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At least 109 records · Page 6

Thermal evaluations for mixed organic and nitrate salt drums in interim storage at the WCS Federal Waste Facility

Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) operates the Federal Waste Facility (FWF) in Texas that is licensed to process and store certain types of mixed low-level radioactive waste packages. The specific waste currently housed at WCS includes some of the transuranic (TRU) waste that originated at the DOE Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and are destined for disposal at the DOE Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility. The TRU waste within each Standard Waste Box (SWB) was packaged in 55-gallon drums at LANL. Some of the drums contain mixed organic and nitrate salt contents suspected of experiencing a chemical reaction. The drums (up to four drums in a SWB) were then overpacked in a SWB prior to shipment to WCS. In the most common configuration, WCS placed the SWB containing the drums on metal pallets and stored two SWBs into Modular Concrete Canisters (MCCs) in a double stacked array. The MCCs were placed in a staggered array at a segregated area of the FWF and covered with sand to mitigate the heating that occurred when stored above ground on waste pads. The temporary interment is also intended to provide additional containment of the suspect reactive waste to mitigate release of radioactivity in an incident such as that which occurred at WIPP for one such drum. Void space of each MCC was filled with 1-inch pea gravel to facilitate retrievability. Thermocouple probes were placed within each MCC to monitor heat generation from the SWBs and the MCC lids were closed. The primary objective of this analysis was to estimate the heat generation of the SWB drum contents when the SWB package temperature inside the MCC and the FWF ambient temperature were monitored.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

FY19 Status of the Full Circumference Examination of the Inner Container Closure Weld Region for Selected 3013 DE Containers

One of the main focus areas of the 3013 Surveillance Program is a thorough evaluation of the inner container closure weld region (ICCWR) opened for destructive examination (DE). As part of the protocol to investigate the corrosion in the ICCWR a laser confocal microscope (LCM) is used to perform close visual examination of the surface and measurements of corrosion features on the surface. In FY17, DE containers from FY13 through FY16 were evaluated to select candidates for a full circumference analysis of the ICCWR. In FY18, the selected DE containers for full circumference evaluation (FCE) were processed according to the ICCWR protocol and LCM data collection was completed for the full circumference only for FY15 DE07. In FY19 the remaining DE containers were completed. The ICCWR protocol was completed as follows: (1) the FCE containers were sectioned into quarters and the weld removed to access the ICCWR; (2) a series of images of the ICCWR full circumference were taken using a stereo microscope and assembled into panoramic views; (3) SEM/EDS analysis performed on selected sections showed what is most likely corrosion products on the surface and chlorides randomly dispersed; (4) the presence of chlorides was also confirmed with ion chromatography of citric acid washes, in which FY15 DE07 and FY16 DE05 showed a significant amount of chlorides with FY15 DE08 showing the less amount of chlorides; (5) dye penetrant examination was performed on the interior and exterior surfaces of all the sidewall sections but reveled no relevant indication of surface-breaking defects, (6) finally, as described above, the full circumference examination of the ICCWR by LCM was completed. The three ICCWRs show general and localized corrosion on the surface. However, FY15 DE08 show more areas with agglomerated pits in Zones 2 and 3 than the other two DEs. The major suspect corrosion events were observed for FY15 DE07 on Sections C1 and C2 and for FY15 DE08 on Section C2. These events correspond to suspect cracks or crack-like features identified with a unique name to easily refer to each feature. FY15 DE07 shows a crack-like feature, identified as Acrux, in Section C1 and three features in Section C2 identified as Bellatrix, Cursa Minor and Cursa Major. Acrux and Bellatrix are located at the boundary of Zone 2 and Zone 3. Cursa Minor and Cursa Major are in Zone 2. FY15 DE08 shows two crack-like features, identified as Denebola and Draco, in Section C2. Both features are located at the boundary of Zone 2 and Zone 3. However, gas analysis and statistical evaluation of the gas compositions and pressures via GEST analyses suggest that leakage between the OI and IC volumes was unlikely. Additional characterization and analysis will be performed on the locations where the cracks were found.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NNSS Soils Monitoring: Plutonium Valley (CAU 366) FY2019

