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NASA NTRS1999

When is Testing Sufficient

The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center has been investigating how projects can determine when sufficient testing has been completed. For most projects, schedules are underestimated, and the last phase of the software development, testing, must be decreased. Two questions are frequently asked: "To what extent is the software error-free? " and "How much time and effort is required to detect and remove the remaining errors? " Clearly, neither question can be answered with absolute certainty. Nonetheless, the ability to answer these questions with some acceptable level of confidence is highly desirable. First, knowing the extent to which a product is error-free, we can judge when it is time to terminate testing. Secondly, if errors are judged to be present, we can perform a cost/benefit trade-off analysis to estimate when the software will be ready for use and at what cost. This paper explains the efforts of the SATC to help projects determine what is sufficient testing and when is the most cost-effective time to stop testing.

Rosenberg, Linda H.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Continuous Risk Management: An Overview

Software risk management is important because it helps avoid disasters, rework, and overkill, but more importantly because it stimulates win-win situations. The objectives of software risk management are to identify, address, and eliminate software risk items before they become threats to success or major sources of rework. In general, good project managers are also good managers of risk. It makes good business sense for all software development projects to incorporate risk management as part of project management. The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to implement risk management. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This is an introductory tutorial to continuous risk management based on this course. The rational for continuous risk management and how it is incorporated into project management are discussed. The risk management structure of six functions is discussed in sufficient depth for managers to understand what is involved in risk management and how it is implemented. These functions include: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions.

Rosenberg, Linda↗

NASA NTRS1999

Continuous Risk Management at NASA

NPG 7120.5A, "NASA Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements" enacted in April, 1998, requires that "The program or project manager shall apply risk management principles..." The Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) at NASA GSFC has been tasked with the responsibility for developing and teaching a systems level course for risk management that provides information on how to comply with this edict. The course was developed in conjunction with the Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon University, then tailored to the NASA systems community. This presentation will briefly discuss the six functions for risk management: (1) Identify the risks in a specific format; (2) Analyze the risk probability, impact/severity, and timeframe; (3) Plan the approach; (4) Track the risk through data compilation and analysis; (5) Control and monitor the risk; (6) Communicate and document the process and decisions. This risk management structure of functions has been taught to projects at all NASA Centers and is being successfully implemented on many projects. This presentation will give project managers the information they need to understand if risk management is to be effectively implemented on their projects at a cost they can afford.

Hammer, Theodore F.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Continuous Risk Management: A NASA Program Initiative

Hammer, Theodore F.↗

NASA NTRS1991

Quality and security - They work together

This paper describes the importance of considering computer security as part of software quality assurance practice. The intended audience is primarily those professionals involved in the design, development, and quality assurance of software. Many issues are raised which point to the need ultimately for integration of quality assurance and computer security disciplines. To address some of the issues raised, the NASA Automated Information Security program is presented as a model which may be used for improving interactions between the quality assurance and computer security community of professionals.

Carr, Richard↗

NASA NTRS2009

Architectural Analysis of Complex Evolving Systems of Systems

The goal of this collaborative project between FC-MD, APL, and GSFC and supported by NASA IV&V Software Assurance Research Program (SARP), was to develop a tool, Dynamic SAVE, or Dyn-SAVE for short, for analyzing architectures of systems of systems. The project team was comprised of the principal investigator (PI) from FC-MD and four other FC-MD scientists (part time) and several FC-MD students (full time), as well as, two APL software architects (part time), and one NASA POC (part time). The PI and FC-MD scientists together with APL architects were responsible for requirements analysis, and for applying and evaluating the Dyn-SAVE tool and method. The PI and a group of FC-MD scientists were responsible for improving the method and conducting outreach activities, while another group of FC-MD scientists were responsible for development and improvement of the tool. Oversight and reporting was conducted by the PI and NASA POC. The project team produced many results including several prototypes of the Dyn-SAVE tool and method, several case studies documenting how the tool and method was applied to APL s software systems, and several published papers in highly respected conferences and journals. Dyn-SAVE as developed and enhanced throughout this research period, is a software tool intended for software developers and architects, software integration testers, and persons who need to analyze software systems from the point of view of how it communicates with other systems. Using the tool, the user specifies the planned communication behavior of the system modeled as a sequence diagram. The user then captures and imports the actual communication behavior of the system, which is then converted and visualized as a sequence diagram by Dyn-SAVE. After mapping the planned to the actual and specifying parameter and timing constraints, Dyn-SAVE detects and highlights deviations between the planned and the actual behavior. Requirements based on the need to analyze two inter-system communication protocols that are representative of protocols used in the Aerospace industry have been specified. The protocols are related: APL s Common Ground System (CGS) as used in the MErcury Surface, Space ENvironment, GEochemistry, and Ranging (MESSENGER) and the Radiation Belt Space Probes (RBSP) missions. The analyzed communications were implementations of the Telemetry protocol and the CCSDS File Delivery Protocol (CFDP) protocol. Based on these requirements, three prototypes of Dyn-SAVE were developed and applied to these protocols. The application of Dyn-SAVE to these protocols resulted in the detection of several issues. Dyn-SAVE was also applied to several Testbeds that have previously been used for experimentation earlier on this project, as well as, to other protocols and logs for testing its broader applicability. For example, Dyn-SAVE was used to analyze 1) the communication pattern between a web browser and a web server, 2) the system log of a computer in order to detect offnominal computer shut-down behavior, and 3) the actual test cases of NASA Goddard s Core Flight System (CFS) and automatically generated test cases in order to determine the overlap between the two sets of test cases. In all cases, Dyn-SAVE assisted in providing insightful conclusions about each of the cases identified above.

