of the best baseline in some networks. We also perform theoretical and experimental evaluations on the scalability of MCS+ to network properties, and find that it scales well with the budget, number of layers in the multiplex network, and the average degree in the original network.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Evaluation of Spatiotemporal Text Representations in Twitter Streams

Language in social media is a dynamic system, constantly evolving and adapting, with words and concepts rapidly emerging, disappearing, and changing their meaning. These changes can be estimated using word representations in context, over time and across locations. A number of methods have been proposed to track these spatiotemporal changes but no general method exists to evaluate the quality of these representations. Previous work largely focused on qualitative evaluation, which we improve by proposing a set of visualizations that highlight changes in text representation over both space and time. We demonstrate usefulness of novel spatiotemporal representations to explore and characterize specific aspects of the corpus of tweets collected from European countries over a two-week period centered around the terrorist attacks in Brussels in March 2016. In addition, we quantitatively evaluate spatiotemporal representations by feeding them into a downstream classification task – event type prediction. Thus, our work is the first to provide both intrinsic (qualitative) and extrinsic (quantitative) evaluation of text representations for spatiotemporal trends.

distributional semantics↗

GRiP - A flexible approach for calculating risk as a function of consequence, vulnerability, and threat.

Get a GRiP (Gravitational Risk Procedure) on risk by using an approach inspired by the physics of gravitational forces between body masses! In April 2010, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Special Events staff (Protective Security Advisors [PSAs]) expressed concern about how to calculate risk given measures of consequence, vulnerability, and threat. The PSAs believed that it is not 'right' to assign zero risk, as a multiplicative formula would imply, to cases in which the threat is reported to be extremely small, and perhaps could even be assigned a value of zero, but for which consequences and vulnerability are potentially high. They needed a different way to aggregate the components into an overall measure of risk. To address these concerns, GRiP was proposed and developed. The inspiration for GRiP is Sir Isaac Newton's Universal Law of Gravitation: the attractive force between two bodies is directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the squares of the distance between them. The total force on one body is the sum of the forces from 'other bodies' that influence that body. In the case of risk, the 'other bodies' are the components of risk (R): consequence, vulnerability, and threat (which we denote as C, V, and T, respectively). GRiP treats risk as if it were a body within a cube. Each vertex (corner) of the cube represents one of the eight combinations of minimum and maximum 'values' for consequence, vulnerability, and threat. The risk at each of the vertices is a variable that can be set. Naturally, maximum risk occurs when consequence, vulnerability, and threat are at their maximum values; minimum risk occurs when they are at their minimum values. Analogous to gravitational forces among body masses, the GRiP formula for risk states that the risk at any interior point of the box depends on the squares of the distances from that point to each of the eight vertices. The risk value at an interior (movable) point will be dominated by the value of one vertex as that point moves closer and closer to that one vertex. GRiP is a visualization tool that helps analysts better understand risk and its relationship to consequence, vulnerability, and threat. Estimates of consequence, vulnerability, and threat are external to GRiP; however, the GRiP approach can be linked to models or data that provide estimates of consequence, vulnerability, and threat. For example, the Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Program/Infrastructure Survey Tool produces a vulnerability index (scaled from 0 to 100) that can be used for the vulnerability component of GRiP. We recognize that the values used for risk components can be point estimates and that, in fact, there is uncertainty regarding the exact values of C, V, and T. When we use T = t{sub o} (where t{sub o} is a value of threat in its range), we mean that threat is believed to be in an interval around t{sub o}. Hence, a value of t{sub o} = 0 indicates a 'best estimate' that the threat level is equal to zero, but still allows that it is not impossible for the threat to occur. When t{sub o} = 0 but is potentially small and not exactly zero, there will be little impact on the overall risk value as long as the C and V components are not large. However, when C and/or V have large values, there can be large differences in risk given t{sub o} = 0, and t{sub o} = epsilon (where epsilon is small but greater than a value of zero). We believe this scenario explains the PSA's intuition that risk is not equal to zero when t{sub o} = 0 and C and/or V have large values. (They may also be thinking that if C has an extremely large value, it is unlikely that T is equal to 0; in the terrorist context, T would likely be dependent on C when C is extremely large.) The PSAs are implicitly recognizing the potential that t{sub o} = epsilon. One way to take this possible scenario into account is to replace point estimates for risk with interval values that reflect the uncertainty in the risk components. In fact, one could argue that T never equals zero for a man-made hazard. This paper describes the thought process that led to the GRiP approach and the mathematical formula for GRiP and presents a few examples that will provide insights about how to use GRiP and interpret its results.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Augmented cognition tool for rapid military decision making.

