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MELCOR Modeling of Accident Scenarios at a Facility for Aqueous Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel

The work presented in this report applies the MELCOR code to evaluate potential accidents in non-reactor nuclear facilities, focusing on Design Basis Accidents. Ten accident scenarios were modeled using NRC's best-estimate severe accident analysis code, MELCOR 2.2. The accident scenarios simulated a range of explosions and/or fires related to a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility. The objective was to evaluate the radionuclide source term to the environment following initiating explosion and/or fire events. The simulations were performed using a MELCOR model of the Barnwell Nuclear Fuel Plant, which was decommissioned before beginning reprocessing operations. Five of the accident scenarios were based on the Class 5 Design Basis Accidents from the Final Safety Analysis Report. Three of the remaining accident scenarios include sensitivity studies on smaller solvent fires. The final two accidents included an induced fire from an initial explosion. The radionuclide inventory was developed from ORIGEN calculations of spent PWR fuel with an initial enrichment of 4.5% U-235 by weight. The fuel aged for five years after a final 500-day irradiation cycle. The burn-up was conservatively increased to 60 GWd/MTU to bound current US operations. The results are characterized in terms of activity release to the environment and the building decontamination factor, which is related the leak path factor used in Department of Energy safety analyses. The MELCOR 2.2 results consider adverse consequences to the filters, ventilation system, and structures as a result of the explosions and fires. The calculations also include best-estimate models for aerosol transport, agglomeration, and deposition. The new calculations illustrate best-estimate approaches for predicting the source term from a reprocessing facility accident.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DNB evaluation of PWR steam-line break event using Westinghouse and CASL coupled code systems

ANCKVIPRE and the VERA-CS code systems have been successfully applied to predicting PWR core response with respect to departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) at the limiting time step of a postulated hot zero power (HZP) main steam-line break (MSLB) event with and without offsite power available. ANCKVIPRE links the ANC code with the VIPRE-W code. ANC is Westinghouse's multi-dimensional nodal diffusion code for all nuclear core design calculations. It predicts core reactivity, assembly power, rod power, detector thimble flux, and other relevant core characteristics. VIPRE-W is the Westinghouse version of a thermalhydraulic subchannel code developed for light water reactor core design applications. The reactor core simulation was based on input of the core boundary conditions from RETRAN system transient and STAR-CCM+ CFD core inlet distribution calculations. To account for the asymmetric power distribution in the reactor core due to the broken steam pipe in one loop and the stuck RCCA, both ANCKVIPRE and the VERA-CS models were set up for the whole reactor core. The advanced modeling and simulations confirmed that the HZP MSLB high-flow case with offsite power available is more limiting with respect to the DNB acceptance criterion, consistent with the limiting case analyzed in the 4-loop plant Safety Analysis Report (SAR). The results also demonstrated that the currently NRC-approved Westinghouse coupled code system such as ANCKVIPRE remains conservative.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Transitional cores and fuel cycle analyses in support of MIT reactor low enriched uranium fuel conversion

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR) is a research reactor in Cambridge, Massachusetts designed primarily for experiments using neutron beam and in-core irradiation facilities. At 6 MW, it delivers neutron flux and energy spectrum comparable to power light water reactors (LWRs) in a compact core using highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel. In the framework of non-proliferation policy, research and test reactors have started a program to convert HEU fuel to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. A new type of LEU fuel based on a high density alloy of uranium and molybdenum (U-10Mo) is expected to allow conversion of U.S. high performance research reactors (USHPRRs) like the MITR. The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) for the MITR LEU conversion has been submitted and currently under review by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). A transition core plan, from 22 fresh LEU fuel elements (i.e., beginning-of-life) gradually to 24 of them arranged in an equilibrium configuration, is expected to serve as an appendix chapter in the final SAR. The current study reported here presents the fuel cycle development, which eventually leads to the transition core plan. The results confirm the equilibrium state, where both the shim bank movement (i.e., core reactivity) as well as the content of fissile materials stabilize, can be achieved by fixed-pattern fuel management. Fission density has been evaluated for a number of fully discharged LEU fuel elements, using a best-estimate approach. The fuel cycle calculations also generate power profiles at each core state. A steady-state thermal-hydraulic safety analysis has thus been performed, where onset of nucleate boiling (ONB) is considered as the safety criterion. The results confirm significant margin to ONB at all analyzed transition and equilibrium fuel cycle states.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Dose Rate Analysis of the WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility

