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DOE OSTI2023

Consequence-Driven Cybersecurity for High-Power Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

Cybersecurity of high-power charging infrastructure for electric vehicles (EVs) is critical to the safety, reliability, and consumer confidence in this publicly accessible technology. Cybersecurity vulnerabilities in high-power EV charging infrastructure may also present risks to broader transportation and energy-infrastructure systems. Here, this paper details a methodology used to analyze and prioritize high-consequence events that could result from cybersecurity sabotage to high-power charging infrastructure. The highest prioritized events are evaluated under laboratory conditions for the severity of impact and the complexity of cybersecurity manipulation. Mitigation solutions and strategies are presented to secure the vulnerabilities that potentially lead to high-consequence events. These mitigations can be immediately implemented by industry or executed during the design stage.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

NASA NTRS1978

Satellite Power System (SPS) military implications

The military implications of the reference satellite power system (SPS) were examined is well as important military related study tasks. Primary areas of investigation were the potential of the SPS as a weapon, for supporting U.S. military preparedness, and for affecting international relations. In addition, the SPS's relative vulnerability to overt military action, terrorist attacks, and sabotage was considered.

Bain, C. N.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Emergency Response Manual

Safety and security is very important at NASA. The Security Management and Safeguards Office goal is ensure safety and security for all NASA Lewis and Plum Brook Station visitors and workers. The office protects against theft, sabotage, malicious damage, espionage, and other threats or acts of violence. There are three types of security at NASA: physical, IT, and personnel. IT is concerned with sensitive and classified information and computers. Physical security includes the officers who check visitors and workers in and patrol the facility. Personnel security is concerned with background checks during hiring. During my internship, I met people from and gained knowledge about all three types of security. I primarily worked with Dr. Richard Soppet in physical security. During my experience with physical security, I observed and worked with many aspects of it. I attended various security meetings at both NASA Lewis and Plum Brook. The meetings were about homeland security and other improvements that will be made to both facilities. I also spent time with a locksmith. The locksmith makes copies of keys and unlocks doors for people who need them. I rode around in a security vehicle with an officer as he patrolled. I also observed the officer make a search of a visitor s vehicle. All visitors vehicles are searched upon entering NASA. I spent time and observed in the dispatch office. The officer answers calls and sends out officers when needed. The officer also monitors the security cameras. My primary task was completing an emergency response manual. This manual would assist local law enforcement and fire agencies in case of an emergency. The manual has pictures and descriptions of the buildings. It also contains the information about hazards inside of the buildings. This information will be very helpul to law enforcement so that when called upon during an emergency, they will not create an even bigger problem with collateral damage.

Barnett, Traci M.↗

NASA NTRS2006

An Efficient Approach for the Reliability Analysis of Phased-Mission Systems with Dependent Failures

We consider the reliability analysis of phased-mission systems with common-cause failures in this paper. Phased-mission systems (PMS) are systems supporting missions characterized by multiple, consecutive, and nonoverlapping phases of operation. System components may be subject to different stresses as well as different reliability requirements throughout the course of the mission. As a result, component behavior and relationships may need to be modeled differently from phase to phase when performing a system-level reliability analysis. This consideration poses unique challenges to existing analysis methods. The challenges increase when common-cause failures (CCF) are incorporated in the model. CCF are multiple dependent component failures within a system that are a direct result of a shared root cause, such as sabotage, flood, earthquake, power outage, or human errors. It has been shown by many reliability studies that CCF tend to increase a system's joint failure probabilities and thus contribute significantly to the overall unreliability of systems subject to CCF.We propose a separable phase-modular approach to the reliability analysis of phased-mission systems with dependent common-cause failures as one way to meet the above challenges in an efficient and elegant manner. Our methodology is twofold: first, we separate the effects of CCF from the PMS analysis using the total probability theorem and the common-cause event space developed based on the elementary common-causes; next, we apply an efficient phase-modular approach to analyze the reliability of the PMS. The phase-modular approach employs both combinatorial binary decision diagram and Markov-chain solution methods as appropriate. We provide an example of a reliability analysis of a PMS with both static and dynamic phases as well as CCF as an illustration of our proposed approach. The example is based on information extracted from a Mars orbiter project. The reliability model for this orbiter considers the various phases of Launch, Cruise, Mars Orbit Insertion, and Orbit. Some of the CCF for the orbiter in this mission include environmental effects, such as micrometeoroids, human operator errors, and software errors.

