Countering Russia's Strategy for Regional Coercion and War
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99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
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August 5, 1963-President Kennedy's Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed in Moscow, Russia
On August 5, 1963, after more than eight years of negotiations, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by atomic bombs marked the end of World War II and the beginning of the nuclear age. As tensions between East and West settled into a Cold War, scientists in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union conducted tests and developed more powerful nuclear weapons. In 1959, radioactive deposits were found in wheat and milk in the northern United States. As scientists and the public gradually became aware of the dangers of radioactive fallout, they began to raise their voices against nuclear testing. Leaders and diplomats of several countries sought to address the issue. In May 1955, the United Nations Disarmament Commission brought together the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on ending nuclear weapons testing. Conflict soon arose over inspections to verify underground testing. The Soviet Union feared that on-site inspections could lead to spying that might expose the Soviets' vastly exaggerated claims of the number of deliverable nuclear weapons. As negotiators struggled over differences, the Soviet Union and the United States suspended nuclear tests—a moratorium that lasted from November 1958 to September 1961. John F. Kennedy had supported ban on nuclear weapons testing since 1956. He believed a ban would prevent other countries from obtaining nuclear weapons, and took a strong stand on the issue in the 1960 presidential campaign. Once elected, President Kennedy pledged not to resume testing in the air and promised to pursue all diplomatic efforts for a test ban treaty before resuming underground testing. He envisioned the test ban as a first step to nuclear disarmament. President Kennedy met with Soviet Premier Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961, just five weeks after the humiliating defeat of the US-sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. Khrushchev took a hard line at the summit. He announced his intention to cut off Western access to Berlin and threatened war if the United States or its allies tried to stop him. Many US diplomats felt that Kennedy had not stood up to the Soviet premier at the summit and left Khrushchev with the impression that he was a weak leader. President Kennedy's political and military advisers feared that the Soviet Union had continued secret underground testing and made gains in nuclear technology. They pressured Kennedy to resume testing. And, according to a Gallup poll in July 1961, the public approved of testing by a margin of two-to-one. In August 1961, the Soviet Union announced its intention to resume atmospheric testing, and over the next three months it conducted 31 nuclear tests. It exploded the largest nuclear bomb in history—58 megatons—4,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. In his commencement address at American University on June 10, 1963, Kennedy announced a new round of high-level arms negotiations with the Russians. He boldly called for an end to the Cold War. "If we cannot end our differences," he said, "at least we can help make the world a safe place for diversity." The Soviet government broadcast a translation of the entire speech, and allowed it to be reprinted in the controlled Soviet press. The Limited Nuclear Test Ban treaty was signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, by US Secretary Dean Rusk, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and British Foreign Secretary Lord Home—one day short of the 18th anniversary of the dropping of an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Over the next two months, President Kennedy convinced a fearful public and a divided Senate to support the treaty. The Senate approved the treaty on September 23, 1963, by an 80-19 margin. Kennedy signed the ratified treaty on October 7, 1963. The treaty: prohibited nuclear weapons tests or other nuclear explosions under water, in the atmosphere, or in outer space allowed underground nuclear tests as long as no radioactive debris falls outside the boundaries of the nation conducting the test pledged signatories to work towards complete disarmament, an end to the armaments race, and an end to the contamination of the environment by radioactive substances. Thirty-three years later, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Signed by 71 nations, including those possessing nuclear weapons, the treaty prohibited all nuclear test explosions including those conducted underground. Though it was signed by President Bill Clinton, the Senate rejected the treaty by a vote of 51 to 48.