This report describes the laboratory directed research and development work to model relevant areas of the brain that associate multi-modal information for long-term storage for the purpose of creating a more effective, and more automated, association mechanism to support rapid decision making. Using the biology and functionality of the hippocampus as an analogy or inspiration, we have developed an artificial neural network architecture to associate k-tuples (paired associates) of multimodal input records. The architecture is composed of coupled unimodal self-organizing neural modules that learn generalizations of unimodal components of the input record. Cross modal associations, stored as a higher-order tensor, are learned incrementally as these generalizations form. Graph algorithms are then applied to the tensor to extract multi-modal association networks formed during learning. Doing so yields a novel approach to data mining for knowledge discovery. This report describes the neurobiological inspiration, architecture, and operational characteristics of our model, and also provides a real world terrorist network example to illustrate the model's functionality.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Assessing Vulnerabilities, Risks, and Consequences of Damage to Critical Infrastructure

Since the publication of 'Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructure,' there has been a keen understanding of the complexity, interdependencies, and shared responsibility required to protect the nation's most critical assets that are essential to our way of life. The original 5 sectors defined in 1997 have grown to 18 Critical Infrastructures and Key Resources (CIKR), which are discussed in the 2009 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) and its supporting sector-specific plans. The NIPP provides the structure for a national program dedicated to enhanced protection and resiliency of the nation's infrastructure. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provides in-depth, multi-disciplinary assessments of threat, vulnerability, and consequence across all 18 sectors at scales ranging from specific facilities to infrastructures spanning multi-state regions, such as the Oil and Natural Gas (ONG) sector. Like many of the CIKR sectors, the ONG sector is comprised of production, processing, distribution, and storage of highly valuable and potentially dangerous commodities. Furthermore, there are significant interdependencies with other sectors, including transportation, communication, finance, and government. Understanding the potentially devastating consequences and collateral damage resulting from a terrorist attack or natural event is an important element of LLNL's infrastructure security programs. Our work began in the energy sector in the late 1990s and quickly expanded other critical infrastructure sectors. We have performed over 600 physical assessments with a particular emphasis on those sectors that utilize, store, or ship potentially hazardous materials and for whom cyber security is important. The success of our approach is based on building awareness of vulnerabilities and risks and working directly with industry partners to collectively advance infrastructure protection. This approach consists of three phases: The Pre-Assessment Phase brings together infrastructure owners and operators to identify critical assets and help the team create a structured information request. During this phase, we gain information about the critical assets from those who are most familiar with operations and interdependencies, making the time we spend on the ground conducting the assessment much more productive and enabling the team to make actionable recommendations. The Assessment Phase analyzes 10 areas: Threat environment, cyber architecture, cyber penetration, physical security, physical penetration, operations security, policies and procedures, interdependencies, consequence analysis, and risk characterization. Each of these individual tasks uses direct and indirect data collection, site inspections, and structured and facilitated workshops to gather data. Because of the importance of understanding the cyber threat, LLNL has built both fixed and mobile cyber penetration, wireless penetration and supporting tools that can be tailored to fit customer needs. The Post-Assessment Phase brings vulnerability and risk assessments to the customer in a format that facilitates implementation of mitigation options. Often the assessment findings and recommendations are briefed and discussed with several levels of management and, if appropriate, across jurisdictional boundaries. The end result is enhanced awareness and informed protective measures. Over the last 15 years, we have continued to refine our methodology and capture lessons learned and best practices. The resulting risk and decision framework thus takes into consideration real-world constraints, including regulatory, operational, and economic realities. In addition to 'on the ground' assessments focused on mitigating vulnerabilities, we have integrated our computational and atmospheric dispersion capability with easy-to-use geo-referenced visualization tools to support emergency planning and response operations. LLNL is home to the National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) and the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC). NARAC/IMAAC has capabilities to respond to toxic industrial chemical spills, nuclear-power plant accidents, fires, chemical/biological agents, radiological/nuclear devices (RDDs, INDs), and other airborne hazards. Our web-based systems provide hazards assessments of critical infrastructure for defensive planning and can provide infrastructure operators and emergency responders with a baseline for planning and exercises. LLNL's infrastructure security web mapping services facilitate dissemination of technical information for all phases of disaster management. Examples of some of these products are shown in the Figure 1.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