reliability analysis↗

NASA NTRS2011

Facility Targeting, Protection and Mission Decision Making Using the VISAC Code

The Visual Interactive Site Analysis Code (VISAC) has been used by DTRA and several other agencies to aid in targeting facilities and to predict the associated collateral effects for the go, no go mission decision making process. VISAC integrates the three concepts of target geometric modeling, damage assessment capabilities, and an event/fault tree methodology for evaluating accident/incident consequences. It can analyze a variety of accidents/incidents at nuclear or industrial facilities, ranging from simple component sabotage to an attack with military or terrorist weapons. For nuclear facilities, VISAC predicts the facility damage, estimated downtime, amount and timing of any radionuclides released. Used in conjunction with DTRA's HPAC code, VISAC also can analyze transport and dispersion of the radionuclides, levels of contamination of the surrounding area, and the population at risk. VISAC has also been used by the NRC to aid in the development of protective measures for nuclear facilities that may be subjected to attacks by car/truck bombs.

Morris, Robert H.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Submerged AUV Charging Station

Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) are becoming increasingly important for military surveillance and mine detection. Most AUVs are battery powered and have limited lifetimes of a few days to a few weeks. This greatly limits the distance that AUVs can travel underwater. Using a series of submerged AUV charging stations, AUVs could travel a limited distance to the next charging station, recharge its batteries, and continue to the next charging station, thus traveling great distances in a relatively short time, similar to the Old West “Pony Express.” One solution is to use temperature differences at various depths in the ocean to produce electricity, which is then stored in a submerged battery. It is preferred to have the upper buoy submerged a reasonable distance below the surface, so as not to be seen from above and not to be inadvertently destroyed by storms or ocean going vessels. In a previous invention, a phase change material (PCM) is melted (expanded) at warm temperatures, for example, 15 °C, and frozen (contracted) at cooler temperatures, for example, 8 °C. Tubes containing the PCM, which could be paraffin such as pentadecane, would be inserted into a container filled with hydraulic oil. When the PCM is melted (expanded), it pushes the oil out into a container that is pressurized to about 3,000 psi (approx equals 20.7 MPa). When a valve is opened, the high-pressure oil passes through a hydraulic motor, which turns a generator and charges a battery. The low-pressure oil is finally reabsorbed into the PCM canister when the PCM tubes are frozen (contracted). Some of the electricity produced could be used to control an external bladder or a motor to the tether line, such that depth cycling is continued for a very long period of time. Alternatively, after the electricity is generated by the hydraulic motor, the exiting low-pressure oil from the hydraulic motor could be vented directly to an external bladder on the AUV, such that filling of the bladder causes the AUV to rise, and emptying of the bladder allows the AUV to descend. This type of direct buoyancy control is much more energy efficient than using electrical pumps in that the inefficiencies of converting thermal energy to electrical energy to mechanical energy is avoided. AUV charging stations have been developed that use electricity produced by waves on floating buoys and that use electricity from solar photovoltaics on floating buoys. This is the first device that has absolutely no floating or visible parts, and is thus impervious to storms, inadvertent ocean vessel collisions, or enemy sabotage.