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Integrating Variable Renewable Energy - Russia
To foster sustainable, low-emission development, many countries are establishing ambitious renewable energy targets for their electricity supply. Because solar and wind tend to be more variable and uncertain than conventional sources, meeting these targets will involve changes to power system planning and operations. Grid integration is the practice of developing efficient ways to deliver variable renewable energy (VRE) to the grid. Good integration methods maximize the cost-effectiveness of incorporating VRE into the power system while maintaining or increasing system stability and reliability. When considering grid integration, policy makers, regulators, and system operators consider a variety of issues, which can be organized into four broad topics: New Renewable Energy Generation, New Transmission, Increased System Flexibility, Planning for a High RE Future. This is a Russian-language translation of Integrating Variable Renewable Energy into the Grid: Key Issues, Greening the Grid, originally published in English in May 2015.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Mikhail Lomonosov - Russia's First Modern Scientist
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Shiltsev, Vladimir↗
Approaches to Deal with Irradiated Graphite in Russia - Proposal for New IAEA CRP on Graphite Waste Management - 12364
The problems of spent reactor graphite are being shown, the options of its disposal is considered. Burning method is selected as the most efficient and waste-free. It is made a comparison of amounts of {sup 14}C that entering the environment in a natural way during the operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and as a result of the proposed burning of spent reactor graphite. It is shown the possibility of burning graphite with the arrival of {sup 14}C into the atmosphere within the maximum allowable emissions. This paper analyzes the different ways of spent reactor graphite treatment. It is shown the possibility of its reprocessing by burning method in the air flow. It is estimated the effect of this technology to the overall radiation environment and compared its contribution to the general background radiation due to cosmic radiation and NPPs emission. It is estimated the maximum permissible speeds of burning reactor graphite (for example, RBMK graphite) for areas with different conditions of agricultural activities. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
Remixing the ‘Appropriate Mix’: Reassessing NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture in the Face of New Threats
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the countries of Europe face a renewed challenge from the east vis-à-vis the Putin regime in Moscow. In the face of these new challenges, NATO must reconsider its deterrence and defense posture in order to deter conflict in Europe. Unfortunately, Russian attempts to rewrite the rules of the post-Cold War international order by force have been coupled with nuclear saber rattling and overt nuclear threats. Russia’s nuclear threats, in addition to provocative changes to Russia’s nuclear posture in its Military Doctrine, are methods to make up for Russia’s conventional military inferiority relative to NATO and the United States. Some have described Moscow’s actions as laying the groundwork for a nuclear coercion strategy. While the decrease in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States has reduced the likelihood of nuclear annihilation to an all-time low since the height of the Cold War, Russia’s nuclear coercion strategy is increasing the probability of nuclear employment in Europe. The probability of nuclear use is compounded by Russia’s tremendous local military advantage around its periphery in spite of U.S. global military primacy. This military advantage increases the incentive to use military force if Russian decision-makers conclude that a quick military victory is possible, or if Russian leaders miscalculate based on an incorrect assessment of military force balance or resolve of their adversary. The integration of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (referred to as the Baltics in this paper) into the NATO alliance in 2004 makes Russia’s military advantage in its periphery increasingly relevant. Each NATO state is required to assist any NATO state that comes under attack per Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Baltic states’ proximity to Russia, their weak indigenous militaries, their former status as Soviet Republics, large population of ethnic Russians, and Russian President Vladimir V. Putin’s claim that he will protect Russians wherever they are makes the Baltics the most likely flashpoint for conflict between NATO and Russia. This analysis will tackle the problem of reshaping NATO’s deterrence and defense posture in light of the new Russian threat and its obligation to defend its most vulnerable members. Specifically, it will assess the suitability of NATO’s “appropriate mix” of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities to deterring conventional conflict with Russia and, if conventional deterrence fails, preventing Russian nuclear escalation. It will use a scenario-based approach informed by a deterrence model to explore how changes to NATO’s posture and policy could impact the deterrence of Russian aggression.