ORNL Trusted Corridors Project: Watts Bar Dam Inland Waterway Project

Radiation has existed everywhere in the environment since the Earth's formation - in rocks, soil, water, and plants. The mining and processing of naturally occurring radioactive materials for use in medicine, power generation, consumer products, and industry inevitably generate emissions and waste. Radiological measuring devices have been used by industry for years to measure for radiation in undesired locations or simply identify radioactive materials. Since the terrorist attacks on the United States on 9-11-01 these radiation measuring devices have proliferated in many places in our nation's commerce system. DOE, TVA, the Army Corps and ORNL collaborated to test the usefulness of these devices in our nation's waterway system on this project. The purpose of the Watts Bar Dam ORNL Trusted Corridors project was to investigate the security, safety and enforcement needs of local, state and federal government entities for state-of-the-art sensor monitoring in regards to illegal cargo including utilization of the existing infrastructure. TVA's inland waterways lock system is a recognized and accepted infrastructure by the commercial carrier industry. Safety Monitoring activities included tow boat operators, commercial barges and vessels, recreational watercraft and their cargo, identification of unsafe vessels and carriers, and, monitoring of domestic and foreign commercial vessels and cargo identification. Safety Enforcement activities included cargo safety, tracking, identification of hazardous materials, waterway safety regulations, and hazardous materials regulations. Homeland Security and Law Enforcement Applications included Radiological Dispersive Devices (RDD) identification, identification of unsafe or illicit transport of hazardous materials including chemicals and radiological materials, and screening for shipments of illicit drugs. In the Fall of 2005 the SensorNet funding for the project expired. After several unsuccessful attempts to find a Federal sponsor to continue with the project, the Watts Bar Dam Project was canceled and the Exploranium radiation monitors were removed from the doors of Watts Bar Dam in early 2006. The DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office decided to proceed with a Pilot building on the ORNL work performed at the TN and SC weigh stations in the highway sector of the Trusted Corridors project and eventually expanded it to other southern states under the name of Southeastern Corridor Pilot Project (SETCP). Many of the Phase I goals were achieved however real-world test data of private watercraft and barges was never obtained.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Final Report: Multi-State Sharing Initiative

In 2003 a joint effort between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Justice created state and metropolitan intelligence fusion centers. These fusion centers were an effort to share law enforcement, disaster, and terrorism related information and intelligence between state and local jurisdictions and to share terrorism related intelligence between state and local law enforcement agencies and various federal entities. In 2006, DHS commissioned the Oak Ridge National Laboratory to establish and manage a groundbreaking program to assist local, state, and tribal leaders in developing the tools and methods required to anticipate and forestall terrorist events and to enhance disaster response. This program, called the Southeast Region Research Initiative (SERRI), combines science and technology with validated operational approaches to address regionally unique requirements and suggest regional solutions with the potential for national application. In 2009, SERRI sponsored the Multistate Sharing Initiative (MSSI) to assist state and metropolitan intelligence fusion centers with sharing information related to a wider variety of state interests than just terrorism. While these fusion centers have been effective at sharing data across organizations within their respective jurisdictions, their organizational structure makes bilateral communication with federal entities convenient and also allows information to be further disbursed to other local entities when appropriate. The MSSI-developed Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) sharing system allows state-to-state sharing of non-terrorism-related law enforcement and disaster information. Currently, the MSSI SAR system is deployed in Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, and South Carolina. About 1 year after implementation, cognizant fusion center personnel from each state were contacted to ascertain the status of their MSSI SAR systems. The overwhelming response from these individuals was that the MSSI SAR system was an outstanding success and contributed greatly to the security and resiliency of their states. At least one state commented that SERRI's implementation of the MSSI SAR actually 'jump started' and accelerated deployment and acceptance of the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI). While all states were enthusiastic about their systems, South Carolina and Tennessee appeared to be the heaviest users of their respective systems. With NSI taking the load of sharing SARs with other states, Tennessee has redeployed the MSSI SAR system within Tennessee to allow SAR sharing between state and local organizations including Tennessee's three Homeland Security Regions, eleven Homeland Security Districts, and more than 500 police and sheriff offices, as well as with other states. In one success story from South Carolina, the Economy SAR System was used to compile similar SARs from throughout the state which were then forwarded to field liaison officers, emergency management personnel, and law enforcement officers for action.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Validation of the BERT Point Source Inversion Scheme Using the Joint Urban 2003 Tracer Experiment Dataset (Final Report)