Jones, Jack A.↗

NASA NTRS2014

Analyzing Risks and Vulnerabilities of Various Computer Systems and Undergoing Exploitation using Embedded Devices

Security is one of the most if not the most important areas today. After the several attacks on the United States, security everywhere has heightened from airports to communication among the military branches legionnaires. With advanced persistent threats (APTs) on the rise following Stuxnet, government branches and agencies are required, more than ever, to follow several standards, policies and procedures to reduce the likelihood of a breach. Attack vectors today are very advanced and are going to continue to get more and more advanced as security controls advance. This creates a need for networks and systems to be in an updated, patched and secured state in a launch control system environment. Attacks on critical systems are becoming more and more relevant and frequent. Nation states are hacking into critical networks that might control electrical power grids or water dams as well as carrying out advanced persistent threat (APTs) attacks on government entities. NASA, as an organization, must protect its self from attacks from all different types of attackers with different motives. Although the International Space Station was created, there is still competition between the different space programs. With that in mind, NASA might get attacked and breached for various reasons such as espionage or sabotage. My project will provide a way for NASA to complete an in house penetration test which includes: asset discovery, vulnerability scans, exploit vulnerabilities and also provide forensic information to harden systems. Completing penetration testing is a part of the compliance requirements of the Federal Information Security Act (FISMA) and NASA NPR 2810.1 and related NASA Handbooks. This project is to demonstrate how in house penetration testing can be conducted that will satisfy all of the compliance requirements of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as outlined in FISMA. By the end of this project, I hope to have carried out the tasks stated above as well as gain an immense knowledge about compliance, security tools, networks and network devices, as well as policies and procedures.

Penetration Testing↗

NASA NTRS2018

Urban Air Mobility (UAM) Market Study

The Booz Allen Team explored market size and potential barriers to Urban Air Mobility (UAM) by focusing on three potential markets – Airport Shuttle, Air Taxi, and Air Ambulance. We found that the Airport Shuttle and Air Taxi markets are viable, with a significant total available market value in the U.S. of $500 billion, for a fully unconstrained scenario. In this unconstrained best-case scenario, passengers would have the ability to access and fly a UAM at any time, from any location to any destination, without being hindered by constraints such as weather, infrastructure, or traffic volume. Significant legal and regulatory, weather, certification, public perception, and infrastructure constraints exist, which reduce the market potential for these applications to only about 0.5% of the total available market, or $2.5 billion, in the near term. However, we determined that these constraints can be addressed through ongoing intra-governmental partnerships, government and industry collaboration, strong industry commitment, and existing legal and regulatory enablers. We found that the Air Ambulance market is not a viable market if served by electric vertical takeoff and landing (eVTOL) vehicles due to technology constraints but may potentially be viable if a hybrid VTOL aircraft are utilized. The barriers and challenges we characterized in this study can be stratified according to their applicability or potential mitigation through technology as well as market maturity (Figure 1). In the near term, high cost of service will be a key economic challenge. We found potential for significant reduction in service cost through increased vehicle and component efficiency, and automation in a more mature market scenario. Weather conditions also pose a challenge to the UAM market, though there is potential for mitigation of some of these impacts through technology such as sensors enabling operations in low visibility. However, even in a mature market with advanced technology, disruptions are still likely to occur due to weather events such as thunderstorms and strong winds. High density operations will likely stress the current Air Traffic Management (ATM) system in the near term, but technology and new initiatives such as the Air Traffic Management -eXploration project (ATM-X) will enable safe and efficient integration of UAM into the National Airspace System (NAS). Current battery technology creates a barrier in the near term, especially for the Air Ambulance market, as battery weight and extensive recharging times would be needed for these operations. Advancements in battery technology, as well as use of hybrid VTOLs, could significantly reduce this barrier in the longer term. As UAM emerges as a viable mode of transportation in the near term, adverse energy and environmental impacts, particularly noise, may impact community acceptance and potentially persist as the market matures into larger-scale operations. For non-technology related challenges, we found that infrastructure constraints will create a significant barrier to UAM in the near term but could be addressed in the longer term through development and expansion of vertiports. Competition from existing modes of transportation such as ride-sharing (e.g., Lyft, Uber) and ground taxi’s pose a key barrier to UAM in the short term, which will likely evolve into competition from other emerging technologies such as autonomous cars and electric trains in the longer term. Weather events will influence other components of the operation such as passenger comfort (e.g., extreme temperatures, turbulence) and infrastructure (e.g., winter weather causing cracks and degradation in vertiports). There is also potential for these impacts to be heightened in the longer term from the increased frequency of adverse weather such as thunderstorms due to changing climatic conditions. We also found that the public has strong concerns about safety as a passenger in a piloted UAM, including “lasing” of pilots, unruly passengers, and sabotage. They would prefer that all passengers pass through a security screening process before boarding a vehicle. They would also prefer to use UAM for longer regional trips, such as flying from Washington, DC to Baltimore, MD or San Diego, CA to Los Angeles, CA. A longer term automated UAM vehicle market will face challenges due to public apprehension about automation and unmanned operations, and a preference to fly with passengers they know in an autonomous (unmanned) operational scenario.

