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The Safety Argumentation Schools of Thought

Safety cases have been produced and researched for decades. Definitions of `safety case' agree on both the need to generate suitable evidence and the central role of argument. But the relevant literature seems to exhibit multiple schools of thought that are largely unrecognized and somewhat at odds with each other. This paper presents preliminary results from research to identify and characterize the safety case schools of thought so as to reduce confusion and discord in research and practice.

Graydon, Patrick John↗

Assuring Ground-Based Detect and Avoid for UAS Operations

One of the goals of the Marginal Ice Zones Observations and Processes Experiment (MIZOPEX) NASA Earth science mission was to show the operational capabilities of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) when deployed on challenging missions, in difficult environments. Given the extreme conditions of the Arctic environment where MIZOPEX measurements were required, the mission opted to use a radar to provide a ground-based detect-and-avoid (GBDAA) capability as an alternate means of compliance (AMOC) with the see-and-avoid federal aviation regulation. This paper describes how GBDAA safety assurance was provided by interpreting and applying the guidelines in the national policy for UAS operational approval. In particular, we describe how we formulated the appropriate safety goals, defined the processes and procedures for system safety, identified and assembled the relevant safety verification evidence, and created an operational safety case in compliance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requirements. To the best of our knowledge, the safety case, which was ultimately approved by the FAA, is the first successful example of non-military UAS operations using GBDAA in the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS), and, therefore, the first nonmilitary application of the safety case concept in this context.

Detect-and-Avoid↗

Role of Human Intrusion in Decision-Making for Radioactive Waste Disposal - Results of the IAEA HIDRA Project - 16287

Disposal of radioactive waste aims to protect people and the environment from the potential hazards of the materials by removing the wastes from the human environment. This approach is considered desirable to dispersal of the waste in the environment. However, the waste becomes concentrated in one location, which poses potential hazards should the waste become disturbed at a future date. For radioactive waste, it is generally expected that in preparing safety cases for such disposal facilities, the possibility of the wastes being inadvertently disturbed at some point in the future and the potential consequences of such an intrusion need to be considered. Potential inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) has a role in the decision-making and the safety case throughout the lifecycle of a disposal facility. In 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) formally initiated a project entitled 'Human Intrusion in the Context of Disposal of Radioactive Waste' (HIDRA) to provide insights regarding the role of IHI for these decisions and to provide a common framework for consideration of IHI as part of development of a safety case for a disposal facility. HIDRA was implemented with a series of annual plenary meetings involving participants from more than 20 countries organised into three working groups. The working groups addressed: societal factors, stylised scenarios, and protective measures. The project resulted in a general approach with specific suggestions for consideration of IHI during the lifecycle of a disposal facility. From a general perspective, it was emphasized that IHI is a contributing factor to the safety case, but does not outweigh considerations related to safety of operations and long-term performance for the normal evolution of the facility. (authors)

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French Cigeo Operational Safety Options: The General Approach and Challenging Issues Towards the Licensing - 18051

After around 25 years of In view of the licensing application, two main milestones for safety are identified for Cigeo: a Safety Options Dossier 'DOS' early 2016 and the safety case to support Future License Application of Cigeo. The Safety Options was an opportunity for Andra to send in advance a first safety case to the French Safety Authority in order to stabilize the safety strategy, the safety requirements, the safety methods, key safety and design options, the list of safety scenarios that are selected and a preliminary 'bounding' impact. The paper describes the approach applied for the operating safety options and the main concluding aspects as well as the challenging issues towards the licensing. (authors)

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Regulating Operational Safety at a Future Geological Disposal Facility in the UK - 18038