99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
Russian anthropogenic black carbon: Emission reconstruction and Arctic black carbon simulation
Development of reliable source emission inventories is needed to advance the understanding of the origin of Arctic haze using chemical transport modeling. This paper develops a regional anthropogenic black carbon (BC) emission inventory for the Russian Federation, the largest country by land area in the Arctic Council. Activity data from combination of local Russia information and international resources, emission factors based on either Russian documents or adjusted values for local conditions, and other emission source data are used to approximate the BC emissions. Emissions are gridded at a resolution of 0.1° × 0.1° and developed into a monthly temporal profile. Total anthropogenic BC emission of Russia in 2010 is estimated to be around 224 Gg. Gas flaring, a commonly ignored black carbon source, contributes a significant fraction of 36.2% to Russia's total anthropogenic BC emissions. Other sectors, i.e., residential, transportation, industry, and power plants, contribute 25.0%, 20.3%, 13.1%, and 5.4%, respectively. Three major BC hot spot regions are identified: the European part of Russia, the southern central part of Russia where human population densities are relatively high, and the Urals Federal District where Russia's major oil and gas fields are located but with sparse human population. BC simulations are conducted using the hemispheric version of Community Multi-scale Air Quality Model with emission inputs from a global emission database EDGAR (Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research)-HTAPv2 (Hemispheric Transport of Air Pollution) and EDGAR-HTAPv2 with its Russian part replaced by the newly developed Russian BC emissions, respectively. The simulation using the new Russian BC emission inventory could improve 30–65% of absorption aerosol optical depth measured at the AERONET sites in Russia throughout the whole year as compared to that using the default HTAPv2 emissions. At the four ground monitoring sites (Zeppelin, Barrow, Alert, and Tiksi) in the Arctic Circle, surface BC simulations are improved the most during the Arctic haze periods (October–March). The poor performance of Arctic BC simulations in previous studies may be partly ascribed to the Russian BC emissions built on out-of-date and/or missing information, which could result in biases to both emission rates and the spatial distribution of emissions. Finally, this study highlights that the impact of Russian emissions on the Arctic haze has likely been underestimated, and its role in the Arctic climate system needs to be reassessed. The Russian black carbon emission source data generated in this study can be obtained via http://abci.ornl.gov/download.shtml or http://acs.engr.utk.edu/Data.php.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
Scaling up the energy service company business: market status and company feedback in the Russian Federation
Many energy efficiency professionals have proposed using Energy Performance Contracts (EPCs) as a mechanism to improve public sector energy efficiency in countries with restrictive government budgets. However, in practice, most middle-income countries have used this mechanism only in a limited way. Russia offers an interesting case study because of its huge energy savings opportunities, increasing energy prices, robust political backing for public sector energy efficiency, and evolving legislation that supports EPCs. In 2009, the Russian Federation launched a program to reduce the energy intensity of the country’s large public sector, which accounts for 9 percent of Russia’s total energy consumption. To achieve energy efficiency goals, Russia experimented with its public procurement rules, adjusting them to encourage EPCs. We conducted structured interviews with Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) in Russia and supplemented them with online research. Our review shows that, to date, nearly 50 ESCOs signed about 150 contracts in public facilities. Most ESCO contracts in Russia are for 5 years, and they generally are small (under $100,000). ESCOs in Russia face a challenging environment, which leads to smaller projects. ESCOs also are concerned about costly and risky tender procedures, uncertainty regarding repayment from public facilities, the inability to expand projects, and financing. We discuss these challenges and propose potential solutions at policy and company levels. The ESCOs feedback regarding Russia’s experimental model can inform the country’s program for public sector energy efficiency and offer lessons for other countries attempting to develop the EPC mechanism.