Rohit Goyal↗

NASA NTRS2019

Why You Might Feel Drained at the End of the Day: Workload and the Anesthesiologist

Anesthesiology is a medical specialty with one of the highest workloads and stress levels compared to all others. It is critical that anesthesiologists understand and develop effective strategies for managing their workload to avoid professional burnout. In this presentation, I will first provide an overview and definition of concepts related to workload, including task load, multitasking, concurrent task management, and interleaving tasks, and will discuss common assumptions (that are typically incorrect) relative to workload and task management. I will review common ways that anesthesiologists might unwittingly "sabotage" their attempts to manage their workload and will briefly discuss workload management techniques and strategies that they can implement to more effectively manage their tasks.

anesthesiology↗

DOE OSTI2013

Believing Your Eyes: Strengthening the Reliability of Tags and Seals

NNSA’s Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) is working together with scientific experts at the DOE national laboratories to develop the tools needed to safeguard and secure nuclear material from diversion, theft, and sabotage--tasks critical to support future arms control treaties that may involve the new challenge of monitoring nuclear weapons dismantlement. Use of optically stimulated luminescent material is one method to enhance the security and robustness of existing tamper indicating devices such as tags and seals.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2016

Spreadsheet Assessment Tool v. 2.4

The Spreadsheet Assessment Tool (SAT) is an easy to use, blast assessment tool that is intended to estimate the potential risk due to an explosive attack on a blood irradiator. The estimation of risk is based on the methodology, assumptions, and results of a detailed blast effects assessment study that is summarized in Sandia National Laboratories Technical Report SAND2015-6166. Risk as defined in the report and as used in the SAT is: "The potential risk of creating an air blast-induced vent opening at a buildings envelope surface". Vent openings can be created at a buildings envelope through the failure of an exterior building component—like a wall, window, or door—due to an explosive sabotage of an irradiator within the building. To estimate risk, the tool requires that users obtain and input information pertaining to the building's characteristics and the irradiator location. The tool also suggests several prescriptive mitigation strategies that can be considered to reduce risk. Given the variability in civilian building construction practices, the input parameters used by this tool may not apply to all buildings being assessed. The tool should not be used as a substitute for engineering judgment. The tool is intended for assessment purposes only.

Allen, David J.↗

DOE OSTI2015

The Need for Cyber-Informed Engineering Expertise for Nuclear Research Reactors

Engineering disciplines may not currently understand or fully embrace cyber security aspects as they apply towards analysis, design, operation, and maintenance of nuclear research reactors. Research reactors include a wide range of diverse co-located facilities and designs necessary to meet specific operational research objectives. Because of the nature of research reactors (reduced thermal energy and fission product inventory), hazards and risks may not have received the same scrutiny as normally associated with power reactors. Similarly, security may not have been emphasized either. However, the lack of sound cybersecurity defenses may lead to both safety and security impacts. Risk management methodologies may not contain the foundational assumptions required to address the intelligent adversary’s capabilities in malevolent cyber attacks. Although most research reactors are old and may not have the same digital footprint as newer facilities, any digital instrument and control function must be considered as a potential attack platform that can lead to sabotage or theft of nuclear material, especially for some research reactors that store highly enriched uranium. This paper will provide a discussion about the need for cyber-informed engineering practices that include the entire engineering lifecycle. Cyber-informed engineering as referenced in this paper is the inclusion of cybersecurity aspects into the engineering process. A discussion will consider several attributes of this process evaluating the long-term goal of developing additional cyber safety basis analysis and trust principles. With a culture of free information sharing exchanges, and potentially a lack of security expertise, new risk analysis and design methodologies need to be developed to address this rapidly evolving (cyber) threatscape.