The United Kingdom (UK) has generated commercial nuclear energy for over 60 years; generating a significant and varied inventory of higher activity radioactive waste (HAW). In accordance with international practice, UK Government policy for long-term management of HAW is disposal in a geological disposal facility (GDF). The nuclear materials comprising HAW include high level waste, intermediate level waste and some low level waste, not suitable for disposal to the Low Level Waste Repository. In addition, other nuclear materials may be reclassified as waste in the future and will require to be managed as HAW for disposal to a GDF; these include spent fuel, uranium and plutonium. The operator of a GDF will be required to obtain a nuclear site licence from the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), as the nuclear safety and security regulator, in order to construct and operate the facility. In the period prior to submission of a licence application, ONR is working to develop its regulatory expectations and provide advice on its regulatory role with regards to a future GDF. ONR has developed regulatory guidance on operational safety, benchmarked against the relevant IAEA Safety Standards and the Western European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) Safety Reference Levels for Disposal. This guidance draws upon ONR's current expectations for nuclear sites; including operational reactors, fuel manufacture and reprocessing facilities, and reactors undergoing decommissioning; and incorporates relevant good practice drawn from international programmes for geological disposal and related industries (eg mining). In addition to the technical assessment guidance, ONR has developed guidance on the licensing process specific to a GDF; providing clarity for example on when a licence will be required. A review of the standard licence conditions applied to all nuclear sites concluded no significant amendment would be required for application to a GDF. Through its voluntary agreement with Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM), the developer and future operator of a GDF in the UK, ONR exerts regulatory influence on the design and organisational development of the future licensee. As part of this scrutiny, ONR has assessed RWM's generic Disposal System Safety Case. Subjecting the generic design and safety case to regulatory review provides opportunity for early engagement to ensure the appropriate standards will be achieved. ONR will only grant the necessary regulatory permissions if RWM adequately demonstrates the GDF will be constructed, operated and closed safely. Future challenges faced by ONR with respect to a GDF include building and maintaining regulatory competence and confidence, and engaging effectively with the public as the UK begins its search for a suitable site to provide appropriate assurance that a GDF will be operated safely and securely. (authors)

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International Implementation of IAEA's Borehole Disposal Concept for Sealed Radioactive Sources - 18545

With funding from the Government of Canada, and support from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Office of International Program and many others, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is supporting the field deployment of the Borehole Disposal Concept (BDC) for secure disposal of radioactive sources in Ghana, the Philippines and Malaysia. This is a first-of-its-kind implementation. Though small in volume, disused sealed radioactive sources can be intensively radioactive and create a significant safety and security liability for the majority of the 168 Member States in the IAEA. Millions of sealed radioactive sources have been manufactured since 1901, and it is estimated that hundreds of thousands are now unwanted. The irony is that some of the countries with the smallest inventories have the greatest difficulties managing their radioactive wastes. The BDC was originally conceptualized in an IAEA-study undertaken by the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA) for countries with small inventories of disused sealed radioactive sources. There are multiple, passive engineered and natural barriers in the BDC design, including an inner stainless-steel capsule (which holds the wastes), an inner cement containment barrier, an outer stainless steel container and outer backfill cement, as well as the surrounding geosphere. In common subsurface geochemical environments, these barriers will isolate the wastes from the biosphere, provide effective containment and ensure long-term safety. To greatly limit the likelihood of inadvertent human intrusion (safety), and deliberate human intrusion (security), these waste packages will be disposed of in a narrow diameter borehole (26 cm) at depths greater than 30 m. This type of borehole disposal creates an exceptionally small footprint, removes the wastes from normal human surficial activities, and isolates the waste packages from near-surface processes. Over the past 20 years, the IAEA, NECSA and many others have advanced the BDC on the shoulders of the IAEA's broader work supporting safe and secure disposal of radioactive wastes and management of sealed radioactive sources. With recent funding and support from many others, the IAEA has assisted Ghana, Malaysia and the Philippines in assessing their inventories and conditioning their disused sealed radioactive sources, in drilling investigation boreholes and characterizing their proposed sites, and in designing their disposal systems. These countries plan to place the uppermost waste package at depths greater than 100 m. While activities in the Philippines remain focused on-site characterization, Ghana is in the latter stages of developing their Safety Case for operational and 'post-closure' safety and Malaysia has completed their Safety Case and submitted a license application to construct and operate a BDC facility. Though this paper identifies the support provided to Member States by the IAEA, it is the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission and the Malaysian Nuclear Agency that are responsible for the safety and security of the disposals and that have been responsible for carrying-out their disposal programs. Once the BDC is licensed by the relevant national regulatory bodies, these first-of-a-kind disposal approaches will provide a template for other countries to safely dispose of their disused sealed radioactive sources - permanently eliminating their safety and security liabilities. (authors)