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
Classified channel masks of portions of 13 rivers across the Arctic and areas of floodplain erosion and accretion ranging from 1973 to 2016
This dataset provides classified river channel masks of 17 reaches of 15 Arctic rivers for river bank erosion and accretion rates, as well as, river channel properties such as channel width, bank curvature, and the aspect/orientation of the river banks. These rivers include the: Chandalar River, Alaska, Colville River, Alaska; Indigirka River, Russia; Kolyma River, Russia; Koyukuk River, Alaska; Lena River, Alaska; Noatak River, Alaska; Ob River, Russia; Pechora River, Russia; Tanana River, Alaska, Selawik River, Alaska; Taz River, Russia; Yana River, Russia; Yenisei River, Russia; and the Yukon River, Alaska. The dataset was generated from a total of 129 images including: Landsat, higher resolution satellite imagery, and aerial photography over time periods ranging from the 1970s and 2016. A full list of the image dates, row and path (for Landsat), and pixel resolutions is provided in the dataset. Masks for the Chandalar River, Tanana River, and Yukon at Holy Cross were obtained from Brown et al. (2020). The masks were analyzed using the Spatially Continuous Riverbank Erosion and Accretion Measurements (SCREAM) software detailed in Rowland et al. 2016. The masks used in this analysis can be found an accompanying dataset (doi:10.15485/1571527). These masks provide the source data for the erosion, accretion, and planform measurement provided in the companion dataset: doi:10.15485/1571527.Revision January 2023:Added masks for Koyukuk River based on imagery from 1978, 2012, and 2018. Added masks based on analysis of Brown et al. (2020) for the Tanana, Chandalar, and Yukon (Holy Cross) Rivers. Update abstract and the image summary file.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
Pan-arctic river bank erosion and accretion, and planform metrics measured over intervals ranging from 1973 to 2016
This dataset provides the tabular summary of analysis of 17 reaches of 15 Arctic rivers for river bank erosion and accretion rates, as well as, river channel properties such as channel width, bank curvature, and the aspect/orientation of the river banks. These rivers include the: Chandalar River, Alaska, Colville River, Alaska; Indigirka River, Russia; Kolyma River, Russia; Koyukuk River, Alaska; Lena River, Alaska; Noatak River, Alaska; Ob River, Russia; Pechora River, Russia; Tanana River, Alaska, Selawik River, Alaska; Taz River, Russia; Yana River, Russia; Yenisei River, Russia; and the Yukon River, Alaska. The dataset was generated from a total of 129 images including: Landsat, higher resolution satellite imagery, and aerial photography over time periods ranging from the 1970s and 2016. A full list of the image dates, row and path (for Landsat), and pixel resolutions is provided in the dataset. Masks for the Chandalar River, Tanana River, and Yukon at Holy Cross were obtained from Brown et al. (2020). The masks were analyzed using the Spatially Continuous Riverbank Erosion and Accretion Measurements (SCREAM) software detailed in Rowland et al. 2016. The masks used in this analysis can be found an accompanying dataset (doi:10.15485/1571527).In files with “summary” in the name, the data is provided at a pixel level, where each mapped bank pixel has an associated erosion or accretion value, a channel width, a curvature value, and an aspect each river and time period will have an individual file. Files with “Segments” in name provide data that is averaged along segments of the rivers. These data are consolidated into a single file each for the erosion and accretion measurements. These segments are approximately 10 channel widths in length. In addition to erosion and accretion rates, the segment-based results include area measurements of erosion and accretion, islands, and channels. Revisions 2023:-Data added for the Koyukuk River for time periods of 1978-2012, 1978-2018, and 2012-2018. ---Data added from the Chandalar River, Tanana River, and Yukon River at Holy Cross based on masks obtained from Brown et al. (2020).-Updated the values for Drainage area and river slope, see methods below-Added values for meant topographic slope for upstream contributing area, long term averaged annual maximum monthly flow, average annual maximum monthly flow for the time period of erosion record, and added the river slope extracted from the Lin et al. (2020) data product.-Add field for River Planform Multi threaded (M) or Single threaded-Added ‘ConsolidatedErosionSegments.csv’ which provides the same data as AllRiversErosionSegments.csv rebinned with averages along river segments based on upstream drainage area instead of channel segments based on lengths set to approximately 10 channel widths.