A terrorist attack in a U.S. city utilizing biological weapons could have severe consequences. A biological agent could be aerosolized and emitted into the air in the middle of a city, invisibly traveling with the winds, and dosing an unknowing populace. The magnitude of the problem would only be revealed as sick people started arriving several days later at hospitals with symptoms, many already too ill to be saved. A national program has deployed a network of biological agent collectors in U.S. cities to provide early detection of a bio-weapon attack, thereby hastening medical intervention and potentially saving many thousands of lives. In fact, the most effective treatment takes place prior to infection or in its early stages and early warning might reduce the disease progression and, consequently, the possibility of an outbreak. If a biological attack were to occur in a city, one or more collectors may register hits with specific dosages and the city would be alerted that an attack had taken place. This piece of information alone, however, would not be enough to determine how serious the attack was, i.e., how much biological agent was released into the air and where the bio-plume traveled. The first responders and public health communities will want to know what regions were impacted, how many persons might get sick, which people most need medical supplies, and where to clean up. The law enforcement community will want to look for forensic evidence at the release location. The Bio-Agent Event Reconstruction Tool (BERT) has been developed in order to recreate what might have happened during an airborne biological agent attack based on biological agent collector measurements and wind collectors mounted around a city. The tool can be used to estimate possible release areas while eliminating other areas, and can estimate bounds on the amount of material released. The tool can then be used to project forward from the possible source areas to estimate potential hazard zones. Due to a unique source inversion technique - called the upwind collector footprint approach - the tool runs fast and the source regions can be determined in a few minutes. In this report, we provide an overview of the BERT framework, followed by a description of the source inversion technique. The Joint URBAN 2003 field experiment held in Oklahoma City that was used to validate BERT is then described. Subsequent sections describe the metrics used for evaluation, the comparison of the experimental data and BERT output, and under what conditions the BERT tool succeeds and performs poorly. Results are aggregated in different ways (e.g., daytime vs. nighttime releases, 1 vs. 2 vs. 3 hit collectors) to determine if BERT shows any systematic errors. Finally, recommendations are given for how to improve the code and procedures for optimizing performance in operational mode.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

LANL Continuity of Operations Plan

The Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is a premier national security research institution, delivering scientific and engineering solutions for the nation's most crucial and complex problems. Our primary responsibility is to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation's nuclear stockpile. LANL emphasizes worker safety, effective operational safeguards and security, and environmental stewardship, outstanding science remains the foundation of work at the Laboratory. In addition to supporting the Laboratory's core national security mission, our work advances bioscience, chemistry, computer science, earth and environmental sciences, materials science, and physics disciplines. To accomplish LANL's mission, we must ensure that the Laboratory EFs continue to be performed during a continuity event, including localized acts of nature, accidents, technological or attack-related emergencies, and pandemic or epidemic events. The LANL Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan documents the overall LANL COOP Program and provides the operational framework to implement continuity policies, requirements, and responsibilities at LANL, as required by DOE 0 150.1, Continuity Programs, May 2008. LANL must maintain its ability to perform the nation's PMEFs, which are: (1) maintain the safety and security of nuclear materials in the DOE Complex at fixed sites and in transit; (2) respond to a nuclear incident, both domestically and internationally, caused by terrorist activity, natural disaster, or accident, including mobilizing the resources to support these efforts; and (3) support the nation's energy infrastructure. This plan supports Continuity of Operations for Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). This plan issues LANL policy as directed by the DOE 0 150.1, Continuity Programs, and provides direction for the orderly continuation of LANL EFs for 30 days of closure or 60 days for a pandemic/epidemic event. Initiation of COOP operations may be required to support an allhazards event, including a national security emergency, major fire, catastrophic natural disaster, man-made disaster, terrorism event, or technological disaster by rendering LANL buildings, infrastructure, or Technical Areas unsafe, temporarily unusable, or inaccessible.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Stability Study for Ultra-Dilute Chemical Warfare Agent Standards