Lindvall, Mikael↗

NASA NTRS2017

Security Vulnerability Profiles of NASA Mission Software: Empirical Analysis of Security Related Bug Reports

NASA develops, runs, and maintains software systems for which security is of vital importance. Therefore, it is becoming an imperative to develop secure systems and extend the current software assurance capabilities to cover information assurance and cybersecurity concerns of NASA missions. The results presented in this report are based on the information provided in the issue tracking systems of one ground mission and one flight mission. The extracted data were used to create three datasets: Ground mission IVV issues, Flight mission IVV issues, and Flight mission Developers issues. In each dataset, we identified the software bugs that are security related and classified them in specific security classes. This information was then used to create the security vulnerability profiles (i.e., to determine how, why, where, and when the security vulnerabilities were introduced) and explore the existence of common trends. The main findings of our work include:- Code related security issues dominated both the Ground and Flight mission IVV security issues, with 95 and 92, respectively. Therefore, enforcing secure coding practices and verification and validation focused on coding errors would be cost effective ways to improve mission's security. (Flight mission Developers issues dataset did not contain data in the Issue Category.)- In both the Ground and Flight mission IVV issues datasets, the majority of security issues (i.e., 91 and 85, respectively) were introduced in the Implementation phase. In most cases, the phase in which the issues were found was the same as the phase in which they were introduced. The most security related issues of the Flight mission Developers issues dataset were found during Code Implementation, Build Integration, and Build Verification; the data on the phase in which these issues were introduced were not available for this dataset.- The location of security related issues, as the location of software issues in general, followed the Pareto principle. Specifically, for all three datasets, from 86 to 88 the security related issues were located in two to four subsystems.- The severity levels of most security issues were moderate, in all three datasets.- Out of 21 primary security classes, five dominated: Exception Management, Memory Access, Other, Risky Values, and Unused Entities. Together, these classes contributed from around 80 to 90 of all security issues in each dataset. This again proves the Pareto principle of uneven distribution of security issues, in this case across CWE classes, and supports the fact that addressing these dominant security classes provides the most cost efficient way to improve missions' security. The findings presented in this report uncovered the security vulnerability profiles and identified the common trends and dominant classes of security issues, which in turn can be used to select the most efficient secure design and coding best practices compiled by the part of the SARP project team associated with the NASA's Johnson Space Center. In addition, these findings provide valuable input to the NASA IVV initiative aimed at identification of the two 25 CWEs of ground and flight missions.

vulnerability↗

DOE OSTI2025

WRS Capabilities Booklet [Slides]

WRS is the digital backbone of the Weapons Program—delivering trusted data assets, cyber-assured software and systems, and AI-enabling software—that transform insights into decisive action. We empower physicists, engineers, researchers, and scientists to think faster, act strategically, and stay ahead in an ever-evolving threat landscape. Our efforts ensure critical nuclear weapons data remains secure, accessible, and usable—supporting mission-critical work, informed decision making, and scientific advancement at LANL and across the Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE).