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
Carbon in the Former Soviet Union: The Current Balance
This work has been carried out in a period of great changes in Russia that have brought extreme hardships to the scientific community. We have been fortunate in establishing excellent relationships with the Russian scientific community and believe we have helped to retain coherence in circumstances where the continuation of research was in doubt. We have learned much and have been effective in advancing, even establishing, scholars and programs in Russia that might not otherwise have survived the transition. The vigor of the International Boreal Forest Research Association (IBFRA) is one sign of the value and success of these activities. Largely due to the current political and economic transitions in the former Soviet Union, the forests of much of the FSU are under reduced logging pressure. In addition, there is a decline in air pollution as heavy industry has waned, at least for now. Russian forestry statistics and our personal experience indicate a decline, perhaps as high as 60%, in forest harvesting over the last few years. But, new international market pressures on the forests exist in European Russia and in the Far East. The central government, still the "owner" of Russian forests, is having difficulty maintaining control over forest use and management particularly in the Far East and among the southern territories that have large, nonRussian ethnic populations. Extraordinarily large areas of mixed forest and grasslands, sparse or open forests, and mixed forests and tundra must be considered when calculating forest area It is insufficient to think of Russia as simply forest and nonforest Forest productivity, measured as growth of timber, appears to be in decline in all areas of Russia except in European Russia. Most information and publications on the recent history of these forests is heavily dependent on statistical data from the Soviet era. The interpretation of these data is very much open to debate. Anatoly Shwidenko, a long term collaborator and former senior scientist (mensuration) for the Soviet Committee on Forests, now a scholar at the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Vienna, has provided abundant contributions from the data available to him and from his experience. Forest stand carbon is concentrated in the Russian Far East (i.e. Primorski Kray), Central-Southern Siberia and European Russia But, soil carbon can be 10 times forest stand C. Our efforts in mapping the area and changes in area (as well as the internal structure) of forests have made major contributions to our joint understanding of the scale and status of these forests. To realize the importance of this contribution one needs only to recognize that any large scale Soviet-era maps of the area did not include latitude and longitude. Even today, there is great reluctance to provide these data, the basis of any GIS.
Woodwell, G. M.↗
Modeling of Environmental-Economic Indicators of Regional Development
One of the current topical problems is the prediction of climate change and mitigation of its consequences. All-sided analysis of ecological, economic, and social aspects of climate issues relies on interdisciplinary assessment models. This article adapts the MERGE optimization model to the current state of the world economy and introduces into the model a new component that implements a simplified procedure of “green” GDP calculation (“green” GDP, or GGDP, provides information about the efficiency of use of environmental resources). The objective of our numerical simulations is to tests the consequences of Russia’s hypothetical participation in the program for reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and to analyze the environmental indicators of Russia’s GDP. The input data are mainly provided by the project of scenario conditions and main macroeconomic parameters for the forecasting of socio-economic development in Russia in the near future implemented by the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation. The calculations reveal the existence of reserves for Russia’s “painless” participation in environment-preserving initiatives that call for not exceeding the 1990 emission level in 2020–2025. At the same time, increasing the environmental efficiency of Russia’s GDP is a relevant task that requires immediate attention.
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
Russian Multi-Domain Strategy against NATO: information confrontation and U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe
Western philosophical and moral principles incline strategic thinkers in democratic societies to reject the notion that information can be used as a weapon or a domain of warfare instead of a tool of freedom and truth. International law suggests that the vast majority of societies and governments agree that freedom of information and truth are crucial to healthy societies. In practice, however, there are also governments that perceive them as both a form of strategic deception and as a vulnerability that can be exploited through information operations. An increasingly common dimension of Russian strategy against the United States and its NATO allies and partners is information confrontation [informatsionnoe protivoborstvo], or IPb. Russia actively pursues a strategy of exploiting perceived vulnerabilities of these democratic societies by carrying out informational-technical (e.g., cyber) and informational-psychological operations below the threshold of open military conflict in order to exacerbate pre-existing societal, political, and military divisions, thereby degrading NATO cohesion. The literature on IPb suggests that a key element of this strategy is an effort to create confusion and sow doubt in the existence of truth. Russia has also applied these operations alongside traditional military means of armed conflict in NATO partner states, Georgia and Ukraine, in order to slow down the decision-making processes in those countries as well as throughout the international community. In Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has employed both aspects of IPb to challenge the Westphalian international order and achieve a fait accompli with a limited use of military force. The body of literature dedicated to understanding the role of IPb in Russian strategy has yet to explore its relationship to U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. This topic merits study for at least three reasons. First, Russian strategic thinkers and official strategic documents identify NATO as threat and assign an increased role for asymmetric, indirect, and non-military (including informational) measures in conflict resolution. Second, Russia has historically used IPb against the Alliance with mixed success. In this regard, Soviet active measures [aktivnie meropriyatiya] operations targeting societal, political, and military divisions about NATO nuclear posture in the late 1970s and early 1980s are illuminating. Finally, current Russian practice reflects an effort to propagate disinformation about U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons. This study seeks to contribute to the body of literature on IPb by analyzing the evolution of Russian strategic thought on and practice of IPb in relation to U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. It explores the following questions: How and under which conditions does Russia employ IPb in an effort to achieve preferred strategic outcomes related to NATO nuclear force structure? What insights about contemporary Russian IPb efforts can be gained from studying Soviet active measures campaigns against NATO nuclear force posture?