This report describes a confirmatory calculation for a proposed consolidated interim storage facility (CISF) to support the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s review of the license application submitted by the Interim Storage Partners. The scope of this report is limited to an assessment of the annual dose from direct radiation associated with Phase 1 of the Waste Control Specialists (WCS) CISF and the determination of the minimum controlled area boundary based on the 10 CFR 72.104 limit of 25 mrem annual dose to the whole body. The confirmatory dose rate calculations used the source term and shielding calculation capabilities of the SCALE 6.2.3 computer code system. The calculation method employed in the confirmatory calculations uses a detailed Monte Carlo radiation transport simulation from source to dose rate. This method differs from the two-step method used in the safety analysis report (SAR), which requires determination of the photon and neutron energy and angular distributions on the cask external surface and then the use of this surface source in a new radiation transport calculation to determine dose rate as a function of distance from the storage facility. A simulation was made using the complete site geometry (all casks present) but with only one cask containing source, and a total of 467 independent calculations were performed to obtain the dose rate maps produced by each storage cask. Basic input data and assumptions used in the SAR (e.g., cask design parameters and design basis assembly characteristics) were used in this confirmatory calculation for consistency with the SAR. Local atmospheric conditions for skyshine calculations were simulated using US standard atmosphere data, which describe average air temperature, pressure, and density as a function of altitude. The determined minimum required distances from the WCS Phase 1 CISF to a contour defined by the 25 mrem annual dose limit were approximately 623 m (0.387 miles) in the N-NE direction, 594 m (0.369 miles) in the SSW direction, and 533 m (0.331 miles) in the E-SE direction and the W-NW direction. The annual dose results of the confirmatory calculation are in relatively good agreement with the annual dose values presented in the WCS SAR. The annual dose produced by the Phase 1 CISF at the nearest site boundary, 0.75 miles away from the CISF, was estimated by this study to be approximately 6.02E-02 ± 2.0E-04 mrem, which is significantly smaller than the 25 mrem annual dose limit provided in 10 CFR 72.104. The SAR annual dose rate value for the nearest site boundary was 7.52E-2 mrem, which included 7.73E-03 mrem due to postulated leakage of the FO-, FC-, and FF-canisters. A comparison with the dose rate values reported in the SAR for 16 detector locations, D1 through D16, on the protected area boundary is also included in this report. This comparison shows that the SAR determined higher annual dose values for detectors D1 through D14 by 12% to 45% and lower annual dose values for detectors D15 and D16 by 18% and 8%, respectively, as compared with this ORNL confirmatory calculation. Sensitivity studies have been performed to support a comprehensive review of the application. In these studies, the effects on dose rate of the modeled air volume, density, and humidity were analyzed. The sensitivity calculations showed that the air volume used in the Monte Carlo simulations was adequate and that a larger air volume would not further increase the dose rate due to skyshine contributions. The sensitivity analysis showed that simulation of local atmospheric conditions is important for the accuracy of dose rate estimates at large distances from the facility. Air humidity was demonstrated to have negligible effects on dose rate values for the simulated local atmospheric conditions.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Modeling and simulation functional needs for molten salt reactor licensing

