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NASA NTRS2013

Systems Engineering Lessons Learned from Solar Array Structures and Mechanisms Deployment

This report has been developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) Risk Management team in close coordination with the Engineering Directorate at LaRC. This document provides a point-in-time, cumulative, summary of actionable key lessons learned derived from the design project. Lessons learned invariably address challenges and risks and the way in which these areas have been addressed. Accordingly the risk management thread is woven throughout the document.

Solar Array Structures↗

NASA NTRS2024

Integrated Systems Engineering, Safety, Reliability and Risk Management – Minimizing Black Swan Events

This paper examines key barriers that can possibly inhibit safe and reliable mission execution and, in the worst case, result in loss of human life due to many unknown contributory factors that can lead to Black Swan events. Some of the representative contributory factors include decision errors, overconfidence and a host of common causes including cultural and human factors. Decisions are always easy to criticize in hindsight when more information is available after a major accident. Depending on the type and complexity of the project and/or mission, the catastrophic risks of drifting into failure can be alleviated by implementing uniquely and strategically tailored Integrated-System-of-Systems, dynamic, risk-informed decision management processes. This paper presents some of the lessons learned from James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), NASA’s Human Space Flight program, and industry that provide motivation to organizations working on mega-complex missions to prudently accomplish targeted mission success. These lessons are important for future human Lunar, Mars and Beyond missions planned to be pursued by NASA through a public-private partnership using nimble but effective safety-conscious, proven sound engineering practices including implementation of integrated risk mitigation practices.

SLS↗

NASA NTRS1992

Findings of a review of spacecraft fire safety needs

Discussions from a workshop to guide UCLA and NASA investigators on the state of knowledge and perceived needs in spacecraft fire safety and its risk management are reviewed, for an introduction to an analytical and experimental project in this field. The report summarizes the workshop discussions and includes the visual aids used in the presentations. Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) methods, which are currently not used, would be of great value to the designs and operation of future human-crew spacecraft. Key points in the discussions were the importance of understanding and testing smoldering as a likely fire scenario in space and the need for smoke damage modeling, since many fire-risk models ignore this mechanism and consider only heat damage.

Apostolakis, G. E.↗

NASA NTRS2006

In-Space Propulsion Solar Electric Propulsion Program Overview of 2006

The primary source of electric propulsion development throughout NASA is implemented by the In-Space Propulsion Technology Project at the NASA MSFC under the management of the Science Mission Directorate. The Solar Electric Propulsion technology area's objective is to develop near and mid-term SEP technology to enhance or enable mission capture while minimizing risk and cost to the end user. Major activities include developing NASA s Evolutionary Xenon Thruster (NEXT), implementing a Standard Architecture, and developing a long life High Voltage Hall Accelerator (HiVHAC). Lower level investments include advanced feed system development, advanced cathode testing and xenon recovery testing. Progress on current investments and future plans are discussed.

Baggett, Randy M.↗

NASA NTRS2006

Managing Analysis Models in the Design Process

Design of large, complex space systems depends on significant model-based support for exploration of the design space. Integrated models predict system performance in mission-relevant terms given design descriptions and multiple physics-based numerical models. Both the design activities and the modeling activities warrant explicit process definitions and active process management to protect the project from excessive risk. Software and systems engineering processes have been formalized and similar formal process activities are under development for design engineering and integrated modeling. JPL is establishing a modeling process to define development and application of such system-level models.

design↗

NASA NTRS2009

Human Research Program Human Health Countermeasures Element Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Risk Standing Review Panel (SRP)

The Extravehicular Activity (EVA) Risk Standing Review Panel (SRP) was favorably impressed by the operational risk management approach taken by the Human Research Program (HRP) Integrated Research Plan (IRP) to address the stated life sciences issues. The life sciences community at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) seems to be focused on operational risk management. This approach is more likely to provide risk managers with the information they need at the time they need it. Concerning the information provided to the SRP by the EVA Physiology, Systems, and Performance Project (EPSP), it is obvious that a great deal of productive activity is under way. Evaluation of this information was hampered by the fact that it often was not organized in a fashion that reflects the "Gaps and Tasks" approach of the overall Human Health Countermeasures (HHC) effort, and that a substantial proportion of the briefing concerned subjects that, while interesting, are not part of the HHC Element (e.g., the pressurized rover presentation). Additionally, no information was provided on several of the tasks or how they related to work underway or already accomplished. This situation left the SRP having to guess at the efforts and relationship to other elements, and made it hard to easily map the EVA Project efforts currently underway, and the data collected thus far, to the gaps and tasks in the IRP. It seems that integration of the EPSP project into the HHC Element could be improved. Along these lines, we were concerned that our SRP was split off from the other participating SRPs at an early stage in the overall agenda for the meeting. In reality, the concerns of EPSP and other projects share much common ground. For example, the commonality of the concerns of the EVA and exercise physiology groups is obvious, both in terms of what reduced exercise capacity can do to EVA capability, and how the exercise performed during an EVA could contribute to an overall exercise countermeasure prescription.