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The application of ICASPA to critical and safe mass calculations - 14586

ICASPA, an Improved Critical and Safe Parameters Algorithm, calculates the size of a fissile body for a given value of k-effective. ICASPA uses an iterative predictor/corrector algorithm in which the MONK9A code is used to derive a precise k-effective value for a given candidate body size; auxiliary equations are then used to adjust the body size. The process is repeated until MONK9A outputs the chosen target value of k-effective. EDF Energy operates eight nuclear power stations comprising one Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and seven Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) stations. At these sites, the term 'fuel route' is used to encompass all of the ex-reactor arrangements for the handling and storage of fuel. The criticality safety cases for these fuel routes are based on the use of geometrically safe arrangements for the required quantities of fuel. The allowed quantities and arrangements of fuel are safely sub-critical, even under the contingency of accidental moderator ingress. The fuel route safety cases consider all credible potential fault conditions, including events such as dropped fuel. Any such events might change the geometry of the fuel elements, but it is difficult to calculate exact k-effective values for realistic models of dropped fuel. This difficulty is overcome by the use of an alternative approach in which limiting safe masses are calculated for bounding (worst-case) rearrangements of fuel rods and moderators, using geometries similar to those covered by criticality handbook data. Where required, the resulting safe masses are used to set safety case limits and conditions. For example, some fire extinguishants, such as water and ABC dry powder, are also effective moderators. Hence, in some fuel route areas, administrative criticality controls are used to either prohibit or limit the permitted quantities of these materials. This paper describes the work that has been carried out to adopt ICASPA as the approved calculation method for these safe mass calculations. The work has been carried out within the company quality assurance requirements for nuclear safety related software. It has involved the development of a configuration controlled version of ICASPA and the local verification and validation of the resulting code. The benefits from the adoption of ICASPA are also presented. These include accuracy improvements and, because the method uses the MONK9A code for k-effective calculations, the ability to use more sophisticated models for limiting case geometries. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

FY16 Summary Report: Participation in the KOSINA Project

Salt formations represent a promising host for disposal of nuclear waste in the United States and Germany. Together, these countries provided fully developed safety cases for bedded salt and domal salt, respectively. Today, Germany and the United States find themselves in similar positions with respect to salt formations serving as repositories for heat-generating nuclear waste. German research centers are evaluating bedded and pillow salt formations to contrast with their previous safety case made for the Gorleben dome. Sandia National Laboratories is collaborating on this effort as an Associate Partner, and this report summarizes that teamwork. Sandia and German research groups have a long-standing cooperative approach to repository science, engineering, operations, safety assessment, testing, modeling and other elements comprising the basis for salt disposal. Germany and the United States hold annual bilateral workshops, which cover a spectrum of issues surrounding the viability of salt formations. Notably, recent efforts include development of a database for features, events, and processes applying broadly and generically to bedded and domal salt. Another international teaming activity evaluates salt constitutive models, including hundreds of new experiments conducted on bedded salt from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. These extensive collaborations continue to build the scientific basis for salt disposal. Repository deliberations in the United States are revisiting bedded and domal salt for housing a nuclear waste repository. By agreeing to collaborate with German peers, our nation stands to benefit by assurance of scientific position, exchange of operational concepts, and approach to elements of the safety case, all reflecting cost and time efficiency.

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Major Achievements of the Springfields Decommissioning Program - 16512