Desert Research Institute (DRI) conducted a field assessment of the potential for radionuclide-contaminated soil to be transported from the Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites Contamination Area (CA) because of both wind and storm water runoff. This activity supported U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management Nevada Program (EM NV) efforts to establish post-closure monitoring plans for the Plutonium Valley Dispersion Sites Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 366. The DRI task was intended to identify the likely mechanism(s) of transport and determine the meteorological conditions that might cause the movement of radionuclide-contaminated soils. The emphasis of the work was on collecting sediment transported by channelized storm runoff and measuring airborne dust concentrations and associated wind conditions. These data will facilitate an appropriate post-closure monitoring program. In 2011, DRI installed meteorological monitoring stations north and south of the Plutonium Valley CA—known as Pu Valley North and Pu Valley South, respectively—as well as a fluvial sediment sampling station within the CA. Since installation, temperature, wind speed, wind direction, relative humidity, precipitation, solar radiation, barometric pressure, soil temperature, volumetric soil moisture content, and airborne particulate concentrations have been collected at both meteorological stations. The maximum, minimum, and average or total (as appropriate) for each of these parameters were recorded for each 10-minute interval. The sediment sampling station included an automatically activated sampling pump with collection bottles for suspended sediment, which was activated when sufficient flow was present in the channel, and passive traps for bedload material that was transported down the channel during runoff events. This report presents data collected from these stations during fiscal year (FY) 2019. During the FY2019 (October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019) reporting period, the warmest month was July and the coldest month was February. Monthly total solar radiation was highest in June or July (depending on the station) and lowest in December. Monthly mean wind speeds were highest during February. At the Pu Valley North station, winds were commonly northerly, northwesterly, and southerly. At the Pu Valley South station, the wind direction was more variable and winds frequently came from most directions, excluding westerly and northwesterly winds. Winds above 15.0 miles per hour (mph) (24.1 kilometers per hour [km/hr]) were frequently southerly at both stations, and less-frequent strong winds were northerly (at the Pu Valley South station) or northwesterly (at the Pu Valley North station). Monthly average relative humidity ranged from 18 percent in August to 62 percent in January and February. Monthly total precipitation ranged from zero at both stations in September to 2.23 inches (in) (56.6 millimeters [mm]) during February at the Pu Valley South station and 2.09 in (53.1 mm) during March at the Pu Valley North station. From October 1, 2018, through September 30, 2019, the total precipitation was 8.23 in (209 mm) and 8.15 in (207 mm) at the Pu Valley South and Pu Valley North stations, respectively. The largest daily precipitation totals of 1.46 in (37.1 mm) and 1.14 in (29.0 mm) occurred at the Pu Valley South and Pu Valley North stations, respectively, on March 6, 2019. However, the ISCO autosampler was not activated during any storm event in FY2019 because the channel water depth measurements were insufficient for suspended sediment sample collection. Additionally, because no significant flow through the channel was indicated, no bedload samples were collected. Light breezes of 0.0 mph to 5.0 mph (0.0 km/hr to 8.0 km/hr) occurred most frequently (approximately 55 percent to 57 percent of the time). The frequency of occurrence diminished exponentially as the wind speed increased such that winds in excess of 25.0 mph (40.2 km/hr) occurred less than 0.01 percent of the time. Winds in excess of 15.0 mph (24.1 km/hr) were most commonly southerly, which is likely controlled by the topography of the valley because topographic highs define the east and west sides of the valley and converge toward the north.The concentrations of PM2.5 (particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter ≤2.5 micrometers [μm]) and PM10 (particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter ≤10 μm) in the air generally increase as wind speed increases. However, the particle profiler at the Pu Valley South station regularly malfunctioned, which resulted in poor data quality and a limited period of record within FY2019. Therefore, discussion of the annual dust observations is mostly limited to the Pu Valley North station. At the Pu Valley North station, significant increases in windblown dust concentrations were observed when wind speeds exceeded 15.0 mph (24.1 km/hr), especially during southerly winds. When all wind speeds were considered, high dust concentrations at the Pu Valley North station were frequently associated with northerly, northwesterly, or southerly winds. The majority of PM10 transport at the Pu Valley North station occurred when winds were blowing northerly and northwesterly because of the high frequency of winds up to 15.0 mph (24.1 km/hr). The ratio of PM10 to PM2.5 is a qualitative indicator of the proximity of dust sources to the observation point and the values of the PM10 to PM2.5 ratio tend to be higher nearer to the source. The PM10 to PM2.5 ratio increased from 1.2 to 2.8 with higher wind speeds at the Pu Valley North station. This increase suggests that some locally sourced PM10 was present in the air when local winds exceeded 15.0 mph (24.1 km/hr). Local dust suspension is interpreted during major dust events when peaks in the PM10 to PM2.5 ratio occur simultaneously with the maximum wind speed and the peak PM10 concentration. Analysis of the five major dust events in FY2019 revealed that northerly winds were dominant in three events and southerly winds were dominant in two events. Local suspension of dust within Plutonium Valley is suspected to have occurred during two of the five major events (April 9, 2019, and September 28 to 29, 2019), and a nonlocal source of dust is presumed for the three other major dust events (October 14, 2018; May 16, 2019; and September 2, 2019). The three suspected regional dust transport events exhibited winds that typically did not exceed the 15.0 mph (24.1 km/hr) wind speed threshold for local dust transport and featured PM10 to PM2.5 ratios that indicate large-scale regional dust transport. Similar event characteristics (e.g., wind speed and PM10 concentration) were observed at air monitoring stations approximately 70 mi (113 km) to the northwest within the Tonopah Test Range (TTR). Therefore, these three regional events may not reflect transport from the Plutonium Valley CA. Routine monitoring of meteorological and hydrologic parameters at Plutonium Valley has been discontinued at the request of EM NV, effective at the conclusion of FY2019. Environmental data acquisition has been completed, and both Pu Valley North and Pu Valley South meteorological stations within Plutonium Valley as well as the ISCO autosampler station within the CA were removed on October 14, 2019.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Status of the Characterization of DEs from the Full Circumference Examination of the Inner Container Closure Weld Region (FY2020)