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
Extended Duration: The SIRIUS 21 Crew Perspective
The SIRIUS (Scientific International Research In a Unique terrestrial Station) missions represent a collaborative effort between NASA and Russia’s Institute for Biomedical Problems (IBMP) to conduct a series of long duration isolation and confinement spaceflight analog missions. Three missions of 17-day, 4-month, and 8-month duration (SIRIUS 17, 19, and 21) have been completed at IBMP’s Ground-Based Experimental Complex / Nazemnyy eksperimental'nyy kompleks (NEK) in Moscow, Russia. The international SIRIUS 21 crew comprising representatives from the United States, United Arab Emirates and Russia recently completed the 8-month analog lunar mission. The extended duration mission included simulated lunar transit, orbital, and surface operations with corresponding deep space communication delay, during which the crew participated in nearly 70 studies, eight of which were sponsored by NASA’s Human Research Program. The studies examined the effect of isolation and confinement on the behavioral health of research subjects, and investigated medical countermeasures, team performance, crew dynamics, crew autonomy, food system risks, consequences of confinement and associated physiological stressors. SIRIUS 21 crewmembers also participated in operational tasks such as Rover and CubeSat assembly, simulated lunar sample assessment, VR activities, robotic arm training, environmental systems monitoring, exercise, greenhouse maintenance and 3D printing. Communication with Mission Control was limited to 30-minute periods every two hours. Since access to the internet and email was restricted, simulated ground support provided the Crew’s primary source of daily news and mission information. This panel discussion will include presentations from the US SIRIUS 21 crewmembers – William Brown and Ashley Kowalski – about their experience participating in the mission and science. A facilitated question and answer session will follow with attendees encouraged to ask questions and join in discussion with the SIRIUS 21 crewmembers about their experiences. William Brown came to SIRIUS 21 with experience spread across multiple industries, including the military, defense contracting, healthcare consulting, software engineering, and logistics. He has lived in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Russia. A former Boren Scholar, Brown is fluent in Russian. He holds a Master of International Business degree from the University of South Carolina’s Darla Moore School of Business. Prior to that, he earned a bachelor’s degree in Russian language, literature, and culture from the University of South Carolina. There, he also completed additional undergraduate coursework in computer science. Ashley Kowalski is a Project Leader in The Aerospace Corporation’s International Partnerships Department, where she works with, represents, and provides technical support to the the U.S. Space Force Space Systems Command International Affairs (SSC/IA) office. Through her numerous national and international assignments (Russia, China, and Germany), she has worked on topics related to international space systems, national security space systems, civil systems (including human spaceflight and civil launch projects), space policy, satellite industry analysis, and satellite manufacturing start-ups. She is proficient in Russian and German, and fluent in Polish. Kowalski received her Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees in mechanical and aerospace engineering from George Washington University in 2011 and 2012, respectively.