Since the 1940's, Springfields has manufactured fuel products for the UK's nuclear power stations and for international customers. The early operations were in support of the atomic weapons program, closely followed by fuel manufacture for electricity generation via the Magnox power stations commencing in the late 1950's. In 2005, responsibility for the assets and liabilities of Springfields was transferred to the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). A new company, Springfields Fuels Limited, was created to run the site, which was managed and operated by Westinghouse Electric UK Ltd on the NDA's behalf. On April 1, 2010, Westinghouse entered into an agreement with the NDA for a long-term lease of the Springfields site, which transferred responsibility for the commercial fuel manufacturing business and Springfields Fuels Limited to Westinghouse. Today, the main Springfields activities include: - Oxide fuels for Advanced Gas-cooled and Light Water Reactors, as well as intermediate fuel products, such as powders, granules and pellets, - Manufacture of Uranium Hexafluoride (now in Care and Maintenance), - Processing and recovery of Uranium residues, - Decommissioning and demolition of redundant plants and buildings. Some 120 plant buildings and support facilities have been successfully decommissioned and demolished in the period 1996 to date. These range from 1940's buildings, subsequently converted for nuclear fuel manufacture, together with some of the formerly sealed chemical agent manufacture and storage facilities. Decommissioning of the now redundant Magnox manufacturing facilities is ongoing at Springfields without compromising the other site operations. Westinghouse is managing all activities related to the whole lifecycle, planning, design, safety case, radiation protection, Post Operational Clean Out (POCO), service diversions, characterization, decommissioning all phases through to ground remediation, waste disposal and agreed end states. Decommissioning of process plants starts with the removal of the majority of radiological activity or hazard contained within the plant. This is known as Post Operational Clean Out. Once this is complete, the plant may be dismantled. Work is scoped and defined within packages (at plant or cell level) to aid control and commercial monitoring as the decommissioning is progressed. This package approach also enables clean or lightly contaminated items to be removed separately to aid potential re-cycling and minimize decontamination and waste disposal costs. Westinghouse is further optimising work package delivery by planning parallel POCO and Decommissioning work phases within plant at a cell level to systematically remove redundant plant and reduce hazard earlier, whilst optimising use of both internal and external resources to reduce total project cost. Waste and Residues from all phases are disposed of via authorized disposal routes and in accordance with our environmental authorizations. On completion of decommissioning and removal of plant and equipment the building is re-assessed radiologically, categorized and appropriate remediation work progressed to render it safe for conventional demolition. The major elements of the success achieved to date can be attributed to the following elements: - Overall programme management with extensive experience of planning, cost, and risk management. Integration of the programme within a major commercial site without compromising safety or operations. - Complete site EHS management working within a complex regulatory framework including the Nuclear Site Licenses, Environmental Authorisations and Security requirements. - Avoiding safety complacency by use of rigorous and systematic process to emphasise safety over competing goals. Including structured use of Human Performance and Corrective Action and Learning processes. - Unique safety experiences attained through complex hazard reduction across a broad range of uranium manufacturing and chemical hazard/agent facilities. - Project leadership and excellence utilizing a core site team to deploy repeatable processes and safe practices to deliver complex scope within budget and schedule. - Optimised use of internal and external resources, with extensive use of Operating Experience to drive continuous improvement and problem resolution. - Management of Contractors from initial selection, pre-qualification, tender assessment and Performance using varied contract forms across delivery phases. - Use of Westinghouse expertise for safety case, waste management, uranium recovery, health physics and design. - Implementation of a work package to ensure gated discreet manageable packages. Underpinned by package specific method statements, with appropriate hold points to maintain management and control of the works. - Continuous local safety focus via safety planning, induction, plant specific training, proactive risk assessment, and a defined approach to decoupling operating plant safety cases enabling focussed and usable documentation. This paper will provide an overview of the latest decommissioning activities achieved on the Springfields site and will focus on best practices that allowed Westinghouse to maintain the program on time and on budget. (authors)

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Regulation of the Shutdown Defueling and Decommissioning Reactors in the United Kingdom - 16576