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

NASA NTRS1984

Advanced information processing system

Design and performance details of the advanced information processing system (AIPS) for fault and damage tolerant data processing on aircraft and spacecraft are presented. AIPS comprises several computers distributed throughout the vehicle and linked by a damage tolerant data bus. Most I/O functions are available to all the computers, which run in a TDMA mode. Each computer performs separate specific tasks in normal operation and assumes other tasks in degraded modes. Redundant software assures that all fault monitoring, logging and reporting are automated, together with control functions. Redundant duplex links and damage-spread limitation provide the fault tolerance. Details of an advanced design of a laboratory-scale proof-of-concept system are described, including functional operations.

Lala, J. H.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Initial flight qualification and operational maintenance of X-29A flight software

This paper is predominantly a nontechnical discussion of some significant aspects of the initial flight qualification and operational maintenance of the flight control system software for the X-29A technology demonstrator. Flight qualification and maintenance of complex, embedded flight control system software poses unique problems. The X-29A technology demonstrator aircraft has a digital flight control system which incorporates functions generally considered too complex for analog systems. Organizational responsibilities, software assurance issues, tools, and facilities are discussed.

Earls, Michael R.↗

NASA NTRS1989

Initial flight qualification and operational maintenance of X-29A flight software

A discussion is presented of some significant aspects of the initial flight qualification and operational maintenance of the flight control system softward for the X-29A technology demonstrator. Flight qualification and maintenance of complex, embedded flight control system software poses unique problems. The X-29A technology demonstrator aircraft has a digital flight control system which incorporates functions generally considered too complex for analog systems. Organizational responsibilities, software assurance issues, tools, and facilities are discussed.

Earls, Michael R.↗

NASA NTRS1997

An Automated Method for Identifying Inconsistencies within Diagrammatic Software Requirements Specifications

The development of large-scale, composite software in a geographically distributed environment is an evolutionary process. Often, in such evolving systems, striving for consistency is complicated by many factors, because development participants have various locations, skills, responsibilities, roles, opinions, languages, terminology and different degrees of abstraction they employ. This naturally leads to many partial specifications or viewpoints. These multiple views on the system being developed usually overlap. From another aspect, these multiple views give rise to the potential for inconsistency. Existing CASE tools do not efficiently manage inconsistencies in distributed development environment for a large-scale project. Based on the ViewPoints framework the WHERE (Web-Based Hypertext Environment for requirements Evolution) toolkit aims to tackle inconsistency management issues within geographically distributed software development projects. Consequently, WHERE project helps make more robust software and support software assurance process. The long term goal of WHERE tools aims to the inconsistency analysis and management in requirements specifications. A framework based on Graph Grammar theory and TCMJAVA toolkit is proposed to detect inconsistencies among viewpoints. This systematic approach uses three basic operations (UNION, DIFFERENCE, INTERSECTION) to study the static behaviors of graphic and tabular notations. From these operations, subgraphs Query, Selection, Merge, Replacement operations can be derived. This approach uses graph PRODUCTIONS (rewriting rules) to study the dynamic transformations of graphs. We discuss the feasibility of implementation these operations. Also, We present the process of porting original TCM (Toolkit for Conceptual Modeling) project from C++ to Java programming language in this thesis. A scenario based on NASA International Space Station Specification is discussed to show the applicability of our approach. Finally, conclusion and future work about inconsistency management issues in WHERE project will be summarized.

Zhang, Zhong↗

NASA NTRS1998

Testing, Requirements, and Metrics

The criticality of correct, complete, testable requirements is a fundamental tenet of software engineering. Also critical is complete requirements based testing of the final product. Modern tools for managing requirements allow new metrics to be used in support of both of these critical processes. Using these tools, potential problems with the quality of the requirements and the test plan can be identified early in the life cycle. Some of these quality factors include: ambiguous or incomplete requirements, poorly designed requirements databases, excessive or insufficient test cases, and incomplete linkage of tests to requirements. This paper discusses how metrics can be used to evaluate the quality of the requirements and test to avoid problems later. Requirements management and requirements based testing have always been critical in the implementation of high quality software systems. Recently, automated tools have become available to support requirements management. At NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), automated requirements management tools are being used on several large projects. The use of these tools opens the door to innovative uses of metrics in characterizing test plan quality and assessing overall testing risks. In support of these projects, the Software Assurance Technology Center (SATC) is working to develop and apply a metrics program that utilizes the information now available through the application of requirements management tools. Metrics based on this information provides real-time insight into the testing of requirements and these metrics assist the Project Quality Office in its testing oversight role. This paper discusses three facets of the SATC's efforts to evaluate the quality of the requirements and test plan early in the life cycle, thus preventing costly errors and time delays later.