S. E. Whiting↗
UNDERSTANDING METHANE EMISSIONS SOURCES AND VIABLE MITIGATION MEASURES IN THE NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS: RUSSIAN AND U.S. EXPERIENCE
This article will compare the natural gas transmission systems in the U.S. and Russia and review experience with methane mitigation technologies in the two countries. Russia and the United States (U.S.) are the world's largest consumers and producers of natural gas, and consequently, have some of the largest natural gas infrastructure. This paper compares the natural gas transmission systems in Russia and the U.S., their methane emissions and experiences in implementing methane mitigation technologies. Given the scale of the two systems, many international oil and natural gas companies have expressed interest in better understanding the methane emission volumes and trends as well as the methane mitigation options. This paper compares the two transmission systems and documents experiences in Russia and the U.S. in implementing technologies and programs for methane mitigation. The systems are inherently different. For instance, while the U.S. natural gas transmission system is represented by many companies, which operate pipelines with various characteristics, in Russia predominately one company, Gazprom, operates the gas transmission system. However, companies in both countries found that reducing methane emissions can be feasible and profitable. Examples of technologies in use include replacing wet seals with dry seals, implementing Directed Inspection and Maintenance (DI&M) programs, performing pipeline pump-down, applying composite wrap for non-leaking pipeline defects and installing low-bleed pneumatics. The research methodology for this paper involved a review of information on methane emissions trends and mitigation measures, analytical and statistical data collection; accumulation and analysis of operational data on compressor seals and other emission sources; and analysis of technologies used in both countries to mitigate methane emissions in the transmission sector. Operators of natural gas transmission systems have many options to reduce natural gas losses. Depending on the value of gas, simple, low-cost measures, such as adjusting leaking equipment components, or larger-scale measures, such as installing dry seals on compressors, can be applied.
03 NATURAL GAS↗
The Future of Energy from Nuclear Fission
Nuclear energy is an important part of our current global energy system, and contributes to supplying the significant demand for electricity for many nations around the world. There are 433 commercial nuclear power reactors operating in 30 countries with an installed capacity of 367 GWe as of October 2011 (IAEA PRIS, 2011). Nuclear electricity generation totaled 2630 TWh in 2010 representing 14% the world’s electricity generation. The top five countries of total installed nuclear capacity are the US, France, Japan, Russia and South Korea at 102, 63, 45, 24, and 21 GWe, respectively (WNA, 2012a). The nuclear capacity of these five countries represents more than half, 68%, of the total global nuclear capacity. The role of nuclear power in the global energy system today has been motivated by several factors including the growing demand for electric power, the regional availability of fossil resources and energy security concerns, and the relative competitiveness of nuclear power as a source of base-load electricity. There is additional motivation for the use of nuclear power because it does not produce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or local air pollutants during its operation and contributes to low levels of emissions throughout the lifecycle of the nuclear energy system (Beerten, J. et. al., 2009). Energy from nuclear fission primarily in the form of electric power and potentially as a source of industrial heat could play a greater role for meeting the long-term growing demand for energy worldwide while addressing the concern for climate change from rising GHG emissions. However, the nature of nuclear fission as a tremendously compact and dense form of energy production with associated high concentrations of radioactive materials has particular and unique challenges as well as benefits. These challenges include not only the safety and cost of nuclear reactors, but proliferation concerns, safeguard and storage of nuclear materials associated with nuclear fuel cycles. In March of 2011, an unprecedented earthquake of 9 magnitude and ensuing tsunami off the east coast of Japan caused a severe nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2011). The severity of the nuclear accident in Japan has brought about a reinvestigation of nuclear energy policy and deployment activities for many nations around the world, most notably in Japan and Germany (BBC, 2011; Reuter, 2011). The response to the accident has been mixed and its full impact may not be realized for many years to come. The nuclear accident in Fukushima, Japan has not directly affected the significant on-going nuclear deployment activities in many countries. China, Russia, India, and South Korea, as well as others, are continuing with their deployment plans. As of October 2011, China had the most reactors under construction at 27, while Russia, India, and South Korea had 11, 6, and 5 reactors under construction, respectively (IAEA PRIS, 2011). Ten other nations have one or two reactors currently under construction. Many more reactors are planned for future deployment in China, Russia, and India, as well as in the US. Based on the World Nuclear Association’s data, the realization of China’s deployment plan implies that China will surpass the US in total nuclear capacity some time in the future.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World
Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that the prospects for maintaining U.S. security and minimizing the chances of nuclear war, while deliberately reducing stockpiles to a few hundred weapons, is possible but not without risk. While the question of the appropriate level of cuts to U.S. nuclear forces is being actively debated, a key issue continues to be whether verification procedures are strong enough to ensure that both the U.S. and Russia are fulfilling their obligations under the current New Start treaty and any future arms reduction treaties. A recent opinion piece by Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft (2012) raised a number of issues with respect to governing a policy to enhance strategic stability, including: in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain - and when possible, reinforce - that confidence. The strengths and weaknesses of the New START verification regime should inform and give rise to stronger regimes for future arms control agreements. These future arms control agreements will likely need to include other nuclear weapons states and so any verification regime will need to be acceptable to all parties. Currently, China is considered the most challenging party to include in any future arms control agreement and China's willingness to enter into verification regimes such as those implemented in New START may only be possible when it feels it has reached nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, in keeping with its goals of reaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia, Frieman (2004) suggests that China would be more willing to accept internationally accepted and applied verification regimes rather than bilateral ones. The current verification protocols specified in the New START treaty are considered as the baseline case and are contrasted with possible alternative verification protocols that could be effective in a post-New START era of significant reductions in U.S. and other countries nuclear stockpiles. Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered to pose an existential threat to the U.S. In a regime of very low stockpile numbers, 'traditional' verification protocols as currently embodied in the New START treaty might prove less than adequate. I introduce and discuss a number of issues that need to be considered in future verification protocols, many of which do not have immediate solutions and so require further study. I also discuss alternatives and enhancements to traditional verification protocols, for example, confidence building measures such as burden sharing against the common threat of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, joint research and development.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
Broad Scope Analysis of the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility and Disposition of Plutonium
The Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), signed into effect in 2000, between the United States and Russia, was made in a post-Cold War effort to dispose of military-useable material, a combined 68 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium. The United States has been pursuing a disposition path through conversion to MOX fuel for use in current commercial nuclear reactors. The Savannah River Site’s (SRS) MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF, the MOX facility) began construction in 2007 with intent to uphold the United States’ half of the agreement. In the FY2017 budget, the Obama administration proposed a termination of the MFFF after lack of sufficient funding to the project, which caused paralyzing delays and drastically inflated costs for completion. Prolonged construction, piled costs, and divergent policies between shifting administrations have resulted in turmoil between the United States and Russia, culminating with the proposed abandonment of the MOX disposition path and being used as a justification by Russia to withdraw from the agreement until the United States is able to identify a clear plan, fulfilling the requirements set forth by the PMDA. The leading expedient to replace MOX fuel is the dilute and dispose method, which leaves uncertainty for the SRS MFFF and places reliance on New Mexico’s Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) to legally accommodate the additional and unaccounted waste. If the current capacity of WIPP proves insufficient, construction of a new repository for transuranic waste would only incur additional costs and regulatory burdens, along with extreme schedule delays. Future proposed adaptations of the SRS MFFF include pit production, which would require complex and costly alterations to be operational at the current site. Restrictions from Congress, such as mandating the proposed solution to abandoning MFFF must equal half of the costs required for completing the facility, have fueled severely underestimated quotations of these alternatives. The increasing pressure from both Russia and South Carolina government officials to make a decision could result in the pursuit of another doomed project, leaving the United States with even further sunk costs and strained international relations. This paper will summarize the involved history of the MFFF, explicate the recourses to salvage the facility for pit production, and provide postulation on the dilute and dispose method.
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