CCE↗

DOE OSTI2017

Towards a Cyber Defense Framework for SCADA Systems Based on Power Consumption Monitoring

Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) is an industrial automation system that remotely monitor, and control critical infrastructures. SCADA systems are major targets for espionage and sabotage attackers. According to the 2015 Dell security annual threat report, the number of cyber-attacks against SCADA systems has doubled in the past year. Cyber-attacks (i.e., buffer overflow, rootkits and code injection) could cause serious financial losses and physical infrastructure damages. Moreover, some specific cyber-attacks against SCADA systems could become a threat to human life. Current commercial off-the-shelf security solutions are insufficient in protecting SCADA systems against sophisticated cyber-attacks. In 2014 a report by Mandiant stated that only 69% of organizations learned about their breaches from third entities, meaning that these companies lack of their own detection system. Furthermore, these breaches are not detected in real-time or fast enough to prevent further damages. The average time between compromise and detection (for those intrusions that were detected) was 205 days. To address this challenge, we propose an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that detects SCADA-specific cyber-attacks by analyzing the power consumption of a SCADA device. Specifically, to validate the proposed approach, we chose to monitor in real-time the power usage of a a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC). To this end, we configured the hardware of the tetsbed by installing the required sensors to monitor and collect its power consumption. After that two SCADA-specific cyber-attacks were simulated and TracerDAQ Pro was used to collect the power consumption of the PLC under normal and anomalous scenarios. Results showed that is possible to distinguish between the regular power usage of the PLC and when the PLC was under specific cyber-attacks.

Hernandez Jimenez, Jarilyn M↗

DOE OSTI2020

INTEGRATION OF FLEX EQUIPMENT AND OPERATOR ACTIONS IN PLANT FORCE-ON-FORCE MODELS WITH DYNAMIC RISK ASSESSMENT

The overall operation and maintenance cost to protect nuclear power plants accounts for approximately 7% of the total cost of power generation, with labor accounting for half of this cost. In the current research, from interaction with utilities and other stakeholders, it was determined that physical security forces account for nearly 20% of the entire workforce at several nuclear power plants. Labor costs continue to rise in the U.S., so any measures to reduce the cost of operating a nuclear power plant will need to include a reduction in labor. The physical security pathway within the DOE’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability program aims to lower the cost of physical security through directed research into modeling and simulation, application of advanced sensors or deployment of advanced weapons. This report presents a modeling and simulation framework for integrating Diverse and Flexible Mitigation Capability (FLEX) portable equipment performance with Force on Force models of a plant’s physical security posture. The generic framework is described in detail, followed by a case study of modeling an adversarial attack aimed at causing a radiological release by sabotaging the plant’s power supply and its ultimate heat sink capabilities at a hypothetical nuclear power plant. Two different FLEX deployment strategies, series and parallel, are modeled with distinct timelines. The results of the adversarial attack modeled in a commercial Force on Force tool are integrated with the FLEX deployment model in INL’s dynamic modeling tool EMRALD. Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the distribution of the timeline in FLEX deployment strategies. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, deployment of FLEX equipment can result in a significantly high likelihood of preventing radiological release. The modeling and simulation framework integrating FLEX equipment with Force on Force models enables the nuclear power plants to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2020

Methodology and Application of Physical Security Effectiveness Based on Dynamic Force-on-Force Modeling