Ultra-dilute (10 ppm) chemical warfare agent (CWA) standards are being supplied to the Environmental Response Laboratory Network (ERLN) laboratories to allow the use of authentic standards to assist in analyses required in the aftermath of a terrorist attack with CWAs. It is critical for the ERLN laboratories to be able to work with authentic CWA standards to allow the unambiguous identification and quantification of CWAs. The ultra dilute standards are synthesized in-house for use in analytical method development by the ERLN laboratories. However, data regarding the long-term stability of the ultra-dilute standards are lacking. For this reason, a study was undertaken to monitor the concentrations of CWAs in ultra-dilute standards as a function of time, under normal conditions of storage and use. The data collected in such a study could then be used to estimate reliable holding times for the ultra-dilute standards.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

BAZAAR DIPLOMACY: Examining Iran's Nuclear Bargaining Tactics

Since undeclared elements of Iran’s nuclear program were revealed in 2002, Tehran has engaged in a decade of efforts to justify and advance its nuclear program. Unlike North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has maximized advantage and minimized backlash by maneuvering near the borders of the NPT system. Iran has embraced a three-pronged approach to bargain with the international community: (1) divide international opposition, (2) delay international monitoring, negotiations, and sanctions, (3) and defy international monitoring, commitments, and pressure. Iran’s nuclear bargaining can be divided into several time periods, and Iran used divide, delay, and defy tactics in each period. During the first phase from 2003 to 2005, Iranian reformist leader Mohammad Khatami was more willing to negotiate with the international community, but his ability to negotiate was constrained domestically and particularly during his last year of leadership. Tehran mainly negotiated with the France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – the European 3 (EU-3) – to drive a wedge between European and U.S. pressures on Iran and to delay outside monitoring and prevent international sanctions. It is in this early period that Iran developed its range of divide, delay, and defy tactics. For divide, Iran negotiated with the EU-3 because Europe had a close and influential relationship with the United States, whereas other international actors such as Russia and China were powerful but could not form an united bloc against the U.S. Iran began to delay international monitoring of its nuclear program by creating hurdles for international inspectors, stalling requests for information, and not volunteering information but providing updates only when Iranian nuclear developments were exposed by other parties. Iranian diplomats also delayed negotiations and sanctions by framing talks, negotiating and responding slowly to offers, providing false hopes and the appearance of concessions before key international events and resolutions, and adopting temporary and shifting negotiating positions. To defy, Iran modified and razed nuclear sites to prevent detection, used legalistic and minimal interpretations to subvert commitments, argued for an international right to enrich uranium, and proclaimed a fatwa against nuclear weapons. After President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, Iran took a tougher stance internationally. Ahmadinejad and his cabinet did not provide major concessions to facilitate international negotiations, were less willing to seriously consider proposals to curb Iran’s nuclear program, and linked Iran’s nuclear program to sovereignty and national pride. Realizing that Europe was less optimistic about negotiations, Ahmadinejad leveraged Russia and China to Iran’s advantage. Both countries helped delay and dilute United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran. Ahmadinejad employed more tactics to defy international monitoring and pressure. These tactics involved demonstrating Iran’s nuclear progress even as Tehran engaged in negotiations over its program. Iran also increased the cost of failed negotiations by sustaining and escalating regional and global tensions to coincide with international events and resolutions that criticized or condemned Iran’s nuclear program. The third and present phase of Iranian nuclear bargaining began during Ahmadinejad’s second term as president (2009-2012). During this period, Ahmadinejad’s power significant weakened and domestic turf wars made Iranian nuclear negotiations unpredictable and at times contradictory. Due to the domestic situation and the exhausting of successful divide and delay tactics, Iran began using more defy tactics. Iran, for example, considered enriching uranium to a higher percentage for naval reactors, warned of closing the Straits of Hormuz, and engaged in terrorist acts against the West and its allies. Currently, Iran’s range of bargaining options has narrowed, with many divide and delay tactics less useful since the international community has become more aware of Iranian efforts to stall and buy time. While Iran leaders have employed more acts of defiance, Iran’s ability to sustain its defy tactics are waning and it is still possible to prevent greater confrontation between Iran and the West.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Preparing Communities for Nuclear Terrorism