One of the main focus areas of the 3013 Surveillance Program is a thorough evaluation of the inner container closure weld region (ICCWR) opened for destructive examination (DE). As part of the protocol to investigate the corrosion in the ICCWR a laser confocal microscope (LCM) is used to perform close visual examination of the surface and measurements of corrosion features on the surface. DE containers from FY13 through FY16 were screened with three candidates selected for full circumference evaluation (FCE) according to the ICCWR examination protocol, During the FCE, FY16 DE05 and FY15 DE07 showed suspect major corrosion events, FY16 DE05 Section C2 shows two crack-like features, identified as Denebola and Draco. Both features are located at the boundary of Zone 2 and Zone 3. Consequently, Section C2 of FY16 DE05 was selected for examination by serial metallography at Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). For FY15 DE07 the suspect corrosion events were observed on Sections Cl and C2. Section Cl shows one crack-like feature, identified as Acrux. Section C2 shows three crack-like features, identified as Bellatrix, Cursa Minor and Cursa Major. Unlike Acrux and Bellatrix, which are located at the boundary of Zone 2 and Zone 3, Cursa Minor and Cursa Major are located in Zone 2. Sections Cl and C2 of FY15 DE07 were sent to Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANE) for characterization by X-Ray Tomography (XRT).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Report of tritide study at the Responsive Neutron Generator Product Deployment Center.