Nuclear policy, including for decommissioning, in the United Kingdom is set by the UK Government. The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, NDA, is responsible for managing the clean-up of the UK's nuclear legacy which includes the first generation of Magnox power stations. Magnox Ltd (MXL), owned by Cavendish Fluor Partnership, is the licensee and the management and operations contractor responsible for ten Magnox reactor sites and two restoration sites in the UK, working for the sites' owner, NDA. The work of the company is diverse covering electricity generation at Wylfa (until December 2015), defueling, and preparation for an interim end state, known as Care and Maintenance (C and M) which will precede the final site clearance. The C and M phase is expected to last over 75 years during which the sites are maintained in a passively safe and secure state while radiation levels are left to decay naturally. Preparations for this phase include removing fuel from the reactors and storage ponds; retrieving intermediate level waste from current stores and treating it or converting it to forms suitable for long-term storage or disposal and making sure of the integrity of critical safety systems of the de-fuelled reactors. The Decommissioning, Fuel and Waste programme within the Office for Nuclear Regulation, ONR, regulates nuclear safety in the 12 Magnox nuclear licensed sites. ONR works with the environmental regulators who are responsible for environmental protection on nuclear sites. The focus of this paper is the regulation of nuclear safety by ONR across the Magnox sites and the interactions with nuclear security and the environmental aspects required to achieve effective, proportionate and efficient regulation of these sites in the UK. ONR's strategy for regulating the Magnox defueling and decommissioning sites is focused on enabling the licensee to complete the initial stages of decommissioning and reduce the nuclear and radioactive hazards on its sites. To this effect, ONR's revised inspection guidance is centred on inspecting the (remaining) important systems for safety identified in the safety cases. Other interventions focus on engaging with the licensee on safety significant decommissioning projects to gain evidence of the licensee's readiness prior to and during these activities rather than formal assessment of the associated safety cases. In light of reduced hazards and risks across the de-fueled and decommissioning Magnox reactors, ONR's revised regulatory expectation regarding evolution of emergency arrangements during decommissioning is based on key transition points that follow electricity generation. Implementation of these revised strategies as well as organisational restructuring within the team responsible for regulation of the Magnox fleet has resulted in improved efficiency and consistency in regulatory approach whilst securing the required safety standards in managing decommissioning activities. (authors)

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Reactor System Safety: A case for New and Advanced Reactors

This presentation covers a generic overview of reactor system safety testing, analysis, and related research and development (R&D) focusing on new and advanced reactor systems. This presentation is prepared for graduate-level student seminar talks. No specific reactor design information is provided. Only publicly available information and related published articles and book contents are utilized.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗

Small Earth Observing Satellites Flying with Large Satellites in the A-Train

This paper/poster presents a real-life example of the benefits of flying small satellites with other satellites, large or small, and vice versa. Typically, most small satellites fly payloads consisting of one or two instruments and fly in orbits that are independent from that of other satellites. The science data from these satellites are either used in isolation or correlated with instrument data from other satellites. Data correlation with other satellites is greatly improved when the measurements of the same point or air mass are taken at approximately the same time. Scientists worldwide are beginning to take advantage of the opportunities for improved data correlation, or coincidental science, offered by the international Earth Observing Constellation known as the A-Train (sometimes referred to as the Afternoon Constellation). Most of the A-Train satellites are small - the A-Train is anchored by two large NASA satellites (EOS-Aqua and EOS-Aura), but consists also of 5 small satellites (CloudSat, CALIPSO, PARASOL, OCO and Glory these last two will join in 2009). By flying in a constellation, each mission benefits from coincidental observations from instruments on the other satellites in the constellation. Essentially, from a data point of view, the A-Train can be envisioned as a single, virtual science platform with multiple instruments. Satellites in the A-Train fly at 705 km in sun-synchronous orbits. Their mean local times at the equator are within seconds to a few minutes of each other. This paper describes the challenges of operating an international constellation of independent satellites from the U.S. and Europe to maximize the coincidental science opportunities while at the same time minimizing the level of operational interactions required between team members. The A-Train mission teams have been able to demonstrate that flying as members of an international constellation does not take away the flexibility to accommodate new requirements. Specific examples will be cited, including CloudSat's relocation (to accommodate a new viewing angle for the CALIPSO satellite), Glory's replan to move closer to PARASOL, and OCO's long term plans to minimize on-orbit operations costs while maintaining safety. In all cases, safety is ensured, science returns are enhanced, and operational flexibility is retained to the maximum extent possible.

Kelly, Angelita C.↗

UK Regulatory experience with the criticality safety of transport package applications - 14519