Both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama have designated the potential use of nuclear or radiological weapons by a terrorist organization as the most significant danger facing American society. In order to confront this threat the Obama Administration’s 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism states, “We recognize that no nation, no matter how powerful, can prevent every threat from coming to fruition. That is why we are focused on building a culture of resilience able to prevent, respond to, or recover fully from any potential act of terror directed at the United States.”1 Promoting the necessary transition of a “culture of resilience” from ambitious rhetoric to plausible reality requires American communities to serve as the primary initiators. Rather than begin with a top down strategy at the national level, it is necessary to ingrain a whole of community approach at the local, state, and federal stages. Through utilization of resiliency planning techniques stakeholders can prepare for a wide spectrum of hazards ranging from natural disasters to the threat of nuclear terrorism. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism affirms that, “Supporting community leaders and influential local stakeholders as they develop solutions tailored to their own particular circumstances is a critical part of our whole-of-government approach that contributes to our counterterrorism goals.” A catalyst for increasing community resilience is knowledge of the threat, what preparedness actions to take, how to implement those actions and communal consensus on why these actions are beneficial. It is important for community leaders to understand the risks associated with nuclear/radiological terrorism and the initial steps required to mitigate these dangers through resilience.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Advancing Aviation Security

Air travel is a popular mode of transportation. Each year, more than 600 million people board U.S. flights for business or pleasure. As demonstrated on 9/11, a coordinated terrorist strike on commercial airlines has devastating consequences where many lives could be lost and the nation’s economy could be crippled. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has worked diligently to enhance security at airports and on flights so that people and cargo can continue to move freely. Today, all passengers and every piece of checked or carry-on luggage are screened before they are permitted on an aircraft. X-ray systems and walk-through metal detectors allow security personnel to identify dangerous metal objects, such as guns and knives. A more complex problem is the detection of explosives, where detection technologies such as multiple-energy X-ray radiography, computed tomography (CT), full body scanners using millimeter wave and X-ray backscatter and other techniques are used to screen for explosives hidden in luggage, in cargo and on the people boarding the aircraft. Scientists and engineers at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) are working with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), Explosives Division (EXD) to help improve aviation security by evaluating and enhancing the performance of next-generation explosives detection technologies. LLNL is providing subject matter expertise to TSA for their multi-billion dollar procurements of explosive detection system (EDS) for the nation’s airports and provides recommendations for process and system improvements. To further improve aviation security, EXD is funding research at LLNL to develop advanced explosives detection technologies that can more accurately discriminate between a wide range of explosives and non-threat materials. One challenge with scanning for explosives is that some nonthreatening materials share similar characteristics with actual threats, leading to false positives or false alarms. When an alarm is generated, security personnel must review the scan images to clear the alarm or manually open and verify the bag’s contents, which can increase labor costs and lead to passenger delays. The Livermore efforts currently focus on CT-based applications. First developed for the medical field as a method for diagnosing disease, X-ray CT has become instrumental in various industrial Non-Destructive Evaluation (NDE) applications. Explosives detection equipment that incorporates CT uses a broad-spectrum X-ray beam to capture projections of an object, in particular, the objects inside a piece of luggage. The CT system then applies complex reconstruction algorithms to the projections to produce a three-dimensional representation of the luggage and its contents. Automated threat-detection algorithms (also referred to as threat-recognition algorithms) further process the images to separate each item and flag potential threats for further review (see Figure 1). Transportation security officers can then examine these images and the relevant data to determine whether further interrogation is needed. LLNL has also performed research on advanced X-ray carry-on bag inspection systems and is helping to better understand the performance of X-ray backscatter and millimeter wave passenger screening systems.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Literature Review of the Extraction and Analysis of Trace Contaminants in Food

There exists a serious concern that chemical warfare agents (CWA) may be used in a terrorist attack against military or civilian populations. While many precautions have been taken on the military front (e.g. protective clothing, gas masks), such precautions are not suited for the widespread application to civilian populations. Thus, defense of the civilian population, and applicable to the military population, has focused on prevention and early detection. Early detection relies on accurate and sensitive analytical methods to detect and identify CWA in a variety of matrices. Once a CWA is detected, the analytical needs take on a forensic application – are there any chemical signatures present in the sample that could indicate its source? These signatures could include byproducts of the reaction, unreacted starting materials, degradation products, or impurities. Therefore, it is important that the analytical method used can accurately identify such signatures, as well as the CWA itself. Contained herein is a review of the open literature describing the detection of CWA in various matrices and the detection of trace toxic chemicals in food. Several relevant reviews have been published in the literature,1-5 including a review of analytical separation techniques for CWA by Hooijschuur et al.1 The current review is not meant to reiterate the published manuscripts; is focused mainly on extraction procedures, as well as the detection of VX and its hydrolysis products, as it is closely related to Russian VX, which is not prevalent in the literature. It is divided by the detection technique used, as such; extraction techniques are included with each detection method.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Improvised Nuclear Device Case Study