Norfleet, William↗

NASA NTRS2001

Risk analysis simulation of rover operations for Mars surface exploration

Risk management advocates have long sought to directly influence the early stages of the systems engineering process through a more effective role in system design trade studies. The principal obstacle to this has been the lack of credible ways to represent and quantify mission risk—that is, a combination of the probability of mission success (“system safety”) and science value—for the project manager and the rest of the design team. If it were possible to quantify mission risk, then the effects of proposed mission and system design changes could be calculated, and along with life-cycle costs, could be used to explore the design space more extensively and select better designs. JPL has been working to build the capability to quantify the probability of mission success using a federation of diverse simulations and models, each of which contributes some vital piece of the puzzle. The initial institutional focus has been on Mars surface operations. This ensemble computing framework enables the diverse models and simulations to work together seamlessly. Recent work at JPL has demonstrated the capability to exercise this ensemble from end-to-end using an Oracle-based database to automatically move results from one model/simulation to the next stage in the analysis.

Shishko, Robert↗

NASA NTRS2011

Composite Crew Module: Primary Structure

In January 2007, the NASA Administrator and Associate Administrator for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate chartered the NASA Engineering and Safety Center to design, build, and test a full-scale crew module primary structure, using carbon fiber reinforced epoxy based composite materials. The overall goal of the Composite Crew Module project was to develop a team from the NASA family with hands-on experience in composite design, manufacturing, and testing in anticipation of future space exploration systems being made of composite materials. The CCM project was planned to run concurrently with the Orion project's baseline metallic design within the Constellation Program so that features could be compared and discussed without inducing risk to the overall Program. This report discusses the project management aspects of the project including team organization, decision making, independent technical reviews, and cost and schedule management approach.

Kirsch, Michael T.↗

NASA NTRS2004

Uncertainties in estimates of the risks of late effects from space radiation

Methods used to project risks in low-Earth orbit are of questionable merit for exploration missions because of the limited radiobiology data and knowledge of galactic cosmic ray (GCR) heavy ions, which causes estimates of the risk of late effects to be highly uncertain. Risk projections involve a product of many biological and physical factors, each of which has a differential range of uncertainty due to lack of data and knowledge. Using the linear-additivity model for radiation risks, we use Monte-Carlo sampling from subjective uncertainty distributions in each factor to obtain an estimate of the overall uncertainty in risk projections. The resulting methodology is applied to several human space exploration mission scenarios including a deep space outpost and Mars missions of duration of 360, 660, and 1000 days. The major results are the quantification of the uncertainties in current risk estimates, the identification of factors that dominate risk projection uncertainties, and the development of a method to quantify candidate approaches to reduce uncertainties or mitigate risks. The large uncertainties in GCR risk projections lead to probability distributions of risk that mask any potential risk reduction using the "optimization" of shielding materials or configurations. In contrast, the design of shielding optimization approaches for solar particle events and trapped protons can be made at this time and promising technologies can be shown to have merit using our approach. The methods used also make it possible to express risk management objectives in terms of quantitative metrics, e.g., the number of days in space without exceeding a given risk level within well-defined confidence limits. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of COSPAR.

Non-NASA Center↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A New Vision and A More Rational Process Will Advance Space Life Support Through Better Projects