The UK Government has created the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) as an independent public body to ensure effective and efficient regulation of the nuclear industry in the UK. ONR brings together for the first time in the UK the regulation of nuclear safety, civil nuclear security, nuclear safeguards and the transport of radioactive substances within a single organization. Applications requesting approval to transport packages containing fissile material through the UK have been received for many decades from numerous organisations across the world. Each application is treated equally with the judgement of safety based on the information provided in the design safety report. In recent years, the ONR has questioned a number of criticality safety related assumptions; some of which have been held for many decades. The outcome from these discussions will be examined. Uranium hexafluoride (UF{sub 6}) has been transported across the world for many years, carried in 30B steel cylinders within a variety of overpacks. For simplicity, some criticality safety cases have not claimed for the presence of the overpack. However, it shall be shown that these safety cases will have difficulty in justifying the criticality safety of transporting uranium hexafluoride if credit for the overpack is not claimed. In addition, the applications that have been submitted for Competent Authority approval have made various assumptions regarding the shell thickness of the 30B cylinder, the distribution of the hydrogen fluoride (HF) impurity and the potential for the uranium hexafluoride residues to hydrolyse. The adequacy of these assumptions will be discussed in turn along with the need for the applicant to demonstrate compliance with any certificate restriction on the mass of heel (residue) allowed within the package. Uranium oxide (UO{sub 2}) powder is regularly transported around the world. For most designs, it is assumed that water will enter the package under accident conditions of transport. Under these conditions, a common assumption is that the grains of uranium oxide powder will evenly distribute within the water and internal volume of the package. The validity of this assumption from a realistic and pessimistic perspective will be challenged. It will then be shown that if instead the powder grains of uranium oxide are agglomerated together into larger sized groups, an increase in the k{sub eff} of the system of up to 2,000 pcm can occur. As packages are commonly loaded up to the criticality safety limit, an increase in k{sub eff} such as this is likely to be problematic. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Andra's strategy and approach for operational safety of French underground facility Cigeo - 15127

According to the French Act on radioactive waste of 28 June 2006, Andra shall design a reversible repository. In response to this demand, Andra is developing the industrial project namely 'Cigeo', a reversible geological disposal facility for HLW and ILW located in Meuse/Haute-Marne. The previous safety cases of 2005, 2009 and 2012 give a sound basis to assess Cigeo's safety both for the operational and post-closure periods. Regarding operational safety, in this new stage of the project, the challenging issues for the preparation of the safety case are the following: - To adapt the various regulatory frameworks (nuclear and non-nuclear) to the underground facility - To design the underground facility and handling equipment's to reduce at first risks in the underground facility as such radioactive particles release, gas explosion, fire and co-activity and limit their consequence. - To establish waste acceptance criteria to be fulfilled by waste producers in line with operational safety and design options. The objective of the paper is to present the experience of Andra in operation safety of the underground facility of Cigeo. Operational safety for Cigeo is assessed as much as possible according to the existing French regulations and guidance for nuclear facilities. Indeed, compared to existing nuclear facilities, a geological repository is a specific case due to the existence of underground facilities with particularities such as: - ventilation management in a large scale underground facility, - fire risk management. As an input for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation, Andra defined a fire guidance and a specific reference safety guidance, based on the adaptation of the French nuclear regulatory texts for and when feasible to mines and tunnels regulatory texts and on its own experience gained through safety operational reports since 2005 and their reviews by the Safety Authority. - underground co-activity of nuclear operation with construction works. According to the common 'defense-in depth' principle for nuclear facilities, these guidelines for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation consider the successive levels of defense of: - Preventing the risk and its spreading by design and construction; - Detecting incidents and early fighting by design and operation dispositions (detection and control systems, survey procedure); - Controlling incidents and limiting of their consequences by safeguarding systems, specific procedures. At that stage, design options for Cigeo constitute an adequate response to the operational safety functions and requirements: - Two levels of containment are set up: the first one is ensured by the waste package, the second one is ensured from the surface facility to the disposal vaults by the transfer cask during the transfer of waste packages in the disposal vaults by the disposal vault itself and a nuclear ventilation with HEPA filter; - Favorable options for fire risk prevention and mitigation: transport system minimizing heat load (cable car for the transfer from the surface, electric transfer engines), twin access tunnels to ease fire-fighting and evacuation...; - Permanent complete physical separation of nuclear zone and construction zone (including ventilation systems). In practice, operation safety assessment of Cigeo, designed following the aforesaid reference safety guidelines, follows a common risk analysis (internal aggressions such as auxiliary losses, chemical and toxic risks, fall or collision, fire, human factors and external aggressions such as earthquake, air traffic, flooding) with the following steps: - Identification of the major risks and the design basis scenarios that have to be considered for dimensioning of the installations and the safety devices; - On the basis of these different situations, those who will have to be quantified are identified; one or more representative and envelop situations are chosen in order to evaluate robustness of the installation. Quantitative evaluation of these situations permits to: - identify the consequences on man, environment and installation, and in particular to gain confidence in the maintaining of the safety functions; - identify or define the technic and/or organisational dispositions classified as 'important elements for protection' (IEP); - Situations beyond dimensioning permit to verify the robustness of the installation. They permit, on one hand to identify possible complementary material or organisational dispositions; on the other hand, to define the 'hard core' i.e. structures, systems and components that permit to maintain the confinement function of radioactive substance. (authors)