This report documents a study of sample counting results for wipes from routine surface area monitoring conducted at the Responsive Neutron Generator Product Deployment Center (RNGPDC) at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The study was initiated in November 2006, with two samples suspected of containing erbium tritide, after some samples were found to exhibit higher tritium counting rates upon recount at a later time. The main goal of the study was to determine whether the current practice of analyzing tritium wipe samples once, within a few days of sample collection, is adequate to accurately quantify the amount of tritium on the sample when tritides may be present. Recommendations are made toward routine recounting of vials suspected of containing particulate forms of tritium.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Sampling and mass spectrometry approaches for the detection of drugs and foreign contaminants in breath for homeland security applications

Homeland security relies heavily on analytical chemistry to identify suspicious materials and persons. Traditionally this role has focused on attribution, determining the type and origin of an explosive, for example. But as technology advances, analytical chemistry can and will play an important role in the prevention and preemption of terrorist attacks. More sensitive and selective detection techniques can allow suspicious materials and persons to be identified even before a final destructive product is made. The work presented herein focuses on the use of commercial and novel detection techniques for application to the prevention of terrorist activities. Although drugs are not commonly thought of when discussing terrorism, narcoterrorism has become a significant threat in the 21st century. The role of the drug trade in the funding of terrorist groups is prevalent; thus, reducing the trafficking of illegal drugs can play a role in the prevention of terrorism by cutting off much needed funding. To do so, sensitive, specific, and robust analytical equipment is needed to quickly identify a suspected drug sample no matter what matrix it is in. Single Particle Aerosol Mass Spectrometry (SPAMS) is a novel technique that has previously been applied to biological and chemical detection. The current work applies SPAMS to drug analysis, identifying the active ingredients in single component, multi-component, and multi-tablet drug samples in a relatively non-destructive manner. In order to do so, a sampling apparatus was created to allow particle generation from drug tablets with on-line introduction to the SPAMS instrument. Rules trees were developed to automate the identification of drug samples on a single particle basis. A novel analytical scheme was also developed to identify suspect individuals based on chemical signatures in human breath. Human breath was sampled using an RTube{trademark} and the trace volatile organic compounds (VOCs) were preconcentrated using solid phase microextraction (SPME) and identified using gas chromatography - mass spectrometry (GC-MS). Modifications to the sampling apparatus allowed for increased VOC collection efficiency, and reduced the time of sampling and analysis by over 25%. The VOCs are present in breath due to either endogenous production, or exposure to an external source through absorption, inhalation, or ingestion. Detection of these exogenous chemicals can provide information on the prior location and activities of the subject. Breath samples collected before and after exposure in a hardware store and nail salon were analyzed to investigate the prior location of a subject; breath samples collected before and after oral exposure to terpenes and terpenoid compounds, pseudoephedrine, and inhalation exposure to hexamine and other explosive related compounds were analyzed to investigate the prior activity of a subject. The elimination of such compounds from the body was also monitored. In application, this technique may provide an early warning system to identify persons of interest in the prevention and preemption stages of homeland security.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

KELT-18b: Puffy Planet, Hot Host, Probably Perturbed

We report the discovery of KELT-18b, a transiting hot Jupiter in a 2.87-day orbit around the bright (V = 10.1), hot, F4V star BD+60 1538 (TYC 3865-1173-1). We present follow-up photometry, spectroscopy, and adaptive optics imaging that allow a detailed characterization of the system. Our preferred model fits yield a host stellar temperature of 6670±120 K and a mass of 1.524{sub −0.068}{sup +0.069} M{sub ⊙}, situating it as one of only a handful of known transiting planets with hosts that are as hot, massive, and bright. The planet has a mass of 1.18±0.11 M{sub J}, a radius of 1.570{sub −0.036}{sup +0.042} R{sub J}, and a density of 0.377±0.040 g cm{sup −3}, making it one of the most inflated planets known around a hot star. We argue that KELT-18b’s high temperature and low surface gravity, which yield an estimated ∼600 km atmospheric scale height, combined with its hot, bright host, make it an excellent candidate for observations aimed at atmospheric characterization. We also present evidence for a bound stellar companion at a projected separation of ∼1100 au, and speculate that it may have contributed to the strong misalignment we suspect between KELT-18's spin axis and its planet’s orbital axis. The inferior conjunction time is 2457542.524998 ± 0.000416 (BJD{sub TDB}) and the orbital period is 2.8717510 ± 0.0000029 days. We encourage Rossiter–McLaughlin measurements in the near future to confirm the suspected spin–orbit misalignment of this system.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗

Fluorine chemistry at extreme conditions: possible synthesis of $HgF_4$

By irradiating a pressurized mixture of a fluorine-bearing compound ($XeF_2$) and $HgF_2$ with synchrotron hard x-rays (>7 keV) inside a diamond anvil cell, we have observed dramatic changes in the far-infrared spectrum within the 30-35 GPa pressure range which suggest that we may have formed $HgF_4$ in the following way: $XeF_2 \xrightarrow{hv} Xe + F_2$ (photochemically) and $HgF_2 + F_2 \rightarrow HgF_4$ (30 GPa < P < 35 GPa). This lends credence to recent theoretical calculations by Botana et al. that suggest that Hg may behave as a transition metal at high pressure in an environment with an excess of molecular fluorine. The spectral changes were observed to be reversible during pressure cycling above and below the above mentioned pressure range until a certain point when we suspect that molecular fluorine diffused out of the sample at lower pressure. Upon pressure release, $HgF_2$ and trace $XeF_2$ were observed to be remaining in the sample chamber suggesting that much of the $Xe$ and $F_2$ diffused and leaked out from the sample chamber. Received: 29 October 2018, Accepted: 18 January 2019; Edited by: A. Goñi, A. Cantarero, J. S. Reparaz; DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4279/PIP.110001 Cite as: M Pravica, S Schyck, B Harris, P Cifligu, E Kim, B Billinghurst, Papers in Physics 11, 110001 (2019). This paper, by M Pravica, S Schyck, B Harris, P Cifligu, E Kim, B Billinghurst, is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0.

Pravica, Michael G.↗

Identification and use of genes encoding amatoxin and phallotoxin

The present invention relates to compositions and methods comprising genes and peptides associated with cyclic peptide toxins and toxin production in mushrooms. In particular, the present invention relates to using genes and proteins from Amanita species encoding Amanita peptides, specifically relating to amatoxins and phallotoxins. In a preferred embodiment, the present invention also relates to methods for detecting Amanita peptide toxin genes for identifying Amanita peptide-producing mushrooms and for diagnosing suspected cases of mushroom poisoning. Further, the present inventions relate to providing kits for diagnosing and monitoring suspected cases of mushroom poisoning in patients.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Quality status display for a vibration welding process

A system includes a host machine and a status projector. The host machine is in electrical communication with a collection of sensors and with a welding controller that generates control signals for controlling the welding horn. The host machine is configured to execute a method to thereby process the sensory and control signals, as well as predict a quality status of a weld that is formed using the welding horn, including identifying any suspect welds. The host machine then activates the status projector to illuminate the suspect welds. This may occur directly on the welds using a laser projector, or on a surface of the work piece in proximity to the welds. The system and method may be used in the ultrasonic welding of battery tabs of a multi-cell battery pack in a particular embodiment. The welding horn and welding controller may also be part of the system.