Many space life support assumptions are obviously mistaken but they are generally accepted because they mutually support each other and because they advance a mistaken futuristic vision of closed human ecosystems in space. Many projects have been mistakenly selected to increase life support system closure or reduce launch mass in order to implement this impractical vision. Project members rarely challenge their project’s assumptions and guiding vision. Systems engineering including cost, reliability, risk, and system trade-offs has been very strongly discouraged to prevent rational criticism of these dubious assumptions, the projects, and the ecosystem vision. A more realistic vision can define better near term life support goals and future aspirations that will improve mission support and increase public interest. Given more realistic goals, it will be possible to develop effective technical alternatives, use open rational project selection methods, conduct professional project management, and make swifter progress in the inevitable human advance into space. The current unworkable human space settlement scenario involves moon visits and permanent bases, zero gravity trips to Mars, Mars visits and bases, all leading to extensive human settlements on the moon and Mars. This is unrealistic because the moon and Mars have less than Earth normal gravity and high radiation that can seriously damage human health. A better alternative would use rotating space colonies that produce Earth gravity and are radiation shielded. The attractive fantasy of reproducing terrestrial ecology in space should be replaced by the idea of building a closed system based on advancing technology such as artificial photosynthesis. Past mistaken projects include growing plants for food to replicate terrestrial food sources, recovering small amounts of water from difficult to process waste to achieve high system closure, and using newly designed, lighter, but unreliable hardware to reduce launch mass. The political process supporting the false assumptions, projects, and vision has deliberately prevented the usual systems engineering and cost-benefit analysis. We are going to do much better.

Harry W. Jones↗

NASA NTRS2002

Uncertainties in Estimates of the Risks of Late Effects from Space Radiation

The health risks faced by astronauts from space radiation include cancer, cataracts, hereditary effects, and non-cancer morbidity and mortality risks related to the diseases of the old age. Methods used to project risks in low-Earth orbit are of questionable merit for exploration missions because of the limited radiobiology data and knowledge of galactic cosmic ray (GCR) heavy ions, which causes estimates of the risk of late effects to be highly uncertain. Risk projections involve a product of many biological and physical factors, each of which has a differential range of uncertainty due to lack of data and knowledge. Within the linear-additivity model, we use Monte-Carlo sampling from subjective uncertainty distributions in each factor to obtain a Maximum Likelihood estimate of the overall uncertainty in risk projections. The resulting methodology is applied to several human space exploration mission scenarios including ISS, lunar station, deep space outpost, and Mar's missions of duration of 360, 660, and 1000 days. The major results are the quantification of the uncertainties in current risk estimates, the identification of factors that dominate risk projection uncertainties, and the development of a method to quantify candidate approaches to reduce uncertainties or mitigate risks. The large uncertainties in GCR risk projections lead to probability distributions of risk that mask any potential risk reduction using the "optimization" of shielding materials or configurations. In contrast, the design of shielding optimization approaches for solar particle events and trapped protons can be made at this time, and promising technologies can be shown to have merit using our approach. The methods used also make it possible to express risk management objectives in terms of quantitative objective's, i.e., the number of days in space without exceeding a given risk level within well defined confidence limits.

Cucinotta, F. A.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Commercial Crew Development Environmental Control and Life Support System Status

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) Project was a short term Project that was managed within the Commercial Crew and Cargo Program Office (C3PO) to help develop and demonstrate a small number of key human spaceflight capabilities in support of moving towards a possible commercial crew transportation system to low earth orbit (LEO). It was intended to foster entrepreneurial activities with a few selected companies. The other purpose of the Project was to try to reduce some of the possible risk with a commercial crew transportation system to LEO. The entrepreneurial activities were encouraged with these few selected companies by NASA providing only part of the total funding to complete specific tasks that were jointly agreed to by NASA and the company. These joint agreements were documented in a Space Act Agreement (SAA) that was signed by NASA and the company. This paper will provide an overview of the CCDev Project and it will also discuss in detail the Environmental Control and Life Support (ECLS) tasks that were performed under CCDev.

Williams, David E.↗

NASA NTRS2005

Safety and Mission Assurance Performance Metric

The safety and mission assurance (S&MA) performance metric is a method that provides a process through which the managers of a large, complex program can readily understand and assess the accepted risk, the problems, and the associated reliability of the program. Conceived for original use in helping to assure the safety and success of the International Space Station (ISS) program, the S&MA performance metric also can be applied to other large and complex programs and projects. The S&MA-performance-metric data products comprise one or more tables (possibly also one or more graphs) that succinctly display all of the information relevant (and no information that is irrelevant) to management decisions that must be made to assure the safety and success of a program or project, thereby facilitating such decisions.