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Presentation: Scenario Timeline Exploration

Slides to discuss a current project with DOE. Topic focus is on: - Advanced reactors will be able to use risk insights for many design aspects - We need bounding scenarios for screening and scoping purposes - We need realistic scenarios for input into the licensing basis safety-case - We need to manage inherent uncertainty - We need to automate the safety-case creation as much as possible

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Scenario Exploration and Timeline Analysis for Advanced Reactors [Slides]

Slides created to discuss the report "Approach and Model Used to Represent a Timeline Analysis for Security Design Enhancements" (August 2022 INL/ RPT-22-68664) for an upcoming DOE security workshop. Advanced reactors will be able to use risk insights for many design aspects. We need realistic scenarios for input into the licensing basis safety-case. These scenarios must include timing and physics. We need to automate the safety-case creation as much as possible.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Fire safety: A case study of technology transfer

Two basic ways in which NASA-generated technology is being used by the fire safety community are described. First, improved products and systems that embody NASA technical advances are entering the marketplace. Second, NASA test data and technical information related to fire safety are being used by persons concerned with reducing the hazards of fire through improved design information and standards. The development of commercial fire safety products and systems typically requires adaptation and integration of aerospace technologies that may not have been originated for NASA fire safety applications.

Heins, C. F.↗

Evaluation of Engineered Barrier Systems in the Disposition of Spent Nuclear Fuel

This document is a summary of the R&D activities associated with the Engineered Barrier Systems Work Package. Multiple facets of Engineered Barrier Systems (EBS) research were examined in the course of FY18 activities. This report is focused on delivering an update on the status and progress of modelling tools and experimental methods, both of which are essential to understanding and predicting long-term repository performance as part of the safety case. Specifically, the work described herein aims to improve understanding of EBS component evolution and interactions. Utlimately, the EBS Work Package is working towards producing process models for distinct processes that can either be incorporated into performance assessment (PA), or provide critical information for implementing better constraints on barrier performance The main objective of this work is that the models being developed and refined will either be implemented directly into the Generic Disposal System Analysis platform (GDSA), or can otherwise be indirectly linked to the performance assessment by providing improved bounding conditions. In either the case, the expectation is that validated modelling tools will be developed that provide critical input to the safety case. This report covers a range of topics — modelling topics include: thermal-hydrologic-mechanical-chemical coupling (THMC) in buffer materials, comparisons of modelling approaches to optimize computational efficiency, thermal analysis for EBS/repository design, benchmarking of thermal analysis tools, and a preliminary study of buffer re-saturation processes. Experimental work reported, includes: chemical evolution and sorption behavior of clay-based buffer materials and high-pressure, high temperature studies of EBS material interactions. The work leverages international collaborations to ensure that the DOE program is active and abreast of the latest advances in nuclear waste disposal. This includes participation in the HotBENT Field Test, aimed at understanding near-field effects on EBS materials at temperatures above 100 °C, and the analysis of data and characterization of samples from the FEBEX Field Test. Both the FEBEX and HotBENT Field Tests utilize/utilized the Grimsel Test Site in Switzerland, which is situated in a granite host rock. These tests offer the opportunity to understand near field evolution of bentonite buffer at in situ conditions for either a relatively long timescale (18 years for FEBEX) or temperature above 100 °C (HotBENT). Overall, this report provides in depth descriptions of tools and capabilities to investigate nearfield performance of EBS materials (esp. bentonite buffer), as well as tools for drift-scale thermal and thermal-hydrologic analysis critical to EBS and repository design. For a more detailed description of work contained herein, please see Section 10 ("Conclusions") of this document.

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