42 ENGINEERING↗

CSI comes to nuclear security

Viewers of television cop shows like “CSI” or its many imitators are familiar with the idea of how forensics can be used to track down a culprit. If you watch and listen closely, you will notice that the detectives often refer to a national collection of crime scene DNA “fingerprints” held on file in a US federal database called CODIS, which helps to narrow down suspects. For example, after DNA has been picked up from a crime scene, it is entered into the system, and software then scans the voluminous database for a match to known previous offenders. The benefits of such a system in helping to narrow down and identify a list of likely suspects are obvious.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Chemical detection system and related methods

A chemical detection system includes a frame, an emitter coupled to the frame, and a detector coupled to the frame proximate the emitter. The system also includes a shielding system coupled to the frame and positioned at least partially between the emitter and the detector, wherein the frame positions a sensing surface of the detector in a direction substantially parallel to a plane extending along a front portion of the frame. A method of analyzing composition of a suspect object includes directing neutrons at the object, detecting gamma rays emitted from the object, and communicating spectrometer information regarding the gamma rays. The method also includes presenting a GUI to a user with a dynamic status of an ongoing neutron spectroscopy process. The dynamic status includes a present confidence for a plurality of compounds being present in the suspect object responsive to changes in the spectrometer information during the ongoing process.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Quality status display for a vibration welding process

A method includes receiving, during a vibration welding process, a set of sensory signals from a collection of sensors positioned with respect to a work piece during formation of a weld on or within the work piece. The method also includes receiving control signals from a welding controller during the process, with the control signals causing the welding horn to vibrate at a calibrated frequency, and processing the received sensory and control signals using a host machine. Additionally, the method includes displaying a predicted weld quality status on a surface of the work piece using a status projector. The method may include identifying and display a quality status of a suspect weld. The laser projector may project a laser beam directly onto or immediately adjacent to the suspect welds, e.g., as a red, green, blue laser or a gas laser having a switched color filter.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Enhanced colorimetric apparatus and method for explosives detection using ionic liquids

An inspection tester for testing a surface for suspected explosive substances includes a body unit, a breakable ampoule carried by the body unit, and an ionic explosive detecting reagent in the breakable ampoule wherein the body unit and the breakable ampoule are positioned to deliver the ionic explosive detecting reagent to the surface for testing the surface for the suspected explosive substances. The ionic explosive detecting reagent is a salt in a liquid state.

Reynolds, John G.↗

Successful Characterization and Remedial Contour of Highly Contaminated Mercury Soil at the Y-12 National Security Complex - 13593

An area known as the 81-10 pad within the footprint of the Y-12 National Security Complex, suspected to be heavily contaminated with mercury, was slated for characterization in support of a Federal Facilities Agreement (FFA) milestone to be accomplished by September 30, 2012. A full remedial design report (RDR) required the soil in Exposure Unit -9 (EU-9) to be fully characterized for a number of contaminates of concern including mercury. The goal of this characterization effort was to determine what soil, if any, would need to be removed for the protection of industrial workers and impacts to the surface and ground water. Funding for this project was made available using buy-back scope under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). The EU-9 soil unit involved 3 different classifications which were determined as follows: Class 1: Known to have been impacted, contamination is likely; Class 2: Suspected to have been impacted, contamination is unknown; Class 3: Area not known to have been impacted, contamination unlikely. Due to various sampling and analysis events since the 1980's, significant mercury contamination was expected under the concrete pad of an area known as 81-10. Mercury contamination outside of the boundary of this pad within the EU-9 footprint was not known and therefore an original planned estimate of 1,461 cubic meters of material were expected to be heavily contaminated with mercury requiring removal, treatment and disposal. Through the use of a highly effective nature and extent sampling and analysis design that involved a hybrid of statistically-based and judgmental sampling, the actual remedial contour requiring removal was approximately 717 cubic meters, roughly 12% of the original estimate. This characterization approach was executed in full compliance with the Record of Decision (ROD) [1] documents that were agreed upon by the U.S. Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency and Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation. In addition, the RDR was completed ahead of the FFA milestone date of September 30, 2012. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Hanford Technology Development (Tank Farms) - 12509

