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DOE OSTI2021

Safeguards by Design Projects (Final Report FY2021)

This University Engagement project challenged engineering students at universities, that do not have Bachelor degrees in nuclear engineering but do have research reactors and some nuclear engineering coursework, to incorporate Safeguards by Design concepts into their Senior Capstone Design Project. This University Engagement project was part of the U. S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Office of International Nuclear Safeguards, Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, Human Capital Development: University Engagement Program. This program exposed university students with Mechanical Engineering majors and Nuclear Engineering minors to the concepts of international nuclear safeguards.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) through a Common Global Approach

Small Modular Reactors (SMR) with power levels significantly less than the currently standard 1000 to 1600-MWe reactors have been proposed as a potential game changer for future nuclear power. SMRs may offer a simpler, more standardized, and safer modular design by using factory built and easily transportable components. Additionally, SMRs may be more easily built and operated in isolated locations, and may require smaller initial capital investment and shorter construction times. Because many SMRs designs are still conceptual and consequently not yet fixed, designers have a unique opportunity to incorporate updated design basis threats, emergency preparedness requirements, and then fully integrate safety, physical security, and safeguards/material control and accounting (MC&A) designs. Integrating safety, physical security, and safeguards is often referred to as integrating the 3Ss, and early consideration of safeguards and security in the design is often referred to as safeguards and security by design (SSBD). This paper describes U.S./Russian collaborative efforts toward developing an internationally accepted common approach for implementing SSBD/3Ss for SMRs based upon domestic requirements, and international guidance and requirements. These collaborative efforts originated with the Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security working group established under the U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission during the 2009 Presidential Summit. Initial efforts have focused on review of U.S. and Russian domestic requirements for Security and MC&A, IAEA guidance for security and MC&A, and IAEA requirements for international safeguards. Additionally, example SMR design features that can enhance proliferation resistance and physical security have been collected from past work and reported here. The development of a U.S./Russian common approach for SSBD/3Ss should aid the designer of SMRs located anywhere in the world. More specifically, the application of this approach may lead to more proliferation resistant and physically secure design features for SMRs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Research on the IAEA State-Level Safeguards Approach in KAERI

The IAEA has verified the declared nuclear material according to the comprehensive safeguards agreement under NPT between the Republic of Korea and the IAEA, as well as the undeclared nuclear material and nuclear activities under the Additional Protocol. In the safeguards Implementation Report for 2007, the Agency drew a broader conclusion for Korea that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in Korea because there was no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material, and no indication of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the ROK. The IAEA also informed that the implementation of Integrated Safeguards (IS) in Korea started on 1 July, 2008 in accordance with the state level IS approach after a drawing of the broader conclusion. In addition, for now, a State-Level Safeguards Approach (SLA) is adopted for the ROK, including 11 Material Balance Areas (MBAs) in KAERI. This paper describes a comparison analysis between IS and SLA.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Blockchain Applications for Nuclear Safeguards

This chapter discusses the benefits and challenges of using distributed ledger technology (DLT) for international nuclear safeguards purposes. The chap-ter introduces the international safeguards system and the role of the Inter-national Atomic Energy Agency. The chapter describes the evolution of the safeguards system, the IAEA’s core functions and the technical objectives it seeks to achieve. The chapter explains the benefits and drawbacks of deploying DLT for safeguards and presents potential use cases where the technology could be deployed. It ends with a description of the international com-munity’s current perspectives on deployment.

DLT, blockchain technology, international safeguar↗
DOE OSTI2014

Feasibility Study of Implementing a Mobile Collaborative Information Platform for International Safeguards Inspections

In response to the growing pervasiveness of mobile technologies such as tablets and smartphones, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories have been exploring the potential use of these platforms for international safeguards activities. Specifically of interest are information systems (software, and accompanying servers and architecture) deployed on mobile devices to increase the situational awareness and productivity of an IAEA safeguards inspector in the field, while simultaneously reducing paperwork and pack weight of safeguards equipment. Exploratory development in this area has been met with skepticism regarding the ability to overcome technology deployment challenges for IAEA safeguards equipment. This report documents research conducted to identify potential challenges for the deployment of a mobile collaborative information system to the IAEA, and proposes strategies to mitigate those challenges.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2017

Safeguards Knowledge Management & Retention at U.S. National Laboratories.