This report describes the research and development being performed at INL towards a dynamic modeling and simulation framework to enable physical security optimization at commercial nuclear power plants. The framework is based on the dynamic modeling tool EMRALD and is demonstrated for applications that can result in physical security optimization. Two main applications are presented: 1. Integrating FLEX portable equipment performance with FOF models of a plant’s physical security posture, and 2. Location optimization of bullet resistant enclosure. The generic framework for modeling FLEX portable equipment is described in detail, followed by a case study modeling an adversarial attack aimed at causing a radiological release by sabotaging the plant’s power supply and its ultimate heat sink capabilities at a hypothetical PWR. Two distinct FLEX deployment strategies, series and parallel, are modeled with distinct timelines. The results of the adversarial attack modeled in a commercial FOF tool, AVERT, are integrated with the FLEX deployment model in EMRALD. Monte Carlo simulation is used to model the distribution of the timeline in FLEX deployment strategies. Thermal-hydraulic analysis of FLEX performance is performed in RELAP5 and integrated with the EMRALD simulations to provide more realistic timelines in the models. The results demonstrate that, even in the extreme case of a successful adversarial attack, deployment of FLEX equipment can result in a significantly high likelihood of preventing radiological release. The modeling and simulation framework of integrating FLEX equipment with FOF models enables the NPPs to credit FLEX portable equipment in the plant security posture, resulting in an efficient and optimized physical security. The objective of location optimization of BRE is to determine the best location in the plant for a new BRE being planned by the plant to enhance their physical security effectiveness. The plant physical security FOF model is integrated with EMRALD that performs Monte Carlo simulation to run different attack scenarios and a discrete set of potential BRE locations. Sensitivity analysis is used to determine the most effective location for the BRE. The optimization approach can be extended to wide applications such as location optimization of remotely operated weapons and other strategic fixed assets.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2021

Attacking the IEC-61131 Logic Engine in Programmable Logic Controllers in Industrial Control Systems

In industrial control systems (ICS), programmable logic controllers (PLCs) directly monitor and control a physical process such as nuclear power plants, gas pipelines, and water treatment. They are equipped with a control logic written in IEC-61131 languages (e.g., ladder logic and structured text) that defines how a PLC should control a physical process. A PLC's control logic is a usual target of a cyberattack to sabotage a physical process. For instance, Stuxnet targets a control logic of a Siemens S7-300 PLC to damage a nuclear facility's centrifuges. The existing attacks in the literature generally focus only on injecting malicious control logic into a PLC. This paper presents a new dimension of control logic attacks that target the control logic engine (responsible for running a control logic) of a PLC. It demonstrates that a cyberattack can disable the control logic engine successfully by exploiting inherent PLC features such as program mode and starting/stopping engine. We develop two novel case studies on control logic engine attacks by employing the MITRE ATT\&CK knowledge base on the real-world PLCs used in industry settings, i.e., 1) Schweitzer Engineering Laboratory (SEL)'s Real-Time Automation Controller (SEL-3505 RTAC) equipped with security features such as encrypted traffic and device-level access control, and 2) traditional PLCs, i.e., Schneider Electric's Modicon M221, Allen-Bradley's MicroLogix 1400 and 1100 that do not have security features. The case studies present the internals of the logic engine attacks and facilitate the ICS research community and industry to understand the attack vectors on the control logic engine. We evaluate the effectiveness of the control engine attacks on a power substation, a 4-floor elevator, and a conveyor belt to demonstrate their real-world impact of halting a physical process.

Ali qasim, Syed↗

DOE OSTI2023

Physical Security Timeline Analysis in Support of Advanced Reactor Demonstration and Deployment

This report presents the regulatory requirements and directions on the physical security of advanced nuclear reactors in USA. Presently, a rule is being proposed that allows for a performance-based analysis. In determining the physical security requirements for an advanced reactor, new tools may be desired to conduct a performance-based analysis. These tools should incorporate dynamic analysis methods to provide as much realism as possible. In comparison, the security requirements for existing light water reactors (LWRs) are much more prescriptive and the analysis conducted to establish the required physical security strategies were more easily performed with static analysis. In order to achieve the cost goals that advanced reactors require for adoption; the nuclear security force required should not be excessive. Dynamic physical security analysis methods and tools have been developed by the US Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program. This report details how the dynamic risk analysis tools developed in the LWRS program using the dynamic risk modelling tool, EMRALD, may be adapted for use in analyzing the physical security designs for advanced reactors accounting for variable performance-based requirements. This report provides an example analysis of a hypothetical SFR using publicly available information and generic assumptions to demonstrate the methods and potential presentation and analysis of the results. No actual plant information is used in this example analysis. Future work in this area will create additional models that can be adapted for any advanced reactor concept and use various security features to create a physical security system that provides adequate protection from radiological theft and sabotage.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2019