The mission of the Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (ORP) is to safely retrieve and treat the 56 million gallons of Hanford's tank waste and close the Tank Farms to protect the Columbia River. The millions of gallons of tank waste are a byproduct of decades of plutonium production. After irradiated fuel rods were taken from the nuclear reactors to the processing facilities at Hanford they were exposed to a series of chemicals designed to dissolve away the rod, which enabled workers to retrieve the plutonium. Once those chemicals were exposed to the fuel rods they became radioactive and extremely hot. They also couldn't be used in this process more than once. Because the chemicals are caustic and extremely hazardous to humans and the environment, underground storage tanks were built to hold these chemicals until a more permanent solution could be found. One key part of the ongoing work at Hanford is retrieving waste from the single-shell tanks, some of which have leaked in the past, and transferring that waste to the double-shell tanks - none of which have ever leaked. The 56 million gallons of radioactive tank waste is stored in 177 underground tanks, 149 of which are single-shell tanks built between 1943 and 1964. The tanks sit approximately 250 feet above the water table. Hanford's single-shell tanks are decades past their 20-year design life. In the past, up to 67 of the single-shell tanks are known or suspected to have leaked as much as one million gallons of waste to the surrounding soil. Starting in the late 1950's, waste leaks from dozens of the single-shell tanks were detected or suspected. Most of the waste is in the soil around the tanks, but some of this waste is thought to have reached groundwater. The Vadose Zone Project was established to understand the radioactive and chemical contamination in the soil beneath the tanks as the result of leaks and discharges from past plutonium-production operations. The vadose zone is the area of soil between the ground surface and the water table 200-to-300 feet below. The project tracks and monitors contamination in the soil. Technologies are being developed and deployed to detect and monitor contaminants. Interim surface barriers, which are barriers put over the single-shell tanks, prevent rain and snow from soaking into the ground and spreading contamination. The impermeable barrier placed over T Farm, which was the site of the largest tank waste leak in Hanford's history, is 60,000 square feet and sloped to drain moisture outside the tank farm. The barrier over TY Farm is constructed of asphalt and drains moisture to a nearby evaporation basin. Our discussion of technology will address the incredible challenge of removing waste from Hanford's single-shell tanks. Under the terms of the Tri-Party Agreement, ORP is required to remove 99 percent of the tank waste, or until the limits of technology have been reached. All pumpable liquids have been removed from the single-shell tanks, and work now focuses on removing the non-pumpable liquids. Waste retrieval was completed from the first single-shell tank in late 2003. Since then, another six single-shell tanks have been retrieved to regulatory standards. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Determining Coal Ash Impacts on Radium and Thorium Background Levels in Soil Using Rare Earth Element Analyses - 18604