The modeling and simulation functional needs to license and design molten salt reactor concepts were assessed and an evaluation methodology was developed using a licensing-focused approach considering the modeling and simulation components that contribute to a molten salt reactor safety analysis report. These functional needs were prioritized by identifying the relationships between functional needs and using a quantitative weighting method to identify the most critical components to build a licensing case. This novel weighting method provided a list of functional needs prioritized relative to key advanced reactor licensing outcomes. In addition, functional need inputs were ranked to reveal those that feed the most modeling and simulation components. The findings from this prioritization effort were used to inform the modeling and simulation goals of the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Molten Salt Reactor campaign.Modeling and simulation needs were grouped into three main categories: (1) source term definition, material accountancy, and radiological consequences, (2) safety analysis, and (3) steady-state neutronics and thermal hydraulics. Here, five near-term goals were identified among these focus areas that add value: (1) deploying a systems and safeguards analysis computational tool, (2) defining source terms for molten salt reactor analysis and interfacing with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission on accident progression analysis, (3) developing point designs for liquid-fueled thermal-spectrum and fast-spectrum molten salt reactors, (4) building safety analysis specifications and reference solutions for Molten Salt Reactor Experiment transients, and (5) interfacing with the thermophysical and thermodynamic salt chemistry databases.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Department of Energy Operational Readiness Review for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has completed an Operational Readiness Review (ORR) for the restart of Contact Handled (CH) waste emplacement at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) located near Carlsbad, New Mexico. The ORR team assessed the readiness of Nuclear Waste Partnership, LLC (NWP) to manage and perform receipt through CH waste emplacement, and associated waste handling and management activities, including the ability of the National TRU Program (NTP) to evaluate the waste currently stored at the WIPP site against the revised and enhanced Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC). Field work for this review began on November 14, 2015 and was completed on November 30, 2016. The DOE ORR was conducted in accordance with the Department of Energy Operational Readiness Review Implementation Plan for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, dated November 8, 2016, and DOE Order 425.1D, Verification of Readiness to Start Up or Restart Nuclear Facilities. The review activities included personnel interviews, record reviews, direct observation of operations and maintenance demonstrations, and observation of multiple operational and emergency drills/exercises. The DOE ORR also evaluated the adequacy of the contractor’s ORR (CORR) and the readiness of the DOE Carlsbad field Office (CBFO) to oversee the startup and execution of CH waste emplacement activities at the WIPP facility. The WIPP facility is categorized as a Hazard Category 2 DOE Nonreactor Nuclear Facility for all surface and Underground (UG) operations per DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. In addition, the WIPP experienced two events in February, 2014 that resulted in Accident Investigations being performed in accordance with the requirements of DOE Order 225.1B, Accident Investigations. Based upon the results of the accident investigations and hazard categorization of the facility, the team placed significant emphasis on the following areas: fire protection, emergency preparedness, radiological protection, nuclear safety, and operations. The identification of specific focus areas was not intended to diminish the importance of other areas of the review, but to ensure that these areas received a particularly thorough and in-depth evaluation due to their significance with respect to the safe operation of the facility.

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Supplemental Thermal-Hydraulic Transient Analyses of BR2 in Support of Conversion to LEU Fuel

Belgian Reactor 2 (BR2) is a research and test reactor located in Mol, Belgium and is primarily used for radioisotope production and materials testing. The Materials Management and Minimization (M3) Reactor Conversion Program of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is supporting the conversion of the BR2 reactor from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel. The RELAP5/Mod 3.3 code has been used to perform transient thermal-hydraulic safety analyses of the BR2 reactor to support reactor conversion. A RELAP5 model of BR2 has been validated against select transient BR2 reactor experiments performed in 1963 by showing agreement with measured cladding temperatures. Following the validation, the RELAP5 model was then updated to represent the current use of the reactor; taking into account core configuration, neutronic parameters, trip settings, component changes, etc. Simulations of the 1963 experiments were repeated with this updated model to re-evaluate the boiling risks associated with the currently allowed maximum heat flux limit of 470 W/cm 2 and temporary heat flux limit of 600 W/cm 2 . This document provides analysis of additional transient simulations that are required as part of a modern BR2 safety analysis report (SAR). The additional simulations included in this report are effect of pool temperature, reduced steady-state flow rate, in-pool loss of coolant accidents, and loss of external cooling. The simulations described in this document have been performed for both an HEU- and LEU-fueled core.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