In 2017, four U.S. National Laboratories collaborated on behalf of DOE/NNSA to explore the safeguards knowledge retention problem, identify possible approaches, and develop a strategy to address it. The one-year effort consisted of four primary tasks. First, the project sought to identify critical safeguards information at risk of loss. Second, a survey and workshop were conducted to assess nine U.S. National Laboratories' efforts to determine current safeguards knowledge retention practices and challenges, and identify best practices. Third, specific tools were developed to identify and predict critical safeguards knowledge gaps and how best to recruit in order to fill those gaps. Finally, based on findings from the first three tasks and research on other organizational approaches to address similar issues, a strategy was developed on potential knowledge retention methods, customized HR policies, and best practices that could be implemented across the National Laboratory Complex.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2018

Scoping Study of Machine Learning Techniques for Visualization and Analysis of Multi-source Data in Nuclear Safeguards

In implementation of nuclear safeguards, many different techniques are being used to monitor operation of nuclear facilities and safeguard nuclear materials, ranging from radiation detectors, flow monitors, video surveillance, satellite imagers, digital seals to open source search and reports of onsite inspections/verifications. Each technique measures one or more unique properties related to nuclear materials or operation processes. Because these data sets have no or loose correlations, it could be beneficial to analyze the data sets together to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards processes. Advanced visualization techniques and machine-learning based multi-modality analysis could be effective tools in such integrated analysis. In this project, we will conduct a survey of existing visualization and analysis techniques for multi-source data and assess their potential values in nuclear safeguards.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2017

Feasibility Study of a Interlaboratory Exchange Program for Safeguards Professional Development

In FY2017, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241) assigned Brookhaven National Laboratory’s (BNL’s) Nonproliferation and National Security Department to investigate the feasibility of interlaboratory exchanges to promote the sharing of specialized skills and expertise across the lab complex and to provide opportunities for safeguards professionals to access facilities and activities not locally available. Such exchanges would give safeguards professionals who work at laboratories without operating nuclear facilities the opportunity to get hands-on experience with the management of such facilities or handling of nuclear material. Other laboratory professionals could get the opportunity to contribute to policy analysis. As originally envisioned, an interlaboratory exchange program would enable selected safeguards professionals in the national laboratory network to work at another national laboratory for a period of two weeks to six months to offer their expertise and gain experience in programs to which they would not otherwise be exposed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2019

Delayed Gamma-ray Assay for Nuclear Materials Safeguards. Comprehensive Technology Readiness Assessment

Spectroscopic analysis of beta-delayed gamma-rays emitted from fission products following active interrogation was investigated as a non-destructive assay technique for detection and characterization of nuclear materials in shielded and complex configurations. This measurement technique is expected to be applicable to a variety of applications within the nuclear material safeguards, arms control, and emergency response areas, where active neutron interrogation is acceptable. Potential applications of the delayed gamma-ray assay in the nuclear material safeguards area include characterization of U and Pu isotopic content in spent and unirradiated nuclear fuel, enrichment measurements, verification of bulk material in containers, and the characterization of nuclear wastes. In the arms control area, this method can be used as a part of warhead dismantlement measurements to confirm separation of components, and may be applicable in warhead confirmation. In the context of emergency response, it can be used for detailed diagnostics of an unknown item. At present, the delayed gamma-ray assay technology reliably qualifies for the Technical Readiness Level 3 (TRL 3). The R&D work completed under this project has successfully demonstrated the empirical proof-of-concept for this active interrogation technology for a variety of measurement configurations, neutron sources, and nuclear material samples. A robust first-principles analytical signature modeling methodology was developed, experimentally validated, and can be easily extrapolated to a range of realistic measurement scenarios. Several response analysis methodologies have been implemented and deemed reliable for a variety of active interrogation applications in the areas of nuclear material safeguards, arms control, and emergency response. The initial readiness level before the start of this project was assessed at TRL 0, since only fragmentary records of the signature observations and speculative statements of the relevant non-destructive assay applications existed at that time. The delayed gamma-ray technology readiness can be easily advanced to TRL 4 in a short period, if a certain measurement application is specified and set for a demonstration in a laboratory environment. The critical hardware components of the delayed gamma-ray measurement technology (neutron generators, gamma-ray spectrometers) are readily available as COTS and can be configured for a specific deployment configuration. The primary risk of the delayed gamma-ray assay methodology is defined by the applicationspecific uncertainties. Evaluation of the system performance can be effectively completed once the expected measurement purpose, nuclear material characteristics, dimensions, and radiation exposure constraints are specified. A minor risk can be associated with the delayed gamma-ray response analysis techniques. Several approaches were proposed and demonstrated primarily using the modeled signatures. The observed performance may not be easily transferrable to the conditions of a real measurement setup, and some additional R&D may be required. Overall, the delayed gamma-ray assay technology can be recommended for follow-up demonstrations addressing relevant measurement applications in the areas of nuclear material safeguards, arms control, and emergency response.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Final Electrochemical Safeguards Model for the MPACT 2020 Milestone.