Rosenberg, Linda↗

NASA NTRS1998

Using Decision Procedures to Build Domain-Specific Deductive Synthesis Systems

This paper describes a class of decision procedures that we have found useful for efficient, domain-specific deductive synthesis. These procedures are called closure-based ground literal satisfiability procedures. We argue that this is a large and interesting class of procedures and show how to interface these procedures to a theorem prover for efficient deductive synthesis. Finally, we describe some results we have observed from our implementation. Amphion/NAIF is a domain-specific, high-assurance software synthesis system. It takes an abstract specification of a problem in solar system mechanics, such as 'when will a signal sent from the Cassini spacecraft to Earth be blocked by the planet Saturn?', and automatically synthesizes a FORTRAN program to solve it.

VanBaalen, Jeffrey↗

NASA NTRS2005

Development of Advanced Verification and Validation Procedures and Tools for the Certification of Learning Systems in Aerospace Applications

Adaptive control technologies that incorporate learning algorithms have been proposed to enable automatic flight control and vehicle recovery, autonomous flight, and to maintain vehicle performance in the face of unknown, changing, or poorly defined operating environments. In order for adaptive control systems to be used in safety-critical aerospace applications, they must be proven to be highly safe and reliable. Rigorous methods for adaptive software verification and validation must be developed to ensure that control system software failures will not occur. Of central importance in this regard is the need to establish reliable methods that guarantee convergent learning, rapid convergence (learning) rate, and algorithm stability. This paper presents the major problems of adaptive control systems that use learning to improve performance. The paper then presents the major procedures and tools presently developed or currently being developed to enable the verification, validation, and ultimate certification of these adaptive control systems. These technologies include the application of automated program analysis methods, techniques to improve the learning process, analytical methods to verify stability, methods to automatically synthesize code, simulation and test methods, and tools to provide on-line software assurance.

Jacklin, Stephen↗

NASA NTRS2006

Case Study: Test Results of a Tool and Method for In-Flight, Adaptive Control System Verification on a NASA F-15 Flight Research Aircraft

Adaptive control technologies that incorporate learning algorithms have been proposed to enable autonomous flight control and to maintain vehicle performance in the face of unknown, changing, or poorly defined operating environments [1-2]. At the present time, however, it is unknown how adaptive algorithms can be routinely verified, validated, and certified for use in safety-critical applications. Rigorous methods for adaptive software verification end validation must be developed to ensure that. the control software functions as required and is highly safe and reliable. A large gap appears to exist between the point at which control system designers feel the verification process is complete, and when FAA certification officials agree it is complete. Certification of adaptive flight control software verification is complicated by the use of learning algorithms (e.g., neural networks) and degrees of system non-determinism. Of course, analytical efforts must be made in the verification process to place guarantees on learning algorithm stability, rate of convergence, and convergence accuracy. However, to satisfy FAA certification requirements, it must be demonstrated that the adaptive flight control system is also able to fail and still allow the aircraft to be flown safely or to land, while at the same time providing a means of crew notification of the (impending) failure. It was for this purpose that the NASA Ames Confidence Tool was developed [3]. This paper presents the Confidence Tool as a means of providing in-flight software assurance monitoring of an adaptive flight control system. The paper will present the data obtained from flight testing the tool on a specially modified F-15 aircraft designed to simulate loss of flight control faces.

Jacklin, Stephen A.↗

NASA NTRS2006

The NASA SARP Software Research Infusion Initiative

A viewgraph presentation describing the NASA Software Assurance Research Program (SARP) research infusion projects is shown. The topics include: 1) Background/Motivation; 2) Proposal Solicitation Process; 3) Proposal Evaluation Process; 4) Overview of Some Projects to Date; and 5) Lessons Learned.

Hinchey, Mike↗

NASA NTRS2008

Using Sequence Diagrams to Detect Communication Problems Between Systems

Many software systems are evolving complex system of systems (SoS) for which inter-system communication is both mission-critical and error-prone. Such communication problems ideally would be detected before deployment. In a NASA-supported Software Assurance Research Program (SARP) project, we are researching a new approach addressing such problems. In this paper, we show that problems in the communication between two systems can be detected by using sequence diagrams to model the planned communication and by comparing the planned sequence to the actual sequence. We identify different kinds of problems that can be addressed by modeling the planned sequence using different level of abstractions.

Lindvall, Mikael↗