AUTHORIZING THE DOT SPECIFICATION 6M PACKAGING FOR CONTINUED USE AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Specification 6M packaging was in extensive use for more than 40 years for in-commerce shipments of Type B quantities of fissile and radioactive material (RAM) across the USA, among the Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories, and between facilities in the DOE production complex. In January 2004, the DOT Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) Agency issued a final rule in the Federal Register to ammend requirements in the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) pertaining to the transportation of radioactive materials. The final rule became effective on October 1, 2004. One of those changes discontinued the use of the DOT specification 6M, along with other DOT specification packagings, on October 1, 2008. A main driver for the change was due to the fact that 6M specification packagings were not supported by a Safety Analysis Report for Packagings (SARP) that was compliant with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 71 (10 CFR 71). The regulatory rules for the discontinued use have been edited in Title 49 of the CFR Parts 100-185, 2004 edition and thereafter. Prior to October 1, 2008, the use of the 6M within the boundaries of the Savannah River Site (SRS), called an onsite transfer, was governed by an onsite transportation document that referenced 49 CFR Parts 100-185. SRS had to develop an Onsite Safety Assessment (OSA) which was independent of 49 CFR in order to justify the continued use of the DOT Specification 6M for the transfer of radioactive material (RAM) at the SRS after October 1, 2008. This paper will discuss the methodology for and difficulties associated with authorizing the DOT Specification 6M Packaging for continued use at the Savannah River Site.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

C-400 and C-409 Criticality Incredible Road Map

Many guides and standards describe a process for evaluating process operations with known quantities of fissile material. The accepted industry guides and standards for performing criticality evaluations for fissile material operations are not well suited for operating systems that may contain residual fissile material. The Paducah Site deactivation activities includes large process components that have unfavorable geometries for the {sup 235}U enrichment levels present. The fissile material holdup in these components can range from negligible residual quantities to significant deposits weighing several hundred pounds. The purpose of this white paper is to outline a methodology that can be used to declare a facility as criticality incredible (CI). For the purpose of this paper, criticality incredible means that the inventory and its form and distribution within the facility does not need Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) type (e.g., administrative or engineered) controls. This assumes of course that certain project assumptions are maintained. For example in the facilities that will be discussed within this paper, wet decontamination is not part of the planned demolition and disposal operations. The proposed methodology for deactivation of a facility to the point that criticality incredible can be declared will be applied to the C-400 Chemical Cleaning Building and to the C-409 Decontamination Facility at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP). The purpose and intent of the CI declaration is to release a facility from Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) requirements and simplify the demolition of the facility. In practical terms, this means the facility can be re-categorized as < a Hazard Category 3 facility per DOE-STD-1027-92 Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, NCS controls are not needed, and the Criticality Accident Alarm Systems (CAAS) can be removed from service. The only involvement from the site NCS program following the declaration would be to ensure that the underlying assumptions are not violated through discovered conditions or project changes. This includes the institutional control of preventing new fissile material from being introduced into the facility. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Progress Report on Development of Intermediate Fidelity Full Assembly Analysis Methods

While high fidelity modeling capabilities for various physics phenomena are being pursued under advanced modeling and simulation initiatives under the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy, they generally rely on high-performance computation facilities and are too expensive to be used for parameter-space exploration or design analysis. One-dimensional system codes have been used for a long time and have reached a degree of maturity, but limit their validity to specific applications. Thus, an intermediate fidelity (IF) modeling method is being pursued in this work for a fast-running, modest-fidelity, whole-core transient analyses capability. The new approach is essential for design scoping and engineering analyses and could lead to improvements in the design of the new generations of reactors and to the reduction of uncertainties in safety analysis. This report summarizes the initial effort on the development of the intermediate-fidelity full assembly modeling method. The requirements and the desired merits of the IF approach have been defined. A three-dimensional momentum source model has been developed to model the anisotropic flow in the wire-wrapped rod bundle without the need to resolve the geometric details. It has been confirmed that the momentum source model works well if its affecting region is accurately imposed. The validity of the model is further verified by mesh and parameter sensitivity studies. The developed momentum source model, in principle, can be applied to any wire-wrapped bundle geometries and any flow regimes; while the modeling strategy can be applied to other conditions with complex or distorted geometry, such as flow in blocked channels.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

CERCA LEU fuel assemblies testing in Maria Reactor - safety analysis summary and testing program scope.