The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program is working toward a 2020 demonstration of Safeguards and Security by Design for advanced fuel cycle facilities. This milestone ties together modeling and experimental work and will initially demonstrate the concept for electrochemical processing facilities. The safeguards modeling tool used is the Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM). This report outlines the baseline model design that will be used for the 2020 milestone analysis, which was updated to represent a new baseline flowsheet developed for the MPACT program. The model was also used to generate simulation data for other labs to use as part of their safeguards analysis. Finally, this report describes how the 2020 milestone will be met. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was funded by the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group as part of the Nuclear Technology Research and Development Program under the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2016

Safeguards Implications for Deep Borehole Disposal of Spent Fuel

Deep borehole disposal (DBD) has been suggested as an option for disposing spent nuclear fuel in a number of countries, including several countries that are subject to international safeguards. While potential benefits of deep borehole disposal include increased safety, reduced cost, and greater flexibility, the method could also impact the implementation of international safeguards. DBD presents some unique safeguards challenges compared to a conventional MGR. These challenges include 1) verifying borehole design below the surface; 2) strong reliance on CoK up to and including disposal; 3) limitations on the ability to observe or verify successfully emplaced canisters; and 4) successfully monitoring a closed and sealed DBD facility over the long term. In some cases, such challenges may prove easier for a DBD facility than for a conventional MGR, others more difficult, and still others may require new methodologies (or existing methodologies newly applied to safeguards). Long-term monitoring in particular might be somewhat less onerous.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Sandia National Laboratories Early Career University Faculty Mentoring Program in International Safeguards

An international safeguards mentoring program was established by Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) for early career university faculty. The inaugural year of the program focused on course material development and connecting faculty to experts at national laboratories. Two faculty members were selected for participation; one developed a safeguards-by-design course, and the other created lecture material related to unmanned robotic systems in safeguards for integration in existing courses. Faculty members were paired with SNL subject matter experts based on the topic of their individual projects. The program also included a two week visit to SNL. The structure of this program not only supported the development of new course material, but also provided junior faculty members with an opportunity to make connections and build collaborations in the field of international safeguards. Programs like this are important for professional development of faculty members and to help strengthen connections between universities and the national laboratories.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Advanced Reactor Safeguards: 2022 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program was established in 2020 as part of appropriations for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) through the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy. The goal of this program is to help address near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) and Physical Protection System (PPS) requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A and PPS designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security 2024 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program was established to provide research support addressing near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accounting (MC&A), Physical Protection System (PPS), and Cybersecurity requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A, PPS, and Cybersecurity designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARSS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARSS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Quantum-enhanced Imaging and Spectroscopy and their Relevance to International Safeguards

As a follow-up to our previous report on quantum sensing for safeguards, here we delve deeper into quantum-enhanced imaging & spectroscopy and address their relevance to international safeguards. Much of the approaches rely on entangled photons, a quantum phenomenon not possible with classical physics, although just correlated photons will work for some applications, such as ghost imaging. We provide a comprehensive survey of quantum approaches, including multiple entangled photon ghost imaging and spectroscopy techniques. Entangled photons for noise reduction are also described, as well as Non-Line-Of-Sight imaging, compressive techniques, and squeezed light. Of particular interest is the generation of entangled photons with large wavelength separation, such as infrared/visible entangled photon pairs. Such entangled pairs would allow interaction with objects in the IR, such as in the molecular “fingerprint” wavelength region, while the recording device captures the visible photons, thus leveraging the high efficiency and lower cost of visible detectors. Unfortunately, entangled x-ray photons are not practical, which would have been useful for safeguards to interrogate shielded materials. Entangled gamma rays are even further beyond reason. We provide our assessment for application of quantum-enhanced imaging & spectroscopy for international safeguards, including suggested improvements to existing IAEA instruments and destructive assay measurements that are done at IAEA lab facilities.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗
DOE OSTI2025

LLM Generation of Online Courses from a Curated Set of Documents in the Nuclear Safeguards Domain