Reducing the casualties of catastrophic terrorist attacks requires an understanding of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) effects, infrastructure damage, atmospheric dispersion, and health effects. The Federal Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation provides the strategy for response to an improvised nuclear device (IND) detonation. The supporting science developed by national laboratories and other technical organizations for this document significantly improves our understanding of the hazards posed by such an event. Detailed fallout predictions from the advanced suite of three-dimensional meteorology and plume/fallout models developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, including extensive global geographical and real-time meteorological databases to support model calculations, are a key part of response planning. This presentation describes the methodology and results to date, including visualization aids developed for response organizations. These products have greatly enhanced the community planning process through first-person points of view and description of the dynamic nature of the event.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nuclear Fallout Decision Tool for First Responders

If terrorists detonated an improvised nuclear device (IND) in an urban area, thousands of people would die from the blast, and many more would become sick or die from exposure to fallout radiation. Proper sheltering and evacuation can protect people from fallout and save lives. This project provides guidance to first responders as to when to evacuate and what route to take to protect themselves against fallout radiation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Microbial DNA Index System (MiDIS): A tool for microbial pathogen source identification

The microbial DNA Index System (MiDIS) is a concept for a microbial forensic database and investigative decision support system that can be used to help investigators identify the sources of microbial agents that have been used in a criminal or terrorist incident. The heart of the proposed system is a rigorous method for calculating source probabilities by using certain fundamental sampling distributions associated with the propagation and mutation of microbes on disease transmission networks. This formalism has a close relationship to mitochondrial and Y-chromosomal human DNA forensics, and the proposed decision support system is somewhat analogous to the CODIS and SWGDAM mtDNA databases. The MiDIS concept does not involve the use of opportunistic collections of microbial isolates and phylogenetic tree building as a basis for inference. A staged approach can be used to build MiDIS as an enduring capability, beginning with a pilot demonstration program that must meet user expectations for performance and validation before evolving into a continuing effort. Because MiDIS requires input from a a broad array of expertise including outbreak surveillance, field microbial isolate collection, microbial genome sequencing, disease transmission networks, and laboratory mutation rate studies, it will be necessary to assemble a national multi-laboratory team to develop such a system. The MiDIS effort would lend direction and focus to the national microbial genetics research program for microbial forensics, and would provide an appropriate forensic framework for interfacing to future national and international disease surveillance efforts.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Improvised Nuclear Device Response Training Materials

Nuclear terrorism is a very real threat to the American people. The best way to prepare for, and respond to, terrorist events is to plan for them ahead of time. Research done at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has already been conducted on what will happen following the detonation of a low-yield, ground-level nuclear device. Even though this knowledge exists, many cities have not begun to prepare for nuclear terrorism events. This project took the scientific research presentations and publications developed at LLNL and turned them into training materials that use clear language without scientific terminology, and can be easily understood by response personnel. These materials model and analyze the detonation of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) in a major metropolitan area. The information contained in these materials explains that survival after the detonation of an IND is possible, and seeks to inform readers on various topics related to the detonation of an IND. Creation of these materials required an understanding of the research behind IND response planning, including building protection factors, radiological fallout, weather patterns and understanding how emergency response happens in an urban environment. The result is a suite of training modules for instructors and students: Fallout, Prompt Effects, Response and Shelter-Evacuation Strategies. These modules are designed so that they may be taught as a combined, full course, or taken as individual modules. Upon completion of an individual module, or the entire set, a person will have a greater understanding, and increased background knowledge, on topics related to a small-scale nuclear attack. These training modules are intended to give an overview of topics necessary to understand what will happen after detonation of an IND and provide suggestions and strategies for response and evacuation. They are not intended to provide a substitute to local, regional, state and national response planning for a nuclear attack. These guides were designed with the intent to act as guidelines and starting points for further extensive planning by all levels of government. By gaining an overview of IND related topics, there is a hope that response planning officials will realize the importance of planning as well as the survivability of such an event with proper planning.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