Data-driven cyber attack detection and mitigation for decentralized wide-area protection and control in smart grids

Modern power systems have already evolved into complicated cyber physical systems (CPS), often referred to as smart grids, due to the continuous expansion of the electrical infrastructure, the augmentation of the number of heterogeneous system components and players, and the consequential application of a diversity of information and telecommunication technologies to facilitate the Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) of the day-to-day power system operation. Because of the reliance on cyber technologies, WAMPAC, among other critical functions, is prone to various malicious cyber attacks. Successful cyber attacks, especially those sabotage the operation of Bulk Electric System (BES), can cause great financial losses and social panics. Application of conventional IT security solutions is indispensable, but it often turns out to be insufficient to mitigate sophisticated attacks that deploy zero-day vulnerabilities or social engineering tactics. To further improve the resilience of the operation of smart grids when facing cyber attacks, it is desirable to make the WAMPAC functions per se capable of detecting various anomalies automatically, carrying out adaptive activity adjustments in time and thus staying unimpaired even under attack. Most of the existing research efforts attempt to achieve this by adding novel functional modules, such as model-based anomaly detectors, to the legacy centralized WAMPAC functions. In contrast, this dissertation investigates the application of data-driven algorithms in cyber attack detection and mitigation within a decentralized architecture aiming at improving the situational awareness and self-adaptiveness of WAMPAC. First part of the research focuses on the decentralization of System Integrity Protection Scheme (SIPS) with Multi-Agent System (MAS), within which the data-driven anomaly detection and optimal adaptive load shedding are further explored. An algorithm named as Support Vector Machine embedded Layered Decision Tree (SVMLDT) is proposed for the anomaly detection, which provides satisfactory detection accuracy as well as decision-making interpretability. The adaptive load shedding is carried out by every agent individually with dynamic programming. The load shedding relies on the load profile propagation among peer agents and the attack adaptiveness is accomplished by maintaining the historical mean of load shedding proportion. Load shedding only takes place after the consensus pertaining to the anomaly detection is achieved among all interconnected agents and it serves the purpose of mitigating certain cyber attacks. The attack resilience of the decentralized SIPS is evaluated using IEEE 39 bus model. It is shown that, unlike the traditional centralized SIPS, the proposed solution is able to carry out the remedial actions under most Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. The second part investigates the clustering based anomalous behavior detection and peer-assisted mitigation for power system generation control. To reduce the dimensionality of the data, three metrics are designed to interpret the behavior conformity of generator within the same balancing area. Semi-supervised K-means clustering and a density sensitive clustering algorithm based on Hierarchical DBSCAN (HDBSCAN) are both applied in clustering in the 3D feature space. Aiming to mitigate the cyber attacks targeting the generation control commands, a peer-assisted strategy is proposed. When the control commands from control center is detected as anomalous, i.e. either missing or the payload of which have been manipulated, the generating unit utilizes the peer data to infer and estimate a new generation adjustment value as replacement. Linear regression is utilized to obtain the relation of control values received by different generating units, Moving Target Defense (MTD) is adopted during the peer selection and 1-dimensional clustering is performed with the inferred control values, which are followed by the final control value estimation. The mitigation strategy proposed requires that generating units can communicate with each other in a peer-to-peer manner. Evaluation results suggest the efficacy of the proposed solution in counteracting data availability and data integrity attacks targeting the generation controls. However, the strategy stays effective only if less than half of the generating units are compromised and it is not able to mitigate cyber attacks targeting the measurements involved in the generation control.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