A multidisciplinary team at Argonne National Laboratory explores the application of advanced technologies to enhance knowledge transfer and retention within the nuclear safeguards domain. Specifically, it examines the feasibility of leveraging secure large language models (LLMs) to streamline the creation of e-learning modules for the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (NA-241). The initiative addresses the critical need for preserving institutional memory and accelerating skill development amidst the imminent retirement of senior professionals in the field in addition to supporting good knowledge management practices. The project integrates instructional design theory with cutting-edge AI technologies to transform curated document sets from the Safeguards Knowledge Repository (SKR) into modular online courses. By automating the generation of learning objectives and instructional content, the effort aims to reduce manual effort while maintaining high-quality educational outcomes. A limited measure of human supervision, however, ensures accuracy, relevance, and alignment with NNSA’s strategic priorities. Key findings highlight the potential of AI-assisted course generation to support safeguards professionals by creating structured, interactive learning experiences. The report underscores the importance of SME validation to address limitations in AI-generated content, such as terminology errors and gaps in coverage. Recommendations include adopting a structured workflow combining LLM acceleration with expert oversight to ensure accuracy, usability, and alignment with learner needs. This work demonstrates Argonne’s commitment to advancing national security and scientific excellence through innovative knowledge management solutions.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Refining a Novel Process Monitoring Method to Safeguard Continuously Cycling Designs Using Isotopic Ratios

In advanced reactor (AR) designs, a common feature is continuous chemical processing and circulation of the nuclear material. This work bridges a significant measurement gap in safeguarding reactors with circulating fuel or continuous refueling by leveraging and building on the isotope ratio method first developed by our team under an FY21 Advanced Reactors International Safeguards Engagement (ARISE) project (Uribe et al. 2021). In circulating fuel designs, the radioisotope inventory changes from traditional effects (e.g., radioactive decay, fission) but also includes material transport due to pressure and temperature gradients. Such designs may also require regular or continuous additions or removals during operation, which significantly increases the rate of inventory change compared to traditional pressurized water reactor (PWR)s. Thus, directly tracking the nuclear inventory is ineffective since the isotopes are continuously added and removed. The isotope ratio method instead focuses on detecting changes to the input and output flows of radioisotopes. Previous work showed that for well-chosen pairs of isotopes, the isotopic ratio provides a sensitive and lasting indicator of deviation from normal conditions (e.g., startup, shutdown, diversion). The isotope ratio method is a process monitoring method with potential for application in for forward-looking approaches to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The original process monitoring method was developed for a specific case—the decay tank of a thorium-fueled molten salt breeder reactor. In this expanded work, we explored other types of reactors and processes with nonstationary (e.g., flowing) nuclear material, which are difficult to safeguard with traditional methods because of the transient nature of the systems. The goal of the present work is to generalize the isotope ratio method for use in processes with continuously flowing nuclear material. All continuous processes have an average time for isotopes to be replaced in the system. The isotope ratio method works by choosing radioisotopes with half-lives both above and below the processing time. The present work seeks to explore which isotopes are suitable for the method by simulating the nuclear inventory, radioisotope emissions, and detector responses for several classes of advanced reactors. While the method can in principle be applied to other processes (e.g., enrichment or reprocessing facilities), the present work limits scope to ARs with continuously flowing fuel. Section 2 details the mathematics supporting the isotope ratio method, and Section 3 introduces the representative ARs selected for this work. Section 4 discusses how each reactor was analyzed, and Section 5 showcases the results for each representative reactor. Finally, Section 6 provides concluding remarks and suggests pathways for further analysis.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2015

Opportunities to more fully utilize safeguards information reported to the IAEA at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

In an effort to increase transparency and to strengthen IAEA safeguards, more countries are adopting practices that provide the IAEA with more timely, safeguards-relevant information to confirm nuclear operations are as declared. At Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants (GCEPs) potential examples include installing unattended IAEA instruments that transmit selected information back to Vienna, instruments that collect and store measurement information on-site, and daily facility operator submissions of material receipts, shipments, or utilization of key operational systems (e.g., UF6 feed stations) to on-site mail boxes. Recently the IAEA has implemented the use of on-site mailbox systems supplemented with short notice or unannounced inspections to maintain effectiveness without significantly increasing the number of inspection days. While these measures significantly improves the IAEA’s effectiveness, we have identified several opportunities for how the use of this information could be improved and how some additional information would further improve safeguards. This paper presents concepts for how the safeguards information currently collected at GCEPs could be more effectively utilized through enhancing the way that raw data is displayed visually so that it is more intuitive to the inspector and provides for more effective inspection planning and execution, comparing information with previous IAEA inspection activities (lists of previous verified inventory), through comparing data with operator supplied data when inspectors arrive (notional inventory change reports), and through evaluating the data over time to provide even greater confidence in the data and operations as declared in between inspections. This paper will also discuss several potential improvements to the submissions themselves, such as including occupancy information about product and tails stations and including weight information for each station.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