Holsomback, Jerry↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Modeling NASA’s Procedural Requirement Processes - Implications for Digital Future

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has an ongoing Digital Transformation effort and to leverage and showcase the power of Digital Transformation, an effort is underway to develop an integrated, datacentric, model representing NASA’s key process requirements. The task was divided into three phases: As Is modeling, Analysis, and To Be Planning. As part of this effort, a team has completed the first Phase I of the modeling task and is nearing completion of the second phase. This effort will capture the key elements as requirements, responsibilities, allocations, roles, products, and associated lifecycle elements. The scope of modeling included NASA’s NPR 7120.5 (Project and Program Management), NPR 7123.1 (Systems Engineering) and NPRs 8705.2 (Risk classification for Robotic Missions) and 8705.4 (Human-Rating Requirements for Space Missions). This paper will summarize the approach, scope, parsing patterns applied, metamodel, and associated workflows for the As-Is modeling. It will also summarize the results and insights gleaned during that phase, including the review process. These insights have informed the analysis and will be discussed. The analysis modeling phase will also be summarized including how the stakeholders were engaged, how the common elements were handled and dispositioned, and will also describe some of the plans for the future of NASA NPDs and NPRs.

Systems Engineering↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Modeling NASA’s Procedural Requirement Processes – Implications for a Digital Future

NPR↗

NASA NTRS2024

NASA Engineering and Safety Center Lunar Rover Design Concepts Assessments

Mass is a significant risk to programs and projects as they transition from formulation to implementation, especially in larger human space systems where delivery mass or volume can be a constrained commodity. • Concepts developed without an adequate systems-engineering basis, including design and operations experience, may miss significant functionality and subsequent mass required for integration or operations. • Further uncertainty can be associated with not fully understanding design best practices and standards that drive mass, such as design for minimum risk or fault tolerance.1 • Finally, the appropriate systems engineering mass properties management rigor and technical discipline insight are required to set the mass baseline, including appropriate mass growth allowance (MGA) to ensure program success. Mass is a key quantity that should be constantly monitored by the systems engineer and the program/project management stakeholder to ensure mission compatibility throughout the project life cycle. In addition, mass is a key programmatic performance metric monitored by the NASA Chief Financial Officer for current and future program cost estimating. NASA Exploration Systems sought an assessment of reasonableness with respect to different potential rover concepts that balances mass needs and human-class cargo lander capabilities. Appropriate systems engineering mass properties management rigor and technical discipline insight were used, and are required to set the mass baseline, including appropriate MGA to ensure program success. Two independent Lunar rover concepts were evaluated, with a goal to understand concept credibility and the Lunar rover designs potential extensibility for Mars surface operations. A notional generic rover concept is shown in Figure 1.

Systems Engineering↗

NASA NTRS2010

Engineering Innovations for Exploration Challenges

This slide presentation reviews some of the engineering innovations requirements for the challenges of space exploration which NASA has and will be involved in. It reviews some significant successes in space transportation, exploration and science accomplished during 2009, and it reviews some of the places that are available for exploration in the near term and the specific missions that NASA has assigned to Marshall. It also reviews the project lifecycle management model, that is designed to reduce undefined, but known, risks. It also demonstrates the sustainable long-term program of block upgrades that contribute to long-term success of programs.

Dumbacher, Daniel L.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Space Program Advocacy Can Distort Project Management and Damage Systems Engineering

Over-optimistic project advocacy often causes exaggerated performance claims and underestimated costs and schedules. This can distort project management and damage systems engineering. NASA projects such as the space shuttle and Hubble are extreme examples. NASA's spectacular success in the Apollo moon landings seems to have produced overconfidence and carelessness, but also to have gained tolerance for unrealistic claims and forgiveness when they were proven wrong. Apollo risk analysis predicted many astronaut fatalities. This was believed but was potentially damaging to the Apollo program, so risk analysis was discontinued. The moon landings beat bad odds because Apollo obsessively reduced risk. Its success seemed to confirm that risk analysis was unreasonably pessimistic and that risk could be overcome by good engineering. This understanding caused risk to be increased during space shuttle engineering and led to an unnecessarily dangerous approach. The shuttle design placed a fragile spacecraft next to the fuel tanks and failed to provide crew escape or launch abort. These design decisions directly caused the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. After Challenger, risk analysis was re-established. The current rocket and capsule design does consider risk and the result strongly resembles Apollo. Apollo advocacy led NASA to abandon risk analysis and this was ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies. Excessive advocacy that distorts risk, cost, and schedule could be prevented in an ideal organization that used systems engineering to make rational and fair decisions. However, most real organizations accommodate human and group needs using informal methods often described as "the system." Humans have biases, use innate decision making heuristics, instinctively rely on "gut feel," and establish deviant groups through groupthink. Expecting organizations to become totally rational is impractical, but specific problems such as neglecting risk and underestimating cost and schedule can be directly challenged with some hope of success.

Jones, Harry W.↗