The presented paper contains neutronic and thermal-hydraulic (for steady and unsteady states) calculation results prepared to support annex to Safety Analysis Report for MARIA reactor in order to obtain approval for program of testing low-enriched uranium (LEU) lead test fuel assemblies (LTFA) manufactured by CERCA. This includes presentation of the limits and operational constraints to be in effect during the fuel testing investigations. Also, the scope of testing program (which began in August 2009), including additional measurements and monitoring procedures, is described.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE-EM-45 PACKAGING OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE COURSE

Savannah River National Laboratory - Savannah River Packaging Technology (SRNL-SRPT) delivered the inaugural offering of the Packaging Operations and Maintenance Course for DOE-EM-45's Packaging Certification Program (PCP) at the University of South Carolina Aiken on September 1 and 2, 2009. Twenty-nine students registered, attended, and completed this training. The DOE-EM-45 Packaging Certification Program (PCP) sponsored the presentation of a new training course, Packaging Maintenance and Operations, on September 1-2, 2009 at the University of South Carolina Aiken (USC-Aiken) campus in Aiken, SC. The premier offering of the course was developed and presented by the Savannah River National Laboratory, and attended by twenty-nine students across the DOE, NNSA and private industry. This training informed package users of the requirements associated with handling shipping containers at a facility (user) level and provided a basic overview of the requirements typically outlined in Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Chapters 1, 7, and 8. The course taught packaging personnel about the regulatory nature of SARPs to help reduce associated and often costly packaging errors. Some of the topics covered were package contents, loading, unloading, storage, torque requirements, maintaining records, how to handle abnormal conditions, lessons learned, leakage testing (including demonstration), and replacement parts. The target audience for this course was facility operations personnel, facility maintenance personnel, and field quality assurance personnel who are directly involved in the handling of shipping containers. The training also aimed at writers of SARP Chapters 1, 7, and 8, package designers, and anyone else involved in radioactive material packaging and transportation safety. Student feedback and critiques of the training were very positive. SRNL will offer the course again at USC Aiken in September 2010.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Verification and Validation of the PLTEMP/ANL Code for Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of Experimental and Test Reactors

The document compiles in a single volume several verification and validation works done for the PLTEMP/ANL code during the years of its development and improvement. Some works that are available in the open literature are simply referenced at the outset, and are not included in the document. PLTEMP has been used in conversion safety analysis reports of several US and foreign research reactors that have been licensed and converted. A list of such reactors is given. Each chapter of the document deals with the verification or validation of a specific model. The model verification is usually done by comparing the code with hand calculation, Microsoft spreadsheet calculation, or Mathematica calculation. The model validation is done by comparing the code with experimental data or a more validated code like the RELAP5 code.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

U.S. HIGH PERFORMANCE RESEARCH REACTOR PRELIMINARY DESIGN MILESTONE FOR CONVERSION TO LOW ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL

The U.S. reactors that regularly refuel with highly enriched uranium (HEU) have undertaken conversion to low-enriched uranium (LEU) using a high-density alloy of uranium-10 wt% molybdenum (U-10Mo) that is under development for the U.S. High Performance Research Reactors (USHPRR). The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Material Management and Minimization (M3) Reactor Conversion Program is pursuing USHPRR conversion. The USHPRR consists of nine national laboratories and three universities working with a uranium processing plant and commercial fuel fabricator to convert five reactors and an associated critical assembly. Feasibility designs were completed in 2009 for all USHPRR. Since then, the USHPRR have completed key milestones leading to preliminary designs. Between 2007 and 2011, the Fuel Qualification (FQ) Pillar conducted seven irradiation campaigns consisting of 14 large size plates and over 60 mini plates with U-10Mo fuel with a zirconium interlayer. The Preliminary Report on U-Mo Monolithic Fuel for Research Reactors submitted for review to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in 2017 summarizes these irradiation tests. The Fuel Fabrication (FF) Pillar has installed and is operating a fabrication pilot line at BWX Technologies, Inc. In tandem, the Reactor Conversion (RC) Pillar, has been working with each USHPRR to mature conversion designs and to include recent data. As of 2018, all five USHPRR have completed LEU designs. This includes three Preliminary Safety Analysis Reports (PSARs) submitted between 2014 and 2017 to the NRC by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, University of Missouri, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology for their reactors NBSR, MURR, and MITR, respectively. In 2018, the two USHPRR reactors regulated by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) at Idaho National Laboratory (ATR) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (HFIR) completed optimized conceptual or preliminary designs, with ATR confirming a ‘base fuel’ design of the same fabrication complexity as required for MURR, MITR and NBSR. Instead of available U-10Mo designs, HFIR is pursuing a longer silicide (U3Si2) fuel design with a fuel meat density of 4.8 gU/cm3. However, HFIR conversion will require additional fuel qualification due to the complex fuel design containing boron and since HFIR exceeds existing silicide qualification limits. These preliminary designs allow for a commercial fabrication demonstration, and subsequent irradiation qualification of these fuel element designs in order to complete final SARs that allow for USHPRR conversion to LEU fuel.

Wilson, E. H.↗

Technical Review Report for the Application for Contents Amendment for Shipping Isentropic Compression Experiment (ICE) Apparatus in 9977 Packaging

This report documents the review of Application for Contents Amendment for Shipping Isentropic Compression Experiment (ICE) Apparatus in 9977 Packaging, prepared by Savannah River Packaging Technology (SRPT) of Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) of Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, LLC, -- the Submittal -- at the request of the Department of Energy's (DOE) National Nuclear Security Agency's (NNSA) Albuquerque Facility Operations Division, for the shipment of the ICE apparatus from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), to Sandia National Laboratory (SNL). The ICE apparatus consists of a stainless steel assembly containing about 8 grams of {sup 239}Pu or its dose equivalent as noted in Table 1, Comparison of 9977 Content C.1 and the ICE Radioactive Contents, of the Submittal. The ICE target is mounted on the transport container assembly base. A Viton{sup R} O-ring seals the transport container base to the transport container body. Another Viton{sup R} O-ring seals the transport container handle to the transport container body. The ICE apparatus weighs less than 30 pounds and has less than 0.6 watts decay heat rate. For the Model 9977 Package, the maximum payload weight is 100 pounds and the maximum decay heat rate is 19 watts. Thus, the maximum payload weight and the maximum decay heat rate for the Model 9977 Package easily bound those for the ICE apparatus. This Addendum supplements the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP), Revision 2, for the Model 9977 Package and Addendum 1, Revision 2, to Revision 2 of the Model 9977 Package SARP. The ICE apparatus is considered as part of Content Envelope C.6, Samples and Sources, under the submittal for the Model 9978 Package SARP currently under review. The Staff at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) recommends that the Submittal be approved by the DOE-Headquarters Certifying Official (EM-60), and incorporated into a subsequent revision to the current Certificate of Compliance (CoC), to the Model 9977-96 Packaging.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

University of Missouri Research Reactor LEU Fuel Element Flow Test Conceptual Design—Hydraulic Reactor Design Parameters