One challenge at large remediation sites contaminated with radiological materials is differentiating between low-level site-related contamination and NORM. This is because sites contaminated with radiological materials, such as thorium processing and mining and milling facilities, often generate wastes that contain contaminants that are similar to NORM deposits. For sites in urban areas, this issue is further compounded due to the presence of historic industrial fill (historic fill) containing materials such as fly ash, coal ash, and red brick, that exhibit elevated radioactivity levels. These materials often have activity levels near, or even well above, a site's cleanup goal. At a large Superfund Site in the eastern US (Site), many of the suspected Site-related fill areas are commingled with coal and fly ash. As the cleanup criteria for the radionuclides of concern (ROC), radium (Ra) and thorium (Th), is 5 pico-Curies per gram above background, a four-pronged approach was developed to determine if the coal and fly ash are impacting the background levels of the ROCs. This evaluation included a review of boring logs to visually confirm the presence of historic fill, as well as coal fragments and coal ash; a literature review to establish the typical concentrations of Ra and Th found in coal and fly ash from US sources; the use of rare earth analyses to establish chemical signatures for non-Site related historic fill containing coal ash versus Site-related fill; and a quantitative analysis of Site-related data to determine if the radioactivity levels in historic fill containing coal were elevated. Soil samples were collected from two locations at the Site; fill areas containing coal ash that were not suspected to be impacted by Site activities, as well as fill areas containing coal ash that were associated with the former processing facility. These samples were analyzed for rare earth elements (REE), as well as Ra-228 and Th-232 and the ratios of lanthanum, cerium, and neodymium to Ra-228 and Th-232 were established for each sample. Based on a comparison of these data, a strong correlation was established between the rare earth/thorium decay chain ratios and the classification of material as either Site or non-Site related. These data were used to develop a higher background activity for fill areas containing non-Site related NORM. While the cleanup level defined in the Record of Decision remained unchanged, the higher background derived from the fly ash/coal ash material, as identified by REE analyses, resulted in higher project screening levels, which ensured that excavation activities did not 'chase' material that was not Site-related. To date, use of the coal ash background level has saved millions of dollars in cleanup costs since non-Site related contamination is not being remediated. Use of this approach to determine the appropriate background level for a site is relatively straightforward since it relies on visual observation of the soil for coal and fly ash, along with REE analyses, which is an inexpensive, quick, and established analytical method for soil samples. As long as a good rare earth profile of both contaminated and natural (in this case fly ash and coal ash) material can be established, the results can be quite definitive, which could result in significant volume reduction by minimizing the amount of material excavated and disposed of. This will lead to cost and time savings for what could be an otherwise costly and potentially complex excavation. Anyone performing environmental remediation of NORM contaminated sites may benefit from this paper and presentation. (authors)

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Developing and Implementing New Waste Chemistry Controls for Hanford's Double-Shell Tanks - 20041

Waste chemistry controls for the Hanford double-shell tanks (DSTs) were established in the 1980's in response to tank failures caused by stress corrosion cracking (SCC) at the Savannah River Site (SRS). The controls were established based on a combination of SRS chemistry limits and corrosion testing results. Conditions in the Hanford DSTs have changed over time, with the temperature in the majority of the DSTs dropping below 50 deg. C. Testing indicated that the original chemistry control specification and SCC testing performed in 2010 did not protect against pitting corrosion mechanisms - what is believed to have caused the failure of tank 241-AY-102. New waste chemistry controls are necessary to protect the DSTs from both SCC and pitting corrosion. Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), with input from the Tank Integrity Expert Panel (TIEP) Corrosion Subgroup (CSG), performed a statistically based investigation of nitrate and halide ion induced pitting corrosion. The investigation was intended to develop a comprehensive waste chemistry envelope that minimizes the risk of both SCC and pitting caused by halide and nitrate ions. The waste chemistry envelope needed to be robust enough to address future waste retrieval and process changes which could significantly change the waste composition of the DSTs. The experimental design allowed the statistically significant ions and their effect on pitting corrosion to be determined. SRNL developed the 'pitting factor' which is an empirical relationship between the statistically significant inhibitive species (hydroxide, and nitrite), and pitting inducing species (nitrate, chloride, and fluoride). The coefficients are weighted factors that show the degree of influence the species have on the propensity for pitting. New waste chemistry control limits were recommended by SRNL, and concurred with by the TIEP CSG, that incorporated the pitting factor along with other limits. The controls developed to reduce the risk of pitting corrosion were evaluated to determine if they also protected against SCC. Hundreds of test results were reviewed and compared against the proposed limits. With the exception of one test result, instances where cracking was observed corresponded to chemistry that was outside of the proposed limits - indicating that the chemistry controls developed for pitting also adequately addressed SCC concerns. Existing tank composition estimates were evaluated against the new chemistry controls - three current tank chemistries are suspect, and may not meet the new chemistry control requirements. These included the interstitial liquid (liquid associated with solids) of DSTs 241-AN-102, 241-AN-106, 241-AN-107, and 241-AY-101. Measures are ongoing to evaluate the tanks with the suspect chemistry. These include varying combinations of: performing additional evaluations (history of use, modeling); DST specific laboratory testing; and, pursuing core samples of the DSTs. (authors)

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