The University of Missouri-Columbia Research Reactor (MURR®) is one of five U.S. high performance research reactors (USHPRR), plus one critical facility, that actively collaborates with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Material Management and Minimization(M 3 ) Reactor Conversion Program to convert to the use of low-enriched uranium (LEU, < 20 wt.% U-235) fuel. A new type of LEU fuel with very high density, based on an alloy of uranium and 10 weight percent molybdenum (U-10Mo), is expected to allow the conversion to LEU of USHPRR that have been found unable to be converted with previously qualified uranium silicide-aluminum (U 3 Si 2 -Al) dispersion fuel. MURR has been working with the USHPRR Reactor Conversion (RC) Pillar at Argonne National Laboratory to perform fuel element design and fuel cycle performance analyses, steady-state thermal hydraulics safety analyses, and accident safety analyses in preparation for the conversion of MURR and to support a preliminary Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for conversion to LEU fuel. This work is performed in preparation for the flow test campaign that will be conducted by the USHPRR RC Pillar. The purpose of the hydraulic performance evaluation of the MURR LEU fuel element designed by the RC Pillar is to test a prototypic commercially fabricated LEU fuel element to determine whether any failure modes are observed or predicted in the fuel element, including significant deformations such as plate bending, twisting, or plate detachment from the side plate under selected safety-basis limits for reactor hydraulic conditions. To support the design of the flow test for MURR LEU fuel element hydraulic performance evaluation, design parameters for hydraulic testing of the LEU fuel element are laid out in this report.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Regulatory Gap Analysis of Select NUREG-0800 Chapters for Applicability to Molten Salt Reactors

The past licensing approach for advanced reactors was based on adapting the current LWR-based NRC process that exists today to the advanced reactor concept. This is the approach used by advanced technologies such as the Pebble Bed Reactor licensing application, the Clinch River Breeder Reactor licensing application, and more recently the NuScale licensing application. Current Standard Review Plan (SRP) guidance for large LWRs is available in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants: Light Water Reactor (LWR) Edition. However, the SRP is cumbersome to apply to liquid-fueled molten salt reactor (MSR) technologies. Therefore, a thoughtful licensing approach for MSRs is necessary.This report documents for DOE-NE an additional regulatory gap analysis of select chapters from the LWR SRP to further inform a generic nonpower MSR test program. Although the review process outlined in NUREG-0800 is LWR-specific, the plant functions and processes to be reviewed will be similar for the MSR. Therefore, a well-planned nonpower MSR test program can provide the performance data needed to better facilitate the eventual commercial-sized MSR review. The LWR SRP chapters dealing with the reactor, reactor coolant, engineered safety features, auxiliary systems, and waste management systems were reviewed.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Commissioning and Startup of a New Category 2 Nuclear Facility for RH TRU Sludge Packaging - 18614

For many years the Department of Energy (DOE) has been executing a plan to eliminate all threats of Radiological release to the Columbia River from the Hanford site, in Richland, Washington. While the River Corridor Closure Project is nearing completion, one of the last remaining facilities along the Columbia River is the 100K reactor complex. Since the 1950's the 105KW fuel storage basin has contained varying levels of spent reactor fuel and products of the degradation of aging stored fuel. Having previously removed all of the distinguishable spent fuel components, CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M) is now in the final stages of readiness review to commence removal of the residual sludge material that has accumulated in the basin throughout the years of operation. There is approximately 27 m3 of sludge in the 105KW basin currently. This sludge material exhibits a very high radiation dose rate with levels reaching 100 R/hr. It is also very difficult to mobilize and transfer due to its physical characteristics. CH2M engineers have developed a novel mechanical system for mobilization and transfer of the sludge to specially designed storage containers. Once transferred to these containers, the sludge will be moved away from the river and taken to T Plant, a decontamination and repair facility on site, for interim storage, while a project to treat and package the material for final disposition is established. The Sludge Removal Project (SRP) is a $309 M capital line item project that was established to achieve the goals of this mission. Part of the project is to develop and install the equipment needed to do the transfer, and part of the project is to construct a new Category 2 sludge packaging facility. Construction of the facility is now complete, all equipment is installed and the project is well into the commissioning phase. Over the final three months of 2017, the project progressed into the final stages of readiness to transition to operations. This will represent the first commissioning of a new Category 2 process and facility at Hanford in over 10 years. The SRP team has crossed over many hurdles in establishing a workable plan for the safety basis for installing, commissioning and transitioning to operations within the boundaries of an existing Facility Safety Analysis Report. The project team has also applied extensive use of a mockup facility in the development and execution of the path to readiness and commencement of operations. At the time of the conference, the project will have completed a DOE Operational Readiness Review and will be very near of just entering full operation. This paper will share the experiences of the project team through these final steps and lessons learned on making the project successful. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